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Abstract 
Based on 15 months of fieldwork in three Basarwa villages on the northern periphery of the 
Okavango Delta, Botswana, this thesis is a study of the indeterminate yet universally 
powerful notion of `development'. It explores the dynamics, meanings and implications of 
different local and national conceptions of what `development' in this area should entail, and 
focuses on efforts by Basarwa to fashion a better `life' for themselves, as well as on the 
policies and programmes of various agencies of the Botswana government. 
Basarwa have attracted much anthropological interest, which has often been based on 
assumptions as to their status as ̀ hunter-gatherers'. This author instead views their ethnicity 
as a key set of symbols and practices, which have structured the nature of their participation 
in official development programmes. He contextualises contemporary development 
interventions within the framework of a much longer historical process of alienation from 
political and economic processes in the region. Of particular importance has been their loss of 
control over land and wildlife, central markers of their ethnicity. 
The principle context in which these themes are explored is the Community Based Natural 
Resource Management (CBNRM) programme, an initiative increasingly common to African 
governments, that claims to decentralise management of natural resources to rural residents. 
Despite these aims, the author shows that in practice CBNRM on the Okavango fringe has so 
far served in certain ways to achieve exactly the opposite. Nonetheless, many Basarwa have 
taken the introduction of CBNRM as an opportunity to reverse the trend of alienation by 
asserting their rights to land and the resources on it, as well as the power to manage them 
according to their own priorities. In bringing the themes of ethnicity and development 
together, the author concludes by suggesting means by which CBNRM could better 
accommodate local-level diversity, and be used to meet the overlapping goals of the 
government, tourism, conservation, and Basarwa themselves. 
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A note on orthography 
The Bugakhwedam and Ts'exadam orthography I use in this thesis has four basic clicks that 
are represented as: 
/ Dental fricative (same as the Nguni `c') 
Alveolar stop (no Nguni symbol) 
Lateral fricative (same as Nguni `x') 
Palatal stop (same as Nguni `q') 
Each of these clicks may be combined with consonants to vary their sound, so that: 
h aspirates the click 
g voices the click 
n nasalises the click 
x releases the click on a velar fricative 
q pharangylisation of the vowel following the click 
Other sounds include: 
xa velar fricative, as in the Scottish ̀ loch' 
q uvular stop 
Bugakhwedam and Tsexadam are tonal languages, but, as this is not a linguistically technical 
document, I have ommitted the use of accents. 
A number of different languages find their way into this thesis. To assist the reader, Khoisan 
languages (which include Bugakhwedam, Ts'exadam, and Ju/'hoan) are written in bold 
italics, and Bantu languages (which include Setswana and Shiyei) are written in italics. Latin 
names are underlined. 
The most commonly-used language of northern Botswana is Setswana, in which the prefix 
that is attached to the root determines the form of the word. The following forms thus exist of 
the root -tswana, for example: 
Motswana: a person from Botswana (sing. ) 
Botswana: people from Botswana (pl. ) 
Setswana: language or culture of Batswana people 
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My fieldwork for this thesis began in Khwai, a small village in northern Ngamiland District in 
Botswana, in May 1996. The people of Khwai are Basarwa, also known as `Bushmen' or 
`San', most famous for their heritage of hunting and gathering. My visit to Khwai coincided 
with a momentous event in the history of Ngamiland. In an unprecedented move, the 
Department for Animal Health and Production, with the assistance of the Botswana Defence 
Force, had just begun slaughtering every single one of the 305 000 cattle in Ngamiland. This 
was the head-on assault on Contagious Bovine Pleuropneumonia (CBPP), or cattle lung 
disease, that the government had judged necessary to contain the threat CBPP posed to the 
national beef industry: mainstay to the rural economy, as well as to the personal fortunes of 
many senior government officials. Most of Ngamiland was in a state of near shock as people 
who had spent lifetimes building up their herds of cattle lost them in the space of a few hours. 
Dithlobolo di a lela ('the guns are crying out') was a constant refrain in Maun, as cattle- 
owners faced the slaughter with disbelief. A few months previously I had been present at a 
small settlement near the Tsodilo Hills in western Ngamiland when the Minister of 
Agriculture arrived in his helicopter to convey the message that their cattle would have to be 
killed. One elderly man I knew who had little else in material possessions other than the 400 
cattle he had built up over the last five decades stood up and told the Minister that he might as 
well shoot his children; these cattle were his life's work. They spared his children, but shot 
his cattle. 
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Yet on that weekend in Khwai, the mood could not have been more different. They were 
holding a village-wide workshop to discuss the content of the constitution for their proposed 
Community Trust. This would be a legal entity representing their village, which would be the 
first step in allowing their entry into the new Community Based Natural Resource 
Management (CBNRM) programme. CBNRM was a government initiative claiming to 
decentralise conservation management by combining conservation and development 
programmes for people who lived in rural areas, such as Khwai. Thirty-two years previously, 
the first residents of Khwai had been removed from their village which fell within the 
boundaries of the new Moremi Game Reserve and dumped in their present position, on the 
northern border of the Reserve. By the end of the 1980s, their position again became tenuous, 
as representatives of some government departments told them that their village fell within a 
`wildlife area' and would again have to be moved. However, by the time of their workshop in 
May 1996, they seemed to finally have some security of tenure. In 1995 they had sent a 
delegation to Gaborone to meet with the Minister of Local Government and Lands, who 
promised them that they would be allocated the land on which their village was situated once 
they registered a Community Trust. 
The optimism was palpable as, with the help of an advisor from Gaborone, they discussed the 
issues one by one that they wanted to include in the constitution of their Community Trust. 
During a break in the proceedings, the conversation turned to the cattle slaughter that was 
happening elsewhere in Ngamiland (the area around Khwai had been zoned a Wildlife 
Management Area, and so was stock-free), and their attitude to it was markedly different from 
that of most people in their district. Sitting nearby was a driver who had brought the Remote 
Area Development Officer to the workshop. He was not a Mosarwa, but a Moyei, the 
numerically dominant ethnic category in Ngamiland, who are commonly regarded as 
pastoralists and agriculturalists. `God has seen our plight, and helped us', they joked with 
him, `We are now in a better position than you because you have lost your animals, but we 
still have ours'. Apart from being a friendly jibe, this was both a statement of similarity (we 
all herd animals) and one of difference (you herd cattle, but we `herd' wildlife). In the face of 
government policies that had progressively restricted their access to wildlife and at the same 
time boosted the cattle industry, it appeared that the tables were turning. Perhaps ethnic 
categories were in their thoughts as one of the points they had decided to stress in the 
constitution was that the Khwai Community Trust would be specifically for the benefit of 
Basarwa. 
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Little did the workshop participants realise in those days of optimism that their clauses on 
ethnicity would block the registration of their constitution, one factor among several that 
would keep them from embarking on CBNRM for the next four years. This thesis is in part 
about that struggle. It is about the hopes and aspirations of Basarwa in northern Ngamiland, 
and strategies they used in attempting to shape their livelihoods. It is about the interaction 
between Basarwa and various arms of the state in negotiating the form and content of 
`development', particularly in the context of CBNRM, and it is about the role of ethnicity in 
structuring relationships between Basarwa, their neighbours and the state. 
Introduction to Ngamiland 
The district of Ngamiland, which encompasses the northwestern section of Botswana, is 
dominated by a unique geographical feature. In an and country where the sandy riverbeds that 
carve their courses through the barely undulating terrain usually only see water for a couple of 
weeks per year, Ngamiland has as its heart a huge complex of perennial waterways and 
seasonal floodplains, known as the Okavango Delta. Fed by abundant rainfall in the highlands 
of Angola, the Okavango River flows into the northwestern corner of Botswana. As it hits the 
flatness of the northern Kalahari, it fans out to form a vast inland delta. The upper portion of 
this 16,000 square kilometre delta - which in all covers a third of the district - is a network of 
perennial channels, swamp and reedbeds (Plate 1.1). Its extremities are patterned by a 
patchwork of channels, open grass plains, and tree islands, maintained by the annual flood 
that arrives six months after the summer rains in Angola to refresh a landscape that is by then 
in the middle of its dry winter. 
The Okavango Delta dominates Ngamiland not only topographically, but economically as 
well. Being a consistent water source, it has for millennia provided for the needs of people 
and wildlife alike during the long dry season, when it typically does not rain for eight months 
(or longer during the periodic droughts). Most of the large mammals disperse into the 
surrounding sandveld during the rainy season to take advantage of the abundant grazing, but 
are forced back to Delta once the rain-filled waterholes in the sandveld dry up. The original 
inhabitants of Ngamiland - ancestors of those known today as Basarwa - lived largely in the 
sandveld, but followed the animals, on whom they depended, to the waters of the Delta each 
dry season. Some Basarwa made the waterways of the Delta their permanent home, as did 
many Bayei, the first Bantu-speakers in known history to have migrated into the region, who 
did so from about 1750 (Tlou 1985: 12-14). Over the next century, the politically ascendant 
Batawana arrived in Ngamiland, as well as other less politically organised groups of Bantu- 
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speakers. Infestation of tsetse fly' through much of the Delta, however, kept most of these 
immigrants and their stock to its peripheries. 
Much more recently, the Okavango Delta has become the base for a thriving tourist industry. 
The first professional hunters moved there from East Africa in 1962, but it was not until the 
1990s that the industry (both photographic and hunting) boomed, becoming the largest 
employer in Ngamiland. Through the 1990s, tourism in Botswana grew in economic terms at 
an average of 11.5 percent per year (GOB 1997a: 38), anchored in the Okavango Delta and 
neighbouring Chobe (Map 1.2). Increasingly important to sustain this growing industry has 
been the maintenance of national parks and game reserves, which form the core area for 
photographic safaris, although many photographic safaris - and all hunting safaris - take 
place outside the unfenced parks and reserves. Chobe National Park was created in 1960, and 
Moremi Game Reserve (which now encompasses one third of the Delta) in 1963, both of 
which were subsequently extended over the next two decades. 
The bulk of my field research for this thesis was undertaken between June 1997 and August 
1998, although my work as a research officer with the National Museum of Botswana had 
taken me to Khwai and other villages of northern Ngamiland several times in the preceding 
years. For the 1997-8 period of fieldwork, Katrin (my wife) and I made Maun, the district 
capital, our base. Maun gave an impression not too dissimilar from the familiar celluloid 
images of a Wild West boomtown, its dusty streets filled with modern-day cowboys whose 
trusty steeds were instead shiny four-wheel drive trucks. Ngamiland's tourist boom centred on 
Maun, and a host of entrepreneurs were arriving to take advantage of its opportunities. People 
from all over Ngamiland were also applying for plots on which to build a home that would 
provide a base from which to look for employment, as well as to gain access to schooling and 
the local hospital. Likewise, Maun became our base of convenience for the next fifteen 
months, although I spent most of my time in the northern sandveld of Ngamiland. This is the 
name by which I refer to the large arc of riverless land covered by the sand mantle of the 
Kalahari, in northern Ngamiland. It is bounded to the south by the Okavango Delta, to the 
north by the Caprivi Strip and the Linyanti and Kwando river systems, and to the east by 
Chobe National Park (Map 1.2). 
' Tsetse fly (Glossina morsitans transmits a trypanosome causing sleeping sickness in people, and the 
fatal disease nagana in livestock. It does not affect wildlife. 
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Plate 1.1: Okavango Delta from the air. 
Plate 1.2: Mokgwati (from near Gudigwa) at his home in Maun. 

The northern sandveld covers about 15,000 square kilometres, but appears as a blank space on 
most maps of Botswana. It contains three permanent villages, although even these are usually 
omitted from maps of the region. It was in these three villages - Khwai, Mababe and Gudigwa 
- that, alongside Maun, I carried most of my research. Gudigwa is almost a full day's drive 
from Maun, stuck on the end of a line of villages that dot the northern edge of the Delta. 
Khwai and Mababe would be equally isolated were it not for the tourist routes that now pass 
through their villages. Khwai is situated on the northern border of Moremi Game Reserve, at 
the transit point for traffic between Moremi and Chobe, and Mababe is on the same route 
several kilometres from the southern border of Chobe National Park (Map 1.2). Local 
memories, confirmed by written records of travellers from the mid-nineteenth century, reveal 
that, until the mid-twentieth century, much of this sandveld was dotted with small and 
transient villages. In the nineteenth century, many of these inhabitants were Bantu-speaking 
refugees, fleeing from their own despotic leaders to the north, or from the upheavals caused 
by the difagane2 to the east and south. This was not an environment that encouraged large 
permanent settlements. The constantly changing hydrology of the Delta, periodic droughts, 
the waxing and waning of the belt of tsetse infestation, and wildlife movements, all 
encouraged flexible settlement patterns. The most flexible were Basarwa, whose habitation 
predated the Bantu-immigrants, and who remained after the last of them were driven away by 
the extending tsetse belt in the 1950s. 
Mababe is the oldest of these villages. The ancestors of its present residents were noted in the 
annals of hunters such as Selous (1893), who were attracted by its famed wildlife populations. 
However, it was not until the early twentieth century that the village became a semi- 
permanent site at the southern end of the Mababe Depression, returned to in most years at the 
beginning of the rainy season. Khwai village was formed in 1964, the core of which was an 
extended family that was moved out of the recently proclaimed Moremi Game Reserve. Over 
time they were joined by relatives who had lived in the area between them and Gudigwa. 
Gudigwa has only existed in its present position since 1988, made up of Basarwa who had 
lived scattered throughout a large section of the northern sandveld. They were brought 
together by the government with the promise that if they aggregated they would be provided 
with basic services -a promise that was as yet unfulfilled a decade later. During my 
fieldwork, Mababe had a population of about 290, Khwai 360 and Gudigwa 600. 
2 Difagane (or mfeqane in Nguni languages) is the name given to a period of upheaval in the early 
nineteenth century, particularly the 1820s and 1830s, triggered in part by the expansion of the Zulu 
kingdom. The resulting wars and population movements affected much of southern Africa. 
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Although the residents of Mababe, Khwai and Gudigwa find themselves in similar contexts to 
Basarwa throughout Botswana in many respects, their situation is fundamentally different in 
two ways. Firstly, their villages have no non-Basarwa residents (with the exception on one 
family in Khwai). Elsewhere in Botswana, apart from a few small settlements, Basarwa 
generally live either on the peripheries of other people's villages, or in government-created 
settlements where they may constitute the numerical majority, but are dominated 
economically and politically by resident non-Basarwa. Secondly, the competition they face 
over land in their region is currently with the government and tourist industry alone, and not 
with cattle-keepers. This has been largely due to the presence of tsetse fly, and more recently 
the designation of large parts of the northern sandveld as Wildlife Management Areas, both 
factors that preclude the keeping of stock. 
`Basarwa' is the Setswana word their neighbours, the government (and now often they 
themselves) use to refer to the category of people whose main markers of difference from 
dominant society include: a foraging past; speaking a Khoisan, rather than a Bantu, language; 
and material poverty. An estimated 50,000 people who live in Botswana carry this label, and a 
similar number are spread through Namibia, South Africa, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Angola. 
This category, however, encompasses five broad linguistic families, and over ten distinct 
languages, all of whom have their own labels for themselves (Barnard 1992a: 22-27). 
Batswana refer to Basarwa who live near the permanent channels of the Delta, such as at 
Khwai, as Basarwa ba noka, or `River Bushmen', and those who live in the sandveld as 
Basarwa ba motlhaba, or `Sand Bushmen'. The people of Khwai and Gudigwa call 
themselves Bugakhwe (Boga means ̀ dry country', to their neighbours, the //Anikhwe) and 
Mababe Ts'exa. Bugakhwe and Handakhwe speak related, but distinct, Khwe languages (Fig. 
2.1). Khwe in these languages means ̀ person', and they often refer to themselves by this 
overarching term, orXukhwe, and their own language as Xukhwedam (dam means ̀tongue'). 
Bugakhwe and Handakhwe have nicknames for each other as well: Mababe often call their 
neighbours from Khwai //'Amdzira (thorn monkeys), and Khwai reciprocate with the name 
Ts'exa, which has gained more common usage than other names of origin, despite its 
pejorative meaning (Ts'ii xa - `large buttocks'). As aggregations of bands that several 
generations ago lived more often apart than together, Bugakhwe and Ts'exa have a number of 
other names of origin as well, which are listed in Appendix One. ̀ San' and ̀ Bushmen' are not 
labels they use of themselves. 
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Plate 1.4: Ts'ima Thamaga, headman of Gudigwa. 
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Plate 1.3: Kebuelemang Kgosietsile, headman of Mababe. 
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The difficulty in finding an appropriate name for Basarwa reflects both the propensity for 
outsiders to categorise and label these people, as well as the contradictions inherent in giving 
a single label to such a varied category of people. The most commonly used umbrella term 
within Botswana is `Basarwa', which I use here. This term, however, has no meaning outside 
Botswana, nor to many Western observers, so I use `Bushmen' when referring to wider 
representations of people who carry this label. 3 To further compound the contradictions of 
such classifications, Bugakhwe and Ts'exa defy the neat distinction in the minds of many 
people between black Bantu-speakers with negroid characteristics and short, yellow skinned 
Khoisan-speakers. In common with most Khwe-speaking Basarwa who live on the northern 
and eastern fringes of the Kalahari, they generally look physiologically similar to their Bantu- 
speaking neighbours, being tall and dark skinned. Western observers have tended to call such 
people `Black Bushmen', although locally this is a misnomer, as `black people' is used by 
Khwe-speakers to refer to their non-Basarwa neighbours (despite Bantu-speakers often hardly 
being any blacker than themselves). If speaking in terms of colour, they refer to themselves as 
`red people', or if they wanted to differentiate between themselves and shorter, lighter- 
skinned Basarwa, they refer to themselves as `tall Basarwa'. 
Life, land and power in the northern sandveld of Ngamiland 
Following in the footsteps of over 130 researchers to have worked with `Bushmen' over the 
last century (Hudelson 1995: 4), my research took me into a field with a substantial academic 
literature. Yet, my interests differed from those of much of this body of work in two 
important respects. Firstly, I place myself within a more recent initiative to undertake research 
with Basarwa on the margins of the Kalahari, and also marginal to the general stereotypes of 
`Bushmen' built by the early and influential ethnographies of Ju/'hoansi in particular (e. g. 
Marshall 1976, Lee 1979). Failing to conform to prevalent stereotypes, such `marginal' 
Basarwa have attracted relatively little academic interest until recently (with the notable 
exception of Guenther [1986, etc. ]. Recent examples are the monographs by Suzman (1997) 
on the Ju/'hoan farmworkers of eastern Namibia, and by Widlok (1999) on Hai//om 
in 
northern Namibia). Other than Köhler's extensive research with Khwe-speakers in the Caprivi 
Strip of Namibia (1989-), virtually nothing has been written about Khwe-speakers around the 
Okavango Delta (except for several brief monographs by Heinz [n. d. ]). 
3 Ideally, I would refer to residents of the northern sandveld as 'Khwe' in my text, to distinguish 
between them and the many other people known by the label `Basarwa'. However, a three-tiered 
system of nomenclature, with 'Bushmen' for southern Africa as a whole, `Basarwa' for Botswana, and 
'Khwe' for the northern sandveld would be stretching the limits of coherence. Also, while I stress that 
the situation of Basarwa in the northern sandveld is in many ways unique, there are important wider 
commonalities implied by the label Basarwa, not least the ways in which it structurally positions the 
bearers of the name in the social and political landscape of Botswana. 
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The second respect in which my research with Basarwa was in a different mould from that of 
much of my predecessors was in my research interests. Rather than framing Basarwa in terms 
of cultural patterns associated with a hunting and gathering past (or of their antithesis; a 
foraging underclass created by relations of capital), I was interested in the contemporary 
experiences of ethnic categorisations, and the locally ascribed values and meanings associated 
with carrying the label `Mosarwa'. I started my research from the assumption that the label 
Basarwa, or its singular form Mosarwa, is not simply descriptive of a group of people who 
display - or have until recently displayed - socio-economic systems and practices associated 
with a foraging lifestyle, such as sharing, egalitarianism and nomadism. I instead took this 
label as defining political spaces of policy and negotiation (or lack of), and the power 
relations within these spaces. In other words, how the values and practices associated with 
being Mosarwa, which could include practices such as foraging (and it becomes 
inconsequential that some of these may no longer be practised), structure relations between 
Basarwa and others in an environment where `Mosarwa' is a highly value-laden term. From 
this perspective, one of the most defining features of Basarwa is their shared experience of 
subjugation and poverty. 4 This did not preclude my interest in the classical anthropological 
institutions that my predecessors have already documented for Basarwa elsewhere, such as 
land tenure, leadership and kinship. Nonetheless, my interest in these institutions was 
inasmuch as they related to present struggles to gain access to land, resources and political 
authority. 
I soon realised from my fieldwork that local struggles were most often related to control over 
natural resources, particularly land. The primary context in which these struggles took place 
was the official Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) programme. 
CBNRM initiatives were being introduced in an array of rural areas in southern and eastern 
Africa, and Ngamiland was no exception. I found that in the northern sandveld, CBNRM was 
becoming an arena in which the central issue of control over land and resources as Basarwa 
was being negotiated. In some senses, the issues Basarwa faced in the introduction of 
CBNRM were common to rural dwellers throughout Botswana. But their situation as 
Basarwa (whether or not they are actually hunter-gatherers), within a dominant economy of 
° Guenther (1986) and Saugestad (1998: 61-2) have made the same observation. These are two scholars 
whose research interests parallel my own, although their approaches are somewhat different. Guenther 
stresses the `continuity' of Sesarwa cultural forms, while my concern is more with the contemporary 
dynamics (particularly of inequality) in which practices, ideas and narratives associated with culture are 
formed. Saugestad focuses on the relationship between Basarwa and the state, as I do. However, hers is 
largely a view from above, focusing mostly on political encounters in public arenas. Mine is more from 
below, exploring the local-level nature of such encounters. 
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pastoralists, added an additional layer to their struggles. I argue that in a large part ethnicity 
has structured the relationship between Basarwa and those with political power, being the 
central logic in maintaining, and challenging, various forms of domination. It is also the lens 
through which problems - and their solutions - are often codified locally, thus making it a 
key axis of difference. Nonetheless, it will become evident through the many narratives 
reproduced in this thesis that a wide range of perspectives on ethnicity and identity emerge 
from among Basarwa themselves, which highlight the many other (internal and external) axes 
of difference, as well as the contradictory experiences of carrying the label ̀ Mosarwa'. 
The title of this thesis reflects the three key themes that emerged from my fieldwork; Life, 
land and power. 
Life: This thesis is above all about the ways in which people in the northern sandveld have 
attempted to shape their livelihoods. With its narrow implications of subsistence options, 
perhaps ̀ livelihoods' is not as good a word as a direct translation of botshelo, the Setswana 
word for `life'. `Looking for life' (go senka botshelo) was a common phrase used to 
encompass the multitude of actions, plans and aspirations, that go into making life better and 
easier, on a communal as well as individual basis. To take an example, Galenkitse was a man 
in his late thirties who I met one day in Mababe. Not recognising him as a usual resident, I 
asked him what had brought him there, to which he answered: 
We move around our relatives looking for life, and, when we find it, we stay there a 
while. 
He called himself a Mosarwa - it didn't matter to him whether he was Ts'exa, Danisani or Shua 
- `we are all of the same womb', he told me. He was born around Puduhudu, grew up 
in Motopi, 
then moved with his parents to Xhana, before moving around the district alone, his latest stop 
being Mababe. This contemporary form of `nomadism' is one aspect of the flexibility that 
residents of the northern sandveld have had to build into their lives in order to maximise their 
livelihood options. It also provides an example of the way in which institutions associated with 
Basarwa find new expressions and meanings in contemporary contexts. Considering how 
livelihoods are constituted involves not only the bread-and-butter issues of feeding oneself and 
one's family, but also the wider frameworks of meaning in which these strategies take place, 
which affect the legitimacy of different forms of `looking for life'. 
Land: Access to, and control over, land has become the central issue in negotiating the 
possibility of finding a secure ̀ life' in the northern sandveld. Basarwa have been steadily 
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alienated from the land on which they have lived, particularly through the creation of national 
parks and game reserves; a recurring theme in the way Basarwa talk about their present 
circumstances. Although not intended as such, CBNRM has been appropriated locally as an 
opportunity to reverse this alienation and assert land rights. 
Power: Contestation over land and the resources on it are by very definition questions of 
power. In an environment where the state attempts to control access to local resources, 
contesting these controls means entering into dialogue with the state. This has been a 
multifaceted struggle; one not only over resources themselves, but also a symbolic 
contestation over the values and meanings attached to resources, and the various activities 
associated with them, such as hunting. My focus is not on bureaucratic power alone, but on 
the individuals and groups whose actions crosscut, resist and reproduce the power relations of 
the state. Power and relations of inequality are an essential consideration in constructions of 
social difference. 
These three themes run as threads through this thesis, which engages primarily with two 
bodies of academic interest. The first is the large and varied body of scholarship that has 
made as its subject Bushmen or Basarwa. My interest in this sphere is in identity, which I 
define as a means of defining relations of difference with categorical others. This thesis 
explores the conditions under which an identity as ̀ Basarwa' has become salient, and the role 
of narratives of identity in contestation over resources, particularly in asserting a sense of 
autonomy and legitimacy in the face of dominant laws and values. The second body of 
interest is development, specifically the volume of literature that has been produced in the past 
decade on CBNRM. CBNRM initiatives are usually assessed in terms of their efficacy in 
achieving more effective local-level conservation. My prime interest instead is what CBNRM 
does as a development programme, and how it is used as a tool to both extend and challenge 
local manifestations of state power. Most stakeholders in the northern sandveld have a belief 
in the necessity and good of `development', but there are crucial epistemological gaps in what 
the concept means to different people (cf. Robertson 1984: 4, Abram 1998: 4). Concepts of 
development are bound up in government agendas, issues of identity, and, increasingly 
explicitly, land. This thesis is thus simultaneously a study of identity and of `development', 
their epistemology and their politics, and how these processes have been played out in a 
remote corner of Botswana. 
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Anthropology, representation and the Kalahari 
The University of Edinburgh, from where I write this thesis, has in its Anatomy department a 
little-publicised collection of human skulls, head casts, and skeletons. These were collected 
from around the world during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by the Phrenological 
Society, a pseudo-scientific society that specialised in the curious task of inferring mental 
faculties from the morphology of skulls. Among this bizarre collection are several 
`Boschiesmans' from southern Africa. One of these skulls is accompanied by a folded piece 
of paper that purports to bear the title of its original inhabitant: ̀ Matroos the Boschiesman'. In 
the same collection lies another Bushmen skull simply labelled 'Robber'. The accompanying 
notes of the Phrenological Journal and Miscellany (Phrenological Society 1832: 68) reveal 
that Robber's skull was presented to the Society by Mr Thomas Pringle of Cape Town in 
1824. It goes on to explain what was deduced about the character of Robber from his skull: 
The skull was sent to Edinburgh to be examined, and the character of the hapless 
individual to be inferred by a Mr Simpson... ̀ The organisation is essentially savage, and 
the character, with occasional gleams of kindliness and sagicity, would be almost 
entirely animal... etc. ' (ibid. ) 
What the Phrenological Society deduced of the character of Matroos the Boschiesman 
remains unknown. However, unfolding the piece of paper that accompanies his skull reveals a 
remarkable testimony, entitled, ̀ The Dying Confession of Matroos the Boschiesman': 
I was a free Boschiesman. Born in Boschiesmans land. My name is Matroos, engiven to 
me by one of my first masters. I was in the service of several Cattle Farmers along the 
Borders of the [Cape] Colony at the New Plantation but never would enslave myself to 
any of them, leaving their service and wandering about - preferring an independent life 
to servitude. I went marauding and murdering through the country and for a long time I 
escaped punishment. But at length stealing some horses from the Farmers I was pursued 
and surrounded, but scorned to surrender myself though repeatedly called upon to do so. 
I defended myself with my Assegais [spears] and poisoned arrows as long as I had any 
left, and then made an obstinate resistance by hurling stones at my Pursuers, but at 
length I was mortally wounded, and am now dying, being as I believe only about 18 
Years of Age. 
Agter Sneuberg 182- 
Overleaf, it explains that: 
This statement was drawn up by Major Rogers, Guardian of Slaves, who accompanied 
Justice Burton on the Circuit, when the skull of Matroos was presented to him at Graaf 
Reniet 
W. M. Ford 
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This reminder, from a very different time and a very different place than the northern 
sandveld of Ngamiland in the closing decades of the twentieth century, nevertheless starkly 
demonstrates some of the key issues that continue to haunt - albeit in a more subtle way - 
representations of people now more commonly known as Bushmen or Basarwa. In the early 
years of the nineteenth century, characterising such people as ̀ savage' and ̀ animal-like' was 
essential to ideologically justify the hunting parties that massacred so many thousands of 
Bushmen, like `Robber' and `Matroos', along the expanding colonial frontiers of southern 
Africa. However, as Europe's empires continued to spread, the image of Bushmen and other 
similarly classified `primitive people' gained the Rousseauian romanticism of the `noble 
savage' (Barnard 2000: 20-22). Savage, yes, but also living exemplars of an exotic lifestyle 
that Europeans had left behind millennia ago .5 Not only did their skulls and skeletons end up 
in Western collections of curiosities but some unfortunate victims were also skinned and 
stuffed, to be displayed alongside various other trophies (Robertson 1993). Others, such as 
`Klikko the dancing Bushman' (Parsons 1988), and Saartje Baartman the `Hottentot Venus' 
(Morris 1996), were brought to the fairgrounds of Europe to be displayed as live curiosities to 
satiate Europe's hunger for its self-defining inversion (cf. Mitchell 1994). 
The hidden vaults of some museum and university collections are one of the few reminders 
today of such obsessions, no longer considered appropriate in today's societies - African or 
Western. Yet there remain some continuities. Basarwa continue to occupy a unique position 
in the imagination of both Western and African observers, a position that is conceptually 
different from the other longstanding inhabitants of southern Africa. They have also 
continued to draw unparalleled interest from Western researchers, giving credence to the 
proverbial joke that you were more likely to bump into an anthropologist than a Bushman in 
the Kalahari. They have found themselves as the object of raging academic debates about the 
nature of their - and our - past, as well as being used as fodder to justify or break down 
different paradigms to which, like clay, they have been moulded. 
Basarwa have without doubt been an icon to anthropologists who otherwise share very little 
common theoretical ground. Evolutionists have regarded Basarwa as a window to our stone- 
age past (e. g. Tobias 1978). The interests of structuralists have hinged on the implicit belief 
that their assumed pristineness and simplicity made them clear exemplars from which to study 
s The transition in western imagination of `Bushmen' from vermin on the colonial frontier to noble 
savages -a quintessential ̀ other' to the West - has been well documented (e. g. Guenther 1980, 
Tomaselli 1993, Wilmsen 1995a, b, Gordon 1992, Barnard 1996). 
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social, cultural and economic structures (e. g. Heinz 1994[1966]). For social ecologists, they 
have displayed a unique relationship with the environment (e. g. Tanaka 1980), and for world 
systems theorists they provided a trope of capitalist underdevelopment (e. g. Wilmsen 1989b). 
Experimental postmodernists (e. g. Shostak 1981) have used Basarwa to construct intensely 
personal narratives linking Western researcher with Mosarwa informant, and poststructuralists 
have found them an ideal example of the fictive reification of non-Western people in the 
West's own alter-ego. Of course, we no longer examine the morphology of skulls and make 
grand pronouncements on the characteristics of their erstwhile inhabitants. We may not have 
the pretension of the anonymous author of `The Dying Confession of Matroos the 
Boschiesman' to construct so blatantly a narrative of someone else's short and miserable life, 
and then attribute it to their own authorship. Yet how much are we still guilty of perpetuating 
the practice of creating images of our anthropological objects that are in a large part actually 
our own images? And how much control in shaping these images do those after whom we 
claim to fashion them actually have? 
This opens up some of the debates about representing other people's lives that fundamentally 
challenged the discipline of anthropology from the late 1970s (cf. Said 1979, Clifford 1983, 
Clifford and Marcus 1986). These are debates that the sub-discipline of hunter-gatherer 
studies has had to grapple with perhaps more deeply than many of its sister sub-disciplines. 
Aspects of these debates were brought to the fore by revisionist challenges (particularly 
Wilmsen 1989b, Wilmsen and Denbow 1990) to the long-hallowed assumptions that had 
underpinned much research in the Kalahari; that contemporary Bushmen represented a way of 
life that had been universal for much of humankind's history. The revisionist argument that 
Bushmen foragers were instead an underclass created by the rise and collapse of mercantile 
capital in the Kalahari in the second half of the nineteenth century stoked vociferous 
exchanges that came to be labelled as `the great Kalahari Debate' (Kuper 1993, Barnard 
1992b, 1996), the embers of which continue to glow a decade later. 
While some of the heat generated by the Kalahari Debate is yet to die down, it is evident that 
it prompted much soul-searching, especially by those who came to be labelled as 
`traditionalists', who as a result generally softened their quasi-isolationist stance (cf. Solway 
and Lee 1990, Lee 1992). Through all these perambulations, however, Basarwa have 
remained primarily icons of the past (Whyte 1995) to Western popular and academic thought. 
Debates as to whether they are `products or survivors of history' (Gordon and Spiegel 
1993: 89) has failed to lift many observers out of this rut, serving only to perpetuate the 
longstanding academic subjugation of Basarwa as a people of the past. Moreover, academic 
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arguments about how `we' understand `them' left very little space for exploring how Basarwa 
understand and represent themselves, a gap acknowledged by some longstanding Basarwa 
ethnographers (e. g. Barnard 1996: 247). By finally laying to rest the myth of the primitive 
isolate and bringing to the fore the contact situation between Basarwa, their neighbours, and 
capital, the stage has been set to carry research with Basarwa into the present. However, 
attempts to understand Basarwa ethnicity, society and economics in the context of 
contemporary socio-economic structures and relations of power have been remarkably 
scattered (although not absent), considering the volume of literature that continues to be 
produced on the Kalahari. 
Attempts to hear Basarwa voices themselves have also been remarkably scattered. ̀ The 
Bushmen were remarkably inarticulate, perhaps the most damning evidence of their 
powerlessness', notes Gordon (1992: 8) in his historical rewriting of the place of Bushmen in 
Namibian history. Basarwa voices may not be heard in libraries and national archives, but of 
course they are verbally as articulate, as anyone else. With a few recent and notable 
exceptions, such as Suzman (1997) who wrote extensively for his doctoral thesis on narratives 
by Ju/'hoansi in Omaheke, Namibia, of their own identity, Basarwa voices in print have been 
restricted to non-academic spheres, such as reports (e. g. Mogwe 1992, le Roux 1999) and the 
media. Academia is yet to allow itself to be significantly influenced by what Basarwa are 
saying about themselves, their identity, their history, their socio-economic and political 
contexts, and how they negotiate their presence (cf. Skotness [1996] on how others have 
negotiated their presence) in the physical and socio-political landscapes in which they live. 
For people whose own voices were so little heard, and who have been so heavily 
commoditised, both scientifically (Gordon 1992: 3) and economically (Buntman 1994, Whyte 
1995), it is all the more important that a new generation of research takes place with (rather 
than on) Basarwa, and according to priorities that they themselves define (cf. Lee 1992: 42). 
Re-conceptualising Basarwa in terms of their past 
Basarwa have found themselves the subjects of a discipline whose very interest in them has 
for the most part depended on their categorisation as ̀ hunter-gatherers'. In this sense, hunter- 
gatherer studies in the Kalahari became a self-sustaining and mutually informing academic 
`region', in which a body of anthropologists produced ethnographies that were reworked 
versions, inversions, and revisions of previous accounts (cf. Fardon 1990). In this manner, 
studies with Basarwa centred around their position as hunter-gatherers, a problematic that 
most research with Basarwa has been aimed at either supporting or challenging. Moving 
beyond these parameters involves rethinking the very terms by which we have come to 
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conceptualise Basarwa. In doing so, we are able to follow general theoretical shifts in social 
science: from harmonious social structure to contestation; from scientific regularity to 
idiosyncratic experience. As Albert (1997) has asserted from research with indigenous people 
in Amazonia, our focus needs to shift from the architecture of social units and symbolic forms 
that we associate with hunting and gathering, to the dynamics of cultural, social and political 
self-production. These are dynamics that need to be contextualised within historical 
transformations induced largely by the encroachment of the state. Removing Basarwa from 
the persistent image of apolitical societies existing in some premodern equilibrium (textbook 
examples of Wolf's [1982] `people without history') opens the possibility of analysis of social 
differentiation, change, and linkages to the larger political economy. 
Although Wilmsen's (1989b) revisionism was timely in its challenge to the assumptions that 
came with encapsulating Basarwa under ̀ hunter-gatherer' studies, he ignores the crucial issue 
of how Basarwa represent themselves, which is, at times, in terms of a hunting and gathering 
past. Contrary to the arguments of the revisionist critique, hunting and gathering therefore 
remains important to our analysis, but not in the traditionalist sense from its defining role in 
shaping a reified `Sesarwa culture'. The salience of hunting and gathering is more as a symbol 
that carries meaning to both Basarwa and their neighbours in the contemporary political 
economy of Botswana, especially considering contemporary experiences of dispossession and 
alienation from land and wildlife. This perspective leads us away from the hitherto dominant 
notion of a Sesarwa ̀culture' shaped by their status as hunter-gatherers, to one more in the 
sense expounded by Comaroff and Comaroff (1992: 27) as, ̀ the semantic space, the field of 
signs and practices, in which human beings construct and represent themselves and others, 
and hence their societies and histories'. Following their lead, Suzman (1997: 209) argues that, 
`hunter-gatherer studies in the new millennium should rather focus on how hunter-gatherer 
identities are appropriated, constructed and negotiated and, furthermore, how the imagery of 
the `hunter-gatherer' with its connotations of aboriginality and authenticity are invoked 
whether in the market place or the political arena'. 
I argue that the past is important in understanding Basarwa identities, not because they 
represent leftovers of a prehistoric way of life, but because contemporary contexts make 
`hunting and gathering' an important label of self-designation by Basarwa in certain contexts. 
Although thoroughly debunked in academic representations of Basarwa, primordialism thus 
paradoxically surfaces in the ways Basarwa represent themselves in terms of their own past. 
However, I avoid the sterile pursuits of either buying into or deconstructing these emic 
narratives (cf. Sharp 1996: 87), and instead focus on the role they play in identity formation 
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and mobilisation. The past is therefore of prime importance in considering representations of 
Basarwa, not because Basarwa are `people of the past' in any sense, but because the past is 
contentious, and can be mined for arguments about the present or future. 
Linking development and identity 
`Development', in its loosest sense, refers to efforts of planned social and economic change. 
Since the word was coined in this context in the post World War II reconstruction of Europe, 
its connotation of economic growth has proved remarkably pervasive among its myriad of 
implementers. Attempts to break out beyond a narrow economic agenda and link it with wider 
issues have stressed that the poverty it is attempting to address is as much about a loss of 
rights, freedom, culture, dignity and environment as low income. It was not until 1993, 
however, that the United Nations Development Programme's annual Human Development 
Report (UNDP 1993) explicitly stressed that quality of life is as important as quantity of 
economic growth. The contestation over whose priorities define quality of life, and thus the 
form and direction that `development' should take is a large part of this thesis. Such 
definitions are, needless to say, dependent on local values and meanings, and thus intimately 
tied to concepts of identity. 
However, the link between development and identity is deeper and more complex than this 
conception of development alone would suggest. The way in which people understand 
themselves and their place in the world affects priorities in development, but even more 
importantly, representations of people are also a means of exercising power. A well- 
developed literature exists on the power of development discourse, a form of representing and 
understanding people and geopolitical spaces that allows the exercise of power over them 
(e. g. Escobar 1995, Crush 1996, Peet and Watts 1996, Leys 1996, Gardner and Lewis 1996). 
However, this line of analysis has generally been applied on a global scale to relations 
between the so-called First and Third Worlds, and not to similar processes by `Third World' 
governments themselves on their own populations. 
Articulating with this form of power involves contesting discourses that justify and normalise 
inequality, thus becoming a cultural struggle: 
Productive inequalities become naturalised through cultural understandings of social 
hierarchy that encourage popular consent. On the other hand, struggles over symbolic 
processes are themselves conflicts over material relations of production, the distribution 
of resources in society and ultimately power... . Struggles over 
land and environmental 
resources are simultaneously struggles over cultural meanings (Moore 1993: 382-3). 
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These cultural meanings hinge on the construction of difference, making the struggle over 
development one that is in part a struggle over the content of difference, and the values 
associated with being different (cf. Arce and Long 1999). Development, as Escobar (1995: 15) 
notes, operates as (and not just in) an arena of cultural contestation and identity construction. 
Social movements struggle not only for goods and services - although these are crucial for 
people on the breadline - but also the very definition of life, economy, nature and society. In 
short, they face a cultural struggle. I therefore maintain a focus throughout this thesis on the 
simultaneity of material and symbolic struggles in development. 
A strength of the postmodern turn in critical development theory has been a vigorous focus on 
the diversity of local priorities in development. One of the harshest critics of the hegemonic 
discourses of conventional development, Arturo Escobar, suggests the importance of 
illuminating alternatives that challenge this hegemonic discourse. The nature of such 
alternatives, he argues, can be most fruitfully gleaned from the specific manifestations of such 
alternatives in concrete local settings: 
The deconstruction of development, coupled with the local ethnographies... can be 
important elements for a new type of visibility and audibility of forms of cultural 
difference and hybridisation (1995: 223). 
I regard this thesis as one such local ethnography. I follow Escobar's advice (1995: 16) that it 
is important that our texts do not just deconstruct development, but construct new ways of 
seeing and acting based on these local ethnographies. The milieu in which I endeavour to do 
this in the northern sandveld is the Community Based Natural Resource Management 
(CBNRM) Programme. 
Community Based Natural Resource Management 
Having only been implemented in earnest since the mid-1990s in Botswana, much of my 
analysis of CBNRM concerns its introduction into the villages of the northern sandveld, and 
the contestation that has occurred over what form it should take in these areas. CBNRM 
reflects a wider change in approaches to conservation that gathered pace during the 1990s. 
This new approach claims to reverse the `fortress' style of conservation that had become so 
prevalent, particularly in Africa, by allowing residents on the peripheries of parks and 
reserves to be directly involved in managing, and thus benefiting from, the natural resources 
in their vicinity. CBNRM is thus aimed at making local-level conservation more effective, 
while simultaneously promoting local-level development. In Botswana, the CBNRM 
programme made it possible for certain villages, including the villages of the northern 
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sandveld, to be allocated a pre-demarcated Controlled Hunting Area (CHA) with a 
predetermined annual wildlife offtake quota, which they could then use for their own benefit. 
While all potential beneficiaries of CBNRM face common issues in its implementation, these 
issues are more pronounced for Basarwa, whose history of marginalisation from authority 
over land accentuates their stakes in the CBNRM programme. In this sense, their context 
provides as it were a lens that magnifies and clarifies more general dynamics of CBNRM that 
non-Basarwa may prompt as well, albeit in not such a visible manner. 
In an article entitled Transforming rural hunters to conservationists, two proponents of 
CBNRM, Gibson and Marks (1995), extol the virtues of the shift to conservation approaches 
in southern Africa typified by CBNRM. Their approach rests on the principle that: 
Conservation policies will only work if local communities receive sufficient benefits to 
change their behaviour from taking wildlife to conserving it (1995: 944). 
From this viewpoint, the ideological assumptions that can underpin CBNRM-type 
programmes are clear. Local people (however they may be integrated into such programmes) 
form `communities', and without intervention they are `takers' of wildlife, but with 
intervention they can become `conservers' of wildlife. The carrot-and-stick approach implies 
that policy implementers, through providing suitable (assumedly monetary) benefits, are able 
to `transform' rural dwellers into conservationists. Yet, these statements are more than simply 
assumptions. By representing local people as being `takers of wildlife', they invite 
intervention. The form of their intervention is also facilitated by the existence of cohesive 
`communities' that can be moulded to adopt official priorities of conservation. This is one 
example of how a seemingly progressive programme like CBNRM can, under scrutiny, be 
seen to be little different from the paternalistic and centrist approaches to conservation and 
development that have preceded it. This thesis will demonstrate that the CBNRM programme 
in the northern sandveld delivers a decidedly limited form of decentralisation of management 
over resources. In fact, it has so far promoted the opposite; the extension of state power into 
an area that it had hitherto been marginal. Nonetheless, the introduction of the CBNRM 
programme into the northern sandveld has, I argue, inadvertantly assisted in the vitally 
important function of opening up debate, in the political arena, between Basarwa and 
representatives of the government, on issues of resource tenure rights. 
Much of the literature on CBNRM in southern and eastern Africa has started from the 
assumption that CBNRM is primarily a conservation programme, and has thus been aimed at 
addressing its efficacy as such. I instead frame CBNRM as a development intervention, and 
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use the established literature on development to guide my analysis of it. The sub-discipline of 
development studies perhaps most accentuates the divide between theoretical and applied 
anthropology. It is a divide I have had to try to bridge as I combine analysis of the 
contestation over meanings with the very bread and butter issues of sustaining a livelihood. I 
have attempted to benefit from both the tools of, applied anthropology and associated 
disciplines, and the rigour and depth of more academic anthropology. Doing so involves 
bridging not just methods, but languages and audiences that often diverge as well. The 
strength of anthropology has been increasingly in tracing and considering the poignant ways 
in which people meet the conditions that shape their lives (McCall 1996: 44), which can 
provide a contribution to a more context-specific and locally-sensitive approach to examining 
the dynamics of CBNRM. This is a method of research in which I place myself firmly in the 
centre. 
Relationships and writing 
I spent the fifteen months of research for this thesis between Maun and the villages of the 
northern sandveld. In Maun I cultivated relationships with tourism operators, and officials of 
the various government ministries who held sway over the northern sandveld, particularly: the 
Department of Wildlife and National Parks; the District Council; the Remote Area 
Development Office; the Department of Animal Health and Production; and the Land Board. 
Many of these officials I would also meet in the frequent meetings I attended in the villages. 
.,,; _ 
In Maun I had access as well to the residents of the northern sandveld who had a second home 
there, although most of my time was spent in their home villages. In the villages I was able to 
take the time to join in the daily activities of my hosts, whether it was sitting in the shade 
arguing about politics, or camping out in the bush cutting thatching grass to sell. My 
knowledge of Setswana, more of which was generally spoken in local conversations than 
Bugakhwedam or Ts'exadam, proved invaluable in saving both my hosts and myself the 
tedium of continual questioning. I could instead allow conversations to take their own course 
and simply listen in. For this reason, local concepts are reproduced in whichever language I 
heard them expressed. Although I learnt the basics of Bugakhwedam and Ts'exadam, the ease 
of communicating in Setswana - which many of my younger informants spoke as a 
first 
language - meant I never mastered them. 
Over time, I formed strong relationships with some individuals. Some were old men who 
enjoyed spending hours talking about their experiences, like Isoo whose identity card claimed 
he was born in 1887 (although the age regiment he had joined indicated 1908 would be more 
accurate), and Kebuelemang, the headman of Mababe (Plate 1.3). Others were middle-aged, 
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like Idea the entrepreneur from Mababe (Plate 5.6), and Moses, who always seemed to be 
mired in controversy. Those to whom I related to easiest were the young men, who by virtue 
of their education inevitably played a leading role in the Community Trust committees of 
each village; people like Merafe, Oral, KB and Brown. I found it hardest to form friendships 
with women, and although I spoke to as many women as men, the connotations of forming 
close friendships with single women or married women whose husbands I did not know well 
meant that forming such relationships was not easy. Women played an important role in local 
politics, and were often particularly outspoken on issues such as land rights. The voices and 
perspectives of young and old women form an important part of this thesis, but my deeper 
conversations were often held with men rather than women. Katrin did spend some time with 
me in the villages, and undertook some activities with women that it would have been 
inappropriate for me to do, but nonetheless my access to women's communal and individual 
worlds was limited. This is an important one of the many biases that my ethnography 
inevitably contains. 
Arriving in the northern sandveld to commence my research, my (white) skin colour spoke 
louder than any of my words could as to my intentions in living there for the coming months. 
The residents of Khwai, Mababe and Gudigwa were well used to white people. Many knew 
whites as their employers, usually in the safari industry, or in the South African mines where 
many men had been part of the migrant labour system from the 1950s to 1980s. Those who 
had been conscripted into the South African Defence Force in Namibia knew whites as their 
commanders. They spoke of mixed experiences in these relationships, of both benevolence 
and racism. They all knew whites as tourists, passing through their areas marvelling at what 
they themselves saw as commonplace. In Mababe, they knew whites as people who once 
came to their empty village, trashed their belongings, and defecated in their homes, at a time 
that they had relocated en masse to a gathering area for several months. Others knew whites 
with whom they went out hunting; they provided the licence and the white man provided the 
gun and transport. Still others knew whites as representatives of the burgeoning NGO 
community in Maun who offered their services to villages such as their own. Some women 
knew white men who had kept them surreptitiously as concubines in their younger years, and 
some men knew white men who posed as ivory buyers, only to find they were undercover 
police agents. In all these varied experiences of people with white skins, the one common 
thread was that whites were people with wealth and power; `half-God' in the metaphor of 
Mma Tiro, 6 a middle aged woman with whose family I often stayed. 
6 In Botswana, adults are often known by their teknonyms (i. e. by the names of their children). 
Although this is a Setswana practice, residents of the northern sandveld have adopted it as well. Mma - 
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Having grown up in rural areas of Botswana, and speaking Setswana as a second language, I 
was used to occupying an ambiguous position in most social contexts. Nonetheless, it was 
very difficult for me to escape these uncomfortable stereotypes, deserving as some of them 
may have been. The most enduring suspicion of my motives was prompted by the timing of 
my stay; that I was after their land. This was a lucrative proposition for a number of tourism 
operators who hoped that CHAs in the northern sandveld would become available for sub- 
lease under the impending CBNRM programme. Over time such suspicions faded, but I faced 
the enduring expectation that my endeavour would produce tangible benefit to my hosts. One 
reflection of this was in the name I was given; Thuso, a Setswana word meaning ̀ Assistance'. 
Expectations that my research would be of tangible benefit were sometimes presented in 
terms of immediate material goods. When I first introduced myself to the headman of Mababe 
as being interested in writing about the lives of people in his village, he invited me into his 
hut and told me to sit down. `Are you ready to write? ' He asked me. I nodded eagerly, pen at 
the ready. ̀ Write... ', he commenced, ̀Tea, sugar, maize meal, trousers... these are the things 
I want you to buy for me before you next come here', and then he stood up and left. At other 
times, expectations were framed in terms of the results from my research. For example, soon 
after I had commenced my fieldwork in Mababe, I met with the committee that they had 
elected to oversee their proposed Community Trust. One member expressed his concern that 
my research would be of local benefit: 
Many people have come here, seen our lives and written our desires, but they have 
changed nothing. They all write things down like you do. We have seen nothing from 
them and they have got rich. What makes you different, that you will do according to 
your name [Thuso]? 
At times, our discussions touched upon practices that the government had deemed illegal, 
especially hunting, and I was reminded of the double-sided potential of my research. One man 
who I often joined in walks through the bush laughed as we crossed the cutline into the 
national park in a hunt for warthog. `At least if we are caught, we will have each other's 
company in jail', he joked. But then he sobered up and asked, ̀ What will you do with this 
information? Will you change our situation? '7 
means ̀ mother of - ', and Rra - means ̀ father of - '. Thus, Mma Tiro is `the mother of Tiro', and 
Rra 
Tiro is `the father of Tiro'. In some circumstances, Mma can also mean `the wife of, so that Mma 
Kgosi is `the wife of the chief (kgosi means ̀ chief ). 
7 For obvious reasons, I disguise the identity of some people I refer to, by using pseudonyms or 
obscuring their circumstances. Not all names are pseudonyms: some informants expressly wanted to 
be 
associated with their opinions, and others say nothing that would warrant their identity to be disguised. 
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The very suggestion that I could `change their situation' spoke to me not only of 
(mis)conceptions of power that I had access to, but also of (mis)conceptions of my hosts' own 
powerlessness in the face of a system of authority that they considered had progressively 
impoverished them. It also spoke to me of my hosts' longstanding operation in a social 
structure in which goods and services were often procured by appeal to those who considered 
themselves superior to Basarwa. Nonetheless, with respect to the direct relationship between 
myself and themselves, I was made aware - particularly at the outset - that my research was 
subject to their continued goodwill. This was not only demonstrated in what information was 
shared or withheld, but also in telling me directly that if my research was contrary to their 
interests I would be asked to leave. Of course, the interests within each village were diverse 
and at times contradictory, and the only direct criticism my research elicited came from time 
spent speaking to the `wrong' people; those whose social position in the village did not 
qualify them in the eyes of others to speak about local affairs. 
Apart from becoming informally involved in some committees on a personal capacity, and 
assisting with logistical activities such as grant applications, my research itself was locally 
framed in terms of writing their tlholego, loosely meaning ̀ who we are' or `our heritage'. 
Residents were well aware that most books of the region ignored their presence or said very 
little about their history. Writing some of these things down became a way of establishing 
their presence and legitimacy, a way of addressing their often-repeated complaint that, `they 
don't know there are people here'. This was the best I could assume to do through my 
doctoral research to meet their expectations. Using extensive quotes from my informants' 
narratives through this thesis is a deliberate attempt to allow some of their voices to be heard. 
My motivation for doing so, in theoretical terms, is not to imply that Basarwa voices are in 
some way more `authentic', but as a means of illuminating local conceptual and 
hermeneutical structures and ways of understanding the central issues which this thesis sets 
out to explore. This thesis is thus more than simply a collection of local perspectives on 
identity and development, but an attempt to account for them and explore their implications 
for social relationships. 
I make no pretence, nonetheless, that through this thesis I let Basarwa from the northern 
sandveld speak for themselves. I cannot escape from the fact that it is myself who ultimately 
retains authorial control, who chooses which of the multivocal perspectives to include and 
exclude, and who has translated the narratives from Setswana into English. I have been as 
faithful as possible in maintaining the sentiments as I understood them in Setswana, but, as 
translations, they cannot be construed to be verbatim. I cannot erase myself from the product 
26 
of my ethnography; doing so would make my informants marionettes, of which I pull the 
invisible strings (cf. Todorov 1985: 520). Ethnography is at best a conversation (Gudeman and 
Riviera 1990, Peterson 2000), between myself, my informants and the wider body of theory. 
Moreover, it is an ongoing conversation; as ethnographers we do not provide finished 
products (Spencer 1989: 148). I do not intend this to be a watertight and final tome on life, 
land and power in the northern sandveld. Ethnographically, it is based on a specific moment 
in the history of the northern sandveld (for which reason I generally use the past tense), 
marked particularly by the introduction of CBNRM. Theoretically, it is subject to the 
changing winds of theoretical fashion. This is yet another reason why I emphasise my 
informants' texts: so that this work is open to be reworked and reinterpreted, as has been done 
with some of the theoretically maligned but ethnographically intricate earlier works with 
Basarwa (Kuper 1993: 67). 
Romanticism 
In researching and writing about the lives of Basarwa, who are a prime example of the 
exoticising tendencies of anthropology, the spectre of romanticisation looms large. We may 
consider ourselves free from the delusions that led to the Kalahari's version of the 
Philippine's well-known Tasaday hoax; Perrot and companions being taken in August 1988 to 
stay with `a small clan' of Bushmen in eastern Ngamiland who they believed ̀ had never been 
in close contact with European types before' (Perrot 1992: 7), and were `stone age simple' 
(1992: 29). Nevertheless, the sense of a way of life that is so profoundly and irreversibly 
changing over even just one generation, easily produces in observers a sense of nostalgia, as it 
did at times in the conversations of my older informants. Making reference to the don of 
romanticisation in the Kalahari, Sir Laurens van der Post, Barnard (1989: 113) observes that, 
`The myth of the Lost World is subtle and elusive, but it exists in our work and should exist in 
our consciousness'. He goes on to argue that, `Only then can we distinguish between "the 
Bushmen" and the Bushmen'. While making such a distinction may not be as straightforward 
as he suggests, his point stands that we are all victims of the van der Postian myth, and only 
by recognising, rather than denying, the vestiges of romanticism that we carry, can we address 
its effects in our own scholarship. 
Choosing to focus on contemporary political process rather than attempting any kind of 
`salvage anthropology' places me in danger of substituting one type of romanticism for 
another, that of subaltern resistance to the encroaching state. As Keesing (1992: 2) wrote of 
his work with Kwaio in the Solomon Islands: 
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In seeing that indigenous peoples have played a more active part as agents locally 
adapting to and reshaping outside forces, and that resistance in its varying modes has 
been more common and enduring than we had suspected, it is important for us not to 
romanticise their cultures or project onto them our idealisations of primitivity, 
populism or political struggle. 
If it were not for the level of romanticism Basarwa have been subject to, it would go without 
saying that `Bushmen do not cease to be Bushmen when they encounter other peoples or 
come to be dominated by them' (Barnard 1989: 112). Predictions that `the Bushmen' would 
imminently disappear have been a recurring theme in the accounts of early travellers (e. g. 
Gillmore 1878: 359), colonial officers, and scholars of wildly different persuasions (e. g. Heinz 
1994[1966]: 210-12, Wilmsen 1995a: 321). These are largely a product of either of the two 
dominant models of social change that Errington and Gewertz (1995: 5) label the myth of the 
fragile Eden, and the myth of inflexible tradition. The first, in the vein of the film The Gods 
Must be Crazy, casts its subjects as unable to cope with the encroachment of external 
pressures, which in the end cause their world to shatter. The second is an all-or-nothing 
model, in which `they' choose to become like `us'. Neither of these models grant any 
cognisance to the mutuality of constructed history; the mutual engagement of people and 
institutions with different interests and resources, and the context this has provided for 
struggles of subsistence, identity and worth. 
Romanticism hinges on the constitution of difference, which can take various forms. 
Difference is a central concept in anthropology, and anthropologists have been credited with 
both creating it (Fabian 1983, Said 1989) and eliminating it (Taussig 1987). In a thesis that is 
in many ways about the salience of social difference, I emphasise as well common 
experiences that crosscut these axes of difference. Basarwa share the difficulties and 
dilemmas faced daily by many rural dwellers regardless of their background, such as gaining 
access to services and employment, dealing with socio-economic change, and now 
increasingly coping with the widespread and tragic consequences of the AIDS pandemic. 
`[W]e have passed beyond the phase of esoterica and can now concentrate on the common... 
it is in the ordinary that people share their lives', notes Wilmsen (1999: xi-xii) of the discipline 
of anthropology. Rather than taking a focus on commonalities as marking the end of an era of 
Basarwa ethnography, as Wilmsen implies elsewhere (1989b: xii), I stress such commonalities 
as a means of countering the exoticising tendencies of anthropology to which Basarwa have 
been so subject. 
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Structure of the thesis 
The seven remaining chapters of the thesis fall into three main parts. The first part (Chapters 
Two and Three) details the changing regimes of power in the northern sandveld, particularly 
with respect to land. The second part (Chapters Four, Five and Six) is about 'life'; the bread- 
and-butter issues of securing a livelihood, as well as the narratives of ethnicity, and counter 
narratives of identity, in which these strategies are embedded. The third part (Chapters Seven 
and Eight) focuses on the current dynamics of CBNRM in the northern sandveld. 
Part I. - Land and power. As the northern sandveld has been all but invisible in writings on the 
region, save the accounts of some early travellers, Chapter Two provides in part this missing 
history. It focuses on the entrenchment of inequality between Basarwa and their neighbours 
through successive colonial encounters. Chapter Three continues to provide the missing 
histories, but on a more localised level for Khwai, Mababe and Gudigwa. The common thread 
in this chapter is the regimes over land in the northern sandveld, from the immigration of non- 
Basarwa into the northern sandveld through the creation of national parks, thus setting the 
stage for the introduction of CBNRM. I argue that, with the exception of CBNRM - which 
appears to promise the opposite - these changes have progressively alienated Basarwa from 
control over the land on which they reside. By tracing the fundamental transformations in 
people's relationships to place and political power, and the manner in which these are 
represented in the social memories of the present, I provide a context for the contemporary 
dynamics mapped in the following chapters. 
Part II. " Life. This section is based on the premise that the contestation between Basarwa and 
conventionally powerful others, particularly various arms of the state, is both a struggle over 
control of land and natural resources, as well as one over representation and the meanings 
attached to resources. I start in Chapter Four with the anthropological lens focused on the 
various powerful institutions in the northern sandveld, particularly those of the state and the 
tourist industry, and the forms of power they use to attempt to dominate the lives of Basarwa. 
Chapter Five, on livelihoods, explores the strategies by which residents of Khwai, Mababe 
and Gudigwa pursue their livelihoods, which includes a complex mix of foraging, waged 
employment and livestock. Chapter Six explores the means by which Basarwa use 
representations of their identity to legitimate claims to resources and practices important for 
`life', particularly rights to land and wildlife. 
Part III: Development. The central themes of life, land and power are brought together in this 
final section on the specifics of development in the northern sandveld. Chapter Seven takes 
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CBNRM as an arena in which various visions of what `development' should entail are 
contested, particularly between Basarwa and the state, although also in debates between 
Basarwa themselves. I argue that in practice CBNRM functions to extend state power, while 
locally it is appropriated as an opportunity to address land rights. In the concluding chapter, 
Chapter Eight, I examine the applied, methodological and analytical issues raised through the 
ethnography, and I consider the ways in which CBNRM could function better to meet some 
of the overlapping goals of the different stakeholders involved. 
Anthropology as a discipline has been largely responsible for creating the primitive `other' as 
an object of study (Kuper 1988), and the Bushmen have proved an ideal trope. Yet I have 
chosen to use the perspectives and methods of anthropology: a focus on culture and meaning; 
a stress on local perceptions and knowledge; the patterns of everyday life; and methodological 
holism. I believe that this approach can do best justice to the vast challenge of claiming to be 
able to represent in some way the lives, thoughts, aspirations of people who see their label 
`Basarwa' as not only indicative of ways of life that they hold important, but also an intimate 
part of their struggle for livelihoods, resources and dignity. 
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PART I 




Authority and inequality 
Whether or not Basarwa are aware that popular histories of Ngamiland - oral and written - 
tend to be the stories of the politically powerful, they are faced daily with the reality that 
official policies and programmes that affect them take little cognisance of their specific 
historical experience. As the undisputed first people' of Ngamiland, this is an historical 
experience that Basarwa often refer to with passion in discussions of their present situation. 
This and the following chapter dwell on history in the northern sandveld - in terms of both 
the salient events and processes that have led to present patterns of authority and inequality, 
as well the means by which such aspects of history are remembered and related. The focus of 
this chapter is on the evolution of political authority in the northern sandveld as a whole. 
Chapter Three concentrates more explicitly on land and the specific historical experiences of 
Khwai, Mababe and Gudigwa. Together they tell a story of how a category of people once 
referred to as `Lords of the desert land' (Guenther 1994) are now engaged in a struggle to 
regain authority over the land on which they live. 
The aim of this chapter is in part to provide a basic history of the northern sandveld of 
Ngamiland, which has as yet received but passing mention - at best - in the annals of 
historians. It also addresses some of the questions of the so-called `Kalahari Debate', 
8I use the term `first people' rather than `indigenous', as `first people' is a category that has local 
resonance in the northern sandveld as in many parts of Bantu-speaking Africa (cf. Woodburn 1997, 
Suzman 2000: 98), whereas the category `indigenous' has proved to be politically contentious in 
Botswana and many other African countries (Saugestad 1998,2000). 
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especially the history of Basarwa interaction with other groups through history, and evolution 
of their `ethnicity'. Above all, however, this account of the history of the northern sandveld is 
an attempt at opening up the historical dimension of the contestation for control over land and 
political authority. It is an exploration of the genesis of present-day narratives and practices of 
sameness and difference, and how networks of power have been created in which ethnicity 
has become a key element in defining access to these networks. Furthermore, this chapter 
provides a background for understanding the way history informs, and is referred to today, in 
struggles over land. 
Following the rise of the Batawana chiefdom in Ngamiland, I outline how at first the various 
Bantu-speaking groups that migrated into Ngamiland initially interacted with Basarwa on 
relatively equal terms. It was not until the beginning of the trade boom in 1850 that Batawana 
were able to build their political authority, which they did primarily through two institutions: 
kgamelo, a system of incorporating sub-tribes into their extending political structures; and 
botlhanka, enforced servitude. An ethnic hierarchy was thus created, in which Basarwa were 
kept at the bottom, due to their liminality as `people of the bush'. I suggest that violence, 
particularly against Basarwa, was necessary to maintain these systems, as Batawana were so 
heavily outnumbered by the subject tribes they sought to dominate. Some relief from the 
excesses of violent coercion, however, came with the local presence of colonial authority 
from 1894. Basarwa were also quick to resist domination, and responses ranged from outright 
defiance to moving beyond the reach of their oppressors. Although the prevalence of enforced 
servitude declined through the twentieth century, it endures in the collective memory of all 
Basarwa in the northern sandveld, and in the personal experiences of many of the older men 
and women. It is thus a history that colours the interpretations of contemporary processes, and 
often gives rise to accusations against the government or their non-Basarwa neighbours of 
unequal treatment. 
History, ideology and memory 
The history of Basarwa has been at the forefront of much academic writing on the people of 
the Kalahari, particularly since the `Kalahari Debate' exploded through the pages of Current 
Anthropology in 1990 (Wilmsen and Denbow 1990, Lee 1990, etc. ). The key contributions of 
revisionists have been twofold: firstly to put to death once and for all the myth of the 
primitive isolate (e. g. Wilmsen 1989b, Wilmsen and Denbow 1990); and secondly to shift 
some of the focus to colonisers' images of Bushmen, and the consequences for Basarwa of 
being categorised as hunter-gatherers (e. g. Gordon 1992). My intention here is not to entrench 
the debate as to whether Basarwa are survivors or creations of history, but to build upon the 
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lessons learnt from this scholarship to develop an understanding of how historical processes 
have shaped present configurations of power, ethnicity and identity. 
The Kalahari Debate became one over not only the history of Basarwa per se, but also the 
ideological implications of our theories of their history. Revisionists accused previous 
scholars of denying Basarwa history by attributing a timeless stone-age past to them by 
recreating them in our fantasy of a pristine hunting and gathering past. In turn, revisionists 
faced the counter-accusation of denying Basarwa history by recreating them as an underclass 
formed by the ubiquitous power of world capital (Lee 1992). While both arguments have 
some validity, they underlie the contention by Kuper (1993: 66) that the controversy has been 
less about ethnographic observations, and more about their interpretation and salience for 
theoretical issues in academia. In other words, the debate itself has been more about ̀ us' than 
it has been about `them'. Such versions of Basarwa history have, despite their claims, the 
same shortcomings as much other historical research in Botswana, characterised by Morton 
(1994: 219) as `kgotla research'. The kgotla is the focal space for political and judicial 
activities in Batswana villages, a space from which, until the post-independence era, subject 
peoples such as Basarwa were excluded, and literally the space in which much of the existing 
historical research has been done. Predominant forms of historiography have therefore given 
little cognisance to what Basarwa themselves say of their own history. 
Without uncritically using oral histories as unmediated fact, the challenge in moving to a 
more `Basarwa-centred' historiography is to draw out some of the ways that history itself is 
understood, related and used in present contexts. Understanding these historical processes 
gives a grounding for examining present patterns of subjective, culturally configured action 
(Comaroff and Comaroff 1992). Shared images of the historical past are kinds of memories 
that have particular importance for the constitution of social groups in the present (Fentress 
and Wickham 1992). But this is a dialectical process; the present is imprinted onto the past 
just as the past is imprinted onto the present. History is, of course, told in the light of the 
present. What is told, how it is told, and why it is told all tell of present priorities and 
relationships. The present therefore cannot be talked about without reference to the past, and 
vice versa. This chapter is thus a narrative about both the past and the present, a 
dialectical 
approach that informs the thesis as a whole. 
The task of `retelling' a subaltern history of the northern sandveld is dogged by the scarcity of 
sources. There are no written, and minimal oral, accounts referring to events prior to 
1700, 
leaving only the evidence of a scanty archaeological record. Starting with Livingstone's visit 
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in 1849, traders, hunters and missionaries to Ngamiland commented, among other things, on 
their encounters with Basarwa. Apart from a general concern with slavery, Basarwa remained 
largely invisible to the colonial officers who were stationed in Ngamiland from 1894. 
Through these records, the voices of Basarwa themselves are, needless to say, virtually silent. 
Nonetheless, my concern here is as much about present understandings of past social realities, 
as about historical representations of the same realities. As Isaacsman (1990: 120) concluded 
in a comprehensive study of scholarship on peasant resistance in Africa: `While there is not a 
perfect correspondence between what peasants thought, or even what they think they thought, 
and the social realities in which they lived, their understanding of this reality is as important 
as the structures of oppression that limited their choices and constrained their actions'. 
Ethnicity and inequality 
In setting out to understand the evolution of ethnicity and inequality in the northern sandveld, 
it is necessary to move away from the idea of a pre-given world of separate and discrete 
`peoples and cultures' that has been so characteristic of Basarwa studies. By seeing, instead, a 
difference-producing set of relations we turn from a project of juxtaposing pre-existing 
differences to one of exploring the construction of differences in historical process (cf. Gupta 
and Ferguson 1992: 16). Acknowledging the centrality of relations of unequal power in 
creating present day cultural systems and the linkages between them, leads to an 
understanding of ethnicity as a product of historical processes which structure relations of 
inequality between discrete social entities (cf. Comaroff and Comaroff 1992: 49-68). 
In an African context, the trajectory for much contemporary scholarship of ethnicity was set 
by two prominent volumes that emphasised the creation and transformation of ethnic 
identities: Hobsbawm and Ranger's The Invention of Tradition (1983); and Vail's The 
Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa (1989). They presented pre-colonial Africa as 
characterised by pluralism, flexible and multiple identities, mobility, overlapping networks, 
and the context dependent drawing of boundaries, which were rigidified into invented 
`traditions' through the colonial process. The only major work on the evolution of Sesarwa 
ethnicity, Wilmsen's 1989(b) revisionist polemic, Land Filled with Flies, is also broadly 
constructionist. He reworks a neo-Marxist analysis to emphasise the role of capital in the 
creation of Sesarwa ethnicity in western Ngamiland, arguing that Sesarwa ethnicity is a 
product of capitalist labour market segmentation; a means to relegate stigmatised people to 
lower levels of the labour pool. 
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While these works benefit from a political-economy perspective, their form of 
constructionism lends itself to two particular criticisms. The first is the assumption that (with 
reference to Wilmsen) ascribing an ethnic identity to Basarwa was contingent on their first 
being an underclass in an integrated political economy. However, this begs the question of 
how these categories came into being in the first place, and where the stigma that became 
attached to Basarwa originated. I suggest (as Suzman (1997: 22) has done for relations 
between Ju/'hoansi and Herero in Omaheke Namibia) that the emergent structures of 
authority built upon a pre-existing consciousness in the northern sandveld that defined 
Basarwa as fundamentally different from their neighbours. These pre-existing categorisations 
determined the manner in which Basarwa came to participate in the emerging political 
economy of Ngamiland. The second, and related, criticism of revisionist analyses of ethnicity 
is that they privilege the power of colonial decrees and ideologies, at the expense of agency. 
The people they argue came to wear the mantle of these ethnicities are presented as passive in 
this process, or at best reactionary. Such a view posits ethnic identities as empty vessels 
within which the powerful place conventional, but arbitrary, oppositions between categories. 
In a subsequent re-evaluation of his earlier work, Ranger (1993: 107) concluded that state 
intervention is surpassed, transformed, and often thwarted, by the imagination of local actors. 
He also discarded his use of the word `invention', with its implication of a one-sided flow of 
power, for Anderson's (1983) `imagined', which opens the way to uncovering the processes 
of negotiation, contestation, and creativity that take place in defining ethnicity. I now turn to 
examining these processes in the northern sandveld of Ngamiland. 
Prehistory 
The archaeological record sheds little light on the nature of prehistoric societies in the 
northern sandveld. The scarcity of naturally occurring durable materials means that there are 
few visible remains of material culture. Furthermore, the constantly changing topography of 
both the Okavango Delta and the sand mantle to the north of it make it even more difficult to 
trace the few remains there may be. Nonetheless, isolated surface remains can be found near 
some pans and lagoons, mainly in the form of Stone Age implements and more recent pottery 
shards. An early Late Stone Age ovate scraper found during fieldwork at Khurumadzanga, on 
the southeastern side of the Mababe Depression, was estimated to be from c. 1000 BC (Alec 
Campbell, pers. comm. ), indicating a long history of human habitation. The sole hills in the 
area, at Gubatshaa and Gcoha on the northern edge of the Mababe Depression (Map 1.2), 
have a handful of rock paintings, which have as yet not been dated. Their style indicates 
connections with Tsodilo to the west and Matopos (in western Zimbabwe) to the east, and that 
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human settlement at the hills was probably intermittent through the centuries (Campbell 
1970). 
The only archaeological work undertaken on the northern fringe of the delta so far has been 
by Wilmsen and Denbow at Xugana, and more recently an ethno-archaeological project by 
begun by Damm et al. (1998) west of Khwai. The ethno-archaeological research used oral 
histories to identify previous settlements of Khwai residents, thus focusing on more recent 
remains. Although this gave an indication of the type of topography favoured for settlement, 9 
attempts to locate older sites have so far proved fruitless. Denbow and Wilmsen's (1986, 
Denbow 1990) excavation at Xugana yielded evidence of Early Iron Age inhabitants up to 
c. 1000AD, who had no stock, although sites on the southeastern edge of the Delta (Lotshitshi) 
gave evidence of stock by 300AD. Despite the difficulties of estimating the identities and 
relationships of these early inhabitants from the archaeological record alone, Wilmsen 
(1995a: 312) concludes from his extensive excavations in Ngamiland that there is 
`circumstantial' evidence that Khoisan speakers constituted the higher-status economic and 
political groups in the Kalahari up to 600AD. By 1000AD, these were overtaken by 
established hierarchical social formations along the eastern fringes of the Kalahari that were 
dominated by Bantu-speaking agropastoral metallurgists. However, it was not until the mid- 
nineteenth century, after the arrival of Batawana in Ngamiland, that the western Kalahari, 
including the Okavango, was absorbed into these polities (ibid. ). 
Turning to linguistic evidence, Vossen (1984,1990) uses lexicostatistical analysis to postulate 
on the historical relationships between the central Khoisan category of languages (Khwe- 
speakers). These are spoken today by Basarwa across central and northern Botswana, as well 
as northern Namibia. He constructs the relationships represented in Figure 2.1, derived from a 
hypothetical Proto-Khwe root. Vossen theorises a split about 2,000 years ago between 
Khoekhoe and other Khwe-speakers. This was followed by further splits into Kxoe, Shua, 
Nharo and //Gana. These four then split further to include the nine shown in Figure 2.1. It is 
difficult to estimate the periods of these further splits, as they were probably successive 
within each sub-category rather than happening at the same time. Bugakhwedam (spoken 
mostly in Khwai and Gudigwa) and Ts'exadam (spoken in Mababe) are shown in bold. 
Although Khwai and Mababe are less than forty kilometres apart, their languages - being in 
separate sub-groups - do not have a high affinity. Khwai today represents the eastern extent 
9 This archaeological research, confirmed by oral history, indicates that settlements were most often 
built on ridges of sand set back from a waterhole or lagoon. This gave access to the water and the 
animals utilising it, but avoided the risks of flooding on the clay soils closer to the water, or of scaring 
the animals away. 
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Figure 2.1: Linguistic relationships of Khwe languages (after Vossen 1984). 
it is unlikely that in prehistoric times Basarwa regarded themselves as the same people. A 
sense of affinity probably arose later through the common experience of domination by agro- 
pastoralists. One division at this time was probably between those that lived along the rivers, 
mostly //Anikhwe (lit. //Ani - river, khwe - person), and those that lived in the sandveld, such 
as Bugakhwe (lit. Boga - dry country, khwe - person in //Anikhwedam), a division of 
ecological niches that probably predated the arrival of Bayei. Confirming contemporary oral 
narratives, a Moyei informant told Stigand (1923) that the only people his ancestors 
encountered when they arrived was `the Bushmen on the sandveld, and the River Bushmen on 
the rivers'. Little linguistic research has been done with Shiyei, but a cursory analysis 
suggests a high degree of borrowing from northern-Khwe languages. Apart from borrowed 
words, 1° Shiyei is the only non-Khoisan language in Botswana to have borrowed and 
maintained extensive use of clicks. 
1°To take a few examples: 
Shiyei Bugakhwedam 
Well she//gang Agana 
Riverbed modom dom 
One /rki /wi 
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Different historical encounters 
In 1906, Jules Ellenberger, Assistant Commissioner for Southern District, who was then on 
special duty in Ngamiland, wrote of the relations between people of different ethnic 
categories in Ngamiland (BNA 1906c): 
The Makhalahari [Bakgalagadi], Makuba [Bayei] and Masarwa are servants of the 
Batawana: the Masarwa are, in addition, servants of the Makhalahari and Makuba... the 
Hambukushu are on the same level as Makuba. 
The hierarchical relationships that these ethnic classifications enabled came into being 
through the various encounters between Basarwa and the Bantu-speaking immigrants that 
arrived in Ngamiland from the eighteenth century, which varied considerably in their nature. 
Relationships were formed that determined access to political structures, land, and other 
resources, and worked towards concretising pre-existent ethnic categories. These historical 
processes have contributed to shaping contemporary relationships, and are often referred to by 
Basarwa today. 
The nature of encounters between immigrant Bantu groups and Basarwa around the 
Okavango Delta provides an interesting context in which to examine the development of 
ethnic hierarchies. The encounters between the ancestors of those presently inhabiting 
Ngamiland were relatively recent, having only begun in about 1700, and so are still spoken of. 
There were also several different layers of immigration, each prompting different forms of 
relationships with the people who they found in the land. The first non-Basarwa immigrants 
in historical times were Bayei and Bakgalagadi, who trickled into Ngamiland in the first half 
of the eighteenth century. They were followed at the end of the eighteenth century by 
Batawana, an offshoot of one of the powerful southern Batswana chiefdoms. Throughout the 
nineteenth century, various other Hambukushu, Basubia, Gcereku, and Banajwa groups 
moved into the northern fringes of the Delta, many of them arriving as refugees from wars or 
fleeing their own despotic leaders (Map 2.1). Three main historical phases in socio-political 
relationships may be identified through all these immigrations: 
" 1700-1840, a period of relative equality between the various people that had populated 
Ngamiland. 
" 1840-1906, marked by the strengthening of the Batawana chiefdom and the development 
of strong social hierarchies. 
" 1906-1966, the colonial presence in Ngamiland in 1906, which introduced new structures 
that both strengthened and weakened the existing patterns of authority. 
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Map 2.1: Early settlement and immigration into Ngamiland (italicised labels for 
Khoisan speakers, regular for Bantu-speakers. Positions of Khwai, Mababe and 
Gudigwa are present-day). 
Relative equality (1700-1840) 
By the mid-eighteenth century Bayei were spread throughout the Delta, having migrated from 
the north using waterways as their main arteries of travel (Tlou 1985: 12-14). They were not 
politically or militarily organised, and did not subdue the various Basarwa groups who they 
found in and around the Okavango. Their lack of military prowess was often commented 
upon by early travellers and missionaries, with Livingstone (1857: 56) characterising them as 
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`Quakers of the body politic in Africa'. In contrast to the encounters between Khoisan and 
Bantu-speakers elsewhere, Bayei and Basarwa interacted on terms that were generally equal 
and amicable. This was particularly so with the ancestors of Basarwa who today call 
themselves //Anikhwe, who - in common with Bayei - lived along the waterways and islands 
of the delta. Early travellers commented on the close association and similarity in the 
lifestyles of //Anikhwe and Bayei (e. g. Passarge 1997[1905]: 236), so close in fact that some 
travellers and administrators even confused Bayei as a Bushman subgroup, especially those 
that lived south of the Mababe Depression (e. g. Livingstone 1852, Doman 1925: 81, BNA 
1962b). Stories of origin in the northern sandveld also tell of an initial relationship of equality 
and mutual co-operation between Basarwa and Bayei (see the story of Khara/'uma, Chapter 
Six). In most such stories told by Basarwa elsewhere, the separation between Basarwa hunter- 
gatherers and Bantu-speaking agro-pastoralists is spoken of as being due to the strength and 
trickery of Bantu-speakers. In the northern sandveld, however, Basarwa instead speak of a 
relationship of mutual co-operation between Khara/'uma, the first Mosarwa, and the first 
Moyei. Furthermore, many Bayei refer to Basarwa in a generic sense as their `uncles' 
(mothers' brothers) as an acknowledgement not only of Basarwa being `first people', but also 
of many Bayei having Basarwa ancestors. 
Whereas most Bantu-speakers took Basarwa women whose subsequent offspring were then 
raised as their own, intermarriage took place in both directions between Bayei and Basarwa, 
with Basarwa men taking Bayei wives and vice-versa. The taking of non-Basarwa women by 
Basarwa men has not been common, but those examples documented have all involved 
(usually sedentary) Khwe-speaking Basarwa: between Kxoe and Ovambo in northern 
Namibia (Gordon 1992; 214); between Zama and Sekele/Mbukushu/Guangares/Mbuela in 
Angola (Almeida 1965); and between Kxoe and Mbukushu/Mbwela (Köhler 1989: 395ff, 
427ff, Gertrud Boden pers. comm. ). Such relationships continue - four men in Mababe, for 
example, are married to Bayei women. Following the predominant pattern of patrilocal 
residence, children from such relationships have usually been brought up in the father's social 
milieu, therefore regarding themselves as Basarwa. 
Such intermarriage is the explanation that residents of northern Ngamiland give as to the 
origins of `black' Basarwa, which has puzzled researchers intent on categorising and 
explaining the physiology of the people of southern Africa. Some early explorers (eg. Selous 
1893: 106, Passarge 1997 [1905]) also pointed to intermarriage in explaining why Khwe- 
speaking Basarwa in Ngamiland had Bantu physiological characteristics, as did early scholars 
(Schapera 1930, Bleek and Dugan-Cronin 1942), and colonial administrators (e. g. BNA 
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1906a, Clark 1951). Nonetheless, others came to different conclusions. Livingstone (1857: 68) 
assumed their `deepest hue' was a product of heat and moisture. Other explorers, as well as 
more recently scholars, have suggested that they originated from pastoral people who lost 
their livestock and adopted the languages and subsistence strategies of neighbouring hunter- 
gatherers (e. g. Seiner 1977[1910], Doman 1917: 42, Cashdan 1979, Campbell 1990: 124, 
Nurse and Jenkins 1977, Nurse et at 1985). Nurse and Jenkins' conclusions were based partly 
on serogenetic studies that indicated that at least some ̀ black' Basarwa had no more Khoisan 
admixture than many Bantu-speaking people. However, if their own narratives are to be 
believed, this only underlies the contention by some Basarwa that `the whole of Botswana is 
descended from Basarwa'. 
The next group of immigrants to arrive in Ngamiland was the Setswana-speaking Batawana, 
who eventually formed, despite their low numbers, a powerful and centralised polity. The rise 
of Batawana hegemony in Ngamiland is well documented, and within Botswana is often 
regarded as the history of Ngamiland (see, for example, Tlou 1985). Their arrival was a result 
of the falling-out of the two sons of Ngwato, chief of Bangwato at Shoshong. Khama, the 
heir, remained, and his younger brother Tawana (after whom they took their name) left with 
his followers. They moved with all their possessions and cattle, arriving at the Kgwebe "Hills 
(near the southwestern edge of the Okavango Delta) in about 1800. Moving to avoid conflict 
was a common strategy for Setswana-speaking groups, spawning the umbrella name by which 
they would become known; Batswana, explained as `those that cannot hold themselves 
together' (Brown 1926). The southern side of the Delta was possibly already claimed by 
Bakwena11 as their land (Tlou 1985: 41), but if this was so, it is likely that their hold was 
tenuous at best, it being used as an occasional hunting area. Although the Batawana arrived 
with a practised army, it was small, and their refugee status made them cautious in their 
dealings with the people they encountered in this new land. Speaking of when Bangwato were 
in a similar position, the Bangwato chief Tshekedi Khama, told a 1935 enquiry into slavery 
(London Missionary Society 1935) that: 
There was in those times no question of overlordship of one people over another. It was 
simply a mutual understanding: at that time we had no strength by which we could force 
them to become our servants. 
The first four decades in Ngamiland were difficult for Batawana. They were attacked by 
Bangwato in 1810, faced internal power struggles, and then in about 1826 were attacked by 
II The Bakwena are another Batswana tribe, off which Bangwato were an offshoot. 
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Sebetwane and his Makololo troops, who left a swathe of destruction as they moved up from 
the south. They fled to the northern side of the Delta, but many were taken captive by the 
Makololo, in whose servitude they remained for a number of years. Not only were Batawana 
unable, as Tshekedi attested of Bangwato, to subjugate the populations they found there, but 
they also had to rely on the knowledge and goodwill of these populations for their survival. 
During this time, many Batawana escaped servitude by fleeing to isolated villages of Bayei 
(Tlou 1985: 43), and, no-doubt, Basarwa. Due to all their cattle being taken by the Bakololo 
invaders, they also probably subsisted largely on hunting and gathering wild food. Other 
Bantu-speaking refugees survived in a similar manner. Livingstone (1857: 69) met Basubia on 
the southeast edge of the Mababe Depression, when he passed through in 1850, who he noted 
had lost sorghum and were reliant on wild plants. It was not uncommon in similar contexts 
throughout southern Africa, for impoverished Bantu-speakers to survive for a time by 
foraging with Bushmen (see the examples noted by Wilmsen 1989b: 84-5). At this time, 
Batawana wielded no control over significant areas of land. Wilmsen (1989b: 75), for 
example, argues that by calling Kgwebe after a Mosarwa, 12 they initially recognised the prior 
right of possession by Basarwa, a pattern attested to by the fact that 48 percent of place names 
in Ngamiland today are of Sesarwa origin (Peters 1972: 225). 
The rise of inequality (1840-1906) 
It was not until 1840 that the Batawana state was re-established by gathering together the 
dispersed Batawana refugees and rebuilding their capital at Toteng. The balance of power 
between Batawana and their neighbours now began to shift. As refugees many of them had 
survived on the goodwill and knowledge of Basarwa, Bayei and Basubia. Now that they 
formed a centralised power, they again looked to their neighbours, but this time to restock 
their herds that had been decimated through raiding. Early writers note that it was the cattle 
wealth of Bayei and Bakgalagadi that laid the foundation for the large herds that Batawana 
then built up (Andersson 1856, Nettleton 1934: 355). Batawana had been used to 
appropriating the labour and resources of tribes that they subjugated before they had split 
from Bangwato. Once they were in a position to do so in Ngamiland, they took the 
opportunity. Ethnic stereotyping reflecting differential power relationships started becoming 
more pronounced, and it was in this period that Batawana started calling Bayei Makoba 
(Sutherland 1984: 64), a term synonymous with servant/slave. 13 
12 Some informants maintain that Kgwebe was a Mokgalagadi, not a Mosarwa. 
13 Informants today claim that this name originated from the practice of using Bayei as carriers. While 
the Motawana rode his horse, he would shout ̀ Koba, koba' (a term meaning to chase with contempt) to 
his carriers. Despite its pejorative origins, many Bayei still refer to themselves by this term. 
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Plate 2.1: Tshaathoboga, on the southeastern side of the Mababe Depression. 
Plate 2.2: Woodland of the northern Delta fringe. 
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The political power of the Batawana expanded considerably under Letsholathebe I, who ruled 
from 1847-1874. He divided his state into provinces, each of which was overseen by a 
molebeleedi (overseer), who was responsible for extracting tribute from the people in his area, 
and carrying out the chief's orders in it. This system, known as kgamelo (milk jug) 
overlapped rather than destroyed the existing political structures. It had already been used to 
consolidate dominance over subject peoples by other Setswana-speakers; the Bangwato 
chieftaincy in the 1820s, and Bakwena in the 1830s. Some subject people were also integrated 
more directly into the Batawana economy through becoming herders and servants. Thus the 
strongly hierarchical and centralised social organisation of the Batawana began to make itself 
felt in Ngamiland. Initially the extent of the Batawana state was fairly small, and it was not 
until the reign of Moremi 11(1876-1890) that the land north and east of the Delta was claimed 
as the chief's hunting grounds. 
Wilmsen (1989b: 101) argues that it was the institution of kgamelo that served to absorb those 
Basarwa that owned stock into the Tawana polity, and create a class of those that did not; who 
then, through the rise and fall of mercantile capitalism, became 'Bushmen'. He paints a vivid 
picture of the penetration and omnipresence of mercantile capital in Ngamiland, in which `the 
entire region had pulsed with activity; everybody had had a piece of the everyday action' 
(ibid: 127). The boom, which began with Livingstone and Oswell's visit to the Batawana 
capital in 1849, and lasted until 1890, was dominated by Batawana, who used the trade to 
become rich in commodities such as guns and horses. As Wilmsen shows, this was action in 
which Basarwa were pivotal, not only as guides to white hunters, but also as hunters for the 
Batawana chieftaincy, and for trade in their own right. Wilmsen represents the collapse of the 
mercantile economy, coinciding with the devastating rinderpest epizootic of 1897 - that 
decimated both wildlife and cattle populations - as the beginning of the end for Basarwa. The 
subsequent cattle economy needed far fewer herders drawn from their ranks than the trade 
economy needed hunters. In this manner, Wilmsen suggested, was a foraging underclass 
created; a relation of production that had been open to negotiation became the ethnic category 
of Basarwa. 
As convincing as Wilmsen's account may appear, to make the rise and fall of mercantile 
capital the primary explanatory factor in the creation of Sesarwa ethnicity verges on 
reductionism. It ignores the pre-existing conceptual separation by Batswana of Basarwa as 
`people of the bush', as opposed to Batswana pastoralists who lived in villages. It is also 
unable to explain persistence of distinct ways of living that separated Basarwa from their 
Bantu-speaking neighbours, despite their long history of close contact. Early visitors to the 
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northern sandveld noted that that Basarwa often lived in close proximity with Bantu-speakers, 
yet retained their distinctiveness (e. g. Livingstone 1857: 69 and Selous 1893: 141-3 for 
Mababe, Gibbons 1904: 202 for Gabamukuni, and Hurwitz 1956 for the east bank of the 
Okavango River). Yet hunting and gathering was a lifestyle that Basarwa chose and 
maintained in spite of sustained contact with agro-pastoralists, perhaps because this social and 
economic niche they occupied remained to their advantage (cf. Barth 1994: 18). 
An important factor in considering both kgamelo and servitude is one that has, as yet, been 
under-appreciated by historians; the extent to which Batawana were a numerical minority in 
Ngamiland. Tlou (1985: 54) assumes that Batawana were numerically the second largest 
ethnic group in Ngamiland. Wilmsen (1997: 225) agrees, quoting an early estimation of 5000 
men as the size of the Batawana army. This figure, given by Schulz and Hammar (1897: 313- 
314), does not explicitly exclude members from subject tribes, which by the late nineteenth 
century comprised a significant portion of the Batawana army (Tlou 1971: 201-202). Compare 
this figure with other early estimates; Baines (1864: 432-3) estimated 500 fighting men, and 
Schinz (in Morton 1993: 92) estimated in 1887 that Batawana comprised 500-700 of a morale 
(polity) of 10,000. Lt. Scolefield (BNA 1897), commander of the police troop in Ngamiland, 
estimated Batawana to be outnumbered by their subject population in 1897 by 25: 1. Passarge 
(1997 [1905]: 225) reproduces the estimate of a local merchant from the same period that there 
were 300 adult fighting Batawana men. The paucity of Batawana as a proportion of the total 
population of Ngamiland made the institutions of kgamelo and slavery especially crucial in 
building and maintaining Batawana hegemony in Ngamiland. 
Kgamelo 
Following the pattern of other Batswana tribes, the Batawana chieftaincy created a system of 
political authority that was spatially represented in their organisation of settlement and land 
use. The seat of political power, the kgotla, was at the centre of the village, and was where the 
chief resided. The village itself was then divided into different wards, each of which had a 
head appointed by the chief. The ward heads were not only responsible for their wards in the 
metropole, but were also designated balebeleedi (overseers) of districts elsewhere in the land 
claimed by Batawana. 14 Kgamelo operated on the principle of accepting the allegiance of 
14 Dikgoti, became the molebeleedi for the area that covered Khwai and Mababe, a job his son 
Motsewakhumo took over at the end of the nineteenth century. Monihe was the molebeleedi for the 
scattered villages along the northern arm of the Delta. Between them, they exacted tribute from the 
Basarwa of the northern sandveld. Motsewakhumo collected this himself, while Monihe did so from 
the ancestors of the Basarwa who now live in Gudigwa through Samushondo, an Mbukushu 
intermediary in Gunitsoga. 
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other non-Batawana groups so as to expand the political authority of the Batawana chiefdom 
(Wilmsen 1989b: 98). Some of these were initially other Batswana groups, but probably the 
first non-Setswana-speaking people to be incorporated were Bakgalagadi (Nettleton 
1934: 345, Schapera 1952: 93ff), some of whom accompanied Tawana when he broke away 
from Ngwato, and others of whom already lived at Kgwebe with Basarwa when the Batawana 
arrived around 1800. Bakgalagadi thus came to occupy a relatively privileged position in the 
Batawana chieftaincy, a necessity born of the paucity of Batawana numbers. The Bakgalagadi 
already owned some stock, and spoke a language not too dissimilar from Setswana. Several 
Bakgalagadi wards were created in the Batawana capital, with Bakgalagadi balebeeledi, who 
were given their own territories to oversee. 
One such molebeleedi was Morubela, a Mophareng (Mokgalagadi), who was given oversight 
of the Qangwa area in western Ngamiland. Ju/'hoansi still speak of the atrocities he 
committed to force them into servitude, including tying up non-adherents in bundles of grass, 
and setting them alight (M. Taylor 1998: 354). Morubela is often spoken of today as being a 
Motawana, rather than Mokgalagadi, an example not only of how some Bakgalagadi were 
permitted to become almost political and social equals of Batawana, but also of how having 
social and political power became conflated with being Motawana. Such extreme methods of 
coercion, although widespread in Ngamiland and elsewhere (Morton 1994: 226), were not as 
prevalent in Khwai and Mababe, which remained a hinterland to most non-Basarwa. 
Motsewaboloi, the widow of the late headman of Khwai, explained the remoteness of 
Batawana rule: `They did oppress us, but it was from afar, so we didn't feel it so badly'. 
Rather than carrying the connotations of an ethnic unit that `tribe' has in Western discourse 
today, the kgamelo system allowed the Batawana tribe to be a political entity that 
encompassed many different people who gave allegiance to the Batawana chief. The fluidity 
of ethnic identity in Ngamiland is evidenced by the 1946 census, which showed a 
disproportionately increasing number of Ngamiland residents (8,124) referring to themselves 
as Batawana (Table. 2.1). Compare this to the estimates above of 500-1,000 people from only 
fifty years earlier, and of 1,500 Batawana in the 1921 census (Stigand 1923: 412). Yet, this 
was a selective fluidity. The greater the geographical and social distance from the metropole, 
the less porous the boundaries were. In both these senses, Basarwa were distant from the 
















Table 2.1: Ethnic composition of Ngamiland, according to the 1946 census (after 
Schapera 1952: 94). 
The status of being granted your own ward in the capital, as well as a district to oversee, 
marked a critical juncture between those that were accepted into the Batawana polity as full 
citizens, and the subject population. Schapera (1952: 94ff) recorded forty wards on a visit to 
Maun, the tribal capital. Over half the population of 7,628 lived in the twenty wards 
designated as Batswana. Another seven wards were designated Bakgalagadi, seven Basotho, 
three Ndebele (Kalolo), and three Herero/Mbanderu. Bayei, Hambukushu and Basarwa were 
denied their own wards, despite undoubtedly comprising the majority of the population of 
Maun. Instead, they were scattered among each of the wards. Each ward was thus ethnically 
heterogeneous, but the ethnic label by which the ward was known was taken from select 
ethnic categories. The power of controlling a section of land, and status as a full member of 
the tribe (and political and social status this conferred) was thus denied subject tribes. A lower 
tier of headmen existed in the districts, through which the balebeleedi in the metropole 
operated. Subject tribes were allocated positions in this lowest level of authority, integrating 
them into the wider political structures of the Batawana chieftaincy. This system meant that 
Basarwa, who rarely had strong leaders, were kept almost completely to the lowest level in 
the structures of authority that were set up in the Batawana chiefdom. Schapera (1952: 94) 
does not mention Basarwa among an official list of 134 `sub chiefs and headmen' issued in 
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1939, but which included Bayei, Hambukushu, Basubia, Gcereku and Najwa. The four tier 
ethnic hierarchy that kgamelo created is represented in tabular form in Table 2.2. 
Level I Batawana Disproportionate political power and 
representation in the capital's wards 
Level 2 Bakgalagadi, Basotho, Limited representation in the 
Ndebele, Ovaherero capital's wards 
:,. w+wý:.... -arr-«ý: ýJr..:.. xi. w. ný. r. u+wßä. wRr. r. ai.. w-:,:.. s ýrw.. 
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Level 3 Bayei, Hambukushu, No representation in the capital's 
Basubia, Gcereku, Najwa wards, but some headmen in the 
districts 
Level 4 Basarwa No political representation at all, 
either in the capital or in the districts 
Table 2.2: Representation of ethnic hierarchies in Ngamiland through kgamelo. 
The kgamelo system therefore created a system of political power and patronage that 
depended on the control of land and allocation of resources from it, and conflated access to 
political power with spatial position and ethnic labelling. Unlike Basarwa, Bakgalagadi were 
a subject tribe that was able to rise in these structures of power. In 1850, Livingstone had 
noted Bakgalagadi were `much oppressed by Batawana' (quoted by Morton 1994: 225), as 
they were in other Setswana-speaking polities (e. g. Wilmsen 1989b: 278-9). Nonetheless, by 
1950 they had seven wards in the capital. The lowest of the subject tribes had no wards of 
their own in Maim, while others of disproportionately small numbers (especially Basotho and 
Ndebele) did. Nevertheless, each of these subject tribes, with the single exception of Basarwa, 
were represented by sub-chiefs and headmen in their own districts, appointed by the 
Batawana chief. In this hierarchy of selective porosity, Basarwa were almost completely 
excluded from attaining formal positions of authority and control over land. There is little 
51 
evidence that Basarwa themselves attempted to achieve formal positions within these 
structures. They either accepted them, attempted to maintain their own autonomy by 
challenging Batawana authority in their own areas, or moved to escape from Batawana 
authority. 
The exclusion of Basarwa was generally comprehensive. Some Bayei were able to rebuild 
small cattle herds for themselves after the devastation of the rinderpest epizootic in 1897 
(Sutherland 1984: 71), a form of wealth that gave them social prestige, through which some 
Bayei even obtained Basarwa serfs. Yet, the few Basarwa in the northern sandveld that were 
able to gain livestock soon lost them to Bakgalagadi. With some exceptions, Basarwa were 
also excluded from initiation ceremonies and subsequent age-regiments, a privilege extended 
to Bayei and other subject tribes. The crucial difference between Basarwa and other subject 
tribes was the position they occupied in the conceptual universe of Batawana, which excluded 
them from the realm of civilised humanity. They were people of naga ('the bush'; place of 
animals, nature, wildness - and Bushmen), as opposed to people of the morse ('the village'; 
place of culture, domesticity, civilisation, humanity). `O a mo nyatsa' ('One despised/reviled 
the Mosarwa') an old Motawana man from a family of balebeleedi in Maun explained to me. 
This gave an ideological justification, not only for the exclusion of Basarwa from attaining 
any position of political authority under the kgamelo system, but also for the appropriation of 
Basarwa labour through enforced servitude. 
Enforced servitude 
In discussing both their past and their present, Basarwa often refer to their history of enforced 
servitude, or koaa-tsi in Bugakhwedam. ̀Our ancestors were owned and used like dogs are 
today', explained Kebuelemang, the headman of Mababe. The Setswana word that 
Kebuelemang, like many others, used was go rua, meaning `to own' or `to raise', a word 
usually used of livestock or other possessions. They were thus dehumanised to the extent of 
being regarded simply as assets useful for their productive potential. In the words of Uma 
Sekere, the now deceased mother of the headman of Gudigwa, whose family had `belonged' 
to a Bakgalagadi family for at least four generations, ̀Anything called Mosarwa was made to 
work'. 
The nature of enforced servitude of subject peoples in the various Batswana chiefdoms has 
been the subject of much debate by both colonial officials and historians. Tlou (1985) 
distinguishes between clientship, which was a voluntary attachment to a particular household, 
and enforced serfdom known in Setswana as botlhanka, but refrains from categorising any 
practices as outright slavery. Nonetheless, despite not being involved in the southern Angolan 
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slave trade, Batawana did trade slaves on occasion, and Ngamiland was known by some Boer 
traders as a source of slaves between 1850 and 1870 (Morton 1994: 229-231). In a letter dated 
10th July 1906 (BNA 1906b), Ralph Williams, the Resident Commissioner reported that in the 
time of the Batawana chiefs Letsholathebe I (1847-1874) and Moremi II (1876-1890), slaves 
were sold among the Batawana, but Moremi II had stopped it. He went on to say that the 
position of Basarwa and other subordinate tribes is 'now not slavery in any sense', but they 
are ̀ subordinate', a judgement he made in comparison to Portuguese-assisted slavery among 
Hambukushu at Nyangana, which he regarded as ̀ real slavery'. He did, however, express his 
concern to the Crown Prosecutor in Mafeking, who replied (BNA 1907b) that according to his 
descriptions, slavery, as defined and outlawed by both Roman-Dutch and English law, existed 
in Ngamiland. 
Oral histories (Tlou 1985: 56, confirmed by my own) indicate that botlhanka had its origins in 
voluntary assistance with labour, as well as the loaning of children for household chores. 
Prior to the 1840s in Ngamiland, it could have been little else, as Batawana lacked the 
political might to enforce it on any significant scale. Tlou (1985) represents Batawana rule in 
their expanding state as fairly benign: `... the Tawana kingdom was thus multi-ethnic and 
multi-cultural, each community being allowed some degree of autonomy'. Certainly the 
vastness of the land they claimed, and the difficulty of traversing large stretches that consisted 
of either swampland or waterless sandveld, militated against severe coercion. However, the 
degree to which Batawana were outnumbered by those they were attempting to subjugate 
promoted the increasing use of terror to coerce subject groups into botlhanka, particularly 
Bayei and Basarwa. Moremi II was reported to have proclaimed in his kgotla that, `We have 
always killed Makuba [Bayei], and taken their children, and we shall go on doing it. (Hepburn 
1896: 262). However, historical sources suggest that the most severe forms of violence were 
aimed at Basarwa. Passarge (1997[1905]: 273), for example, noted that `Bushmen are still 
caught in great numbers, especially young girls are stolen and used as concubines'. Traders 
and missionaries who visited Letsholathebe I during his reign (1847-74) unanimously singled 
him out for his ill treatment of Basarwa. Doman (1925: 66) labelled him `the greatest offender 
in ill-usage of Bushmen'. Andersson (1856: 437) accused him of `setting little value on 
Bushman life', and related an incident of Letsholathebe drowning two Basarwa who failed to 
look after a horse of his, as well as tying a young Mosarwa accused of sheep stealing to a tree 
and using him for target practice. Baines (1864: 175), who visited the Batawana capital in 
1861, accused Letsholathebe of luring a group of Basarwa who had stolen some of his cattle, 
on the pretext of wanting to trade, and then slitting their throats. 
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With the increase of botlhanka under Letsholathebe, Ngamiland gained the reputation towards 
the end of the nineteenth century of being the stronghold of botlhanka among the Batswana 
chiefdoms. Although present in all the Batswana chiefdoms, it was the opinion of the resident 
police chief, Lt. Scolefield, that `slavery is more prevalent among Batawana than any other 
Bechuanaland tribe'. In a letter that he wrote to the Resident Commissioner in Mafeking in 
1897, he went on to describe his understanding of slavery in Ngamiland (BNA 1897): 
The slave owner has the power of life and death over his slaves and this he has no 
compunction to use to its full extent. The owner does not attend to his slaves' 
requirements he does not, probably, he cannot feed them and at such times as these they 
wander about the country in search of food, stealing stock and as often as they get caught 
they get shot. Should a native owner discover one of his slaves working for a white 
master, when impelled by hunger, as often as not they will flog him so unmercifully that 
the wretched fellow dies. 
Local voices also spoke out against treatment of serfs, particularly those that aligned 
themselves with the church. In a letter dated 146' September 1888 to a Setswana newspaper, 
Mahoko a Becwana, Khukhu Mogodi, an evangelist based in Palapye, catalogued a series of 
ill-treatments of batlhanka by a particular Batawana family, among which he wrote the 
following (trans. Raditladi 1998): 
... The elder 
brother to this man [who tied his maidservant to the tail of a running horse] 
killed his Mosarwa. The fault with this Mosarwa was that the killer's younger brother 
married Basarwa prolifically, selecting prettier ones for himself, yet he had a wife from 
among his own people, at home. This Mosarwa who had been married to this man fell in 
love with a fellow Mosarwa and both eloped to live in the bush. This man found them 
and cut off the male Mosarwa's ears and part of the cheeks dangled loose, loaded the 
gun with gunpowder and shot his private parts and the man died a slow death after lots 
of anguish. 
Severe violence as a means of enforcing servitude was therefore a particular characteristic of 
the Batawana chiefdom in the second half of the nineteenth century. The use of terror was an 
integral strategy, alongside institutions such as kgamelo, for the numerically very small tribe 
of Batawana to assert their political authority over subject tribes. Although Basarwa were not 
the only people subject to serfdom they bore the brunt of violent subjugation, inhuman 
treatment that was ideologically underpinned by the liminal position Basarwa occupied in the 
Batawana social universe (cf. Gordon 1992: 212-216). 
British rule (1906-1966) 
Historians generally represent the impact of British colonial rule in Africa as strengthening 
the hand of the local elite, and thus preserving institutions such as botlhanka (see, for 
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example, Morton 1994: 233). But the reality was rather more complex with respect to 
botlhanka in Ngamiland; although colonial authority strengthened local hierarchies in some 
respects, it also functioned to undermine them. 
The British colonial authority took some time to make their presence felt in Ngamiland. 
Despite the declaration of Botswana as a British protectorate in 1885, it was not until 1894 
that the first British administrative post in Ngamiland was established. Even then, it was only 
after the British deposed the `insubordinate' Motawana chief Sekgoma in 1906 that they took 
a more direct role in the affairs of Ngamiland. In the British tradition of colonialism, their rule 
was indirect, channelled through the existing political structures, which tended to strengthen 
the position of chiefs. Nonetheless, colonial rule heralded a new political dispensation based 
on an authority beyond that which Batawana state had made for itself. Eager to assert their 
authority after the deposition of Sekgoma, Ralph Williams, the Resident Commissioner based 
in Mafeking, went on tour to Tsao, the then Batawana capital. He took with him the message 
of this new authority which subsumed Batawana and subject people alike, which he reported 
to The High Commissioner in Johannesburg (BNA 1906a): 
I made them all speeches and, in the simplest words I could, I impressed upon them the 
greatness of the King, the power exercised by your excellency, and the paramount 
necessity of obeying the orders of the government. 
This authority was embodied in the eyes of Batswana in the timeless person of Queen 
Victoria, nicknamed Mmamosadinyana ('The little lady'), to whom three Batswana chiefs had 
gone to petition for British protection in 1885. Colonial rule is referred to today as molao oa 
ga Mmamosadinyana, or `the law of Queen Victoria'. Molao is a pivotal concept 
in 
understanding the construction of Sesarwa ethnicity, one that I return to in later chapters. 
Molao is used by all Sotho-Tswana speakers (Schapera 1955: 35-6, Gluckman 1955: 164ff) to 
refer not only to a body of legal rules, but `law' in its widest sense, encompassing a sense of 
order, authority, and even civilisation. Dominant representations of Basarwa as ̀ people of the 
bush' implied that they lacked this one essential ingredient of sociality; molao. Older Basarwa 
characterise the colonial period as introducing a new form of molao that did not belong to 
Batawana, but encompassed them. In a sense it did to Batawana what the Batawana molao 
had done to Basarwa; defined Batawana as lacking molao in certain respects, particularly in 
their `barbaric' treatment of Basarwa. The imposition of a colonial molao was therefore seen 
to limit the excesses of violence against Basarwa. 
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The issue of slavery was a touchy one for the new British administration, having come 
through the storm of abolition back home. There was continued debate about whether slavery 
existed or not in the various Batswana chiefdoms, culminating in three reports in the 1930s 
(Taggart 1933, London Missionary Society 1935, Joyce 1938), but which focused mainly on 
the Bangwato Reserve, the most powerful of the Batswana polities. The outcomes of each of 
these investigations were equivocal, informed as much by political expediency as a close 
analysis of the situation. Despite the unwillingness of the colonial administration to 
fundamentally challenge the institution of botlhanka, however, the concern of some local 
officials functioned to challenge its excesses. 
One such official was Sgt. Fox, a police officer stationed at Mohembo, on the northern border 
of Ngamiland, who claimed that he had been able to stamp out slavery in the Mohembo area 
(BNA 1935). He referred to cases that had mainly involved Basarwa working for non- 
Basarwa, including people that had been bought for goods (for example, a man and woman 
who had been bought in about 1920 for a gun and a blanket), and people held against their 
wishes. He spread the message in surrounding villages that `anyone who has been a slave and 
applies to be freed from his master, and is in a position to better himself, should be given all 
assistance to get away and begin life in an independent manner'. His method was to offer 
assistance (grain and agricultural equipment) for those wishing to leave slavery, but to stop 
short of enticing them to leave their masters. His activity, however, seems to have been 
confined to established villages: `Natives who are at the cattle posts are not in the habit of 
coming and reporting the wish to leave their masters', he commented (ibid. ). Fox observed 
that many people were attached to masters for whom they worked for no payment, but did not 
want to leave, a state he did not class as slavery. In his estimation, the result of his policy was 
that `nearly all [slaves] have left which proves that independence means quite a lot to them 
and slaveryjust the opposite' (ibid. ). 
The legacy of servitude: memory and experience 
Basarwa in the northern sandveld speak today of botlhanka not just as an institution their 
ancestors were subject to, but as an experience from living memory. The extreme forms of 
terror catalogued by early visitors to Ngamiland were generally no longer a characteristic of 
botlhanka much beyond the beginning of the twentieth century, yet coercion through violence 
(or the threat of it) was still common. The regular payment of tribute (sehuba) to the 
Batawana chieftainship was a well-established practice that lasted in Mababe until 1940, and 
some years later in Gudigwa. Thereafter it became less regular and more haphazard. Tribute 
was most commonly given in the form of honey, meat, skins or ivory. The form of enforced 
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servitude experienced by many of the older residents of the northern sandveld was coercion 
into itinerant labour, particularly portage. This was usually instigated by Bakgalagadi hunters 
and traders, who themselves often hunted on behalf of Batawana. ̀ I have been beaten by 
Bakgalagadi', Mma Area, a 60 year old woman from Khwai told me, `They stepped on my 
neck, which is why it is weak now. They treated us as donkeys. If we refused [to do what they 
wanted], they beat us'. Taking children for domestic servants and girls and women as 
concubines was a practice that also lasted well into the twentieth century. `Batawana would 
come here and be well behaved, ' explained Mma Kgosi, the wife of Mababe's 70 year-old 
headman, of the time of her childhood, ̀ until the time came to leave, and then they would take 
a child'. 
Several families in Gudigwa, were `owned' by Bakgalagadi families for whom they worked, a 
relationship that was passed down from generation to generation. Mmadifalana, a 65 year old 
woman now resident in Khwai, described the nature of this relationship with a Bakgalagadi 
family at Gabamukuni: 
I know how to speak Sekgalagadi, as they owned [go rua] us. My parents worked for 
them, doing things like hunting and working in their fields, but they were not paid. They 
were owned by Nyangana's family. I was a child then, so I wasn't forced to work. They 
were like our parents. If we did something wrong, they would hit us like a child, but they 
weren't bad. They sometimes married us. We stayed on the edge of their village. We ate 
from their fields, and when they killed a cow, they gave us meat. We would sometimes 
accompany them on journeys to Maun, and be given things they bought. If Basarwa 
complained, they were beaten, but when they were fed up with being told what to do, 
they refused. 
By the mid-twentieth century, a greater degree of `negotiation' was possible, as 
Mmadifalana's description illustrates. In part to escape from servitude to Nyangana's family, 
her family moved from Gabamukuni to Khwai in the late 1960s. 
Kaiyowe, a 43 year old nephew of the headman of Gudigwa's first wife, is one of the 
youngest residents of the northern sandveld to have personally experienced servitude. I 
found 
him staying with the headman's family in Gudigwa, where he had been taken by a relative in 
1996 who had happened upon him at a Kwangari doctor's cattle-post outside Rundu in 
Namibia. As a boy, he had gone with his older sister's family to Rundu to look for work. The 
doctor had taken him as a house-help, and then, after his retirement, to his cattle-post to look 
after his cattle, where Kaiyowe had worked until recognised and ̀ rescued' by his relative. 
He 
had been paid with nothing other than the food he ate and the clothes he wore. 
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Kaiyowe's case was perhaps atypical for its time. At the end of the twentieth century, some 
Basarwa in the northern sandveld were still working for notoriously low wages, such as a calf 
per year for full-time herding, but these were the only cases I found where no form of 
monetary payment was involved. Yet servitude nevertheless constitutes a lived experience in 
the minds of many Basarwa in the northern sandveld, and a most personal reminder of the 
ethnic hierarchies that evolved in the Batawana chiefdom. Although the nature of 
mistreatment that these ethnic categories permitted has changed over time, the hierarchies 
themselves have persisted. Serfdom had all but disappeared by independence in 1966, but it 
continued to provide a frame of reference through which to take issue with contemporary 
practices that were reminiscent of those associated with servitude. For example, Mma Kgosi 
from Mababe pointed to the skin of a rogue lion they had just killed, which the law defined as 
a government trophy, and exclaimed to me. `You see, we still pay tribute! ' The legacy of 
serfdom often surfaced in contemporary claims of unequal or derisory treatment by 
government officials or non-Basarwa neighbours, thus structuring the way that Basarwa 
conceptualise such interactions. In a similar manner, however, Basarwa also draw upon a 
history of challenging servitude in attempts to challenge contemporary incidents of perceived 
unequal treatment. 
Contesting servitude 
Despite the degree of terror used to subjugate Basarwa, numerous instances were recorded of 
resistance by Basarwa to the established order. One of the most common means by which 
Basarwa resisted servitude was simply to move. Seiner (1977[1910]: 35-6), for example, noted 
that many Basarwa from the northern sandveld fled to eastern Caprivi and western Zambia to 
escape Batawana overlordship. He also documented counter-movements to escape 
Hambukushu and Marotse overlordship. Similar migrations occurred between the 1940s and 
1970s: from the Gabamukuni area eastwards along the northern edge of the Okavango Delta 
towards Khwai; and from the eastern side of the Linyanti/Kwando River system to eastern 
Caprivi. Such moves were to escape not only mistreatment by Bakgalagadi, but also 
restrictions on hunting. Zibiso, a forty year old man, who by 1997 had returned to Botswana, 
explained why his family had fled to Caprivi when he was a child: 
I was born at ! Omxa [in the sandveld near Kwando]. When I was still a small boy, my 
father was arrested by police at Kwando for hunting giraffe. It was in 1971, and we had 
killed a buffalo and then a giraffe, which we were eating. When we saw a car coming, 
we knew we were in trouble. The police took me and the other youngsters back to our 
village, which we had made near Kwando [hunting] camp because my parents worked 
there. But they beat the four adults, and took them and the meat to Maun. Khomba and 
Elias got two years in jail, although Elias was let out early. The others came back free. 
Those days we just ate freely, not thinking that people would come and stop us. After 
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that incident, we saw we would all end up in trouble, so our parents moved over to 
Lizauli in Namibia. At that time, it was easy to cross the border. 
During the colonial period, disappearing into the vast sandveld was not so easy for Bayei, 
who lived in fairly settled villages. The testimony of early commentators indicates that 
Basarwa were more active than Bayei, not only in escaping domination, but also in actively 
resisting it. For example, following his tour of Ngamiland in 1906, Ralph Williams, the 
Resident Commissioner, expressed his puzzlement at the ease with which Bayei, who he 
heard refer to themselves as ̀ but flies on a milk pail', seemed to accept Batawana domination 
(BNA 1906c). He described Bayei as ̀ a fine athletic race and merry fellows but humble to a 
degree in estimating their own powers and position... . Mathibe and Tawana put these great 
big hearty Makuba's [Bayei's] necks under the yoke like an ox in a span'. Basarwa around the 
Okavango Delta, however, gained themselves a reputation for not being so accepting of 
domination, as illustrated by a conversation related by Lt Reilly of the Bechuanaland 
Protectorate Police on a patrol of Mababe District in 1907 (BNA 1907a). He noted that some 
`Bechuanas' from Khama's country were terrorising `Makubas [Bayei], Masubias and 
Masarwas', then commented, 
One of the Masarwas who overheard the foregoing [kidnapping of a Moyei girl by a 
Motawana] told them it was the old story, the Makubas [Bayei] would never stick 
up for their rights, and asked them why they would not take a lesson from the 
Masarwas and the white men who were, in his opinion, the only people who knew 
how to keep the Batawana in his place. The Masarwa method, I understand, is 
somewhat drastic. 
This `somewhat drastic' method was, no doubt, the threat of poisoned arrows, which 
Livingstone (1857) alleged could cause Batawana to `change their manners to fawning 
sycophancy' when they met Bushmen. Baines (1864: 175) also commented that Letsholathebe 
(who, as we saw, was not shy of committing atrocities against Basarwa), `dared not engage 
them' on their own ground. Basarwa themselves were known to use violence to directly 
challenge the system of authority, such as in the case of a //Anikhwe man who shot and 
killed 
an Mbukushu tax collector with an arrow in June 1905 (Seiner 1977[1910]: 34). 
These threats 
and actions, as Reilly's unnamed Mosarwa observed, served in these contexts to reverse 
the 
established order of power that usually regulated interaction between Basarwa and non- 
Basarwa" 
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Probably the greatest single challenge to Batawana authority in Ngamiland came from a 
Mosarwa leader remembered as N/aikhwe, 15 who claimed authority over a large tract of land 
near the panhandle of the Delta, and refused to pay tribute to the Batawana chieftainship. He 
is remembered as a hero by Basarwa in the region today, who recount his attitude as being, 
`Those arriving in this land [i. e. Batawana] should be the ones to bring tribute to those they 
found here'. As such, he presented a challenge not only to the system of authority, but also to 
the moral universe on which this authority was predicated. Batawana were swift to punish 
such obstinacy, and in 1881/2, Moremi II dispatched a regiment that killed N/aikhwe (cf. 
Hurwitz 1956: 22). 
Alongside these historical accounts is a genre of contemporary narratives eulogising instances 
of revolt against mistreatment. Some of these refer to incidents in the distant past, such as that 
of N/aikhwe, or the claim that the ancestors of those presently in Mababe once beat 
Molatedi's grandfather with sticks - in the words of one old man from Mababe - `to stop him 
trying to oppress us, and because he thought we were Basarwa and didn't respect us'. 
Molatedi was the chief of Shorobe, whose family had been made responsible for collecting 
tribute from Mababe and Sankuyu on behalf of the Batawana chieftainship. Other accounts 
refer to more recent acts of revolt, such as beating up game scouts who accused them of 
poaching. For example, in the late 1960s Kwere, the late headman of Khwai, tied a game 
scout to a tree who had reported him for illegally killing a giraffe. People in Gudigwa also 
talk of instances such as the time a Department of Wildlife and National Parks vehicle arrived 
with a resident they believed was unfairly accused of poaching rhino. Men and women set 
upon the vehicle when it entered the village, breaking its windows and beating the officers 
with whatever they had at hand, including sticks, live chickens and charcoal. It is not always 
possible to ascertain retrospectively the level of exaggeration in such stories, but they carry 
the common theme of celebrating brazen acts of resistance to a system that they believe 
continues to discriminate against them because of their ethnicity. As such, these narratives 
forge a link between the past and the present, keeping alive a sense of not only the existence 
of discrimination, but also of active resistance to it. 
Basarwa also challenge the legitimacy of Batawana hegemony in Ngamiland on a discursive 
level. `Batawana are really Basarwa', was a comment I frequently heard, referring in part to 
memories of the bouts of nomadism and foraging that Batawana endured as a means of 
survival in their early years in Ngamiland, when they existed on a relatively equal level with 
15 Some Khwe-speaking Basarwa in northwestern Ngamiland refer to themselves as N/aikhwe. He is 
therefore most probably remembered today after the name of his people. 
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Basarwa. This comment also refers to the numerical status of Batawana subsequently being 
boosted by incorporating Basarwa (among other `minorities') into their ranks by 
appropriating the reproductive capacity of Basarwa women, whose children were then 
brought up as Batswana. By implying the real Motswana is a Mosarwa, Basarwa turn on its 
head the often-quoted (Gadibolae 1984, Morton 1994: 248, Wilmsen 1995a: 319) Setswana 
adage, `Mosarwa ke yo motonanyana, yo 'monamagadi ke Mongwato', meaning, `The real 
Mosarwa is the male one, the female one is a Mongwato'. 16 Basarwa in the northern sandveld 
also refer to Batawana derisively as Barwa, the name by which they were known when they 
arrived in Ngamiland (Passarge 1997 [1905]: 225), meaning `those that come from the south'. 
Ironically, Barwa was also the name that southern Batswana used to refer to those now called 
Basarwa. Many Basarwa speak as well of the open secret that Seretse Khama (the first 
president of Botswana)'s mother was a Mosarwa. 17 Thus Dice, Khwai's Village Development 
Committee chairman, could contend that, `when Ian [Khama, son of Seretse, and then head of 
the Botswana Defence Force and its Anti-Poaching Unit] comes here he respects us, because 
he knows he is among bo-malome [his mother's brothers]'. Each of these statements serves to 
discursively undermine Batswana claims to difference from Basarwa, and thus their claims of 
superiority. 
Servitude and other forms of mistreatment form an important part not only of the collective 
memory, but also of the individual experiences of many older adults. Nonetheless, as these 
various examples demonstrate, Basarwa often did not passively accept domination. It was 
often directly or indirectly resisted. These acts of resistance form an important element of 
contemporary narratives of inequality and domination, which also serve to undermine the 
legitimacy of contemporary Batawana hegemony. 
Authority and incorporation 
Basarwa, as those who may be classed as `peasants' in Africa, have historically managed to 
enjoy a degree of autonomy from the state. Their principle form of struggle has been over the 
extent of this partial autonomy. Most studies of peasant resistance in Africa have set the arena 
of autonomy as agriculture, in resistance to labour (Isaacsman 1990: 58), whereas in the case 
of Basarwa the possibility of hunting and gathering has provided a measure of autonomy from 
both agriculture and labour. However, both kgamelo and botlhanka worked to articulate 
Basarwa into the dominant system of authority as an underclass, and thus reduce their scope 
for autonomy. 
16 Bangwato are the largest of the Setswana-speaking tribes of Botswana. 
11 Probably from the Nata area, where Khama kept many of his cattle. 
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Of course, authority over people and over land was not a privilege that originated solely with 
Batawana. Basarwa too had their own band leaders, which were referred to by Batawana as 
Rraabo ('their father'), rather than kgosi (`chief) or even kgosana ('little chief' r 
`headman'). The Bugakhwedam and Ts'exadam word for 'chief, //'axa, was also generally 
reserved for non-Basarwa. Although they were given no official title or position by the 
Batawana chieftainship, Basarwa leaders still functioned as intermediaries through whom 
tribute was collected, or hunting parties organised. As such, these local structures of power 
were recognised, incorporated, and `hidden' into the dominant Batawana structures. One 
example of this was the practice of taking Basarwa women as wives (rather than concubines). 
Hambukushu chiefs, for example, had a practice of taking one Mosarwa wife (Christo Weiss: 
pers. comm. ) as a means of incorporating them into their social sphere, and thus maintaining a 
degree of control over them. In a similar manner, some Basarwa today claim that Seretse's 
Mosarwa mother was a purposeful strategy to end talk of motswakwa (`foreigners'), a derisive 
label that Basarwa gave Batswana to undermine the legitimacy of their authority. 
As violent coercion decreased through the twentieth century, the continuation of established 
social hierarchies depended less on violence and more on the hegemony that naturalised such 
conceptions of power, promoting the acceptance of them by subject people. This was clearly 
evident in a reply Sangando gave to a young man who facetiously asked him as we visited his 
ancestral land why he votes for a `black' government (literally #u - `head'), leaving behind 
his own `head' here in his land. Sangando was one of the oldest men in his village, and also 
one of the least willing to be `villagised' when the government created Gudigwa as a 
settlement in 1988, and as such he represented what the young considered to be ̀ old ways' of 
thinking. `We had no head and were spread around this land', Sangando replied. `BDP [the 
ruling party since independence] became our head and pulled us together'. Political authority 
thus became accepted by some Basarwa as something to which they needed to become 
subject, but which they themselves could not own. 
The degree to which previous generations accepted these social structures was at times a point 
of teasing between young and old. Take, for example, the following jibe by Oral, the headman 
of Gudigwa's son, to Patrick, the head of Gudigwa's Village Development Committee, as 
they discussed the possibilities of Gudigwa setting up their own CBNRM Project: 
0: We are giving up on you old people. You tried and failed. It is yourselves that have 
messed us up. 
P: How? 
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0: Well, for example, rushing to your white friends to get them involved in our project 
without proper consultation first. 
P: Whites are our friends. We need them for our project to succeed. 
0: But they cheated you. They came and used your Special Game Licences to hunt and 
took most of your meat. The blacks cheated you as well. They came and took what they 
wanted from your land, and you just let them do it. What did you say to them when they 
told you to carry their belongings? ̀You are welcome here with your good manners'? 
[laughter]. 
P: In those days we were not aware that such behaviour was wrong. It is only now that 
we realise that such things are oppression, and we will not stand for it. 
The forms of Batawana hegemony that resulted in Basarwa being `unaware' that what they 
were subject to could or should have been anything different began to be broken down during 
the colonial era, and received further blows after independence in 1966. The new president, 
Seretse Khama, actively promoted a message of equality as citizens of Botswana. Returning 
to Sangando, he related the arrival of Seretse's message thus: 
I remember when the chief [Seretse Khama] said botlhanka should stop. It was after 
independence. I heard the message [passed on] at the kgotla in Seronga, and I was 
happy. They said that we are all made by God, and our only master is him. They said 
that you cannot own [go rua] your younger brother, when our father is present. I 
understood and liked that message, but some refused to listen to it. It was this molao 
[law] that made it possible for me to refuse botlhanka. Before that I was just in the bush 
and didn't know anything. 
Sangando was frequently joked with for being, in his own words, `just in the bush and not 
knowing anything'. For example, there was the time he was taken to court in 1981 because he 
tried to sell a pair of elephant tusks to an undercover policeman for the princely sum of P30 
(then equivalent to about £15). Statements such as that by Sangando about the bush and 
ignorance reveal not only the extent of Batawana hegemony, but also the potent symbolism 
that this hegemony brought into being. `The bush' became not just the realm of Basarwa, but 
a domain of ignorance and powerlessness; a recurring theme in this thesis. 
With respect to their Basarwa neighbours, Batswana achieved a feat that Morton (1994: 239) 
points out was almost unique in Africa; that of reducing their immediate neighbours to 
bondage. He suggests two reasons why many Basarwa tolerated this subjugation. Firstly, 
fleeing was generally not an option, as ̀ most Basarwa simply had nowhere to go if their land 
was conquered' (1994: 240), and secondly, staying put generally allowed Basarwa to continue 
using their own land for activities such as foraging. The experiences of Basarwa in the 
northern sandveld contradict the first reason, but concur with the second. As the next chapter 
will make clear, kinship networks extended over vast distances, and there was a fair degree of 
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fluidity in the membership of territory-based social groups that these networks allowed (cf. 
Silberbauer 1981: 142 for G/wi and G//anna). Basarwa who wanted to move to escape 
subjugation thus often could, and did, do so. I suggest that the pervasive domination of 
Basarwa was enabled by a combination of Batawana hegemony that to an extent naturalised a 
strong social hierarchy, along with the strategic use of terror. Furthermore, as Morton 
correctly observes, fleeing was tantamount to surrendering claim to the land on which they 
lived, a cost that many Basarwa did not want to pay for the opportunity to escape subjugation. 
This was attested to by Uma Sekere, 85-year old mother of Gudigwa's headman, whose 
family endured at least four generations of `ownership' by Bakgalagadi in their land: 
We did not flee, because it was our own land, and we did not want to give it up. We 
stayed so that when they died or went, we would still have our land. 
Their patience paid off; she passed away during my fieldwork, in her own land, and no longer 
a servant of Bakgalagadi. 
Conclusion 
The particular historical experience of the various encounters between Basarwa and Bantu- 
speaking immigrants in Ngamiland illuminates the means by which ethnicity has become a 
central factor in negotiating access to political power. Their status as `hunter-gatherers', and 
thus somehow different from the agro-pastoralist societies that came to dominate them, 
ensured that they were excluded from the political hierarchies that were established in 
Ngamiland over the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Rather than their ethnic label being a 
product of economic domination, as revisionists argue, this prior relation of difference proved 
useful to the expanding Batawana polity in justifying and facilitating their economic 
subjugation. 
The nature of domination has changed over the past three centuries of interaction between 
Basarwa and Bantu-speakers in Ngamiland. From initial relationships of equality and mutual 
co-operation, Batawana were able to consolidate their political authority through the selective 
incorporation of subject tribes, which excluded Basarwa. Basarwa instead found themselves 
subject to increasing coercion and violence in efforts to secure their services. Although the 
frequency of such violent excesses declined through the twentieth century, their vestiges 
remain in the experiences of older Basarwa, and in the collective memories of both young and 
old. Their vestiges also remain in the continued social stigma of being labelled `Mosarwa', 
and perceived mistreatment this sometimes entails. This is a history that has contributed to 
shaping present patterns of power in Ngamiland, and also one which Basarwa often refer to in 
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making sense of, and challenging, contemporary structures of authority. Just as dominant 
notions of Basarwa ethnicity were used to ideologically underpin their domination, 
expressions of Basarwa ethnicity, drawing in part on a common experience of subjugation, 
are becoming used to challenge relations of inequality. 
Probably the most salient legacy of these patterns of domination in the northern sandveld is 
their spatial expression in the landscape. Control over land is today an issue of intense 






Land and landscape 
On most maps of Botswana, the large green triangle of the Okavango Delta sits conspicuously 
in the centre of Ngamiland. On larger scale maps, the complex topographical features are 
faithfully displayed in great detail; the myriad perennial and annual waterways, as well as 
floodplains, tracks, islands, safari camps, along with the variously-ascribed names of each of 
these places. The northern sandveld, in contrast, is conspicuous only by the large expanse of 
emptiness that marks the space between the Okavango Delta and the Caprivi Strip. Apart 
from a few sites on old trade routes, and old tourist camps, the land is represented as 
featureless and without name. To those with the power to make maps, the northern sandveld 
may not carry the hydrological or tourist interest of the adjacent Delta. Nonetheless, its 
intricate surface of sands and soils, waterholes, trees and animal routes, is intimately known 
and named by those who have lived in it. Yet, this land is more than an inert series of features 
that can be reduced to colours and lines on a map. It is also a landscape of semiotics (cf. 
Moore 1993: 396) that carries a web of shared and contested meanings between the many 
different people that have experience and interest in it. 
Within the context of the wider structures of authority and power developed in the preceding 
chapter, this chapter draws the analysis to the particular historical contexts of Khwai, Mababe 
and Gudigwa, focusing particularly on patterns of authority over land. The experiences and 
contexts of each of these three villages provides a lens for examining a different aspect of the 
overall story of material and symbolic struggle over land, which has been shaped largely by 
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the ascendant demands on land of conservation and tourism. The first section, on the changing 
patterns of Basarwa land tenure through different historical dispensations, refers mainly to the 
experiences of Gudigwa, and Khwai and Mababe provide the base for the second and third 
sections on the more contemporary dynamics of the rise of conservationism. 
Gudigwa 
The village of Gudigwa was created in 1988, through the Remote Area Development 
Programme's policy of creating service centres in rural areas, to promote the aggregation of 
scattered settlements. It was made up mostly of people that moved there from //Gam/wi, and 
Letshaobe, both nearby settlements. Each of these small settlements was in turn made up of 
people that had moved together at different times in the preceding decade, from their different 
family areas that covered much of the northern sandveld. The population of Gudigwa was 
hard to estimate, as it was in constant flux; residents moved to and from Namibia, Shakawe 
and Maun as they went to school, sought work, or visited relatives. I counted 345 residents in 
April 1998, but 649 people were registered for food handouts under the CBPP programme. 
Allowing for a few beneficial `phantom' residents, the total population of Gudigwa was 
probably around 600, of which one-half to two-thirds may actually be there at any one time. 
Yet Gudigwa did not give the impression of being a village of this size. From any one place in 
the village, no more than a handful of huts were visible. Gudigwa could be more accurately 
described as a cluster of small villages spread over several kilometres, with each section (of 
the ten families that came together to form Gudigwa) separated by a band of trees. The layout 
of Gudigwa is therefore a spatial expression of both the centripetal forces arising from the 
advantages of living together, and the centrifugal forces inherited from a history of smaller 
units of social organisation. Apart from a cattle post at Dishokora (Plate 3.3), Gudigwa is now 
the only settlement remaining on the land that its residents claim historically as their own. As 
such, it represents the culmination of a process of gradual agglomeration that has been taking 
place over the past two generations. Kinship bonds extend between these family groups, 
uniting all the residents of Gudigwa, so that each is able to claim at least some form of 
relation to the others. All the residents of Gudigwa consider themselves Bugakhwe, making 
Gudigwa probably the largest wholly Basarwa village in Botswana. 
'Mapping the land' 
Mapping their ancestral land was an idea that arose from discussions on how to present their 
case to be allocated an area of land under the new Community Based Natural Resource 
(CBNRM) programme. The residents of Gudigwa were unhappy at being combined in a 
Community Trust with four other villages; Seronga, Gunitshoga, Ereetsha and Beetsha, each 
of which only have a minority of Bugakhwe or //Anikhwe residents, and are dominated 
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numerically and politically by Hambukushu and/or Bayei. The Trust, named Okavango 
Community Trust (OCT), was allocated two Controlled Hunting Areas (CHAs), NG22 and 
NG23, which were a distance from Gudigwa itself (Map 3.1). The residents of Gudigwa felt 
that the other villages did not respect them, being Basarwa, as equal partners in OCT, thus 
denying them a fair share of the benefits. They felt this especially sharply, as they had given 
up their Special Game Licences, which allowed each family to hunt a quota of animals, in 
exchange for a Community Quota, given to OCT as a whole. All in all, people in Gudigwa 
felt that they had sacrificed more, and benefited less, than the other villages in OCT. They 
therefore wanted to secede, in order to form their own Community Trust, and be allocated 
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Debating which areas that they could be allocated under CBNRM became a discussion of the 
different boundaries that had been drawn across their land, and their potential entitlements 
within them. They spoke of their own historic family boundaries, of the ten families that had 
come together over the last two generations to form Gudigwa. In places these boundaries 
were crosscut by the colonial ones now marked between Botswana and the Caprivi Strip by a 
triple fence, the middle one electrified. There were the boundaries on the map drawn up in 
1968 that divided Ngamiland into concession areas for citizen hunting and safari hunting, 
determining where Gudigwa could hunt the animals listed on their Special Game Licences. 
These fell away and were replaced with new divisions in 1991 (GOB 1991) when 
Ngamiland's concession areas were redrawn, dividing the whole district into 49 Controlled 
Hunting Areas, some of which could be allocated to villages for management under CBNRM 
(Map 7.1). Finally, there was the very real boundary created by the northern buffalo fence, 
passing six kilometres east of Gudigwa (Plate 3.4). Built in 1991, and extended in 1997, it 
divides land in which cattle are allowed (north and west), from land in which they are not 
(south and east). The fence also affects livelihood potentials (from both subsistence hunting 
and tourism) by blocking migration routes of ungulates, thus reducing wildlife numbers on 
both sides of the fence, but particularly on the cattle side (Albertson 1997). 
These were all boundaries that Gudigwa had to consider in their struggles for land. Doing so 
involved, in part, going back to the only boundaries that they had themselves instituted; those 
of their own family lands. This was initially an oral process, one that arose in discussions of 
entitlement to land. Such discussions often led to people referring to the names of their 
ancestral lands, listing the names of the different areas as they mentally walked through them. 
Expounding such oral maps was a local strategy akin to more formal techniques of drawing 
maps known as `counter-mapping' (Peluso 1995). Counter-mapping has come to be a popular 
tool by which political movements and community groups attempt to counter dominant 
representations of property regimes and landuse practices (Poole 1995). Most residents of 
Gudigwa had never seen any maps of their area to be aware of the big expanse of blankness 
around their village. Neither were they aware before our discussions of the potential of 
creating their own map to promote their own land rights or provide the basis for a possible 
management plan for their area. While paper maps may not have otherwise meant much in a 
generally non-literate society, the residents of Gudigwa were very aware of the power of 
written information and images about their land. For example, Amos, whose land area was the 
largest of the ten, was offended that the aerial photos we referred to as we mapped his land, 
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Plate 3.1: Entering Gudigwa. 




Plate 3.3: Cattle at Dishokora being watered. 
Plate 3.4: Buffalo fence near Gudigwa. 

produced by the Department of Surveys and Lands, had been taken without his permission. 
Thus the idea of producing a `counter map' of Gudigwa's ancestral land was born. Masarwa 
Community, the committee they had set up themselves to motivate for their own CHA, 
arranged for members of each family to go out with me to their respective ancestral lands and 
plot important sites of settlement, boundary, subsistence, water and travel: 
Three intense weeks of driving and walking produced a map covering an area of about 
7,000 square kilometres, in which we recorded 454 place names. Like much of the 
Kalahari, the land is flat, except the northern section that undulates with east - west 
running fossil sand dunes. It is a mosaic of fossil riverbeds, whose clay soils seasonally 
hold water in the waterholes that are scattered along them, and the sand mantle that rises 
almost imperceptibly between the clay depressions. The clay depressions support thick 
monostands of mopane (//oro, Colophospermum mopane) interspersed with leadwood 
(A'oo, Combretum imberbe). The sand mantle between these depressions supports more 
varied vegetation, dominated in the south by species such as Kalahari Christmas tree 
(/oe, Dichrostachys cinerea), sand yellowwood (tsheree, Terminalia sericea) and raisin 
bush (//gani, Grewia spp). As one moves northwards, this changes to more open 
grassland with canopies of bloodwood (n/gao, Pterocarpus an olensis and Rhodesian 
teak (gwa, Baikiaea lurp ijuga). In the south, the sandveld meets the open grassland of the 
old floodplains, dotted with thickly wooded islands of trees (Bugakhwe land taxonomy 
is listed in Appendix Two). Driving through land with no roads or tracks was a difficult 
process. Most of the time we followed the well-used elephant paths that formed a 
network linking each waterhole to adjacent ones. Elephants did the work of maintaining 
a gap through the bush, which made these paths the easiest routes for animals and people 
on their journeys. Known as oo dao [oo - gap, dao - path], these paths, with waterholes 
at their intersections, were the spines that made up the mental maps of the landscape, 
upon which hung other areas of importance (Plates 3.5,3.6). Except for a few isolated 
safari hunting camps, and the cattle post at Dishokora, this land is now uninhabited. Yet, 
people who have now moved to Gudigwa lived in parts of it recently enough that there 
are sites where wells that have not caved in, roof support poles are standing, and where 
the debris of life, such as shoes, knives and ploughs, can be found (Plate 3.2). 
By sharing knowledge of the land - not only its names, but also the location of fruitful areas 
and sites where water was close to the surface -I was inserted into Gudigwa's negotiations of 
power over land; given knowledge that could be used against, as well as for, their interests. 
Initially, there were lively private debates about my involvement in mapping their land. I first 
discovered this when Sangando, one of the elder men, asked me, `Some people say you are 
writing down our land so you can kill Basarwa and take our land. Is that true? ' The issue of 
land was without doubt a very sensitive one locally, illustrating not only its importance in the 
present, but also their painful history of alienation from it. Basarwa were very aware that in 
showing the land to others in the past who had then taken control of it - chiefs, 
administrators, hunters, conservationists - that they had been implicated in the alienation of 
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their own land. '8 I was thus left with a caution not to share sensitive information with officials 
who may be able to use it to the detriment of residents of Gudigwa, such as in anti-poaching 
operations. 
Maps represent views of the land, sites and channels of interest to those with the power to 
influence mapmaking. They therefore speak of authority and power not just to name, but to 
make those names heard. This is a form of power generally held by the state, which can use 
maps to more effectively control a peasant or tenant population (Harley 1988: 284, Scott 
1998). Creating a map for Gudigwa's own use thus became an exercise in -appropriating the 
`power to nominate' (Parkin 1982: xlvi), and asserting the rights that should come from their 
own power to name the land. Travelling through their family lands also presented numerous 
opportunities to discuss their relationships to land, both past and present. What arose 
displayed a unity of social identity, local history and landscape, as much an expression of 
identity as a declaration of rightful possession. These expressions were rooted in the concrete 
representations of places, and stand in contrast to the more abstract Edenic ideas of African 
landscape explored in the next chapter. I use what arose from some of these discussions as a 
basis for the following sections on the historical nature of Basarwa land tenure, the impact on 
land tenure systems of non-Basarwa immigrants, and contemporary attitudes to land tenure. 
Historical land tenure 
The nature of Basarwa land tenure has been a contentious issue, especially as it has come to 
bear on issues of contemporary land rights. In facing the very real issue of the erosion of land 
rights for Basarwa, Wily (1994: 8) argues that `the most urgent need at this point is simply for 
the state to recognise, once and for all, that contrary to local opinion, Basarwa did own land 
through their customary tenure system'. Recognising that anthropological constructions of 
Basarwa as nomadic have contributed to misconceptions that Basarwa make no claims to 
specific territories, 19 anthropologists have tended since the 1970s to stress notions of Basarwa 
territoriality. Lee, for example, reversed his original tenet that Ju/'hoansi have no concept of 
land tenure (1972), to state that they `do own the land they occupy' (1979: 337). However, 
concepts such as ̀ own' and `territory' are socially related concepts that have little meaning 
18 Most of the early white travellers through Ngamiland gave credit to the Basarwa guides on whom 
they were so reliant. The Resident Commissioner, for example, described Basarwa on a visit to Mababe 
in 1906 as ̀ the most useful to meet of all people' (BNA 1906a). 
19 The most often-quoted remark of this nature was made by a litigation consultant in the Attorney 
General's Chambers regarding common-law leases of tribal land in 1978: ̀ As far as I have been able to 
ascertain, the Masarwa have always been true nomads, owing no allegiance to any chief or tribe, but 
have ranged far and wide for a very long time over large areas of the Kalahari... . It appears to me that 
a true nomad Masarwa can have no rights of any kind except to hunting' (in Hitchcock 1978: 242). 
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unless embedded in the social systems of which they are a part (Carstens 1983: 60). The 
process of writing land tenure systems as an institution can give the impression that they 
existed as a coherent set of rules and practices, which they did not (Peters 1994, Neumann 
1997). There were, nonetheless, commonalities - subject to some debate - in the way land 
tenure in the past was spoken about, and it is both these commonalities and the contemporary 
debates over them that are examined here. 
While there are differences in the tenure systems of the many people that have become 
subsumed under the umbrella `Basarwa' (Barnard 1992a: 223ff), the most important common 
element is that entitlement to land has been mediated through social relationships (e. g. 
Cashdan 1977: 22-4 for G//ana; Heinz 1972 for ! XÖ; Barnard 1979,1980 for Nharo; 
Silberbauer 1981: 99 for G/wi; Lee 1979: 333-43 for Ju/'hoansi). People therefore became 
associated with geographic space through their position in a social network. Ownership was 
therefore neither individual nor absolute, but negotiated by individuals through relationships 
at a community level; a principle that applied to tenure systems across southern Africa, 
Basarwa and Bantu-speakers alike. These similarities made tenure systems between Basarwa 
and their neighbours mutually intelligible, and, to some extent, complementary, so that their 
landholdings could overlap where necessary. Figuring entitlement through a social matrix that 
extended over many hundred of kilometres enabled migration over wide areas. The origins of 
some of the elderly residents of Gudigwa, for example, ranges from southern Angola and 
western Zambia to the north, and beyond the Okavango River to the west. Many such people 
gained, or concretised, entitlement to lands in the northern sandveld through marriage. Gross- 
cousin marriage was the preferred norm, as for other Khwe speakers (Barnard 1992a: 127, 
Silberbauer 1981: 148), and I estimated that about eighty percent of northern sandveld 
residents over the age of sixty had married a classificatory cross-cousin. 
The land that people in Gudigwa considered their own was divided into ten family 
`territories', as illustrated on the map that was produced from the land mapping (Appendix 
Five). These were not, however, absolute territories belonging to absolute families. Our land 
mapping exercise captured land ownership as it was figured in a specific historical moment; 
memories at the end of the twentieth century of lived patterns from several decades 
previously. Relations were, and are, negotiable, and consequently entitlements to land, and 
the way land was divided, also changed. The average size of the seven territories whose 
complete borders we were able to map (counting Amos and Sangando's land as two), was 915 
square kilometres (Table 3.1). Although this figure is significantly larger than the 300-600 
square kilometres that Lee (1979: 334) estimated for Ju/'hoan nloresi in Ngamiland's western 
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sandveld, the per capita area of territory is similar; roughly 30.5 square kilometres per person 
for Bugakhwe in Gudigwa, as compared to Lee's 24 square kilometres. 20 The larger overall 
territory size for Bugakhwe may be partly due to the gradual agglomeration of land that has 
taken place. For example, the largest of the territories mapped was that of Amos, which in the 
past was considered separate from Sangando's land. Due to the close relationship of the two 
families, they have used each other's land, and over the past generation, have congregated for 
extended periods in common villages such as Ghoi and Letshaobe. A similar process appears 
to have occurred in the Kgalagadi District, where Wily (1974: 21) reported an average 
territory size of 1,500 square kilometres, but each with about 150 claimants. Land was also 
divisible, as relationships changed. //Ae/exo's land, lying to the west of Kharakhwe's, 
provides a case in point. In the early 1900s, his father, Borakanelo, migrated down from 
Bwabwata on the border between West Caprivi and Angola. Borakanelo was following his 
sister, who had been married to a man from the Dishokora area. Borakanelo already had a 
wife from Namibia, and took Kharakhwe's classificatory sister as a second wife. Kharakhwe 
in turn took Borakanelo's daughter, and //Ae/exo's half sister, Kwima, as a wife. As a result 
of this double alliance, Kharakhwe gave Borakanelo the western portion of his land, which is 






Amos and Sangando 
(combined) 1978 
Average 915 
Table 3.1; Family land size for seven of the ten main families that now live in Gudigwa. 
20 Based on an average occupancy size of thirty (my estimate) for Bugakhwe in a territory of 915 




Plate 3.6: Amos drawing maps in the 
sand; a network of waterholes (oro) 
connected by elephant paths (oo dao). 
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Plate 3.5: Elephant path through the bush 

The Bugakhwedam and Ts'exadam word for land is ngu, which Cashdan (1977: 224) 
translates for //Ganakhwe as 'place' or 'territory'. This is similar in meaning to the Ju/'hoansi 
word nlore, which Wilmsen (1989a: S1-54) argues carries connotations of belonging, and 
translates as 'place in land/country' (1989b: 162). However, the Bugakhwcdam ngu is closer 
in meaning to the Setswana lefatshe, meaning simply 'land', rather than 'territory'. There is 
no specific, and commonly used, word that implies land belonging to particular people? ' 
When referring to a family territory, Bugakhwe use the possessive construct 'my land' (11 da 
ngu a), or more commonly, 'the land of my father' (mba m da ngu a), emphasising the 
relational element of establishing rights to specific territories. Rather than being framed in 
terms of 'my land', claims to specific tracts were communicated to me as, 'This is the land 
my mother's brothers and grandfathers showed me when I was young, saying, "Sec, my 
nephew, this is our land, this is where you must look for food"'. As such, land can be referred 
to as inheritance (solo in Bugakhwedam), or, more accurately, what is inherited is not land 
per se, but a position in a network of relationships that entails obligations to land (Wilmsen 
1989b: 170). In referring to the 'owner' of the land, the Sctswana word 'along' is used, or the 
Bugakhwedam possessive construct di ma (m) or dl sa (f). Ownership was ascribed to a living 
member of the family group (only one of whom in this case - Tactso - was a woman), as 
Silberbauer (1981) reported of G//ana in central Kalahari. These owners themselves, however, 
often referred to their land as belonging to relatives of their parents, grandparents or great- 
grandparents generation. Moving through their land provided a continued link with these 
ancestors through the opportunity of asking for their assistance and protection. For example, 
as we camped in their land, Amos gave a mug of water to his older classificatory cousin 
Sangando, and told him tophekola (bless) the land. Sangando sprinkled the water around him, 
saying: 
//GJ wa //gave j, a//e //e ngl}-ae tshaa a //ao da oro ke //ao Iuwwoko tshaa lwcJ $Y /4o tee 
ngu ht //ao ko xo /a ko. Tee ht ngu a //Ee //em ko //we uu //e }-oo xa ka k ä, rrrrrrr 
rrrrrrr. Sekundeko, Puduhudu. 
(Our ancestors, come. We arc going to bless the water in your w%aterhole from %%hich we 
drink, let the rain fall and fill this watcrholc. We are now in your land, the one in %hich 
you ate. We are in your land. Go with us and look after us tomorrow. rain rinn. 
Sckundeko [Sangando's classificatory uncle], Puduhudu [Sangando's father]). 
21 The word nPwa is also used to refer to a place or area, but is not used in a possessive sense. Xom 
(literally meaning 'soil') can be possessive, but is not commonly used to refer to family lands (1 am 
grateful to Matthias Brenzinger for a discussion on this topic). 
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In their time, these ancestors would have been described as #uukao (#uu - to gather/collect, 
kao - plenty), or /x'üngyeu (/x'ü - kill, ngyeu - young man), referring to their role as 
outstanding providers for their people. With regard to their capacity as leaders, most Basarwa 
would stop short of calling them //axa (chief), a form of authority generally owned by 
Batawana, and those on whom they chose to bestow it. They instead referred to leaders of 
each family as di xa ngu a (owner of the land), or di xa //'ae a (owner of the village). These 
people had a relationship to their land referred to by the verb //'ae in Bugakhwedam, and od 
in Ts'exadam. The closest translation is the Setswana term go rua, literally meaning to 
possess, but with the implication of benefiting from the productive nature of what is owned. If 
one moved away and stopped using the productive assets of a particular tract of land, title to it 
was lost, and it was free to be taken over by another family group. 
Boundaries between family lands were, and are, not without contestation. Perhaps 
disagreement is intrinsic to territorial claims, and has certainly been common in other 
Basarwa claims to land (e. g. Heinz 1994: 94 for ! XÖ, Lee 1979: 334 for Ju/'hoansi). Bugakhwe 
today say that such disagreements in the distant past sometimes became violent. Even as we 
mapped their areas, arguments arose in adjoining areas as to which land was whose. The 
boundaries between territories were often imprecise (cf. Lee 1979: 334-5), and sometimes 
overlapped. At other times, clear topographical features functioned as borders, such as 
elephant paths (oo dao) or fossil riverbeds. Such boundaries, however, were not presented as 
lines of separation, but lines of meeting. The Setswana word used to refer to them was 
mokopano, meaning ̀ place of meeting', rather than the more common term kgaolo ('district'), 
from the verb go kgaola ('to divide/separate'). Important resource areas along these 
boundaries, such as waterholes and fruit collecting areas were shared (a common attribute of 
Basarwa territories; see Barnard 1992a: 235), and neighbours would sometimes move together 
for a period at such places. These physical `boundaries' were thus - as Barth (1969,1996) 
argued of social boundaries - places of social connection; spaces for the construction of 
relationships rather than places of separation. 
Water was paramount in figuring patterns of land ownership. Virtually without exception, all 
the names in the land are of waterholes, with surrounding features (smaller waterholes, 
sandveld, fruit groves, etc. ) taking their name from the nearest large waterhole. Each family 
territory bordered a supply of permanent water, either the lagoons and floodplains of the 
Okavango and Kwando/Linyanti river systems, or the permanent groundwater of Dishokora, 
also known by its Bugakhwedam name, Bien/wä. Situated in one of the east-west valleys just 
south of the Caprivi border, Dishokora was the meeting point of about five different family 
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lands; the centre from which the `petals' of territories radiated, giving each one access to its 
water (see Appendix Five). It was a place of congregation when all the other waterholes in 
their land had dried up. Ex-residents speak of it having been an extensive and permanent 
water source, and this is corroborated by a map made by Percy Reid (1901) as he travelled up 
the Kwando River in the dry season of 1899, which marks it as a `large marsh'. Dishokora is 
now a cattle post with a hand dug well. In May 1998, it supported 394 cattle (Plate 3.3), 281 
of which belonged to a Mokgalagadi from Shakawe and the rest to eight //Anikhwe from 
Ngarange. The only Bugakhwe there were several young men, paid to look after the cattle, 
under the antiquated system of a cow per year for their labour. 
Early commentators in Ngamiland were struck by the high degree of exclusivity that marked 
Basarwa territories. `No Mokuba [Moyei] or River Mosarwa is allowed by his neighbours to 
poach outside his own district', wrote Stigand (1923), and Doman (1925: 85) observed that, 
`each family group had its own hunting ground and bitterly resented the intrusion of others, 
either native or European'. As these comments imply, what was guarded was not so much the 
land itself, but the useful resources on it, which included waterholes (or lagoons in the 
swampland), gathering areas, honey and wildlife. As with G//ana in central Kalahari (Cashdan 
1984: 447-9) and Tyua in northeastern Kalahari (Hitchcock 1995: 177) some of these resources 
could also be individually owned. These could include dispersed resources such as melon 
groves, or specific point resources, such as an anthill that Amos pointed south of N/omn/om 
which belonged to his father. Using the resources of another's territory was possible if 
permission was sought and granted, which it often was, especially for water. `Water is never 
refused' I was told, indicating that it was so essential that it had to be held loosely and shared 
with anyone who, if necessary, would go through the formality of asking. Less essential 
resources, such as groves of fruit or nuts, or honey were often more exclusively held. 
Informants today maintain that individuals who asked such permission, whether Basarwa or 
Bantu, were accompanied by a member of the family who owned the land to ensure there was 
no abuse, such as hunting juvenile animals, picking unripe fruit, or over-harvesting. Such 
practices are termed /'ae ü (/'ae - destructive, ü- hunt[ing]), and individuals who made this a 
habit were denied continued access to these resources. Both Basarwa and Bayei informants 
stated that, in the distant past, Bayei and other (unrelated) Basarwa found hunting or gathering 
without permission could be beaten or killed (cf. Schapera 1930: 155-9). While specific 
localities belonged to specific families, kinship ties created larger `clusters' of territories into 
which access was guaranteed for members, and a united front could be presented against 
incursions. Doman (1925: 85) was told that `[Basarwa] clans combined in former times to 
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resist other tribes who threatened their control of land'. Such rigid control, however, began to 
decline with the immigration of Bantu-speakers. 
Immigration and the decline of tenure 
The entry of different waves of Bantu-speaking immigrants into Ngamiland from about 1700 
marked the beginning of the end of the strong controls over land by Basarwa described by the 
likes of Doman. This was a common fate of Basarwa land tenure systems throughout southern 
Africa, documented, for example, by Heinz (1994: 94) of ! XÖ land tenure, once their land 
became an important cattle trek route. In the eyes of many Basarwa, this was the beginning of 
a single continuous process of gradual land alienation that has continued until today, thus 
affecting perceptions of current programmes, like CBNRM, that touch upon issues of resource 
tenure. Take, for example, the impassioned account of changes in land tenure given to me by 
Petros, an old blind man from Khwai (which I have edited into chronological order): 
Long ago, if people wanted to hunt in my [ancestors'] area, they came and asked first. 
We told them not to finish the animals, but to take a few then go back home... . When Bayei came into our land, we showed them our animals, but they started finishing them. 
So we refused to let them hunt anymore in our area, to finish off the few animals that 
were left. They generally respected us, but sometimes they came to steal in secret. If we 
found a Moyei, we would beat him with sticks so that he wouldn't come back, then let 
him go... . When blacks came into our land, they asked for land to keep their cattle 
in. 
We showed them and they kept it... Batawana came and took our land and animals 
without asking. In the past we Basarwa had no chiefs. Batawana were our chiefs. They 
let us keep our food [i. e. access to land and wildlife], they just said they would eat it too, 
not like the government [of today] that has taken them away altogether. Our chief 
Seretse [Khama] gave us all a number of animals [through Special Game Licenses], he 
looked after us. Today all our land and all our food has been kidnapped by the 
government, without thought for how we will live and stand up. Today the government 
has struck us down. 
Many of the initial Bantu immigrants into the northern sandveld, particularly Bayei, arrived 
via the waterways of the Okavango-Linyanti-Kwando system (Tlou 1985: 15). The 
immigrants lived along the waterways in semi-permanent villages with summer sites and 
winter sites, to avoid the annual floods. //Anikhwe, who also lived along the riverine fringes, 
22 
most felt the impact of immigration. In contrast, Bugakhwe at Gudigwa maintain that their 
preferred residence has always been the sandveld. Both Gibbons (1904: 207) and Seiner 
(1909) confirmed this pattern, with their observations that the sandveld from Okavango to 
u Both Gibbons (1904) and Seiner (1909), who travelled along the northern rivers in 1899 and 1905-6 
respectively, noted that many of the small villages along the Okavango River were //Anikhwe. 
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Kwando was the domain of Basarwa23 Like Ju/'hoansi in western Ngamiland (Lee 1965: 198) 
and //Ganakhwe near the Boteti (Cashdan 1986), Bugakhwe spent the wet season dispersed in 
the sandveld, and moved to permanent water sources (springs or rivers) in the dry season. For 
some Bugakhwe groups, Dishokora was the point at which they congregated (which by 1900 
had Hambukushu living at it), for others it was along the riverine fringes. Villages along the 
rivers provided an opportunity to trade; skins, honey, meat and wild fruit in return for 
tobacco, cannabis, agricultural produce, pots and iron. In many respects, therefore, the 
relationship between Bugakhwe in the sandveld, and their Bantu neighbours along the rivers, 
was initially mutually beneficial. 
By the time of the first census of Ngamiland in 1921, the riverine fringes around the northern 
sandveld were scattered with villages. The census estimated 1,500-2,000 Hambukushu lived 
down the eastern bank of the Okavango from Mohembo to Gabamukuni, most likely an 
underestimate considering the difficulty of access (Stigand 1923: 412). By this time, however, 
northern Ngamiland was a mix of not only Hambukushu, but also Bayei, Bakgalagadi, 
Basubia, Banajwa, and, of course, Bugakhwe and //Anikhwe. The largest settlement was 
Gabamukuni itself. Situated in the middle of the northern arm of the Delta, it was a 
cosmopolitan cluster of villages where Bayei, Hambukushu, Bakgalagadi and Bugakhwe 
lived in close proximity. Stigand (1923) referred at the beginning of the century to 
`Kabamokoni' as `most thickly inhabited with a large number of little Mampukushu and 
Makuba [Bayei] villages'. Hambukushu and Bayei villages also sprung up along the southern 
banks of the Kwando and Linyanti. The largest of these was Sekeletu's, on the southeastern 
edge of Linyanti. It was visited by Livingstone in 1850, who recorded that he exacted tribute 
from many surrounding tribes. There were strings of smaller villages as well along Kwando 
and Linyanti, where a 1934 census enumerated 474 Bayei and Hambukushu (including nine 
Batawana) in 14 villages (BNA 1934). 
One of the main determinants of settlement was the changing distribution of tsetse fly. Tsetse 
infestation in the northern sandveld receded to riverine pockets in the 1880s, but once it 
recovered from the rinderpest epizootic of 1897 that had decimated its main carriers (cattle 
and wildlife) it began spreading again. By the 1940s it covered virtually the whole of the 
Okavango and Kwando-Linyanti, as well as peripheral savanna areas. Since then, it has 
waxed and waned, largely subject to attempts to control it by the colonial and post-colonial 
governments (Davies 1980). Tsetse was the main cause of the decline of Gabamukuni, as well 
as the villages along the southern edges of Kwando and Linyanti. The Kwando and Linyanti 
23 On the map he produced of his travels, Seiner (1909) labelled the northern sandveld Hukwe-Veld. 
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villages were moved by the Protectorate government, between 1935 and 1941, to 
Gabamukuni and Caprivi, in an attempt to depopulate the worst areas of tsetse infestation. 24 
The non-Basarwa residents of the Gabamukuni area also started to move away of their own 
accord in the same period, mostly to the northern and southeastern edges of the Delta. 
The influx of Bantu-speaking immigrants did not at first substantially change the spatial 
layout of existing territories (as Wiley 1974: 18 noted for Basarwa in the Kgalagadi District). 
Basarwa continued to adhere to these, and a patchwork of tenure arrangements grew, forming 
a complex sets of overlapping rights. Areas were delineated that were open access and 
uncontested, others that were managed to restrict access to some degree, and yet others that 
were effectively private (cf. Scoones 1995). As Bantu-speakers became more established, 
their rights along the rivers superseded those of Basarwa. Nonetheless, principally by virtue 
of their intimate knowledge of the sandveld, the strength of Basarwa tenure in the sandveld 
was not so easily eroded. Even the Batawana chiefs, who claimed the entire sandveld as their 
own hunting grounds, would hunt in conjunction with the Basarwa owners of the land they 
were hunting in. In part this was a logistical necessity; people unfamiliar with its repetitive 
terrain could easily die of thirst. But it was also recognition of their unique form of power as 
first people in the land, a supernatural power ascribed to occupying a liminal state between 
society and nature (cf. Gordon 1992: 212-5). Batawana hunters (according to Basarwa 
informants) would ask Basarwa owners of the land they were hunting in to bless or charm 
(phekola) them to ensure their success, in the same way that Sangando did for himself and his 
companions as we mapped his land. 
Despite being able to maintain control over sections of the sandveld (especially those with no 
permanent water sources) there were times of crisis, when Basarwa were forced to enter 
servitude in order to survive. When Reid (1901) travelled along the Kwando in 1899, he 
described the Basarwa he encountered living with Hambukushu as `the lowest of the low'. 
Perhaps in the wake of the rinderpest epizootic of 1897, the vulnerability of some Basarwa as 
they lost the relative independence afforded by the sandveld, was taken advantage of by their 
non-Basarwa neighbours. Through such experiences, and with the rise in political power of 
Batawana and select subject tribes, the patchwork of overlapping rights gradually tipped out 
of the favour of Basarwa, to the extent that practices such as asking permission to hunt in 
24 Other villages in tsetse areas around the Delta were not moved, indicating that perhaps the removal 
of Kwando and Linyanti villages was more a function of the District Commissioner's prejudice that 
they were ̀ a lazy, dirty and good for nothing community of people' (BNA 1940). 
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another's territory, fell away. Speaking of this later period (into the twentieth century), 
Mojeremane, an elderly man from Khwai, explained: 
Outsiders did not ask first to hunt or gather. If we found someone hunting, we would ask 
for meat but not ask him where he was from or what he was doing. Basarwa were not 
jealous. If they saw someone hunting, they left them because they were also people who 
needed food. We say the land [as a whole] is ours because we have named it, showing it 
was all our land. Mosarwa... knew the land. He welcomed others into the land and 
showed them around, but then they started being in charge. 
Despite conveying a much looser sense of territoriality that was characteristic of this later 
period, Mojeremane's description carries the same ultimate theme as the earlier account of 
resource tenure by Petros; dispossession. To Basarwa in the northern sandveld, the enduring 
consequence of Bantu immigration was dispossession; from their land, their resources, and 
often their labour. 
Contemporary attitudes to historical territories 
Basarwa live today in the northern sandveld in a very different context than that which gave 
rise to the pattern of family territories which we constructed as we mapped their land. 
Demographically, the most important change is that they now live in one single village, rather 
than each in their own family's territory. As such, there has been a corresponding shift from 
emphasising the ownership of individual families, to a more inclusive sense of ownership of 
the land as a whole, by the village as a whole. These two levels of locally figuring ownership; 
on a family as well as a village-wide basis, overlap. Most people are familiar with, and use, 
both. However, the middle aged and elderly people who had life experience in these lands, 
were often those most keen to emphasise family territories. They spoke with fondness of the 
land that they called their own, reflected in Amos' comment as we walked around the remains 
of his village at Ndyabe/xamtsha: ̀I love this land. It is beautiful when it rains. I would return 
to it if there were water'. 
The gradual agglomeration of Bugakhwe at Letshaobe and //Gam/wi, and then at Gudigwa 
from 1988, was due to a variety of factors. The lower than average rainfall in the past three 
decades made reliable supplies of water harder and harder to find. This was coupled with 
promises by the Remote Area Development programme that, if they congregated in one place, 
they would receive essential services; water, a health post and a primary school? s Although 
no one was forced to move to Gudigwa, some families alleged that harassment by the Anti 
u Ten years later, however, the one of these they had received was a regular supply of water (Plate 
4.6). 
87 
Poaching Unit of the Botswana Defence Force (BDF) left them with little choice. For 
example, Two-Boy's land lay between Gudigwa and Khwai, now in a CHA leased by the 
government directly to a tourism operator. He explained to me one day, as we sat in the 
hunting lodge where he worked as a tracker, how he had ended up moving from Four Rivers 
to Gudigwa: 
Ian Khama [head of the BDF] came to my house and asked for me, saying that the 
soldiers would end up shooting me, as they said I was harassing the animals. But I 
thought, ̀ If I am harassing them, why are they still around? ' Nonetheless, I broke my 
village and moved to Gudigwa. 
Today we give ourselves nothing, living instead at the hands of white people. I didn't 
want to fight with the soldiers because I am illiterate and don't know how to protect 
myself, or my younger brothers and children who were with me. If they had not harassed 
me, I would still be there. I want assurance from the government that I will not be 
harassed, and I will return there. 
Today we can only live by honey, a bit of work, and kills from predators. The 
government has robbed us. As a Mosarwa, I am the owner of the wildlife. The 
government has raped us. Hambukushu and Bayei were given sorghum, but Khara/'uma 
was given animals to look after. The land is my inheritance. If I had the choice, I would 
send my children to hunt for me. But today the government has kidnapped the wildlife, 
and if we try to hunt we go to jail. 
Like Amos and Two-Boy, most of the residents of Gudigwa continued to hold an attachment 
to the land they still considered their own. Yet even Amos and Two-Boy realised, despite 
their sentiments, that they were unlikely to ever live in their family territories again. The new 
set of official principles, priorities and laws over land, settlement and wildlife make 
agglomeration in villages a virtually irreversible process. Although none of Gudigwa's 
ancestral lands fall within land zoned as national parks or game reserves, much of it is zoned 
as Wildlife Management Areas, which restrict the growth of `new' settlements. As Brown, a 
young member of Khwai's Interim Management Committee, told me, `If you want to move, 
you can move to an existing settlement, but not out into the bush. The bush is for wildlife'. 
Two-Boy's response to the restrictions imposed by the government were aimed at 
legitimating continued claim over `his' land, as well as making a more generalised claim over 
the land as a whole and wildlife in it ('As a Mosarwa, I am the owner of the wildlife... 
Khara/'uma was given animals to look after. The land is my inheritance'). It is this 
generalised claim of land ownership that is preferred by the younger people, who, although 
they are often familiar with the boundaries of their family territories, have a life experience 
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more rooted in the contemporary dynamics of living in a single village. One such person was 
Starvation, a younger member of both the Okavango Community Trust committee, and the 
newly formed ̀ Masarwa Community' committee. He was of the opinion that, `Those who say 
different areas belong to different people are ha bogologolo [of the old ways], the whole land 
belongs to me [as a Mosarwa]'. Reflecting a similar sentiment, a young Ju/'hoan man in the 
Omaheke farms, Namibia, stated: ̀ My n! ore is the world, this world, this Kaukauveld, this 
Omaheke' (Suzman 1997: 90). Such notions by Basarwa of land and their place in it also 
reflect the position that they have come to occupy in an overarching political economy, that 
encompasses both them and their land, transcending the social and spatial boundaries of 
individual family territories. 
By the late 1990s, the boundaries between family territories of Gudigwa received little more 
than lip service, seen, for example, in Amos' complements to Taetso for allowing, without 
complaint, the whole village of Gudigwa to live on her land. In practice, residents of Gudigwa 
hunted, grazed their cattle, and used the veld with no restraints to stick to specific band 
territories. The boundaries of family lands had been overtaken by the more recent boundaries 
imposed by the government. When I asked Ts'ima, the headman of Gudigwa who had lived 
and hunted throughout the northern sandveld, about hunting in another's territory, he 
responded, ̀We didn't ask each other's permission to hunt. We just used each other's areas 
freely because we are relatives. It is the government that makes us ask to go places. ' It is to 
these government-imposed boundaries that I now turn, through the experiences of Khwai and 
Mababe. 
Khwai 
Like the residents of Gudigwa, the people of Khwai call themselves Bugakhwe. The dialect 
that they speak has slight phonetic differences, indicative of the increasing geographical 
distance between them and their relatives in Gudigwa over the past few generations. They are 
nicknamed Ma-dzikidza by their relatives in Gudigwa, after the tall peri-swamp mophane 
(Col ovhospermum mo ane woodland, characteristic of the Delta fringe (Plate 2.2). Their 
land was the southeastern-most of the Gudigwa cluster, so, unlike most of their relatives, they 
lived a life more commonly associated with the northern waterways and floodplains of the 
Delta than in its sandveld hinterland. From the mid-nineteenth century, the Gabamukuni area 
where they lived became increasingly populated by immigrants, some of whom forced 
Khwai's ancestors into servitude. As a result, from around the end of the nineteenth century, 
they began moving eastwards, along the northern fringe of the Delta. 
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The northeastern fringe of the delta along the Khwai River has been the least populated 
stretch of the Okavango fringe since Bantu immigration into Ngamiland. Despite the lack of 
permanent substantial settlements, the area was extensively used by Bugakhwe. From the late 
nineteenth century, Basubia fleeing Matebele aggression also found refuge in its isolation, 
some of whom lived at //Xam (which was abandoned in the early 1950s due to the 
encroachment of tsetse). For non-Basarwa, however, Khwai was more commonly a hunting 
and gathering ground, rather than an area of permanent settlement. It was an especially 
important area for Bayei from around Sankuyu, who often joined their Basarwa neighbours on 
hunting and gathering trips in the winter months, after having harvested their crops. Bayei 
presence in the land historically has left its mark in some Shiyei place names, such as 
Njakamakata ('relief from famine', indicating the importance of its abundant resources) and 
Kanjrye ('scorpion'). Other Shiyei names have been displaced by Bugakhwedam names, such 
as that of the lagoon just west of Khwai presently called Segagama. Its previous name, 
Sama#awa, is only remembered by descendants of Bayei that lived there in the early years of 
the twentieth century. 
Khwai became an important hunting ground for Batawana as well. Selous, who travelled up 
the `Machabe [Machaba]' River (as it is known downstream from Khwai) in the winter of 
1880 encountered ̀a great many Kafir [sic] hunters from Lake Ngami, all of whom told us 
that there were many of their people ahead' (1893: 173). In about 1920, Mathiba, The 
Motawana chief, with his young son Moremi III, decided to build a kraal at Khwai, the exact 
site of which is known today as Mapako a ga Moremi, 26 which served as a base for Batawana 
hunting expeditions. It also constituted visible reminder of the presence and authority of the 
Batawana chieftainship, an authority that previously was more hearsay than a tangible 
presence in this region. Resident Bugakhwe were often used as guides and porters for the 
hunters, in return for which they were given meat and the occasional use of a gun. As a 
product of its comparative isolation, forced labour, of the type typical of the Gabamukuni area 
and elsewhere, was not as prevalent in Khwai. It was generally limited to porterage for 
transient Bakgalagadi, who hunted for hippos to sell their hides to white traders for sjamboks. 
The groups of Basubia and Bayei that either lived in the area, or visited it regularly, generally 
related to Bugakhwe on a more egalitarian level than either Batawana or Bakgalagadi. 
26 Meaning `Moremi's posts', some of which still stand (Plate 3.8). This was the original area known as 
`Khwai', while the present site of the village originally carried the name of the nearby lagoon, 
`Kanjiye'. Although the lagoon retains its name, the village site is now called ̀ Khwai'. 
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Plate 3.7: Aerial view of Khwai village. 














egagama *iý JýuNr ýý ýl4fNWUý µý 
, ̀ `ýý1.111111111NI 
NINNINIMýIW 
' -------- Il 1"TO, nb hw 
' 
ý4 _. 
- --. (Hippo Pool) 

















10 20 30 40 
Map 3.2: Khwai, Moremi Game Reserve (with extensions) and surrounding areas. 
The creation of Moremi Game Reserve 
The creation of Moremi Game Reserve, proclaimed on 15`h March 1963, is often heralded as 
mould-breaking for conservation in Africa, in being, to take an example from tourist 
literature, `the first Wildlife Sanctuary created by an African tribe, namely the Batawana, in 
their own area' (Roodt n. d). This rather loose interpretation of the events leading up to its 
creation typifies the approach of much of the conservation-related practice and policy that this 
event set in motion; namely that Basarwa have remained largely invisible to those with the 
NG15 
NG18 
Mapako a ga Moremi 
NG1 
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power to make decisions affecting their livelihoods. For Khwai, the struggle to maintain 
resource tenure has been a defining factor of their history and present circumstances, 
beginning with their removal from Moremi Game Reserve, and culminating with their present 
struggles to control the land surrounding their village. Situated at the northeastern-most 
extension of the Delta, Khwai has been an exceptionally rich area for wildlife, due to the 
combination of permanent water in the riverbed and the extensive grazing available in the 
sandveld to the north, south and east. 
The pivotal point in Khwai's narratives of their history, around which prior and subsequent 
events are hung, was the removal of Kwere and his family in 1963 from where they were 
living at /Uku (referred to on tourist maps as Hippo Pool), within the newly created Moremi 
Game Reserve. Kwere's father, Seriri was not actually Bugakhwe, but the son of //Anikhwe 
parents from along the Okavango River. He married into a Bugakhwe family, and, through his 
abilities, came to be seen as their di xa //ae. The movements of Seriri, and later Kwere, are 
carefully told today, in as far as they relate to claims over land within Moremi Game Reserve. 
When Moremi Game Reserve was created, Kwere and his family were moved from /Uku to 
Segagama, three kilometres east of the present village, on the south bank of the Khwai River, 
which formed the border of the new reserve. At Segagama, they were joined by Sango's 
family, who had spent a few years living on the edge of the Bayei village of Sankuyu. 
Sango's and Kwere's families had a long history of intermarriage and close association, and 
were the two core families that came to form Khwai village. After only several months at 
Segagama, however, they were once again moved, to their present position, on the northern 
side of the Khwai River, and outside the new reserve. 
Moremi Game Reserve was formed at the instigation of the Fauna Conservation Society 
(FCS), a group based in Maun with both expatriate and Batswana members. The proposal to 
create the reserve was presented to the public in a meeting of 100' September 1962, in the 
Maun kgotla, the seat of traditional authority for Ngamiland. In the meeting, FCS stressed the 
potential for income from tourism as a motivation to preserve its unique wildlife. They 
justified the choice of proposed area as it was `little hunted over by the Batawana, the Bayei 
or the Masarwas' (BNA1962a). The issue of hunting had to be handled delicately in public 
arenas, considering its widespread importance to residents of Ngamiland, Basarwa and non- 
Basarwa alike. Privately, the motivation of FCS in proposing a reserve was as much to 
address the perceived effects of overhunting as to open up its tourism potential. In an internal 
memorandum, Robert Kay, the main proponent behind the formation of the reserve, wrote 
that: 
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There is no question about the fact there will be no more fauna to speak of on the Kwaai 
and environs in ten years time if the present rate of shooting, trapping, etc. is allowed to 
continue unchecked' (BNA 1963). 
While the suggestion to create a game reserve may not have come primarily from Batawana 
themselves, once presented and discussed in the Maun kgotla, it was agreed to. Maun kgotla, 
however, was not a political space in which Basarwa were likely to have their voice heard, 
nor one in which they would even have been present. There was no consultation with the 
people that lived within the reserve, one of the largest groups of which was Kwere's extended 
family, but which also included several transient Bayei and //Anikhwe families. 
The bitter memory of being removed from Khwai provides a pivot, a seminal event, in the 
Khwai's tellings of their history. It separates the `good old days' (cf. Scott 1985: 150) when 
they were free to govern themselves, from the new dispensation, in which they found 
themselves under the increasing limitations of official edicts on land and hunting. Despite the 
memories of FCS members involved in relocating Kwere's village that they were willing to 
move, local memories are somewhat different. Take, for example, this account by a group of 
middle-aged women in Khwai, in 1997, about their removal from /Uku: 
They [FCS] were not good because they moved us. They burnt our houses, some even 
with our belongings in. We did not choose where they dumped us. They just poured us 
out on the ground like you would spill sorghum. 
June Vendall-Clark, a founder member of FCS, gives an evocative description in her book 
Starlings Laughing (1990) of Kwere running through the `deserted encampment setting light 
to the huts one by one', and includes a photograph of their huts ablaze (Fig. 3.1). Exactly 
what happened remains unclear, but the differences in narratives of this seminal event reflect 
that collective memories are often tropes rather than facts. They therefore speak of shared 
present experience, as much as historical events. For the residents of Khwai, the most 
important present experience in this respect has been, once again, the threat of their removal. 
Throughout much of the 1990s, various government officials visited Khwai informing them 
that Khwai is a ̀ wildlife area', and they would thus have to move. While the pressure to move 
continues from some government officials, it has been a pressure that Khwai has so far 
succeeded in resisting. 
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Figure 3.1: Kwere's village at /Uku burning (reproduced with permission from June 
Vendall-Clark). 
Mababe 
The compact village of Mababe - the third of the trio of Basarwa villages in the northern 
sandveld - lies on a sand rise south of the Mababe Depression, two kilometres east of the 
corridor that was created in 1980 to link Moremi Game Reserve with Chobe National Park 
(Map 3.3). Like Khwai and Gudigwa, the village of Mababe is unmarked on most Department 
of Surveys and Lands maps, but unlike them, it has existed (for at least some months of the 
year) in the vicinity of its present position since the nineteenth century. 
Situated on the main route between Khama's country in the south, and the expanding Lozi 
kingdom to the north, Mababe was a comparative hub of activity in the nineteenth century. It 
was a cosmopolitan collection of different people attracted by abundance of wild food, and by 
the lack of turmoil that characterised much of southern Africa. Immigrants included Manajwa 
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refugees fleeing Matebele expansion in their homeland (Nettleton 1934: 356), Basubia who 
had moved down from Chobe, and Bayei who were scattered around the flats by the 
beginning of the nineteenth century (ibid: 357). Livingstone passed through Mababe in 1850 
on his way to Chobe, encountering Bayei and Basarwa living together, as well as a Basubia 
village on the southeast edge of the depression (Livingstone] 857: 69). He noted that the 
Basubia did not cultivate sorghum, but were reliant on wild tsitla (Bulrush, Typha capensis), 
indicating a fairly close association with Basarwa lifestyles. He was impressed with the 
constitution of Basarwa around Mababe, commenting that, `the Bushmen of these districts are 
generally fine, well-made men, and are nearly independent of everyone... . 
From the 
quantities of berries and abundance of game in these parts, the Bushmen can scarcely ever be 
badly off for food' (ibid: 149). 
The abundance of wildlife in Mababe was also an attraction to hunters from elsewhere. In the 
early nineteenth century, Mababe was regarded as the hunting grounds of Bangwato (BNA 
1962b), but by the end of the century it was claimed by Batawana chief Sekgoma as his 
hunting area, where he hunted elephants (Passarge 1997 [1905]: 258). The illustrious white 
hunter, Courtney Selous passed through Mababe twice, as he travelled north to Chobe. He 
was first taken in 1879 by Collinson and French who had already taken advantage of its rich 
hunting grounds. Selous returned to Mababe in 1884 and camped for over a month while he 
hunted, assisted by Basarwa `eager to receive a share of the meat' (Selous 1893: 141-3). Like 
Livingstone, Selous commented on the close relationship between Bayei and Basubia with 
Basarwa at Mababe. In 1906, the Resident Commissioner deemed Mababe worthy of a visit, 
and noted that its residents had `a more or less imperfect knowledge of Sechuana [Setswana]' 
(BNA 1906a), evidence of the frequency of visits by Batawana hunters. 
Just as Seriri and Kwere came to fulfil the role of leaders in Khwai through their articulation 
with figures of external authority, sustained contact with Batawana hunters, white travellers, 
traders and administrators, who used these leaders as guides and porters, promoted the 
emergence of leaders from among the Ts'exa. These leaders were later to represent the views 
of their people to the colonial and postcolonial administrations. The extended period of acting 
in these roles meant that leadership of the Ts'exa became comparatively developed. Unlike 
many other Basarwa, whose knowledge of lateral kin is often more comprehensive than that 
of ascending generations, the present headman of Mababe, Kebuelemang, could trace his 
lineage back four generations (Fig. 3.2). Like Seriri, Kebuelemang's great-great grandfather, 
//Xudzobe, was not originally from the area that his descendants came to inhabit. He was 
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Danisani (who speak a related central Khwe language) from near Gweta, 200 kilometres south 





Thabare (Born c. 1870) 
I 
Kgosietsile (Born c. 1895, died 1954) 
I 
Kebuelemang (Born c. 1925, still headman in 1998) 
Figure 3.2: Lineage of Kebuelemang, Mababe's headman. 
By the end of the nineteenth century, however, the decline in trade for animal products 
reduced the importance of Mababe as a destination for white hunters, prompting the Resident 
Commissioner to write in 1906 (BNA 1906b) that: 
Curiously enough, the Mababe country which was so well known in the old days and 
was hunted both on horseback and on foot by Selous and others is now practically 
untravelled by white men. 
The decline in the hunting industry coincided with the rise of Ngamiland's cattle industry, 
which began in the early 1900s. Initially these cattle were driven south through Rakops to 
Bangwato, but in 1924, Riley, one of the Maun traders, cut a trek route from Maun, through 
Mababe, to Kazangula to tap the export market to Northern Rhodesia (Zambia). Cattle that 
traders in Maun accumulated, along with others from as far afield as South West Africa and 
the new Ghanzi farms (Holly 1993: 102), were trekked along this route to Livingstone, from 
where they were taken as far as the mines of the Copperbelt and Katanga. In the 1930s, one of 
these traders, Pretorius, employed a number of the residents of Mababe to keep some of his 
cattle, but the persistence of predators made this a short-lived exercise. 
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Plate 3.10: Mina Kgosi, the headman of Mababe's wife, with a grandchild. 
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In the 1940s, Mababe's natural resources once again attracted external interest. This time, it 
was from colonial officers eyeing out the economic potential of the large swathe of Crown 
Land which stretched from Mababe eastwards and northwards to the border. 27 A. Sillery, the 
Resident Commissioner, drew up a proposal to convert 12,000 square miles of this land, from 
Mababe to Pandamatenga on the Rhodesian border, to ranching and plantation operations 
involving sisal, vegetable ivory, cereals, nuts, a piggery and an abattoir. He submitted an 
application for £15,000 to the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund to cover the first 
phase of the operation. Nonetheless, his scheme to help `the peasants of the Delta' (BNA 
1948) was denied funding, and collapsed. However, this was only after he had in 1948 - in 
anticipation of the scheme's success - requested Kgosietsile and his people to move their 
village from Mababe to Nxaraga, 180 kilometres away. Mma Kgosi (Plate 3.10), his 
daughter-in-law and wife to the present headman, related their response thus: 
Kgosietsile was the one that refused to allow us to be moved to Nxaraga. The 
government wanted to move us, but he said if you take these stones and trees and 
waterholes, I will move there. The government could not say anything, so they left us'. 
The creation of Chobe National Park 
Having successfully resisted removal, the residents of Mababe were unable to prevent the 
alienation of land that gathered pace in the following decade, spurred by the growing 
conservation movement. Although Bechuanaland's Resident Commissioner, Sir Charles Rey, 
had attempted to form a game reserve in Chobe in the 1930s, his plans had come to nothing 
(Spinage 1991: 55-7). However, by the late 1950s concern was again expressed over the 
declining wildlife numbers around Chobe, which the Divisional Commissioner (North) 
blamed on `the slaughter of game by Bushmen' (BNA1959a). Hunting laws up to that time 
had been fairly lax. Tribal authorities regulated hunting in the tribal reserves, such as that of 
the Batawana which in 1910 prohibited hunting of elephant, giraffe, eland, buffalo, rhinoceros 
and hippopotamus without permission from the chief (Spinage 1991: 10). However, such 
regulations were very difficult to enforce in the remoter areas, where most Basarwa lived. The 
Basarwa at Mababe lived mostly on Crown Land, which fell under the colonial 
administration, rather than the Batawana tribal authority. The policy of the colonial 
administration on the Chobe Crown Lands up to 1960 had been to restrict wildlife use, which 
was monitored along the Chobe River between Kazangula and Katchikau. Nonetheless, they 
27 Lands designated as Crown Land (known as State Land after independence) were generally those 
considered devoid of people to whom 
it could be allocated as tribal land. It was thus under the direct 
control of the government, evidence again of the frequent invisibility of Basarwa to administrators and 
policy makers. 
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`allowed indigenous Africans further westwards to be left alone as long as they did not kill 
elephant, rhinoceros, giraffe, hippopotamus and sable' (BNA 1959b). 
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Map 3.3: Mababe and the various phases of Chobe National Park. 
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The administration's increasing concern with citizen hunting led to a 15,400 square 
kilometres stretch of the Chobe Crown Lands being gazetted as a game reserve in 1960, 
which incorporated the villages of Mababe and Sankuyu. By this time, only the Ts'exa 
remained at the Mababe Depression, the Bayei, Basubia and Manajwa residents having 
moved away. The Divisional Commissioner regarded the residents of Mababe and Sankuyu as 
`squatting on Crown lands' (BNA1962b), but followed the recommendation of the Chobe 
Game Reserve Committee that it would be wrong to remove them if they had already been 
staying there with the approval of the administration. He noted that Mababe was a well- 
established village of thirty huts, and that the residents of Mababe, and Sankuyu (whom he 
wrongly assumed were also Basarwa), lived by hunting buffalo and selling the biltong in 
Maun at ten shillings per bundle (ibid). He therefore recommended degazetting the section 
south of latitude 19°S to exclude Mababe and Sankuyu, (reducing the area of the reserve to 
10,800 square kilometres) which was done in 1964 (Map 3.3). 
GAME RESERVE 
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Figure 3.3: No Hunting' sign produced in 1961 for the new Chobe Garne Reserve. 
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Despite the reduction in the size of the reserve, the people of Mababe lost significant areas of 
land in which they used to hunt and gather. The new division of land between lefatshe la 
diphologolo ('land of the animals') and land that people were permitted to inhabit were 
marked in part by signs which were nailed to trees around the perimeter of the new Reserve 
from 1961. These signs (Fig. 3.3) clearly implied the responsibility of Basarwa for the decline 
in wildlife populations that had ostensibly led to the creation of the reserve. The highly 
stereotypical illustration (peppercorn hair, steatopygia, extended stomach, loincloth, bow and 
arrow) ignored the fact that most Basarwa in the region are `black' and have hunted mainly 
with spears, snares or guns since the end of the nineteenth century (cf. Selous 1893: 107). 
In 1967, Chobe Game Reserve was upgraded to the status of a national park, and in 1980 it 
was extended to include a corridor between Chobe National Park and Moremi Game Reserve, 
giving it a final size of 10,570 square kilometres (Map 3.3). Needless to say, these progressive 
encroachments on their de facto tenure were sorely resented by the residents of Mababe. On 
my first visit to Mababe, I raised the topic of the Park with Mina Kgosi, the headman's wife. 
Her reply exemplified the strong sentiments it aroused: 
The real name of Savuti [a popular destination within the Park] is OAn#o. The whites 
named it, as they wanted to ask Basubia the names and not us. They named it, made a 
park, and took away our land. They took all our land. Today we are in a ditch, we are 
treated as those that are thrown away. 
The 1964 boundary of the Reserve lay 20 kilometres north of Mababe village (which in 1960 
had moved from the western side of where the Machaba river entered the Mababe depression, 
to the eastern side). Although the reserve cut off land in which many of the older residents 
had grown up (particularly around Sedungu), they were able to continue using land south of 
the boundary. However, the 1980 extension, which linked Chobe National Park with Moremi 
Game Reserve, brought the park boundary to within two kilometres of Mababe village. This 
extension encompassed two particularly fruitful areas that were visited regularly by the its 
residents. One was N//odzö, a section of the Magwikhwe sand ridge, with concentrations of 
Motsentsela (Berchemia discolor), Mompudu (Mimisops zeyheri) and other fruit trees. The 
other was ! Hodo, southwest of Mababe in a riverbed where water is usually found close to the 
surface, and where animals often congregate. 
In an allusion to the tribute system to which they had been subject to under Batawana, 
Kebuelemang complained to me that the government has `taken the chest [sehuba] of the 
land'. As well as meaning ̀ chest', sehuba means ̀tribute', as the chest of an animal, being the 
most fatty and best-valued part of the animal, was often demanded as tribute by the Batawana. 
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Khwai used similar metaphors about losing their best land to conservation, accusing land use 
planners of `picking the eyes out' of the Khwai area'28 (OCC 1995: 109). As with the creation 
of Moremi Game Reserve, there was no local consultation about the 1980 extension of Chobe 
National Park. In the laconic words of one resident of Mababe in a kgotla meeting, ̀ the only 
consultation they did was from a plane [as they flew over the land viewing what they 
wanted]'. 
In all three villages, narratives of the seminal events that led to their loss of land and resources 
are, like the Khwai women's narrative of being dumped like sorghum from a sack, stories of 
the stealth of the government in taking `their' resources. For example, Morgan, a young 
member of Gudigwa's `Masarwa Community' committee related the loss of their Special 
Game Licences (to pave the way for their entry into OCT) thus: `They took our passes at 
night. They came in the dark, and went away with them quickly, without any consultation'. 
For Mababe, the boundaries of the extension were marked by cutlines through the bush, 
which men from Mababe were employed to help cut. `We thought we were cutting firebreaks' 
explained Kebuelemang, ̀until they told us it was a park, and we could not let these feet of 
ours touch the other side'. Each of these narratives is not so much a factual account of 
historical events (although some may well be accurate), as a passionate statement decrying a 
process of alienation, in which these are key events. Land lost to the Park has become a focus 
for resentment against a general loss of control that the older residents of Mababe feel. `We 
didn't suffer for meat like we do today. Today we have no life', I was told by //Ae/getso, a 
seventy year-old woman, `The old life was better because we ruled ourselves, and now the 
ndoba [cutline]29 is making us hungry and we have no food'. 
Constituting space in the northern sandveld 
This chapter has so far contextualised the historical experiences of Khwai, Mababe and 
Gudigwa, and the relationships they have had with the land around them. I end by drawing 
out a theme implicit in much of what has been covered; how the residents of the northern 
sandveld constitute their landscape. In other words, how they perceive, talk about and 
represent the physical space 
in which they have lived, and how this relates to contemporary 
struggles over its tenure. Much of this struggle is symbolic, aimed at representing their 
landscape as one in which they have a legitimate place. It is a struggle they face today 
28 A suitably indirect means of calling the government's land use planners ̀vultures'. 
29 Ndoba is a Shiyei word used for bunds they made to change the flow of floodwater in the channels of 
the Delta. It is used in Mababe as a nickname for the cutline, after its role in `blocking' the flow of 
people. 
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primarily in the face of a pervasive form of `preservation' that has little place for people. 
`Khwai has always been an area belonging to wildlife and safaris. Not people. They [i. e. the 
government and safari operators] stopped any developments from coming here, because we 
are only Basarwa', Moses told me. This expresses the double predicament that the residents of 
Khwai and Mababe face: as people in a `wildlife' area; and as Basarwa in a socio-political 
system dominated by non-Basarwa people and values. 
Opposing the authority of the government that has been imposed on the land and people of 
the northern sandveld alike has involved a struggle to map their own authority over land they 
regard as their own. On a symbolic level, Basarwa attempt to represent their landscape 
according to their own experiences, values and practices. The most immediate dominant 
construction of the landscape of the northern sandveld is that which divides it into land for 
people and land for wildlife. The conceptual separation by Batswana between villages (for 
people) and bush (for wildlife) underpins this dichotomy, and the very real boundaries it puts 
into place. By challenging this dichotomy (a popular academic project as well, cf. Croll and 
Parkin 1992), and asserting their `home' as encompassing the whole land, Basarwa undermine 
the legitimacy of such constructions and their consequences. This does not mean Basarwa 
lack a conceptual distinction between `village' and `bush'; separate words exist for `village' 
(//'ae, which carries connotations of `home') and `bush' (Is'ao). Nonetheless, in the current 
situation of alienation from `the bush', Basarwa often stress the connections between these 
categories of landscape, rather than their separation. Pekenene, the elderly Chairman of 
Mababe's Village Development Committee, explained: 
The life of living in the bush is ours. When our parents died, we listened to you white 
people and the government who wanted us not to fill the land, and we moved together 
here. Yet, we still desire that life. If my eyes were still okay, I could take you through the 
whole land between here and Kasane [at the northern border of Botswana] and tell you 
all the names. We are in one place because of government, but we are people who move 
in the land (emphasis mine). 
A delegate from Mababe, at a seminar in Ghanzi in 1992, spoke of the effects of dominant 
representations of `Mababe' as being the small area in which their huts were situated. This 
contrasted to a huge area that they had called `home' and used regularly in the past, but to which 
they were no longer allowed access: 
I do not know any longer how big Mababe is. Each time I go out I am told by Wildlife 
[DWNP] that I have gone too far, I am not in Mababe. Even for gathering berries we are 




Plate 3.11: Se is/zuhe raga ('don't burn the veld') sign in Mababe village. 
Plate 3.12: Sign between Khwai and Mababe, on boundary of Chobe National Park 

The message that such statements convey is that official restrictions on land use in the 
northern sandveld are tantamount to an intrusion into their home. It is an analogy made all the 
more explicit by statements such as Idea's that the government had made a park `through the 
middle of our village', or Elias from Gudigwa's comment that, ̀ [buffalo] fences have been made 
all around us. I feel like I am in a kraal'. Such assertions are not simply primordial statements 
of being hunters and gatherers, or `people of the bush'. They are instead expressions of a very 
contemporary nature, that challenge the legitimacy of dominant representations of their 
landscape, through asserting their own meanings, values and interpretations on it. 
Constituting the whole land as their home also has another implication; that having its 
`owners' in it is a normal state, rather than an aberration. ̀ The land is unhealthy and dying 
now that we are not allowed into it anymore', commented several people to me as we walked 
through land in which they no longer lived. Basarwa views of the `ideal' environment are thus 
in this sense opposite to dominant ideals (cf. McCann 1997) 30 Rra Diatla, from Khwai, 
explained to me how he saw it as anathema that the government wanted to move his village 
from a wildlife area: 
When the government moves people, Basarwa are not the same as others. We are people 
who live with animals. Animals live better with us. We have stopped moving around, as 
the government didn't want that. We have settled in one place, in a wildlife area. They 
say we should move to a place with no animals. If we move they will follow us, as we 
go with their blood. They will then move us again. Where will we then go? We will not 
finish the animals. We have many guns, but are the animals finished? 
The health of the land is thus dependent on the presence of Basarwa in two ways: firstly in the 
essence of who they are as Basarwa ('we go with their blood'); and secondly because of their 
active custodianship of the resources ('we have many guns, but are the animals finished? 
'). 
One of the most commonly talked about methods of land stewardship was to burn it each year 
at the end of the dry season. ̀ God likes the smell of burning', Moses told me. 
Basarwa 
commonly burnt the veld for a variety of reasons, apart from giving God a good aroma. 
It 
made hunting easier, it `cleaned' the land, and it promoted the growth of new grass shoots. ̀
In 
the park we are not allowed to burn so that our animals can eat, yet Bayei burn in their 
homes', Mma Kgosi commented to me, illustrating not just the pastoral motivation behind 
burning, but its legitimation through comparing the veld with their home. 
30 That humans are not separate from nature is commonly shared in African views of the environment 
(Peterson 2000: 163-74). Perhaps a long history of living in large villages has marked the separation 
between people and ̀ the bush' in Batswana conceptions of the environment. 
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Practices such as hunting with guns and burning the veld are today loaded with contention. 
Basarwa asserted that they controlled the excesses of such practices, such as not burning in 
areas that fire would damage fruiting bushes or shrubs, such as ts'inya Dios os 
chamaethamnus), and by preventing indiscriminate hunting. In the opinion of Mojeremane, a 
55 year old man from Khwai: 
The animals are much less now. In our culture when herds of animals came, we would 
look carefully and see which one to kill, then we would all eat. But now govenunent has 
made the land rotten by selling so many animals to be killed. Now they say it is us who 
have killed them all'. 
Accusations fly in both directions, yet beyond the evidence that wildlife numbers on the 
whole are decreasing (DWNP 1994), blame cannot be simply placed on, or avoided by, any 
one party. 3' Nonetheless, many residents maintain a sense of custodianship over an 
environment of which they form an integral part, but which government policies have 
progressively eroded. Although CBNRM claims to recognise their capacity to manage local 
resources, its pretence of introducing natural resource management to local residents gives 
little cognisance or respect to pre-existing management practices. 
Attempts by Basarwa to map their own authority onto land has also involved attempts to 
define spaces of autonomy, which tend to be within huts, or in the bush outside the parks. 
Feelings still run high in Khwai over a period in the early 1990s when DWNP officials 
sometimes came into people's huts at night to check their cooking pots for poached meat, a 
practice which caused such uproar that it was stopped. Although the confines of people's huts 
are once again spaces of personal autonomy, public spaces within the village remain domain 
of the government. Its authority is marked in these spaces, for example, by red signs in the 
middle of Khwai and Mababe (Plate 3.11) that declare Se tshube naga ('Don't bum the veld'), 
a potent statement considering the derisory name by which Batswana sometimes refer to 
Basarwa; Matshubanaga ('Those that bum the veld'). The government's gaze is also marked 
by the presence of officials, especially in Khwai, where DWNP has a base, thus regulating 
behaviour that may be deemed illegal. Khwai have had some success in resisting this 
increasing presence in their village of an authority they feel at odds with, by flatly rejected a 
DWNP proposal in the mid-1990s to build their headquarters in Khwai. Had DWNP's plan 
been carried out, it would have involved the building of forty houses, and the influx of two 
hundred employees and their families. This would have increased enormously the local gaze 
31 Although coming from a very different epistemological context, recent studies have also pointed to 
the positive impact of habitation and cultivation on environmental health (e. g. Tiffen and Mortimore 
1994 for the Machakos District of Kenya, and Fairhead and Leach 1994 for Sierra Leone). 
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of authority in their village, which already makes it necessary, for example, to bring illegally 
hunted meat into the village under cover of darkness. Beyond the reach of this gaze - i. e. out 
in the bush - there is more freedom. In the words of Mma Roger from Khwai, `It is nice in the 
bush, there is not so much hunger there as here in the village. If you see a vulture you can 
follow it, not like here where there are so many [DWNP] officials'. 
On a symbolic level, Basarwa often stress their role in attaching names to tracts of land. `We 
say the land is ours because we have named it, showing it was all our land', explained 
Mojeremane from Khwai, echoing a comment by Jack, a middle-aged man: `To see the 
owners of the land, see what language it is named in'. In the same manner, no pretence is 
made to name land over which no authority is claimed: 'We have no name for Okavango 
because it is not our land', Kebuelemang, the headman of Mababe, told me. The constitution 
of landscape in this manner is an ongoing process; areas may be named and renamed as social 
dynamics change. A waterhole near Mababe, for example, is called Tshitshirimtshaa 
(`Tshitshiri's water'), after a resident more commonly known by his nickname, Phentse. 
Protecting rights to land is a role that women in particular take. This is undertaken on a 
village level, such as speaking out in public meetings (particularly in Khwai), as well as on a 
family level, such as Sangando's wife, who prevented the Land Board from allowing the 
headman of Mogotlho, a village along the river, to drill a borehole for his cattle in their field 
at Khyao/gwaba. Speaking out on the fundamental issue of land is a role that often falls on 
women, a role that women (not altogether undeservedly) accuse their men of neglecting 
because so many of them are often either absent or drunk. 
Conclusion: the centrality of land 
In tracing the changing tenure patterns of Basarwa in the northern sandveld over the land on 
which they have lived, and the way that these changes are understood and represented by its 
inhabitants today, one factor stands out; control over land is an absolutely central issue in 
negotiating development options today. In the words of Roy Sesana, Chairman of First People 
of the Kalahari to a delegation from the northern sandveld who visited his organisation, ̀ Our 
human rights are our land. They cannot do anything for us if they take us off our land'. 
Despite having lost much of the land they would call their own to conservation, Basarwa in 
the northern sandveld enjoy a privilege that many other Basarwa no longer have; being able to 
call at least some land their own. Such land (outside the parks) remains common property, but 
they face comparatively low levels of competition for its use from non-Basarwa agro- 
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pastoralists. Having land that is at least customarily recognised as under their jurisdiction 
(because there are no other non-Basarwa locally to claim it) gives them a sense of standing in 
the wider social economy that landless Basarwa cannot achieve. This principle is confirmed 
by Wily (1976: 16), who observed that relations between Basarwa and non-Basarwa at Bere 
(in Kgalagadi District) improved after they were officially allocated a small tract of land, as it 
gave them a standing by being able to declare, ̀ we have a place'. Woodburn (1997) also 
observed higher levels of discrimination against landless Hadza in Tanzania than against 
those who were still able to assert a measure of control over land. Nonetheless, the land 
encompassed by Chobe National Park and Moremi Game Reserve is a tangible representation 
of the history and identity of many Basarwa in the northern sandveld. It is also a reminder of 
their alienation from not just their physical space, but from many of the markers by which 
they have come to define themselves. 
The following section on livelihoods continues these themes, examining not just the material 
consequences on livelihood strategies of conservation policies, but the means by which 








Wilderness, people and development 
Development is about mapping and making, about the spatial reach of power and the 
control and management of other people's territories, environments and places. 
Jonathan Crush, The power of development (1996: 7) 
Considering the means by which the residents of the northern sandveld pursue ̀ life' directs 
our initial attention upwards in the frameworks of power, to those that strive to set the 
parameters within which livelihoods are defined and pursued. This chapter focuses on the 
people and institutions that attempt - from beyond the northern sandveld - to define what 
shape such grand concepts as `wilderness', `Bushmen' and `development' should or should 
not take within it. As such, it provides a context for subsequent chapters on attempts by 
Basarwa to shape their own livelihood strategies. As with `first peoples' worldwide, the 
external domination of Basarwa is increasingly structured by the state (Hitchcock and Holm 
1993, cf. Albert 1997), and so a large part of this chapter focuses on the Botswana 
government. However, I follow Barth's (1994: 20ff) suggestion that any analysis of ethnic and 
social processes needs to pay explicit attention to micro, median and macro levels at which 
they work. Apart from the Botswana government (macro), this chapter takes as its main 
subjects the interests of local and international tourism and conservation bodies (macro and 
median) and the perceptions and interactions of wider Setswana society (median and micro). 
Through each of these interconnected levels, I examine the structural relationship between 
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Basarwa and the various people and institutions that have attempted to define and shape both 
them and the landscape in which they have lived. 
I begin by laying out a framework for understanding the nature and operation of power, 
particularly in the interaction between the state and its subjects. I then consider Western views 
of the place of Basarwa in the landscape of the Okavango Delta. Conceptions of nature and 
the African landscape are integral to this analysis, as these have influenced the place that 
people have in it, and thus policy and practice in conservation and tourism. I go on to examine 
how Basarwa are imagined by their non-Basarwa neighbours, and the discursive frameworks 
through which Sesarwa ethnicity in Botswana is moulded. Lastly, I examine how these views 
have contributed towards defining development interventions, particularly the Botswana 
government's Remote Area Development Programme (RADP). 
Understanding power 
`Power', over the last two decades, has been a popular, but remarkably diffuse, concept in the 
social sciences. With the rise of poststructuralist theory, studies of power began focusing on 
the power inherent in a variety of discourses or practices that do not appear to be formally 
part of the institutions of government, rather than on the coercive and explicit means that 
institutions use to achieve their aims. A key conception of power from this viewpoint is the 
constitution of knowledge. Moulding a subject group into an object of knowledge becomes a 
means of exercising power over them. The state and other dominant institutions become the 
producers and possessors of legitimate knowledge; of history, of collective representations of 
identity, of what is legitimate and what is not. Such claims to knowledge and attribution of 
ignorance are important themes in analysing development (Hobart 1993: 3), bringing to the 
fore the forms of power that development creates and sustains. Development ideology is thus 
not simply an abstract set of philosophical propositions, but, to use Ferguson's words, `an 
elaborate contraption that does something' (1990: xv). 
Drawing largely from Said's (1979) notion of `Orientalism', Escobar (1996: 225) presents 
development as a particular set of discursive power relations that construct a representation of 
the Third World. He asserts that `thinking of development in terms of discourse makes it 
possible to maintain the focus on domination... and at the same time explore more fruitfully 
the conditions of possibility and the most pervasive effects of development' (Escobar 
1995: 5,6). Representing particular regions or people as `underdeveloped', or backward and 
childlike, allows them to be treated as such by legitimating intervention (cf. Hobart 1993: 2). 
Development thus becomes, in part, an attempt to produce governable subjects, largely by 
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asserting norms and forms (such as fields of knowledge and types of landscape) by which a 
society can be understood and regulated (Watts 1996: 48, cf. Scott 1998). The emphasis on 
discourse in the work of these critical development theorists is inspired by Foucault's 
conception of discourse as not only language, but also what is represented and asserted 
through language. Discourse on a subject contributes towards the `laws of possibility, rules of 
existence of the objects that are named, designated or described within it, and for the relations 
that are affirmed or denied in it' (Foucault 1972: 91). A discourse of development, therefore, 
identifies appropriate and legitimate ways of thinking and speaking about development, as 
well as practising it. A discursive perspective of development embraces a totalising 
conception of how development, through language, `constitutes' the people it acts upon 
(Grillo 1997: 12) by defining who they are, and the realms of possibility in which they exist. 
While this perspective on development has generally been applied on a global level, to 
relations between the `First' and `Third' Worlds, I use it here to illuminate the exercise of 
power largely on a national level within Botswana. 
Useful as it is in its attention to the `hidden' operations of power, the poststructuralist theory 
that has inspired critical development perspectives has two particular shortcomings that I 
attempt to avoid in this analysis. The first is the dissolution, in the face of power, of the 
people we write about to an incoherent `subject effect', losing any sense of agency or 
creativity (Lee 1992: 36, Ortner 1995: 183-7). The second is the reification of a diffuse concept 
of `power', that has little grounding in real events and processes, and whose reach becomes 
infinite. This is a theoretical shortcoming that is reproduced in the thinking of some critical 
development theorists who privilege the overreaching power of the state as a monolithic 
entity (Grillo 1997: 20-1). Although I do draw upon some generalised conceptions of the state, 
I attempt to give cognisance to the limitations of state power, and to ground assertions of 
power in the individuals and institutions that give them life, rather than representing the state 
as an abstract unity of legislation and buildings. The state, as Barth (1994: 20) argues, needs to 
be treated as an actor, but it is also more than that. It is made up of a multiplicity of different 
actors, forming a varied and embodied institution filled with individuals. 
Integral to a focus on discourses of `development', is the notion of hegemony, used by 
Gramsci (1971) to describe the cultural processes by which those in power maintain their 
privileged position. Political and economic power is maintained largely through being able to 
naturalise a particular way of seeing the world, particularly social relationships, rather than 
through overt repression. It is in these terms that Escobar (1995: 53) characterises the power of 
global development dynamics: 
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The forms of power that have appeared act not so much by repression, but by 
normalisation: not by ignorance but by controlled knowledge: not by humanitarian 
concern, but by the bureaucratisation of social action. 
Hegemony attempts to obscure the political nature of the dominant-subordinate relationship to 
those that are subordinate, to whom it is meant to appear as natural order. Nonetheless, 
hegemony is not so complete as to preclude resistance to the political order. Dominant 
representations colour, but stop short of determining, consciousness and social action: 
`hegemony is always more fragile than it appears, and never as total as it would claim' 
(Ortner 1984: 154). These representations are therefore a zone of continual contestation. 
Subordinate populations, such as Basarwa, are not simply deluded and passive captives of the 
state, but at the same time their expressions of politics and culture exist in, and are shaped by, 
the fields of state power. This chapter focuses on the social, political and symbolic dynamics 
of domination. The extent to which Basarwa articulate with Setswana hegemony, in both 
affirming and challenging its frames of reference, is explored in Chapter Six (with reference 
to identity) and Chapter Seven (with reference to development). 
Imagining wilderness 
Integral to dominant perceptions of Basarwa have been conceptions of the landscape in which 
they have lived. As one of only two inland deltas in the world, and a sea of waterways in an 
otherwise parched semi-desert environment, the Okavango has long captured the imagination 
of Western visitors. Take, for example, the lyrical description penned by Hauptmann 
Streitwolf, a German visitor to the Delta in 1911: 
High leafy trees wooded the island banks and mirrored their hanging greenery in the 
water. Lotus lilies and water-plants of all sorts covered the unruffled water surface. 
Countless waterfowl sat motionless on the pools and trees, amongst the deep green of 
which often showed forth the dazzling white of the heron. Duck, geese, ̀snake-neck' 
birds [cormorant], did not dare to disturb the silence of this secluded region. It is a 
beautiful world, this swamp region! Practically uninhabited except for a few Makuba 
[Bayei] engaged in catching fish, shut off from the outer world and difficult of access, it 
has retained its virgin charm (translated and quoted by Stigand 1923: 403). 
Streitwolf's vision of the Okavango as a wilderness where nature rules supreme has proved 
pervasive, especially within the context of the expanding tourist industry. Today, the 
Okavango Delta continues to attract foreign tourists seeking its `virgin charm', and fuels 
Botswana's fastest-growing industry; tourism, growing in economic terms by an average of 
11.5 percent per year through much of the 1990s (GOB 1997b: 38). 
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Plate 4.1: Elephants on the River Khwai. 
Plate 4.2: Tourism. 
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In 1997,130,195 visitors paid to enter Moremi Game Reserve and Chobe National Park, the 
most common destinations of foreign tourists. Almost half of these stayed in the Okavango 
Delta's 54 lodges or hotels. 32 The first of these was Khwai River Lodge, built in 1967, four 
kilometres downstream from the present site of Khwai village. Khwai village is itself a hub of 
tourist activity, situated at the North Gate of Moremi Game Reserve, the transit point between 
Moremi and Chobe for overland visitors, and in close proximity to two other upmarket lodges 
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Map 4.1: Khwai and neighbouring lodges. 
Kilometres 
in addition to Khwai River Lodge; Mochaba and Tsaro (Map 4.1). Clients of these lodges 
arrive by light aircraft to a dirt airstrip several kilometres east of the village, where they are 
32Source: Department of Tourism unpublished statistics. 
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picked up by a guide in open-sided safari vehicles, and taken to relax and refresh before a 
game drive. One of the lodges, Tsaro, lies to the west, beyond Khwai village. Clients on the 
way to Tsaro, however, are usually taken on a specially constructed circuitous route to avoid 
the village of Khwai, one example of how `nature' is carefully `staged' for tourists seeking 
the authenticity of a wilderness experience. 
Selling and consuming nature in the Okavango Delta 
`We are living a dream to be here', Dick, a retired professor from New York, told me as he 
savoured his first evening at Machaba Lodge, echoing a comment that continually surfaced in 
the well-filled pages of all three of the lodges' guest books. The dream that their hosts 
carefully cultivate, despite the presence of Khwai at North Gate, and Mababe on the route 
between Moremi and Chobe, is one in which people have little place. Take, for example, 
Gametrackers'33 brochure: 
You find yourself harmonising with a different, timeless place, remote from cities, 
beyond ordinary history... and the realisation dawns that you are fortunate and 
privileged to be in one of the last corners of the planet under the total governance of 
nature (emphasis added). 
An analysis of the publicity brochures from fifteen lodges and camps in the Delta by Damm et 
al. (1998: 8) reveals that fourteen make no mention of whatsoever of local population or 
culture. Three do mention `Bushmen', but in a generic sense as an unthreatening part of the 
prehistoric landscape, such as the claim by Kanana Safaris that `this is where the Bushmen 
have stalked game for untold generations'. The brochure from Xugana lodge, on the land 
claimed by Two-Boy who was moved to Gudigwa (p. 88), gives the same message: 
There was a time when the ancient Bushman would kneel down to drink from the 
promised water of the Xugana lagoon, a lake formed by the timeless meanderings of the 
Okavango Delta's waterways... . Today `Xugana' means more than 
`kneel down to 
drink'. You will now find a lodge on an island nestling within a forest of wild ebony and 
garcinia trees... . Xugana has awaited your arrival for millenia (ibid: 8-9). 
Few of the photographs that generously cover these glossy brochures show local people. 
Apart from eager servants within the confines of the camp, the only non-dislocated and 
contemporary people presented in scenes of the Delta are Streitwolf's `Makuba' polers, who 
33 Gametrackers is a subsidiary of the international leisure group Orient Express Hotels, which owns 
Khwai River Lodge. 
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are reinvented in tourist brochures as mediators, to guide tourists in their dugout canoes along 
the waterways. 
Actually, most guides drive open-sided four-wheel drive vehicles. They do however, play a 
crucial role as interlocutors between their clients and the raw and unpredictable environment. 
Their role in protecting and educating clients in this new experience gives them a unique form 
of authority, which can be financially rewarding. `Dangerous' encounters with elephants, and 
`once in a lifetime' glimpses of rare animals such as leopards, can be carefully managed so as 
to elicit generous tips, which can raise a guide's income to higher than that of their superiors 
in the busy season. Despite their room for manoeuvre, however, guides - very few of whom 
are Basarwa - are most successful if they reinforce the vision that has attracted tourists in the 
first place. They, alongside the residents of Khwai and Mababe, inhabit a world not only 
consumed by people from outside Africa, but also to a large extent produced and controlled 
outside Africa as well. This illustrates two aspects of the neo-colonial nature of tourism in this 
region: that it produces and thrives on conceptions of the Okavango as Edenic; and that its 
economic control and benefits exist in the main far from the locality of their production. 
People in nature 
`Landscape', Mitchell (1994: 1-2) suggests, ̀ doesn't merely signify or symbolise power 
relations: it is an instrument of cultural power'. Representations of landscape can act, in much 
the same way as an ideology, to naturalise a social construction of wilderness; an external 
nature that can be dominated, conquered or protected by a human society that exists as 
separate from it. Neumann (1998: 9) refers to this as the `national park ideal', which he 
describes as the `the notion that "nature" can be "preserved" from the effects of human 
agency by legislatively creating a bounded space for nature controlled by a centralised 
bureaucratic authority'. From its inception with Yellowstone National Park in 1872, this 
particular ideal has provided a model for national parks throughout the world, not least those 
in Africa. As Neumann (ibid. ) and others (e. g. Williams 1973, Mitchell 1994) have shown, 
the genesis of this ideal coincided with a Euro-American trend towards seeing landscape as 
pristine nature, in contrast with the degradation that industrial society wreaked on the 
environment. The African landscape has been particularly prone to Western constructions as a 
special kind of `Eden' (Anderson and Grove 1987: 4-6), thus begging ̀ protection' as national 
(and more recently, international) heritage, for consumption by modern society. As such, 
these landscapes - of which the national park is the ultimate form - have paradoxically 
become primary sites of capitalist production and lucrative generators of foreign exchange. 
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Needless to say, these `pristine' environments were not untouched by the hand of man prior to 
the arrival of tourists. Promotional material for Xugana makes no mention of virtually the 
only known and excavated prehistoric archaeological site in the Delta - about ten metres from 
the present bar area (Damm et. al. 1998: 9) - nor of the more contemporary habitation by Two- 
Boy's family. The Okavango Delta thus represents (as Neumann [1998: 31] characterises 
national parks in general) a harmonious, untouched space of nature, masking the colonial 
dislocations and obliterating the history of those dislocations, along with the history of spaces 
that existed previously. 
Closely associated with the concept of the unique and mysterious wilderness of the Okavango 
Delta has been the idea, in the second half of the twentieth century, of a mystical and 
unknown people hidden in its depths. For some, the wilderness of the Okavango constituted 
the final frontier beyond which the last undiscovered Bushmen might be found. Four 
expeditions were mounted between the 1940s and 1960s to attempt to `discover' the 
`remnants' of the River Bushmen: Balsan (1950); Van der Post (1958); Cowley (1969); and 
Heinz (1969). `Mystery and ignorance hang over the reedbeds of the swamps', wrote Heinz 
(1969: 743) in introducing his journey. `Some say that remnants of Bushmen tribes live hidden 
away on inaccessible islands here and that the River Bushmen who have been seen are tall 
and dark, totally unlike their small, light skinned desert cousins'. In true expeditionary 
fashion, Cowley and his men set off from Maun in 1966 with 1501b of leaf tobacco, 401b of 
trinkets and a locked tin trunk of instruments for taking anatomical measurements, looking for 
`Swamp Bushmen [who] were said to be the purest survivors of the Old Yellow Race' 
(1969: 3). He had already faced the disappointment of visiting Khwai in 1960 and finding 
them `hybridised'. He therefore aimed to find out what he could `before the fabled tribe of 
swamp Bushmen was swallowed up in the racial hodgepodge of the Okavango Swamps' 
(1969: 61) 34 Needless to say, each of these expeditions did not find the pure exemplars they 
had hoped for. Constrained by a fantasy of `pure Bushmen', protected by a ̀ pure nature' from 
being tainted by non-Bushmen, it was inevitable that they would come to a similar conclusion 
as Seiner (1910: 31-2) had half a century earlier; that Swamp Bushmen were, `relics in a rapid 
process of. assimilation into the dominant culture, and that in a few years it would be 
impossible to describe them unequivocally as Bushmen'. 
34 The fascination continues. Shortly before I left Scotland in 1997 to undertake my fieldwork, I was 
contacted by a researcher from the BBC who told me she had heard that the last River Bushman was 
alive somewhere in the Okavango Delta, and did I know where he was? 
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Plate 4.3: Entrance to Khwai River Lodge. 
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Plate 4.4: Bridge over Khwai River at North Gate (entrance to Moremi game 
Reserve). 

Despite such disappointments, the lasting idea that certain kinds of people had a natural place 
in the landscape did allow some conceptions of national parks to include native inhabitants 
within them. It was in this mould that the Central Kalahari Game Reserve (CKGR) was 
created by the colonial government in 1961, conceived as a reserve for both Basarwa and 
wildlife. These two aims were inextricably linked, as the welfare of Basarwa, ̀ who would 
continue to pursue a traditional hunting and gathering existence' (DWNP n. d. (a): 1) depended 
on the conservation of wildlife and vegetation. George Silberbauer, who recommended the 
creation of CKGR in 1960, was well aware how tenuous the Basarwa hold on land in the 
Kalahari was in the face of expanding pastoralism, and thus saw the reserve as an opportunity 
to protect Basarwa land rights (Silberbauer 1981: 37). Silberbauer specifically stated that, `[i]t 
is not intended to preserve the Bushmen of the Reserve as museum curiosities and pristine 
primitives, but to allow them the right of choice of the life they wish to follow' (quoted in 
Hitchcock and Brandenburgh 1995: 8). Nonetheless, it did not seem out of place to the 
colonial government that `hunting and gathering' people should have a place in a game 
reserve. As time passed, however, the situation became less clear cut. It was obvious that the 
`hunter-gatherers' had accumulated stock: about 2000 goats; 225 chickens; 127 donkeys; and 
23 horses by 1976 (Murray 1976: 9). A fact finding-mission was commissioned (Pilane et. al. 
1985), and the DWNP later concluded that `the interests of the people and the wildlife have 
diverged and were no longer compatible' (DWNP n. d. (a): 1). Initial threats by the government 
to remove the residents of CKGR in 1987 were put on hold after international protests, but 
were realised in 1997 when residents of Xade, the largest settlement within the reserve, were 
moved out of the reserve. 
The example of CKGR provides an illuminating insight into various processes examined in 
this and subsequent chapters. In post-independence Botswana, the notion of a tract of land 
reserved for a specific non-Batswana ̀ethnic' group was anathema to the non-ethnic discourse 
that the government propounded. Moreover the explicit focus of government programmes 
affecting Basarwa has been integrationist rather than isolationist. Despite the changing 
conceptions of local Basarwa as hunter-gatherers or petty-pastoralists, it was perhaps 
therefore inevitable that the Botswana government would move to change this incongruity. 
That this happened at a time when the government, through CBNRM, had a stated policy of 
encouraging local involvement in tourism and conservation, provides a telling commentary on 
the overall policy framework in which CBNRM is being implemented in Botswana. 
Narratives of racial purity and of natural purity form parallel discourses based on the same 
presuppositions. They rely on the essentialisation of a pure form of nature, and of people (in 
129 
this case `Bushmen') subject to it, who exist in contradistinction to others (both white and 
black) who have subordinated and tainted nature. Like wilderness, `Bushmanness' is seen as 
fragile and easily lost, as the residents of Xade found to their cost. `It is very difficult to refer 
to [the residents of Khwai] as Basarwa because they are not true Basarwa anymore, they are 
too mixed, and their features are different... . 
The Bushman gene is a very weak gene and 
disappears quite quickly', I was told by one of the original tourism operators in the Khwai 
area. Such constructions of nature and `Bushmanness' mean that once Bushmen cross the 
conceptual line between nature and culture, their presence in a `wildlife' area becomes an 
anathema. The very real implications of this worldview and consequent policy have been 
repeated not only in CKGR, but also the Etosha Game Reserve in Namibia, from where 
Hai//om Bushmen were evicted in 1954. Justifying its actions, the commission argued that 
Hai//om `assimilation had proceeded too far', so that it would not be ̀ worthwhile to preserve 
the Heikum [sic] as Bushmen' (Schoeman n. d.: 14, quoted in Widlok 1999: 25). 
Casting Basarwa in the Okavango Delta as inimical to the aims of the proposed Moremi 
Game Reserve was therefore an essential strategy to their eviction, a characterisation in 
common with general characterisations of African hunting by conservation advocates as cruel 
and wasteful slaughter (Neumann 1996). June Vendall-Clark, a prime initiator of the reserve, 
alleged that, `Masarwa Bushmen in some areas routinely surrounded herds of red lechwe 
antelope and deliberately broke the legs of as many of them as they could so that the flesh of 
the still-living beasts would stay fresh for longer' (1990: 223). Tourism operators questioning 
the ongoing settlement at Khwai use arguments in the same vein. `But they are not even 
pedigree Bushmen', 35 one of the lodge managers complained to me about Khwai, and another 
argued that most of Khwai's residents are only there because of the job opportunities in the 
area. Both these assertions carry the implication that their `transformation' from Bushman to 
proletariat delegitimises their continued presence in a `wildlife area'. 
Contestation over the landscape of the Okavango therefore becomes one of ideas of nature 
and culture, and where (literally) to draw the boundary between them (cf. Neumann 1998: 11). 
Damm et al (1998) use the rustic wooden bridge at North Gate (Plate 4.4), which spans the 
Khwai River - the northern border of Moremi Game Reserve - as a metaphor for the crossing 
between nature and culture. While this is true in a legal sense, in that Khwai village is 
33 Her use of a word normally reserved for animal breeds betrays the conceptual categories in which 
`Bushmen' are often placed by observers. While few would explicitly adhere to the implications of 
such a statement, the use of terms normally reserved for animals in discourses about `Basarwa' is 
remarkably pervasive (Damm 1999: 3). 
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permitted to exist on the north bank, and its inhabitants are excluded from the south bank 
(unless in transit or as guides), in reality priority is given on both sides to nature. Although 
none of the three lodges have been granted concessions to land beyond their immediate 
vicinity, their extensive use of NG19, which encompasses all three lodges and Khwai village 
(Maps 3.2,4.1), for game viewing contributes to its de facto status as a wildlife area. About 
half their game drives are conducted outside the reserve, as the reserve is not fenced, allowing 
the wildlife to move freely either side of the shallow river, Practices such as creating and 
maintaining wildlife-viewing tracks, attempted restrictions on movement and petty-hunting of 
springhares and birds all reinforce Khwai's sense of alienation from the area around their 
village. The construction of Khwai as a `nature' area means that attempts by the lodges to 
present an image of corporate responsibility to their potential clients are framed with 
reference to the environment, rather than local people. For example, a brochure of 
Gametrackers boasts, `We maintain a respectful relationship with a fragile environment and 
pride ourselves on harmonising with the ecological balance; the wellbeing of all natural 
inhabitants is paramount'. Most operators would simply prefer Khwai and Mababe not to be 
there, and in the words of one operator to a consultancy team gauging opinion on Community 
Hunting Areas in Ngamiland, their greatest need is `birth control' (OCC 1995: A39). 
The land on which Khwai is situated (NG19) is designated as a Wildlife Management Area, 
which permits existing settlements to remain, but places restrictions on landuse, such as the 
creation of new settlements, or the keeping of domestic stock. Nonetheless, Khwai's position 
in an area sold to tourists as `wilderness' has prompted efforts by various government 
departments to relocate them elsewhere. These are efforts that Khwai has so far resisted, 
agreeing to relocation only if it is back to their previous location within the reserve, thus 
challenging its designation as a `nature' area. ̀They don't know there are people here', was an 
exasperated comment I often heard in Khwai, referring to the priority the government and 
tourist industry gives to nature over people in their area. The invisibility of Basarwa is not a 
new phenomenon. Early censuses of Ngamiland tended to ignore Basarwa, such as the 1921 
census which noted ̀ a good number of River Bushmen', but failed to enumerate them because 
of the `impossibility of catching and numbering the wild River Bushmen' (Stigand 1923: 412). 
This census completely ignored Basarwa in the sandveld (the ancestors of those now in 
Gudigwa), and, still today, the villages of Khwai, Mababe and Gudigwa are omitted from 
many official maps. Nonetheless, although the autonomy that this invisibility afforded may 
have been valued, Basarwa in the northern sandveld today face a struggle to make their 
presence felt in an environment that is predominantly regarded as one in which people have 
little place. 
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I now turn from predominantly Western ideas about their landscape to ideas about Basarwa 
themselves within Botswana, and the conceptual place Basarwa occupy in the woridviews of 
their neighbours. 
Imagining Basarwa 
The nature of dominant stereotypes of Basarwa in contemporary Botswana is an issue that, as 
Hitchcock and Holm (1993: 314) have pointed out, academic discussion has tended to avoid - 
perhaps a function of most such research being done under the auspices of official 
programmes. There is no doubt that Basarwa are imagined in a particular manner by many of 
their neighbours, but the forms that these imaginings take are open to various interpretations. 
To illuminate the place of Basarwa in the wider conceptual landscape of Botswana, I recount 
two everyday interactions between Basarwa and non-Basarwa, chosen from a multitude of 
similar interactions that I observed. 
The first occurred as I sat next to the dusty road west of Maun with the two Basarwa men I 
had started chatting to, as I whiled away the time waiting for a lift to Ghanzi. One of them 
told me he was G//anakhwe, who speak a southern Khwe language, related to the northern 
Khwe languages of Okavango. Another young man, a Moyci from Gumare, sauntered over 
and started chatting to him. Without a hint of malice, he asked the G//anakhwe man, `Where 
are the namagadi [female ones], I want to grab their backsides' 36 The G//anakhwe man 
fended off his question, and they continued to make small talk with each other, holding each 
other's hands as many men do in friendly conversation. Namagadi is a Setswana word 
meaning 'female', but it is usually reserved for animals. Viewing the reproductive nature of 
Basalagadi, or female Basarwa, as equivalent to that of animals or livestock, has a long 
history. Chapman (1971[1868], 1: 74, quoted in Morton 1994: 226), for example, said of the 
Bangwato that they `hold the Bushmen as beasts, term them bulls and cows, heifers and 
calves. In speaking of a female they say she has calved'. Yet, as Gordon (1992: 212-3) argues 
with reference to constructions *'of Bushmanness by white settlers in Namibia, their 
`inhumanity' was only one in a series of stereotypes used to justify actions against them, and 
did not load the use of Basarwa women for sexual services with the taboos of bestiality. That 
the Moyei's question did not elicit visible offence hints at the pervasive and socially- 
acceptable structures of society in Botswana that governs social interaction between Basarwa 
and non-Basarwa. 
36 Steatopygia is a common stereotype of Basarwa in Botswana. 
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The second example is taken from a visit to a small Jul'hoansi village in Western 
Bushmanland, Namibia, by a group from Khwai, Gudigwa and Mababe. The Kalanga37 driver 
we were with turned to some of the group, and commented on the children going to fetch 
water: `If only they went to school, they would be people'. This perhaps gets closer to the 
nature of dominant attitudes to Sesarwa ethnicity; that it is not always so much about Basarwa 
per se (as the comment was made to people who called themselves Basarwa as well), but 
about a `backward' lifestyle that many Basarwa are seen to represent. This is a lifestyle 
associated with the bush and a lack of `civilisation', which makes the civilising project of 
development particularly potent when aimed at Basarwa. The categorisation of people 
according to stereotypical modes of subsistence structures similar relationships elsewhere in 
Africa as well (Woodburn 1997), and is an important marker with which Basarwa are 
categorised by their neighbours, alongside language (particularly its abundance of clicks)38 
and physiognomy. 
The relegation of Basarwa to beyond the realm of civilisation is illuminated by the conceptual 
model governing Setswana land use (documented, for example, by Peters 1987: 184). It 
consisted of a pattern of concentric circles around the sphere of sociality, the village (motse). 
As one moved outwards, through arable land (masimo), then cattle posts (meraka) and finally 
no-man's land - the bush (naga) - one moved from the realm of society to that of nature and 
wilderness. Although the function of the bush, especially around the Okavango, has changed, 
becoming for some a lucrative site of production through expanding cattle ranches or tourism, 
the stereotype remains that Basarwa are of the realm beyond society, of the bush. As Basarwa 
are seen to lack the civilisation that comes from sociality, they also represent a way of life that 
we all come from; they are people of the past. This stereotype is reproduced (and thus 
enforced) through local representations, such as school textbooks that tend to present Basarwa 
living very much as their predecessors 20,000 years ago (Motzafi-Haller 1995). In a similar 
vein, the National Museum's Mobile Museum Service travels the schools of Botswana 
showing, for example, ̀ how Basarwa live' using John Marshall's classic films of Ju/'hoansi 
made in the 1950s. 
Several observers have commented on local representations of Basarwa as people of the bush 
(Suzman 1997) and of the past (Motzafi-Haller 1995, Saugestad 1998: 60, Damm 1999). 
" Kalanga are a large Bantu-speaking minority in Botswana, originating mostly from the east of 
Botswana. 
39 One aspect of this is the common conception that Sesarwa languages are difficult to write (cf. 
Hasselring 1997: 43). For example, the simple name Khwai is spelt in at least four different ways by 
DWNP alone in various signs and brochures: Khwai, Khwaai, Khwaii and Kwai. 
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There has, however, been little comment (with the exception of brief mentions by Kuper 
[1970: 45,66,91]) on perhaps the most important aspect of this; that they are thus people 
without molao - without `law'. Although references to molao frequently surfaced in 
conversations I had in the northern sandveld, there is no commonly-used Bugakhwedam or 
Ts'exadam equivalent. 
Being seen as people without molao has two important implications for their relationship with 
the contemporary state. The first arises from the view that those who lack molao are anarchic, 
and do not submit to the norms and codes of conduct of society. Take, for example, the 
description Rra K, a Moyei man in Ditshipi (on the southeast side of the Delta), gave me of 
Basarwa (speaking in the present tense). 
Basarwa of the sandveld are unfamiliar with other people, and run away when you 
approach them. If you come across them alone they will kill you, or else they will see 
your tracks, follow you and kill you. If they see you, the first thing they ask you for is 
motokwane [cannabis]. You had better give them what you have, and leave quickly 
before they kill you. 
For individuals, such stereotypes make Basarwa unpredictable neighbours. For the state, they 
make unpredictable subjects, as Basarwa, being beyond the reaches of molao (i. e. 
governability), become seen as separatist. In a review of the RADP, its originator, Liz Wily 
noted that one of its major stumbling blocks was the fear that Basarwa living in the bush are 
being separatist (1982: 302). A decade later, this was still in evidence, with the reaction to 
calls for greater access to land by a delegation of Basarwa to the government. A spate of 
reports in national newspapers followed, claiming that Basarwa were being separatist and 
demanding self-rule (Daily News 21.05.92, Mmegi 22.05.92, Botswana Guardian 22.05.92., 
all quoted in Saugestad 1993: 40). 
The second implication, which follows closely from the first, is that they need to come under 
molao. Bringing Basarwa under molao is an essential step in increasing their `legibility' 
(Scott 1998) to their neighbours and the state. Until the 1980s, some government officials 
used the unfortunate - though accurate from their point of view - term for their consequent 
policy; that Basarwa should be `domesticated' (Gulbrandsen, in Saugestad 1998: 113). 
`Integration into mainstream society' has since become the more acceptable buzz-phrase for 
policy towards Basarwa. Behind this aim lies the assumption that Basarwa will gradually 
absorb dominant norms, values and customs, submit themselves to existing authority 
structures and, in short, become more governable subjects. Integration is justified by 
constructions of Basarwa as backward. ̀ How can you have a Stone-Age creature continue in 
134 
the age of computers? ' Festus Mogae - then vice-president of Botswana, and now president - 
was reported by the New York Times to have asked (Daley 1996). Presenting a similar 
viewpoint, the outgoing president, Sir Keitumile Masire, commented in Ghanzi, as he gave 
his farewell tour, on the relocations of Basarwa from Xade in CKGR (as reported in the 
government-produced Daily News): 
He said the government did not want to see certain tribes in the country remaining 
primitive. He blamed some anthropologists and sociologists from Europe for a 
misinformation campaign on the relocation programme. He said such people wanted 
Basarwa to remain primitive for research purposes. He described such people as `bo 
marata helele' [loosely translated as ̀ those who enjoy a spectacle'] who did not want to 
see Basarwa enjoying the fruits of this country like the rest of Batswana (Shabani 
1998: 1). 
The President presents Basarwa (presumably all Basarwa, although his statement is in the 
context of Xade) in a similar manner to the way they are commonly represented, especially in 
development discourse; by the attributes that they lack (Motzafi-Haller 1995, Saugestad 
1998). In this case they lack the position to `enjoy the fruits of the country', but it could be 
any number of things; molao, civilisation, money, jobs, or skills. The problem is defined as 
one of culture, that their culture - rather than systematic dispossession by their neighbours - is 
to blame for their material poverty. This is not a new thought; almost a century earlier, 
Passarge (1997[1907]: 128) had commented on the unequal relationship between Basarwa and 
Batswana, that, `inevitably the oppressed bear the major blame. Their inability to accept 
cultural imperatives, to rise to the cultural level of their suppressers is their own fault'. These 
representations of the problem beg a clear solution; that for `progress' to be achieved, 
Basarwa must adopt a way of living that conforms to that of the majority. 
The conception that Basarwa represent a `primitive' way of life is widely held. That some of 
these comments originate from Bayei is especially significant, being people that for much of 
the twentieth century lived in a very similar manner to their Basarwa neighbours. To most 
people in Botswana, as well as the government, Basarwa represent an inappropriate 
continuation of `the primitive' in a country that has prided itself on its rapid economic growth 
and social change since independence. While this view of Basarwa is not too different from 
popular Western notions, it has very different connotations; rather than constituting a 
romantic alter ego of their own society, they are an embarrassment. 
9 Basarwa, therefore, 
generally occupy a space in the conceptual landscape of contemporary Botswana that is 
39 Demonstrated too in the embarrassed giggles that often accompany public showings of John 
Marshall's classic films of Ju/'hoansi by the Mobile Museum. 
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different not only from Setswana-speakers, but also other minorities as well. Although 
Basarwa are not alone in carrying a legacy of subjugation, they face the double disadvantage 
of also being placed conceptually in a very different category from other minority groups; 
being people of the bush, and people who lack the constraints of molao. 
The state, (non)ethnicity and development 
Botswana achieved independence in 1966, surrounded by white-ruled states that were in the 
process of entrenching their power through ethnic ascription and division. In his country's 
first address to the United Nations General Assembly in 1969, Seretse Khama focused 
overwhelmingly on the divisive ethnic policies of its neighbours, concluding: 
... but Botswana, as a thriving majority-ruled state, on the borders of South Africa and Namibia, will present an effective and serious challenge to the credibility of South 
Africa's racial policies, and in particular its policy of developing so-called Bantu 
homelands and its stated goal of eventual independence for these Bantustans (Khania 
1969: point 29). 
Although this initially provided a powerful motivation to develop, in contrast, a `healthy non- 
racial democracy' (ibid. emphasis added) based on equality, the policy of disavowing an 
ethnic discourse has remained, despite the magnitude of political changes in its neighbours. 
This policy has proved expedient beyond its time, as a means of maintaining the image of a 
culturally homogenous state. Rather than being non-ethnic, it is decisively monoethnic, 
preserving the de facto hegemonic status of Setswana language, culture and political power 
(cf. Saugestad 1998: 71). 
About fifty percent of Botswana's 1.5 million citizens are ethnically Batswana. However, 
there is a deliberate blurring of the distinction between being a citizen of Botswana (labelled 
Motswana), and being ethnically a member of one of the dominant Setswana-speaking tribes 
(also labelled Motswana). Dominant discourses tend to conflate these two meanings of the 
root -tswana, so that if you are a Motswana (citizen), you are expected to reflect the traits that 
are associated with being a Motswana (in the ethnic sense), such as speaking Setswana (the 
language of the ethnic majority), or holding to its pastoralist values. Conflation of the two 
meanings is so pervasive that it is often even apparent in the narratives of non-Batswana (in 
the ethnic sense), such as the unnamed Mosarwa who told a team of consultants researching 
policy issues on wildlife, `I am now a Motswana [citizen]. Therefore I must own cattle 
[associated with the pastoralist values of ethnic Batswana]' (Cooke et al 1992: 11). 
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Commenting on the relationship of Jews to the state, Marx (1975[1844]: 219) argued that the 
abolition of the particular is the condition of universal ̀ equality' within the ̀ modern' state. By 
proclaiming universal equality, the state, in its political functions, dissolves the particular and 
only recognises a universal (and presumably equal) populace that has shed all particularities. 
The particular - Basarwa ethnicity in the case of Botswana - does not disappear, but it 
becomes delegated to outside the sphere of the political, thus becoming depoliticised. 
Prejudice and democracy thus work, in this respect, towards the same goal; the dissolution of 
the particular in political life (cf. Sartre 1972: 57). In the case of Basarwa, the Botswana 
government has acted no differently than most other states that have faced a similar situation 
(cf. Morris 1989: 182 for Australia, Saugestad 1998: 226-8 for Norway); by defining their 
particular problem in terms of quantitative needs that are different from those faced by other 
citizens only by degree. Even taken simply as a matter of degree, the differences are startling. 
Remote Area Dweller illiteracy, for example, was 86 percent in 1995, compared to a national 
average of 26 percent (Selolwane 1995: 7). Yet ignoring differences in kind allows denial that 
the present situation of many Basarwa is the product of a specific and concrete history in 
which the dominant are intimately implicated. 
The state's aversion to recognising ethnic particularities in its policies is nonetheless 
challenged in two respects. Firstly, by the distinct position that Basarwa occupy conceptually, 
including in the minds of many officials, in the social landscape of Botswana. This is 
reflected, for example, in the tendency (which is not a result of an explicit policy) for the 
government and independent press to refer to `Basarwa' in reports that concern Basarwa, 
although they do not use ethnic labels in reference to other people in Botswana. The second 
challenge is a more direct one, arising from both beyond and within its borders. The situation 
of Basarwa has become an issue of concern to not only donors and researchers, but also 
prompted the rise of Basarwa interest groups, such as First People of the Kalahari. Along with 
occurrences such as the second regional conference for Basarwa held in Gaborone in 1993, 
and the CKGR removals, Basarwa have gained a higher profile within Botswana. The 
treatment of Basarwa has become a political issue, taken up by local organisations, such as 
Ditshwanelo (The Botswana Centre for Human Rights), and some opposition politicians. For 
example, Ephraim Setshwaelo, the head of the newly formed Bosele UAP party, denounced 
the CKGR removals at a public rally in March 1998 (as reported in Mmegi 06.03.98): 
, it is barely conceivable that residents of such a village as Serowe or Ramotswa [large 
Batswana villages] could be uprooted from their ancestral land'. He dismissed as false 
government claims that Basarwa had moved voluntarily. `I personally visited the 
Basarwa and what they wanted to know was when Batswana will cease their dictatorial 
hold over them'. 
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When the particular (or others on behalf of the particular) assert themselves and challenge 
their situation, this poses a dilemma for the state, forcing it to acknowledge the particularity 
of Basarwa, despite espousing a non-ethnic discourse. An example of this is in the issue of 
research permits, stipulated by the Anthropological Research Act of 1967 as a requirement for 
all research undertaken in Botswana. My research permit, issued by the Office of the 
President, gave me permission to undertake research on the proviso that, `This research does 
not cover Basarwa at all. At no point during data collection will the issue of Basarwa people 
be touched upon, nor will there be any research involving this population group '. 40 Local- 
level officials are also well-aware of the government's sensitivity to issues pertaining to 
Basarwa, such as I found when I attempted to interview Nyamanyama, a man from Gudigwa 
who was serving a three-year term in Maun prison for illegal possession of a firearm. `Kgang 
ya Mosarwa ke kgang ya moruthuthwa' ('The issue of Basarwa is a hot one'), the Prison 
Officer in Charge explained as he denied me a formal interview. 
Despite these contradictions, Basarwa nonetheless face a development apparatus that is 
explicitly aimed at dissolving local difference, subjecting them to a universal development 
plan that does not take into account local histories. This becomes a central issue in the 
analysis of CBNRM as implemented in the northern sandveld (Chapter Seven). I focus here, 
however, on the Botswana government's Remote Area Development Programme (RADP), as 
it is has been the single government programme that has most comprehensively put into 
policy and practice dominant attitudes towards Basarwa. The RADP also illuminates the 
productive nature of power; the means by which Basarwa as the subject group are turned into 
an object of knowledge over which others, as dispensers of truth about the needs and 
requirements of Basarwa, attempt to gain control. 
RADP: dissolving difference 
The RADP is the most influential government department in the lives of people in Gudigwa, 
Mababe and - alongside DWNP - in Khwai. Several insightful evaluations (Wily 1979, Egner 
1981, Kann et at 1990, CMI 1996, and particularly Saugestad 1998) have been made of the 
RADP, primarily under the auspices of NORAD, its main funders. Each of these, however, 
have to some extent made the fundamentally flawed assumption that the government is 
primarily a machine for delivering services. Although true to a degree, the government is also 
a way of governing people, a device through which certain classes and interests control the 
ao Yet, the permit gave me permission to undertake research in Khwai, Mababe and Gudigwa, 
presumably in ignorance of the identity of the people that lived in these villages. It was an ambiguity I 
was relieved to be able to exploit. 
138 
behaviour and choices of others (cf. Ferguson 1990: 225). Through the ways that it addresses 
(or fails to address) the primary issues of land and ethnicity, it is clear that the RADP fails to 
escape the entrenched paternalistic mould of dealing with Basarwa. It is dressed in words of 
concern (such as in the ex-President's assertion of wanting `to see Basarwa enjoying the fruits 
of this country like the rest of Batswana'), but premised on the assumption of Basarwa 
comprising a category of people needing a form of development amounting to assimilation. 1 
This is most immediately evident in the RADP's designation of Basarwa as Remote Area 
Dwellers, or its commonly used Setswana equivalent, Matengnyanateng ('those from deep 
within the deep'). Such designations serve to maintain their socially and politically peripheral 
position, as well as legitimating bureaucratic intervention. The RADP is thus characteristic of 
general official policy and practice towards Basarwa; explicitly integrationist, but couched in 
benevolent terms of wanting to avoid their social and economic exclusion. 
The RADP began its life in 1974 as the Bushmen Development Programme, and underwent a 
series of name changes to more accurately reflect government policy. It was changed in 1975 
to the more locally acceptable Basarwa Development Programme, and then the ethnically 
neutral Extra-Rural Development Programme in 1976, before settling on its present name, the 
Remote Area Development Programme, in 1977. These semantics were symptomatic of 
deeper tensions in the programme, between the priorities of its expatriate initiator, Liz Wily 
(and subsequent donor funders), and the priorities of the Botswana government, particularly 
its policy of ethnic neutrality. The RADP, like the account of CKGR above, is a story of a 
programme initiated by well-meaning activists, and funded by humanitarian donors, to 
address the crucial issue of land for Basarwa, but that has been progressively used by 
bureaucrats in a way that affirms, rather than challenges, the inherited structures of inequality. 
Wily recognised that the central issue for Basarwa was land rights, and, in an early report, 
recommended exclusive land allocation to nexus (band territory) owners (1974: 22-23). Her 
strategy was (in retrospect) to secure ̀ as much land as possible, as fast as possible, as 
uncontroversially as possible' (1979: 128). Nonetheless, she faced the constraints of operating 
within a government programme, and so had to be careful to remain within its sphere of 
acceptability. She set the aim of fostering `the self-reliance and development of Bushmen 
citizens, and to facilitate thereby their great(er) integration with the wider society of 
41 It is not only the government that constructs Basarwa as in need of forms of assistance that it is in a 
position to offer. Although coming from a very different perspective, some NGOs working with 
Basarwa may be guilty of the same, as argued by Garland (1999) of the Nyae Nyae Development Trust 
in Namibia. As NGO involvement is (as yet) insignificant in the northern sandveld, I do not include 
them in this analysis. 
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Botswana' (Project Memorandum: LG32 Bushmen Development Para. 1,1975, quoted in Wily 
1979: 69). While the general äims of the programme have gone through several 
metamorphoses over the last 25 years, the central theme of `integration' has remained. 
Ngamiland's RAD Office declared, for example in its 1998/9 budget estimate that their aim 
was to `develop RADs socially and economically in order to integrate them into mainstream 
society', a distillation of the national Draft RADP policy, which aims to: 
Facilitate the integration of the marginalised sections of the population into the 
mainstream of society, and to develop rural settlements to a level that is comparable to 
that of other rural villages in the country by providing the necessary social services to 
improve the living conditions in those settlements. 
The longevity of the aim of integration - like `development' itself - has been precisely in its 
ambiguity. Wily (1973, quoted in Saugestad 1998: 153-4) defined her use of the term as 
involving, `a tacit respect of the inherent equality of all cultures and their equal right to 
peacefully coexist; integration must not be confused with uniformity or the abandonment of 
one culture or way of thinking for another'. However, considering dominant views of 
Basarwa, it is unsurprising that `integration' in official policy became a tactic of attempted 
assimilation, with no thought that it would involve any attempt to change by the majority (cf. 
Saugestad 1998: 235). Ambiguity was also built into the RADP through the definition in 1977 
of its target group as `Remote Area Dwellers' (RADs). An estimated eighty percent of RADs 
are estimated to be Basarwa (Saugestad 1995: 6), justifying popular perceptions that Basarwa 
are the prime targets of the RADP. 
The best that Wily, and donors, could hope for was ambiguous policy statements that both 
appeased the government, and gave the RADP the freedom to address the issues they hoped 
to. Challenging the status quo with an explicit land rights programme would have been 
impossible: 
The launching of an explicit land rights programme was unthinkable. It became clear 
that the programme could only survive for as long as it did not directly challenge 
existing land distribution... or challenge the prevailing conception of how Basarwa/ 
RADS should be ̀ developed' (Wily 1994: 16). 
In her own estimation, the role of the RADP has never been to challenge the status quo, but 
rather to `appeal to the charitable behaviour of an emerging capitalist society' (Wily 
1982: 306). Considering the history of patron-client relations between Basarwa and other 
Batswana, this appeal has had a measure of success. The prime achievement of the RADP in 
evaluative terms has been the provision of essential services in remote areas - water, health 
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Plate 4.5: Classroom in Mababe Primary School. 
Plate 4.6: Water tank at Gudigwa. 
141 

and education (Kann et al. 1990: ix) - to form a nucleus around which settlement can form. 
Nonetheless, these were late in coming to the northern sandveld. Mababe received a health 
post in 1994, and a primary school in 1998 (Plate 4.5). In 1998, Gudigwa was still reliant on 
a weekly supply of water from a bowser (Plate 4.6), but a borehole, school and health-post 
were all in the pipeline by 2000. Due to the uncertainty of the future of their village, Khwai 
still lacked even the promise of these facilities by the turn of the millennium. In the meantime, 
primary school children from Khwai and Gudigwa have had to continue enduring 
overcrowded hostels at boarding schools elsewhere in the district 
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The RADP's focus on service provision functions as an essential element in facilitating the 
bureaucratic management of Basarwa. Hitchcock and Holm (1993: 325) have argued that the 
programme of creating settlements with essential services have been, above all, a carrot to 
induce Basarwa to congregate at locations where the government can establish its authority 
and encourage assimilation, especially of children (through formal education). 
`Development', or its commonly used Setswana equivalent, tlhabololo, thus becomes a path 
of modernisation in which `they' are made like `us' (and thus more governable). In Setswana, 
the most common use of the word, which literally means to `improve' or `renew', is as a verb, 
sometimes in the passive sense, go tlhabologa (to be developed), but most often in the active 
go tlhabolola (to develop). Both these senses imply a process involving a subject (usually the 
government) doing the development, and an object (in this case Basarwa) being developed. 
Conceptually, therefore, Basarwa are seen as passively being developed - and thus 
assimilated - by the government, as commented to me by a DWNP official in Maun: 
If we keep them with Special Game Licenses, how are we going to develop (tlhabolola) 
them? They must go to developments where they can have tar roads, clinics, roads, and 
the like. Basarwa here are different because they already have fields, so it is easier to 
make them leave a hunting and gathering way of life. We can entice them out by 
providing services and showing them another way of life is better and easier. 
42 Yet these facilities are also often sparse. In 1998, the North West District Council (NWDC) had 434 
spaces available for RAD students in seven hostels, augmented by an extra 120 spaces in tents. 
However, 1088 students were crowded into these spaces (NWDC unpublished figures). Most students 
from Khwai and Mababe went to Kareng, which in 1997 had 125 square metres of floor space in its 
hostel for 225 children. Unsurprisingly, they developed a Tuberculosis outbreak, and the school had to 
be closed for several months. The District Health Officer, among others, was of the opinion that such 
conditions would not be tolerated by the government if it was not Basarwa that were affected 
(pers. comm. ). 
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Through all its formulations and reformulations, the RADP has consistently failed to involve 
Basarwa themselves in setting its agenda. This is symptomatic of a more general attitude of 
officials to Basarwa where, in the estimation of Selolwane (1995: 9): 
Botswana continues very much as during the pre-independence ra when Basarwa were 
regarded as minors who were incapable of making or implementing decisions of their 
own... . The perception of those responsible for encouraging and nurturing [the] democratic culture has been that Basarwa could not usefully gain from such knowledge 
and practice. 
Despite being staffed by generally sympathetic officers, its assumedly apolitical nature is 
evident from its failure to address anything. beyond welfare and training. The Remote Area 
Development Officer (RADO) for Khwai and Mababe, for example, was allegedly criticised 
by colleagues for `talking politics' when he used a metaphor from dominant society to plead 
for the rights of Basarwa to hunt, a privilege granted by their annual Special Game Licences. 
He told a government committee considering the termination of Special Game Licences that, 
`Taking Special Game Licences away from Basarwa would be just like dismissing a man 
when he arrives at work in the morning'. During my fieldwork period, this RADO was 
transferred to another district, and replaced by an officer who had been with RADP in the 
Central District. Although no less sympathetic to the plight of her clients, she was frustrated 
by what she saw as the lack of co-operation with her attempts to introduce `development' 
projects. After an offer to fund an orchard in Mababe that met with little enthusiasm, she 
complained to me: 
To be honest, people here are lazy. They don't want to work, and they don't want to co- 
operate. They are different from Basarwa in Central District. They waste my time... .I 
used to take money they earned to the bank and give them half and make them save the 
rest. Here they won't let me touch their money. They won't even tell me how much they 
are earning... . Why don't they just move? They moved in [the western sandveld of] Central District into the settlements. Then they would be given what they want. 
Well-meaning in her intentions, she was genuinely frustrated that her initiatives provoked 
such a feeble response. Predictably, this was blamed on their culture, rather than the 
patronising and non-participatory nature of RADP initiatives, and their attempts to provide 
technical solutions to deeper, underlying, political problems. 
Dependency or self-assertion? 
There is, however, an irony here. Wily hinted at it in an early evaluation of the RADP, when 
she surmised that through fostering `self-reliance and development of Bushmen citizens' 
(1982: 3 06) -a stated aim in the early phases of the RADP - Basarwa may be given the tools 
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to challenge, rather than adapt to the socio-political reality. `Self reliance is not quite the 
controllable quality it may appear', she ominously stated (ibid. ). This is a possibility not 
seriously countenanced in official circles, where the assumption reigns supreme that 
integration and assimilation will form a natural end to the `Basarwa problem'. 
Despite its rhetoric, the evidence suggests that self-reliance does not appear to be a de facto 
aim of the RADP. Largely as a result of RADP (and in combination with other government 
policies, particularly conservation policy, and the Tribal Grazing Lands Policy43), Basarwa 
throughout Botswana are estimated to be more dependent than ever (Hitchcock and Holm 
1993: 326). According to a 1989 UNICEF study, ninety percent of Basarwa in settlements 
depended on food aid (through drought relief, destitute rations, rations for lactating mothers 
and Tuberculosis outpatients, and - since 1997 in Ngamiland - rations handed out in the 
aftermath of CBPP) to meet their survival needs. In my estimation, about 75 percent of the 
food consumed (excluding protein) in Khwai, Mababe and Gudigwa in 1997-8 was obtained 
directly from government handouts. 
Unsurprisingly, the prime consequence of RADP has been judged to be the 'clientification' of 
Basarwa (Saugestad 1998: 231). It would be more accurate to say that the RADP has 
constituted the logical continuation of a process of clientification that has characterised 
relations between Basarwa and their neighbours for almost two centuries (Chapter Two). In 
the same way that during hard times in the past, Basarwa appealed to the `goodwill' of their 
Bantu neighbours through providing occasional agricultural labour, many now appeal to the 
state to provide their basic needs - the difference being that now this no longer a mutual 
process. `The government oppresses Basarwa', Mogodu, an elderly man from. Mababe, 
complained to me, `because it doesn't give us enough food and clothes'. Far from being a 
sponge, Mogodu held down a job with a taxidermist company in Maun (Plate 5.3), while at 
the same time maintaining one of the largest fields in Mababe. Although he was not as 
dependent on government welfare as many elderly people, government policy has fostered a 
widespread attitude among Basarwa that the government should provide their daily needs. 
Paine (1977: 3) uses the term welfare colonialism to refer to the perpetuation of domination of 
`indigenous' people by the state through such relations of dependency. The relationships are 
43 The Tribal Grazing Lands Policy (TGLP) was implemented in 1975, and paved the way for large 
areas of the Kalahari to be fenced into cattle ranches. These areas were presumed to be empty, but were 
often populated by significant numbers of people, particularly Basarwa (Hitchcock 1978). Reference is 
often made to the effects of TGLP in discussions of Basarwa dependency and land rights, but as no 
TGLP ranches have (as yet) been created in northern Ngamiland, conservation remains the primary 
competitor for land. 
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characterised as liberal rather than repressive, solicitous rather than exploitative, but 
nonetheless function to maintain political and economic control in the hands of the state. 
Demands on the state, however, do not simply imply an attitude of resignation (as Mogodu's 
situation demonstrates), but rather an attempt to maximise opportunity in a context of difficult 
but varied subsistence strategies. Demands on the state are also a moral argument, as 
government legislation has restricted access to wildlife and veld products. The introduction of 
CBNRM to villages in the northern sandveld, however, has provided a context for residents to 
be proactive in addressing the fundamental issues of inequality that are in part responsible for 
their material poverty; control over land and its productive capacity. When CBNRM was 
introduced in these areas as a programme that would decentralise management and decision 
making over land and wildlife, it was welcomed as an opportunity to address these most 
central of issues. The implementation of CBNRM has opened the opportunity for dialogue on 
land, which RADP has kept firmly off the agenda. It has also provided the opportunity for 
Khwai and Mababe to mark their presence in a landscape where people have little place, 
countering the trend of their increasing ̀ invisibility'. Despite its rhetoric, however, CBNRM 
has proved so far in practice to have exactly the same shortcomings as RADP; its universalist 
assumptions make little room for the specific histories and contexts of its recipients. 
Moreover, like the RADP, it is not just passively universalist, but actively universalising, in 
its attempts to homogenise a plan of local management of resources in a manner that appears 
to extend bureaucratic power rather than promoting local-level empowerment. 
Conclusion 
Far from the terror and violence used to subjugate Basarwa in the second half of the 
nineteenth century, the continued domination of Basarwa in Botswana is pursued by much 
more subtle means. In a continuation of the paternalistic relations that grew historically to 
characterise relations between Bantu-speakers and Basarwa, the Botswana government 
oversees a contemporary form of welfare colonialism. Its programmes aimed at Basarwa, 
particularly the RADP, are dressed in the language of concern and benevolence, but function 
to retain, even extend, political and economic control over Basarwa. Such development 
interventions are underpinned by (to use Fraser's [1989: 6] words), the hegemonic ̀ power to 
construct authoritative definitions of social situations and legitimate interpretations of social 
need'. Dominant constructions of Basarwa as people who lack skills, material goods, 
civilisation - in short, `development' - function to invite the `normalisation' and 
standardisation of their reality, legitimating bureaucratic intervention and control over their 
lives. 
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Basarwa in the northern sandveld face the double challenge of making themselves visible in 
an environment which is constructed as one in which people have no place, as well as 
attempting to resist aspects of the universalising tendencies of the Botswana government. 
Dominant discourses often characterise Basarwa as hunter-gatherers whose poverty is a 
product of their culture. Their culture, and the technical solutions needed to solve their 
problems, provide a powerful external motivation for `development' by a concerned - but 
detached - government that is able to benevolently provide what Basarwa lack. Within this 
framework, questions of power and inequality, which implicate the powerful in the poverty of 
Basarwa, remain taboo. Continuing the principle established in earlier chapters, ̀ ethnicity' 
remains as a central logic in dominating Basarwa. This may be through the corrupting 
influence they exert on a `pristine' environment as devolved hunter-gatherers, ethnocentric 
constructions of the implications of their ethnicity in popular discourse in Botswana, or the 
curiously non-ethnic discourse of the contemporary Botswana government. 
The semiotic conquest of Basarwa in the northern sandveld is not limited to their selves, but 
includes the land on which many of them have lived. The Okavango Delta in particular has 
captured the imagination of many Westerners as a unique wilderness. It is a vision that proves 
so lucrative to tourism operators and the Botswana government that they actively perpetuate 
it: the tour operators in the packages that they sell to clients; and the government in its 
attempts to separate non-tourist people from these landscapes. The residents of the northern 
sandveld therefore find themselves in a landscape that has little space for real people, and in 
which they and their desires become invisible. 
Having explored the political, social and economic contexts in which Basarwa are made 
subjects in contemporary Botswana, I now turn to examining the means by which Basarwa 
operate within these structures: in strategies aimed at procuring livelihoods (Chapter Five); 






In a village-wide workshop in June 1996, Khwai's residents came together to discuss a 
constitution for their proposed Community Trust. The many different ideas contributed were 
underpinned by the single guiding principle, expressed by a participant from the floor: `What 
is important is that we make a life for ourselves'. For people never far off the breadline, the 
concern with `making a life' pervaded many of their daily activities and their plans for the 
future. This is nothing unusual; the search for `life' is a pursuit that dominates the lives of 
many Basarwa, as it does the lives of many rural - and urban - poor throughout Africa (see, 
for example, Kenrick [1996: 62] and Peterson [2000] about immigrants in the Ituri forest of 
Zaire pour chercher la vie'). The time of Khwai's workshop, and then the periods in the 
following two years that I spent in Khwai and the other villages in the northern sandveld were 
a transitionary period as far as their livelihood strategies were concerned. The hopes, 
aspirations and plans that were pinned on their proposed participation in the Community 
Based Natural Resource Management Programme were yet to take shape, but they had 
already lost their Special Game Licences, that allowed each household to hunt an annual 
quota of animals. 
The struggle to `make a life' has many different facets, and the diversity of strategies that 
economically poor people use to maintain their livelihoods has become more widely 
appreciated by observers both generally (e. g. Scoones 1995, Chambers 1997: 162ff), and in 
the Kalahari specifically (Hitchcock 1996, Twyman 1997). There has also been a renewed 
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appreciation by development agencies of the centrality of people's livelihood strategies in 
considering the appropriateness of development interventions, an example being the primary 
emphasis on `sustainable livelihoods' in the 1997 UK Government White Paper on 
International Development. This document relies on a definition of `livelihoods' as: 
[T]he capabilities, assets (including both material and social resources) and activities 
required for a means of living (Carney 1998: 4). 
While this is an adequate definition of the material aspects of securing a reasonable 
subsistence, it does not make explicit the symbolic importance of how different aspects of 
livelihoods are constituted, and how these symbolic aspects affect material strategies. The 
mention of `social resources' implies a recognition of the salience of social bonds and norms 
in considering livelihoods, but it stops short of taking account the wider social and political 
contexts that give various meanings to different livelihood options, thus shaping local 
possibilities within them. 
For the residents of the northern sandveld, defining an adequate ̀life' involves considering 
not only the means of procuring various subsistence options but also the meanings with which 
they are loaded. I identify three significant arenas in which livelihood strategies take place; 
money, livestock, and wildlife. Separating these arenas does not imply that they involve 
discrete modes of pursuing a livelihood; on the contrary each is deeply interdependent on the 
other. The articulation of these three realms has a long history, as evident in the following 
description by Kebuelemang of his parents' and grandparents' livelihoods in Mababe, typical 
of many such descriptions I heard: 
A long time ago, white people used to pass here by ox-wagon from Maun to Katchikau 
and Kasane, on the old road. They were good-mannered [maftseo]. They used to stop 
near us and rest their oxen. They gave us a few small things, and we gave them meat, 
and some skins like bat-eared fox and caracal. Most skins, however, we took to sell in 
Maun. They paid us in money, or in goods that we asked for. Often we asked for 
ammunition for our muzzle-loaders. About five people in our village had guns, though 
they are now broken. We were given guns by chief Mathiba [reign: 1906-1932], father 
of Moremi [reign: 1937-1946]. We hunted for him and looked after his cattle at Charoga, 
which was free from tsetse. My father, Kgosietsele, looked after his cattle. Minidzoko 
[Kebuelemang's FF] and Thabare [Kebuelemang's FFF] didn't herd, neither did I; it was 
only my father that did so. Mathiba said to him, `Here are my cattle, you will keep them 
in your land there'. There were about thirty cattle. When a lion killed a cow, my father 
would set a trap with a gun, so that when it came back to eat it, the gun would be set off 
and kill it. Mathiba paid us by buying us things now and then, though he did not give us 
money. My father stopped herding once I was grown up. Many of them were being 
eaten by lions, so he returned the remaining ones, saying there were too many lions. He 
was not forced to herd, and he didn't mind doing so. They were not oppressed by 
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Batawana like we are today. The biggest oppression today is that we are denied our 
animals, and that we cannot gather tzinzini [bird plum, Berchemia discolorl and other 
fruits beyond the cutline [that marks the border of Chobe Game Reserve]. We hunted 
over the whole area before there were borders. 
Kebuelemang's narrative demonstrates the interconnectedness of money, livestock and 
wildlife: regular subsistence hunting also yielded products that could be traded for money and 
goods, which in turn provided ammunition for hunting; looking after other people's cattle not 
only provided subsistence from their milk (and carcasses if they were killed) but also made 
guns available, which further facilitated hunting. As Kebuelemang also reveals, restrictions 
imposed by conservation have become a central pivot in negotiating livelihoods in the 
contemporary context. 
The realms of money, livestock and wildlife are not neutral options, but exist in a socio- 
political environment in which each of them signifies a different way of living and a different 
set of values. Employment, and the world of money and goods that this opens up, is 
associated largely with Western values and products. Livestock is associated with the 
politically and economically dominant Batswana, and the pastoralist values they 
stereotypically espouse, and hunting and gathering is associated with Basarwa. The values 
attached to these associations vary considerably, and are the subject of much debate. 
Contestation is especially pronounced in the context of discourses of 'development', which - 
to many non-Basarwa - create a hierarchy of positioning, with livelihood strategies associated 
with Basarwa representing `backwardness' (Chapter Four), and money representing the 
`ultimate' form of development. Of course, these are caricatures, but the varying degrees to 
which they are held (or denied) mean that livelihood strategies cannot be analysed in isolation 
of them. This is especially relevant to livelihood strategies associated with wildlife, strategies 
in which their identity is centrally implicated. The struggle to legitimise what the law has 
defined as illegitimate - and the role constructions of identity play in this - are the subject of 
the Chapter Six. 
The aims of this chapter are fourfold. To: 
" examine how different forms of gaining a livelihood are articulated. 
illustrate the complexity of livelihood strategies employed by Basarwa in the northern 
sandveld. 
analyse livelihood strategies in the context of the symbolic importance attached to various 
strategies. 
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0 understand the formal and informal institutions that regulate these various livelihood 
strategies. 
I argue that, not only do Basarwa rely on a wide diversity of livelihood strategies, but also 
they face a range of difficulties and limitations that most other citizens of Botswana do not 
face to the same degree. Some of these limitations are directly intended, such as legislation 
that restricts hunting. Others are more indirect, such as the difficulties of keeping livestock in 
`wildlife areas', or being viewed as lacking the requisite skills for employment. Considering 
the meanings attached to various subsistence options, wildlife assumes a greater importance 
than simply its nutritional value, an importance that conservation policies take little 
cognisance of. Evidence from the northern sandveld suggests that although restrictive 
legislation has changed the ways in which hunting is undertaken, it has done little to reduce 
the volume of subsistence hunting, and has actually contributed to undermining local wildlife 
management practices. 
I begin by providing a framework for the analysis of livelihoods. 
Components of livelihood strategies 
Sen's influential work Poverty and Famine (1981) brought to the fore the importance of 
`entitlements', or the ability to control commodities, in understanding the relationship 
between people and resources in maintaining their livelihoods. His analysis of famines 
emphasised that the occurrence of famine is not dependent on an absolute shortage of food, 
but on the inability of certain sections of society to command control over it. Leach, Mearns 
and Scoones (1997) developed and refined his ideas in their `Environmental Entitlements' 
approach, which they present as a means of exploring `the ways differentially positioned 
social actors command environmental goods and services that are instrumental to their 
wellbeing' (1997: 1). The Environmental Entitlements framework separates the means by 
which people pursue livelihood options into five components: 
" Environmental goods and services: natural resources and services of the environment. 
" Endowments: the rights and resources that social actors have, e. g. land, labour, skills. 
" Entitlements: legitimate effective command over goods and services that are instrumental 
in achieving wellbeing. 
" Capabilities: what people can do or be with their entitlements. 
" Institutions: regularised patterns of behaviour between individuals and groups in society, 
which exist on macro, meso and micro levels. 
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This facilitates an analysis of how individuals attempt to access resources so as to turn them 
into endowments, and to what extent they may or may not yield effective command over 
them, transforming them into entitlements. The use of entitlements in securing a livelihood is 
then reflected in the differing capabilities that people achieve. Each of these four steps is 
mediated by various institutions that contribute to determining the possibilities that actors 
face. Leach et al (1997: 30), claim that their framework, in focussing on the processes by 
which environmental goods and services, may or may not become endowments, entitlements 
and ultimately capabilities, emphasises three critical aspects that are often ignored in 
development analysis and planning: the importance of social difference; variability in human- 
environment relations; and historical context. 
I use the Environmental Entitlements approach to disaggregate livelihood strategies in the 
northern sandveld, with a particular emphasis on the `institutions' that mediate these 
components. Using a similar framework in her analysis of livelihood strategies by Basarwa 
residents of the Okwa CHA in Ghanzi District, Twyman (1997,1999) widens the institutional 
mediators to include identity, ethnicity, place and landscape. She found in Okwa, as I did in 
the northern sandveld, that these mediating factors are particularly important in considering a 
category of people for whom expressions and practices of `difference' are so central to 
contestations over entitlement. However, although narratives of ethnic difference may present 
a world of clear dichotomies, these narratives must be embedded in the complexities of lived 
reality; of how residents of the northern sandveld pursue livelihood strategies by means that 
defy simple categorisations. Khwai's annual grass-cutting event illustrates these complexities. 
Cutting grass in Khwai 
The onset of the grass-cutting season in July each year usually empties Khwai village of 
most of its inhabitants. The yards that usually have the familiar sounds of life - 
especially those that sell khadi or monate homebrews44 - are silent, and visiting 
government or council officials are unable to hold meetings. It is a period that is eagerly 
awaited by the residents of Khwai, spoken of with anticipation in months running up to 
it. The grass-cutting season begins some months after the rains have come to an end, 
once the grass heads have dried and dropped their seeds; a prompt for the people of 
Khwai to relocate en masse to scattered grass-cutting camps along the northern fringe of 
the Khwai River, from Segagama to Njakamakata. As these sites are from one to five 
hours walk from the village, the move is generally made possible by vehicles belonging 
to the local councillor, or to one of the lodges (Khwai' residents owned no vehicles, 
as Both these homebrews are sold on occasion by most households in the village. Khadi is made from 
mogwana Grewia bicolor berries (du-10M in Bugakhwedam), and Monate is the brand name of a 
shop-bought packet mix based on sorghum. 
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apart from Rra Diatla's donkey cart). Transport is needed not only to bring the cut grass 
back to the village, but also for the old and infam, and the multitude of belongings that 
are taken along; dogs, chickens, chairs, even drums of khadi to sell to neighbouring 
camps. Small family camps are made in wooded islands, near to both the newly arrived 
water of the annual flood, and the open dry floodplains that support the mokamakama or 
//ee-doa (Cymbopogon casius) grass that is cut for thatching. Once cut, the grass is 
usually sold to lodges around Khwai, whose constant extensions and refurbishments 
provide a steady market. The owner of Tsaro lodge alone estimated he had bought 
P150,000 worth of thatching grass from Khwai over the previous ten years. Two hours 
heavy work could produce a large bundle per person, that once back in the village could 
be split into 20 beer-can sized bundles at P 1.00 each, yielding the same as a full-day's 
work in a menial job at a lodge. 
Not long after I started living in Khwai, I joined Moses and his family for their annual grass- 
cutting expedition. Moses was an enigmatic character. In some ways, he fiercely protected the 
values and practices he associated with his ethnicity. He was a keen hunter, for example, and 
made a point of speaking to his five children in Bugakhwedam (or Ts'exadam, as Mma Tiro, 
their mother, was from Mababe) rather than Setswana. He was outspoken against the erosion 
of values that he saw happening through policies such as Setswana-medium education and 
restrictions on access to land and hunting. Yet, he defied any attempt to be categorised as 
`traditionalist'. He sent all his five children to school, and his first son, Tiro, became the first 
person from Khwai to complete secondary school. He also thought big; from the trivial 
example of the huge logs that he would carry to the family fire (when the norm was to 
sparingly use arm-size branches), to the businesses he had set up that had brought him into 
serious conflict with other members of the village. His failed poultry project (to supply eggs 
to Khwai and nearby lodges) was one in a series of rifts that ostracised Moses from some of 
the other members of Khwai, and ended with a confrontation in Khwai kgotla that had made 
headline news in the Okavango Observer (Dimbo 1997). This particular incident had involved 
a dispute over money that had been given by a regular American visitor to a nearby lodge, 
who had made a habit of bringing gifts to Khwai village. Moses was accused by others in the 
village appropriating money given to the village as a whole for his own chicken project, and 
he in turn maintained that the money was given to him personally, and accused others in the 
village of unfairly taking it off him. 
Moses, his wife Mma Tiro, and their three young daughters were joined in their grass- 
cutting camp at Njakamakata by two other families that found themselves marginalised 
in village affairs. Mma /Idam, who was the head of the only Moyei household in Khwai, 
came with her Mbunda companion, and they were joined too by Ogwe and his two 
children and three grandchildren. Ogwe, who struggled with a back condition, had 
moved to Khwai after being decommissioned from the South African Defence Force in 
Caprivi in 1988. Only later would I learn the implications of choosing this camp for the 
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Plate 5.1: Building a shelter at grasscutting camp, Njakamakata. 
Plate 5.2: Carrying cut grass back to camp. 
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first part of the grass-cutting season; being branded a `son' of Moses meant that I would 
find it harder than expected to establish relationships with those that did not get on with 
him. Despite what people said about Moses, however, they did admit that no-one in his 
camp would ever go hungry. Not only was Moses one of the only five licensed gun 
holders in Khwai, but he also had a reputation as an effective hunter, and every day there 
was meat in his camp. There was also fish, tswii water lily roots, and occasionally 
honey. 
Cutting grass was backbreaking work; ripping a bunch of stalks off at the base with a 
sickle, stripping the leaves off, and then tying them into huge bundles to carry on one's 
head back to the camp. This had to be done while keeping an eye out for wandering 
elephants, or predators such as lions (that killed and dismembered a soldier upriver from 
us during our stay). One also kept an ear out for the passing vehicles of either a safari 
camp or the Botswana Defence Force (BDF)'s Anti-Poaching Unit, a couple of which 
may pass in a week. The distant drone of an engine was the cue to sprint to the track and 
scrounge what one could; buckshot from safari hunters, or the rations of well-stocked 
soldiers. Although the soldiers were generous with their rations, Moses was ambivalent 
about their presence: The BDF tried to stop us living in the bush, but the bush is our 
town where we find everything. I can't spend more than two days in Maun; I want to 
leave'. Although Moses had spent years working of his own accord in Maun, and other 
larger and more distant towns such as Francistown and the mines of Johannesburg, this 
period of grass cutting was cherished as an opportunity to spend time living out in the 
bush. Usually the mornings were spent cutting grass, and the afternoons relaxing, 
fishing, hunting, or visiting other camps. Yet this was not simply a `back to the bush' 
exercise, it provided a very real and necessary cash income. The previous year Moses 
had made P1,875 from selling his grass, after he had paid one in five of his bundles to 
Tsaro lodge for transporting them to the village. 
Khwai's annual grass-cutting event encapsulated for me some of the complexities of attitudes 
and relations to land, resources and economics. Like the contradictions Moses himself seemed 
to embody, it defied the neat dichotomies that people like Basarwa have so often been subject 
to. For example: 
" The experience of being out in the bush was cherished, but it was done for the 
opportunity to earn money. Despite what he said, Moses never spent days in the bush 
just for the sake of it, and he criticised Mma Kanjiye's family - the only family that 
regularly did so - for `putting Bosarwa forward' and thus delaying the ̀ advancement' 
of her children. 
" The safari hunters and soldiers who denied residents the opportunity to hunt or use 
the land as freely as they wished were resented, but simultaneously relations with 
them were carefully cultivated on an individual level. These relationships could be 
profitable, evidenced by the lodge manager who transported Moses' grass, the safari 
hunter who gave him buckshot, and the soldiers who shared their rations with him. 
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" The lodges that surrounded their village were also resented for being an intrusion 
onto their land, yet they provided employment, as well as the market (and often the 
transport) for thatching grass that enabled the event to happen each year. 
The commercial aspect of their annual grass-cutting event also legitimised the movement of 
people into the bush, a move that DWNP and the BDF would otherwise have frowned upon. 
Although such moves are not technically illegal, they lay Basarwa open to accusations of 
poaching if they do not have a `legitimate' reason for being there. Going out into the bush for 
ostensibly commercial reasons, therefore, legitimised an activity that had many different 
purposes and motivations. Grass cutting became a means of demonstrating entitlement to 
much more than grass, but to the whole stretch of land and its productive potential, including 
wildlife and other resources. Khwai's annual grass-cutting event thus illuminates not only the 
multiple ways in which livelihood strategies are pursued, but also the interdependence 
between them, and the importance of considering the meanings they acquire. Although the 
realms of money, livestock and wildlife are not in reality discrete, their different symbolism 
makes them useful hermeneutic categories, and I use each of them in turn as a framework for 
examining livelihood strategies in the northern sandveld. 
Money 
`Money is essential for life', Ogwe, by then living with his family in Khwai, told me in 
response to my asking him why he had joined the South African Defence Force in Caprivi. 
Perhaps an obvious answer, but a point that needs to be made to stress the centrality of a cash 
economy to people so often conceptualised (within and beyond Botswana's borders) as 
`foragers'. As Wilmsen's (1989b) revisionism stressed, money has been essential to life for 
many Basarwa since the middle of the nineteenth century. The prime means of production 
that were introduced in this era were guns; at first muzzle-loading Tower muskets. (matena), 
and later Martini-Henry rifles (majapane). Guns were generally owned by Batawana who 
inserted themselves as intermediaries in the trade in wildlife products by lending them to 
Basarwa clients who hunted on their behalf. This did not prevent Basarwa from profiting 
themselves, however. If they were able to obtain ammunition, they could also use these guns 
for their own hunting. Selous, who visited Mababe in 1879 and 1884, noted, for example, that 
most Basarwa there hunted with guns (1893: 107), some of whom had been able to obtain 
them by selling ivory found on dead elephants. The chiefly decree that the `ground tusk' 
belonged to the Batawana chieftainship generally did not apply to Basarwa, who risked losing 
both tusks for no payment. One way to avoid this risk, however, was to keep the tusks buried 
until it was possible to make a trip northwards to trade the ivory in Caprivi. 
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Direct involvement in trade was easier for Mababe than Khwai or Gudigwa, being closer to 
established trade routes. The first person from Mababe to buy their own gun was Minidzoko, 
Kebuelemang's great grandfather. He bought it in about the 1880s with a tusk and several 
leopard skins. That such details are remembered points to the significance of gun ownership, 
both then and now. Gun ownership by Basarwa was often tenuous, however, as Basarwa who 
were able to obtain guns were susceptible to having them snatched by others more powerful 
than themselves. This was one reason given by Lekgoa for moving his family from Gudigwa 
to Khwai in the late 1960s; his Mokgalagadi `master' was attempting to relieve him of a gun 
he had bought with wages from working on the South African mines. Today, the granting of 
gun licences is very restricted, with only a limited number being raffled to applicants each 
year. In 1998, there were eight licensed guns in Mababe, eight in Gudigwa, and seven in 
Khwai. However, all but four of these were shotguns, which limited the size of animal they 
could easily be used for. The war in Namibia prompted the influx of some unlicensed rifles to 
Gudigwa, where many households had a relative in the army. By 1998, however, five people 
from Gudigwa had been arrested for illegal possession of firearms. 
Men from the northern sandveld became involved in paid employment from about the 1940s. 
Of course, they had worked for others long before that, but generally for no payment, or 
payment in kind. Older children were sometimes hired at a minimal wage to do domestic and 
farm work, such as Moses who did domestic work for a policeman in Maun and Francistown 
in the 1950s, for R2.50 (then £1.25) per month. A number of men worked within Ngamiland 
for traders or on road construction projects. Others went further afield, such as to work on 
tobacco farms in Rhodesia, for diamond prospectors in South West Africa, or to do odd jobs 
in Lesotho. From the 1950s many men went to the mines in South Africa. 45 One man from 
Khwai, Lebelo, went as far as the Middle East in 1942 as part of Botswana's effort to assist 
the Allies. In 1974, the South African Defence Force in Caprivi set up two `Bushmen 
Battalions', to which a number of men from Botswana signed up, particularly residents of 
Gudigwa. They were paid salaries a lot higher they could get elsewhere; many were earning 
over R1,500 (then £350) per month by the time they were decommissioned in 1989. Some of 
those who originated in Botswana stayed in Namibia, but sixteen men returned to Gudigwa, 
and two moved to Khwai. 
as Kohler (1966: 140) reports that migration by Kxoe in West Caprivi to work in the South African 
mines began after the First World War, and reached its peak in the 1940s. I am indebted to Gertrud 
Boden (pers. comm. ) for pointing this out to me. The reasons for this different timing to their relatives 
over the border remain unclear. 
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The 1960s marked the beginnings of the tourism industry along the riverine fringes of the 
northern sandveld. The largest employers in the region were soon hunting and photographic 
safari operators, with their demands for local labour as trackers, skinners, gun-bearers, 
waiters, groundsmen, laundry women, and a variety of other jobs classed - and paid - as 
unskilled. It was not until 1990 that the first Mosarwa guide, Galebone Amos, was hired. 
Galebone was born in 1950 and began his working career in 1970, when he went to the South 
African mines. In 1973 he returned and began work for Ker and Downey, one of Ngamiland's 
first safari companies. He worked for the first year as a gardener, and the next fifteen as a 
tracker. In 1990, he was promoted to become a guide, a position he has held since. Galebone 
was able to overcome the main obstacle to most Basarwa becoming guides - fluency in 
English - through interacting with clients as a tracker. Most other guides are young men (very 
few women are guides) who have some form of education that has given them a grounding in 
English. Guide's wages are significantly higher than other work options available, typically 
P80 per day in 1998 (compared to P20 per day for `unskilled' work), which is often doubled 
by tips. 
While government positions and skilled work such as guides and teachers tend to be stable, 
`unskilled' employment in the private sector is highly variable. Few jobs are long term, and 
most Basarwa who work move in and out of employment. Employers rarely give long-term 
contracts, especially for menial positions. A company that owns a photographic lodge near 
Khwai, for example, employs all its employees on temporary terms. Apart from facilitating 
easy hiring and firing, it also absolves them from associated responsibilities such as maternity 
and sickness benefits, annual increments, and severance pay. Basarwa also commonly leave 
jobs of their own accord, usually citing low pay and lack of respect or mistreatment as the 
main reasons. 6 With very few exceptions, camp and lodge managers are expatriates, usually 
white South Africans. Managers that I spoke to complained about the difficulties of finding 
suitably skilled local employees. The emphasis on formal training particularly affects 
Basarwa, who generally have less formal qualifications than other Batswana, and whose 
ethnic difference classes them, in the words of some employers, as `raw'; a useful 
qualification for tracking, but little else. 
46 Employment conditions in the tourism industry were a concern of the government, being the main 
topic of speeches held by the Minister for Ngamiland on a tour in February 1998, which included 
Khwai and Mababe. 
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Plate 5.4: Kenny (from Khwai) at work in a lodge. 
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Plate 5.3: Mogodu (from Mababe) at work for a taxidermist in Maun. 

Entry into the labour market is thus difficult for Basarwa. In 1998, Khwai residents held only 
nine of the 74 non-management posts in the three lodges in the vicinity of Khwai. In the same 
year, one of the lodges began an explicit policy of not hiring staff from Khwai, claiming this 
would reduce `staff problems'. Yet, Khwai is unique in having at least the opportunity of 
local employment. Residents of Mababe had the opportunity of only three locally-available 
formal jobs: night watchman at the healthpost; Family Welfare Educator; and borehole 
operator, while Gudigwa had none (although the lodges under OCT in NG22 and NG23 
employed twenty Gudigwa residents in 1999). Beyond this, the rapidly growing town of 
Maun gives the nearest promise of employment. However, despite the evident wealth in 
Maun, the difficulty of securing employment makes it a promise that is more often than not 
empty. In an analogous fashion, natural resources are plentifully evident in the northern 
sandveld, but access to them is difficult. Idea Newe, a man in his 30s who struggles to run a 
small semausu (vending shop) in Mababe (Plate 5.6) explained their dilemma thus: 
Maun and here is the same, because there is no life in both. You need money in Maun, 
and there is nothing here, even though the veld is so full of food... . But now we are 
afraid to [go into the bush] because the government says it is breaking the law to do so... 
Some tribes (merafe) get their life is in the bush, like us. They are taking that life away. 
For the residents of Khwai, Gudigwa and Mababe, as for many villages in Botswana, their 
security net lies in `drought relief programmes. For six hours per day, participants labour at 
local projects such as brick making (Plate 5.5), construction, or surfacing a sandy track with 
clay. The number of participants in drought relief work is a good indication of levels of 
employment for residents as the wages are so low (P 1.00 per hour, less than half the 
minimum wage for formal employment) that it is only turned to as a last resort. Yet, an 
estimated eighty to ninety percent of Basarwa countrywide were dependent on such food for 
work programmes in the early 1990s (Hitchcock and Holm 1993). In 1998, Gudigwa had 149 
people (virtually all the resident adults) regularly working on drought relief projects, 
compared to twelve for Mababe, and fourteen for Khwai. As this indicates, livelihood options 
are much more restricted for residents of Gudigwa. Like other citizens of Botswana, residents 
of the northern sandveld receive various other forms of government welfare. Since 1996, 
pensions have been given to over 65s, initially set at P100 per month, rising to P130 in 
2000.47 Pregnant or lactating mothers, and children under five, are given food supplements, 
41 Pensions are given according to the stated age on National Identity Cards. These were issued from 
1988, with the holders' age generally estimated by a government official. An inordinate number of 
Basarwa had patently wrong age-estimates (usually underestimates), while some simply had `not 
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and individuals classed as destitute are given a monthly allowance of rations. Furthermore, in 
the aftermath of CBPP, people classed as dependent on cattle, whether as owners or herders, 
were given a monthly food package as well, which included the whole of Gudigwa (649 
rations to 117 households), but only two members of Khwai, and no-one in Mababe. While all 
citizens of Botswana are eligible for government welfare, what sets Basarwa apart in the 
receipt of government welfare is its comparative importance in the reproduction of most 
households. These combined sources of food touch virtually every family, and end up 
supporting a far wider network of people than those officially registered for them (Appendix 
Three gives an indication of welfare handouts in the northern sandveld). 
While fewer women than men tend to have formal employment beyond low-paid jobs in 
lodges, women are more involved than men in informal means of generating income. Primary 
among these are basket weaving for sale to tourists (Plates 5.8,5.9), and the brewing of 
alcohol for sale (primarily to men) within the village (Plate 5.10). Basket weaving is a skill 
most women have, and an activity that is easy to combine with others, such as child minding. 
Most weavers produce two to four baskets per month, which are sold for an average of P50 
each to passing tourists. Brewing is an important redistributer of income on a village level, 
and an activity most women engage in on occasion. Unlike the pattern in many mixed villages 
in Botswana, where non-Basarwa are usually the sellers of alcohol to Basarwa (e. g. Twyman 
1997: 127, Ruigrok 1995: 52), the very few non-Basarwa residents in Khwai, Mababe and 
Gudigwa means that brewing is generally undertaken by Basarwa women. 
Basarwa in the northern sandveld are, therefore, intimately involved in a cash economy, as 
they have been since the middle of the nineteenth century. For many, however, the only 
predictable form of income (in cash or kind) is government welfare. Employment is usually 
marked by unpredictability, as jobs come and go, excluding them (in their opinion) at times 
specifically because of the negative connotations of their ethnicity. Government interventions, 
such as drought relief, welfare and CBNRM are characteristically biased towards increasing 
income, perhaps a product of the universal association of capital with `progress'. While 
increased economic opportunities are welcomed, they can become a point of contention when 
they curtail other activities, such as hunting and gathering. This issue becomes particularly 
pertinent in considering interventions associated with CBNRM (Chapter Seven). 
known' as their date of birth. Unless their identity card specifies an age over 65, they are not allowed to 
claim a pension. 
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Plate 5.5: Drought relief work, Mababe. 
Plate 5.6: Idea, from Mababe in his semausu (vending shop). 
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Plate 5.7: Monthly dispersal of destitute rations, Mababe. 
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Although both pastoralism and agriculture are elements of livelihood strategies in the northern 
sandveld, the returns from agriculture are generally minimal. Basarwa in the northern 
sandveld have a long history of agriculture, as noted by Gibbons (1904), who travelled from 
Linyanti to Okavango in 1898 and met Basarwa living in villages near the river growing crops 
of mealies, sorghum and pumpkins. However, the combination of erratic rainfall, damage by 
wildlife, and the quantity of food handouts, mean that although each family has a field, only a 
small proportion of fields are generally planted, and crop yields are usually low. This section 
therefore focuses primarily on livestock rather than crops. 
The tension between livestock and wildlife is a recurring theme in considering livelihoods 
throughout Botswana, and particularly in the northern sandveld. This is a tension that exists 
not only between the different values placed on them by Basarwa and government officials, 
conservationists and tourism operators, but also between officials in different government 
ministries. Forty percent of Botswana's territory is designated for wildlife (Map 4.1), which 
includes national parks, game reserves and Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs). Unlike 
national parks and game reserves, WMAs permit human settlement, but they restrict the 
keeping of livestock. The Animal Disease Control Act of 1997, administered by the 
Department of Animal Health and Production (DAHP), strengthened earlier policy by 
declaring the Okavango and Kwando Wildlife Management Areas (including Khwai and 
Mababe, but not Gudigwa), to be free from any domestic animals. However, the Remote Area 
Development Programme (RADP) - under which all three villages fall - has pursued a policy 
of encouraging stock ownership among its clients by providing a free core of stock to select 
households. This has been a central element of their wider policy of integrating Basarwa into 
`mainstream' society, which is characterised by its pastoralist values (cf. Comaroff and 
Comaroff 1991, Peters 1994). Nonetheless, Mababe is the only one of the three villages to 
have received free stock. Most families in Mababe have received several donkeys, and fifteen 
households were designated in 1998 to receive ten goats each. RADP had no such plans for 
Gudigwa or Khwai. Although DWNP has tolerated stock ownership in Mababe, they have not 
done so in Khwai, beyond dogs, chickens, and several donkeys. Khwai residents regard this 
discrepancy as part of a more general denial of services for Khwai (due to pressure from 
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Map 5.1: Protected areas in Botswana (national parks, game reserves and WMAs). 
The lack of assistance from RADP has not prevented some individuals from building up their 
own herds of livestock, a practice which stretches back long before the RADP came into 
existence in 1974. Wilmsen and Denbow (1990, Wilmsen 1989b) interpret archaeological 
evidence to indicate that Basarwa have been intermittent pastoralists since prehistoric times. 
Their interpretations remain contentious, however (Solway and Lee 1990, Sadr 1997, Lee 
All 
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1998), and Basarwa in the northern sandveld maintain that although they had already been 
herding other people's stock for at least a century, they were unable to accumulate their own 
until the closing decades of the nineteenth century. Despite attempts by Batawana chiefs to 
tightly control the booming trade in wildlife products, some Basarwa were able to purchase 
guns through selling ivory, which they could then use to obtain more ivory to trade for cattle. 
Take, for example, this account by Sangando, who was born in about 1914, at Tsu//ao, 
northwest of Gudigwa: 
Lebelo was the first of our ancestors to raise cattle. His father, Montenyane, originated 
from Namibia, on the Angolan border. He came here, took a wife, and had Lebelo. 
Lebelo bought cattle from hunting elephants. Lebelo lived at Gunitsoga [on the northern 
arm of the Delta], and went visiting and hunting around Mbunda [Angola]. He died in 
the year of locusts [ 1924], and Monihe took his cattle and the gun. 48 
It was not until the 1970s, however, that cattle ownership became more consistent and spread 
beyond a few isolated individuals. The four families in Khwai that had cattle in 1998 started 
their herds by buying cattle with money earned at the South African mines, or locally in the 
safari industry. Three of these owners, Moitshoki, GB and Lekgoa, kept their cattle together at 
Shokomokwa, a cattle-post just south of the buffalo fence on the road to Khwai, where 
Lekgoa and his family moved to look after them. The fourth, Rra Diatla, bought six cattle in 
1982 with a loan from the National Development Bank, which he paid back with his wages 
from working for the Civil Aviation Department. He paid a Moyei at Qukao P100 per month 
to look after them, and the herd grew to 40, before being reduced to nothing by drought, 
neglect and predators. The residents of Gudigwa, living outside an area zoned for wildlife, 
have had the additional option of accepting mafisa49 cattle from non-Basarwa, an option 
chosen by three of the 13 cattle owners in Gudigwa before the CBPP cattle slaughter in 1996. 
Labelling the payment of a cow per year as `exploitation', the three remaining cattle owners 
in 1998 chose not to continue mafisa relationships after the CBPP restocking. 
The patterns of livestock ownership show marked variation over time, both historically, as 
illustrated by the example of Lebelo's cattle, and today, as indicated by the story of Lekgoa's 
herding fortunes. Lekgoa (one of Khwai's four cattle owners) grew up herding the cattle of 
48 Monihe was the Motawana molebeleedi based at Seronga. He was responsible for collecting tribute 
from the area for the Batawana chieftainship, and died in the late 1920s. It is possible that the gun and 
some of the cattle actually belonged to Monihe, but were looked after by Lebelo, who hunted and 
herded on Monihe's behalf. 
49 Mafisa is a Setswana term for cattle entrusted to another person to herd. The herder generally has 
access to products such as milk or the meat of dead animals, but the progeny (except for a calf per year) 
generally remain the property of the owner. 
173 
his Bakgalagadi patrons. Although his family had `belonged' to them for several generations, 
it was not until his own generation that his patrons began paying them a cow per year for 
herding, which he kept with their cattle. In the early 1960s, he went to work on the mines in 
South Africa for eight years, and on his return found that his cattle had multiplied to fifteen. 
To these, he added another six bought with earnings from the mines. He returned to work on 
the mines, but when he came back home, he found that all his cattle had been killed by tsetse. 
Lekgoa then moved to Khwai, and began working for DWNP. In 1982 he invested some of 
his salary in a cow he bought from a Herero man. He kept it with two cattle that each of his 
older brothers had bought. Using his wages, he slowly began building his herd up again. He 
kept them this time at Shokomokwa, where he had an arrangement with a Moyei cattle owner 
to water his cattle at his borehole in return for contributions to diesel expenses. By the time of 
the CBPP slaughter in 1996, Lekgoa had 36 cattle in his herd (almost half of which belonged 
to close relatives) for which he received 12 cattle and P 12,000 in compensation in 1997. 
The vagaries of stock ownership are also demonstrated by the example of Mababe, illustrated 
in Fig. 5.1 overleaf. Each of the 29 households5° in the village was asked in June 1998 how 
many cattle, donkeys and goats they presently owned, as well as how many they had owned at 
any time in the past generation. The graphs illustrate past and present stock ownership for the 
21 households that had owned stock (eight households stated that they had never owned stock 
in the past generation). According to their responses, every single one of the 21 households 
had owned more stock sometime during the last generation than they owned in June 1998. 
While six families had owned cattle, only one still did in June 1998, and although 21 
households had owned goats, only nine still had them. A similar pattern is demonstrated for 
donkeys; of the 17 who had owned them, only seven still did. The most common reason given 
for losing livestock in Mababe was predation by hyenas, lions and leopards. 
As these examples illustrate, raising livestock is, and has been, an unpredictable exercise. 
This has been true for not only Mababe, but is confirmed by similar examples of Basarwa 
elsewhere owning and losing sometimes spectacular numbers of stock (e. g. Lee 1979: 409 for 
Dobe, Wiley 1976: 3 for Bere). This is an unpredictability Basarwa face to a greater degree 
than non-Basarwa. While environmental factors (drought, predators, tsetse) are no respecters 
of ethnic labels, there are additional socially-induced factors that Basarwa have to contend 
50 A `household' was designated as the occupants of a spatially distinct cluster of huts. Household size 








4Jwbb/ö9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
Household number 
Figure 5.1. a: Goat ownership for 21 households in Mababe (dark bars for ownership 
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Figure 5.1. b: Cattle ownership for 21 households in Mababe (dark bars for 
ownership in past generation, light bars for ownership June 1998). 
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Figure 5.1. c: Cattle ownership for 21 households in Mababe (dark bars for 
ownership in past generation, light bars for ownership June 1998). 
with. Historically, their subordinate status made them vulnerable to simply being divested of 
any livestock they accumulated. In ethnically mixed settlements today, Basarwa commonly 
find themselves in situations where they have to sell their cattle to non-Basarwa neighbours at 
a fraction of their value (e. g. Twyman 1997: 127-9). For Basarwa in the northern sandveld, 
however, this is not as much a problem today as that posed by predators and the restrictions 
imposed on land-use. Although DWNP promised compensation in cash for livestock killed or 
fields damaged by wildlife, in practice such claims took up to two years to be received, or 
were not received at all. 51 The resources necessary to pay for and maintain a borehole and 
pump elsewhere are beyond most Basarwa, so they are also limited to watering livestock at 
their own village water supply, or else paying to share someone else's borehole. Only Khwai 
- where no livestock are tolerated - is near permanent surface water. Residents of Khwai who 
want to keep stock therefore have three options: moving to look after them beyond the buffalo 
fence; paying someone else to look after them; or giving them as mafisa to a trusted friend or 
relative. The first option, followed for example by Lekgoa's family, requires the willingness 
to leave Khwai. The second is more popular - chosen, for example by Joe and Sisko, brothers 
who used their earnings from working for safari companies to build up a herd of 62 goats, 
which they paid a Moyei at Boro P250 per month to keep with his own goats. However, 
people who have done this complain that those looking after their stock feel little obligation to 
take good care of them, as their owners are Basarwa. The third option is not common, as 
mafisa are generally given to a poorer client -a small pool of people for most Basarwa. 
Despite occasional assistance from RADP, it is therefore unsurprising that levels of stock- 
ownership are significantly lower for non-Basarwa than for Basarwa. Table 5.1 compares 
cattle ownership for Gudigwa with the four other non-Basarwa villages under Okavango 
Community Trust, all of which are on land that faces no restrictions on stock keeping. Not 
only does Gudigwa have significantly less cattle per capita, but also a smaller proportion of 
the village are cattle owners, and the average herd size of those that do own cattle is smaller. 
A study by Lesley Boggs (1996) comparing stock ownership in Khwai and Gudigwa with the 
Bayei villages of Sankuyu and Shorobe yielded similar results; these villages had ten times as 
much per capita stock ownership than Mababe and Khwai (with cattle: goats weighted 4: 1). 
Overall, Ngamiland had an average of 1.06 cattle per person in 1999, compared to 0.03 for 
Gudigwa. 
51 During the 15 months I spent in Khwai, Gudigwa and Mababe, not a single compensation cheque 
was received, although there were over ten outstanding claims. This was a matter of constant complaint 
in meetings with government officials. Although compensation was always promised, DWNP is 
technically not obliged to compensate for stock loss or property damage in Khwai and Mababe, being 
situated in Wildlife Management Areas. 
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Plate 5.10: Tending a small field, Khwai. 
Plate 5.11: Watering cattle, Gudig a. 
177 
s, 4j 
Beetsha 1116 150 27 
Eretsha 428 349 46 
2.4% 5.6 0.1 3 
10.7% 7.6 0.82 
Gunitshoga 166 549 42 25.3 % 13.1 3.31 
Seronga 2524 1402 110 4.4% 12.7 0.56 
Table 5.1: Comparative stock ownership for villages on the northern arm of the 
Okavango Delta, 1998.52 
Despite low levels of ownership, livestock - especially cattle - is strongly desired by most of 
the residents of Khwai, Mababe and Gudigwa, as by Basarwa elsewhere (e. g. Twyman 
1997: 126). The dominant values in Botswana of cattle as a symbol of not only wealth, but 
also proper humanity are highly pervasive, as apparent in a comment to me by Motsamai 
Mpho, the Moyei leader of the opposition Botswana People's Party: 
If cattle are good for people, why give Basarwa animals? Hunting was good enough for 
Basarwa in the past, but they remained poor. Let them instead get used to what will last 
longer. 
Some Basarwa - especially younger men - express similar views themselves. However, the 
desire for cattle is not simply an adoption of dominant values. Cattle perform some important 
livelihood functions that legislation has prevented wildlife from performing. Livestock are an 
important source of investment that can be sold when money is needed, or killed on an 
occasion such as a funeral. Wildlife could provide meat on demand for such events, but as 
funerals are now often public events, the risk of being accused of poaching is high. For the 
12 Population data taken from census estimates, 1997. Cattle numbers taken from unpublished DAHP 
census, April 1998. Figures for Eretsha include cattlepost of Ndorotsha, and for Seronga include 
cattleposts of Letsau, Teekae, Mawana and Dungu. 
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same reason, trophies such as skins that have a cash value are usually buried where the animal 
is killed, to destroy incriminating evidence. Despite legislation, the use of wildlife for 
subsistence on a day-to-day basis is easier, as this can be hidden. As would be expected, 
therefore, livestock are generally preserved for emergencies, and not killed for day-to-day 
subsistence, a pattern common to Basarwa livestock owners elsewhere (e. g. Murray 1976 for 
CKGR). 
The implications of legislation restricting access to wildlife, accompanied by an intangible, 
yet very powerful, package of dominant values in which cattle symbolise `development', even 
`humanity', therefore combine to create an environment in which cattle are a more viable 
livelihood proposition than wildlife: 
Cattle are better than animals, because animals make you go to jail. If hunting was 
allowed, we would try to have both. I want our children to live off cattle, because 
animals are owned [go ruiwa] by the law [molao], so they cannot live off animals 
(Morena Motoloki, one of the three cattle-owners in Gudigwa in 1998). 
Nonetheless, statements such as this are as much protests against restrictive legislation on the 
utilisation of wildlife as indications of individuals embracing a `cattle culture'. Perhaps partly 
because of these restrictions, narratives on livelihoods often stress the importance of wildlife, 
to which I now turn. 
Wildlife 
A wide variety of natural resources are regularly used by residents of the northern sandveld 
for subsistence, sale or medicinal purposes: from thatching grass to the seeds of phuka grass 
(pi; Aerograstas natalensis); tswii water lily roots (adi, Nymphaea nouchali var. caerulea); 
wild spinach (boko/xono, Amaranthus thunbergii); mongongo nuts (/qom, Ricinodendron 
rautanenii); and a variety of fruit, like mogwana (du /om Grewia bicolor) berries for brewing 
khadi. However, I focus here on wildlife rather than plant resources, for two reasons. Firstly, 
the volume of food handed out in the northern sandveld, which is primarily carbohydrates, has 
reduced the quantity and diversity of gathered food. Nonetheless, the minimal protein in these 
handouts means that other sources of protein are still avidly sought. Secondly, the legal 
restrictions on hunting are more strictly enforced, and more comprehensive, than on other 
natural resources. Wildlife, therefore, has become a primary symbol of contestation between 
Basarwa and molao (law), although it represents a wider contestation over land and plant 
resources as well as wildlife. 
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Until 1995/6, the residents of Khwai, Mababe and Gudigwa were eligible for Special Game 
Licences (SGLs). These were issued from 1979 as part of the Unified Hunting Regulations, 
allowing households which were classed as dependent on wildlife an annual quota of animals 
that could be hunted year-round. SGLs were introduced in part to legitimise subsistence 
hunting by Basarwa, a practice that had been regarded as illegal, but generally tolerated 53 
When the Community Quota System came into operation under CBNRM, SGLs were 
rescinded. However, the number of animals given in the Community Quota is significantly 
less than the sum of animals of all the SGL holders for the village (Appendix Four). 
One of the main reasons for moving from an SGL to a Community Quota system, was that 
SGLs allowed `biologically unsustainable' levels of offtake (Hitchock n. d.: 4). As SGLs were 
inefficiently monitored, in practice they translated to a free licence to hunt what one wanted, 
and there was often little correlation between the animals stated on the license, and what was 
actually hunted. The full quota was very rarely used, but specific quotas on particular animals, 
such as buffalo and eland (which were removed from Ngamiland's SGLs in 1991) were often 
surpassed. The existence of a legal hunting quota also made it easier to hunt animals not on 
the quota, such as giraffe, as once the meat was cut into strips, it could not easily be 
identified. 4 Under the new system introduced with CBNRM, villages that have not yet set up 
a community trust can apply to use their quota for subsistence hunting, which is limited to the 
hunting season (April-September), rather than being available the whole year like SGLs. If 
the quota is granted, it is to the village as a whole, resulting in the hunting being done by a 
few men on behalf of the rest of the village (Plates 5.17,5.18). The Technical Committee 
retains the prerogative, however, to withhold the Community Quota, which they did for 
Khwai in the 1998 hunting season, citing internal divisions within the village as their reason 
for not granting it. 
The only individual licences still available in the northern sandveld in 1998 were Bird 
Licences, and Small Game Licences. The first cost P5.00 per year in 1998, allowing a 
S3 According to the Fauna Conservation Proclamation Act of 1961, Part III, Section 15, any hunting 
required the granting of a licence or permit. However, Act No 4 ('Extent of application of 
proclamation'), amended by Act 47 of 1967, allowed hunting on state land `by a person belonging to a 
community which is entirely dependent for its living on hunting and gathering veld produce, and who 
is himself a dependent, where the animal is hunted for the reasonable food requirements of the hunter 
or of the members of the community to which he belongs' (Point 3). Nonetheless, law enforcement 
officials did not often seem to be aware of this exemption (cf. Wily 1974: 20-21). 
54 Stories are sometimes told, with much hilarity, of individuals who sold giraffe meat under the noses 
of DWNP officials - or even to DWNP officials - under the pretence that it was the meat of an animal 
listed on their SGLs. Many Basarwa state giraffe as their favourite meat, although it is listed as a 
protected species. 
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selection of ducks and other birds within specified seasons, the second covered duiker and 
steenbok - the smallest ungulates - and cost P0.25 per animal. 55 Generally, only shotgun 
owners bought Bird Licences, and few bothered with Small Game Licences, the amount of 
meat they yielded being small compared to the time taken to hunt them and the cost of 
shotgun cartridges. Most duiker and steenbok were therefore caught with wire snares, which 
is illegal, and thus not covered by Small Game Licenses. Residents could also apply, 
alongside other citizens, for a selection of licenses for single large animals that are raffled to 
applicants each hunting season. These licenses are, however, expensive, and can only be 
hunted in designated CHAs. This is thus not an option that many Basarwa pursue. 
Hunting options under the formal licensing system are therefore very restricted. Yet, many 
Basarwa consider game meat to be an essential part of their diet. Game meat has long been an 
important part of the diet of many Batswana, and Batawana chiefs had Basarwa and Bayei 
hunters that hunted on their behalf from the early nineteenth century (Andersson 1856). In the 
mid-1970s, von Richter and Campbell (1975: 3) estimated that sixty percent of the protein 
eaten in Botswana derived from wildlife, although the restrictions imposed by the Unified 
Hunting Regulations in 1979 subsequently decreased this proportion. In Botswana as a whole, 
meat consumption (now usually beef) is high, and it is often eaten daily. Within this national 
`meat culture', many Basarwa lay specific claim to game meat, as expressed in a conversation 
about hunting between several men in Khwai: 
Rra Diatla: There is no Motswana who can live without meat... 
Moses: (interrupting) Not any Motswana56 - you are different, say your ethnicity 
[letso]. I cannot live without game meat because that it what my culture is... 
That is my life'. 
The restrictions on hunting thus present a problem, especially acute when the hunting season 
is closed (October to March). `For six months we cannot eat meat, if this continues, we will 
all be arrested for poaching', Rra Diatla went on to comment. 
The legal restrictions that have grown up to regulate hunting have provoked a change in 
hunting patterns, but not necessarily a significant change in the amount of game meat that is 
ss In 1998, the hunting regulations were in the process of being revised to considerably raise the fees 
for these licenses, to P50 for a bird licence, and P50 each for duiker or steenbok. 56 ̀Motswana' usually refers to a citizen of Botswana, but it can also mean a member of one of the 
politically dominant Setswana-speaking tribes. Rra Diatla was using it in its first sense, Moses was 
bringing in its second sense. 
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consumed. Despite legislation, Basarwa continue to hunt regularly. Although legislation has 
had little impact on levels of hunting, it has had a significant impact on the way hunting is 
done, how it is internally regulated, and in how Basarwa perceive their legitimacy as citizens 
of Botswana. I outline the informal - though not illegal - ways in which meat is obtained, 
before going on to illegal hunting. 
Informal procurement of meat 
Apart from the regular licensing and quota system, there are three possible avenues in 
procuring wildlife meat without falling foul of the law: 
" Building a relationship with a safari hunter in a neighbouring concession area, who allows 
them to take some of the meat from commercially hunted animals. 
" Chasing predators off their kills, and taking the meat. 
" The destruction of `problem animals' that have damaged or endangered property. 
The first is a restricted option, dependent on the goodwill of a neighbouring lessee who leases 
directly from the Land Board (thus having no obligations with the meat of hunted animals). 
Khwai was the only village able to make such an agreement, with the lessee of adjacent CHA 
NG20. Their request was based on a moral claim to NG20 being ̀ their' land, as historically it 
was the land that many of their ancestors used, and under the previous division of hunting 
areas it was subsumed in the area in which they could hunt the animals on their SGLs (Area 
7). After some negotiation, the lessee of NG20 agreed to send one of his trucks to Khwai to 
pick up meat-cutters after several of the five elephants on his annual quota had been shot. 
The second is an option that is more widely possible: 
As we went out each day onto the plains to cut grass, I noticed that Moses kept a look 
out for vultures. If the little black specks riding thermals were visible, he would keep an 
eye on their movements. They in turn might be following the wanderings of predators on 
the ground. The vultures were used as indicators of the location of predators, not so 
much out of fear of their proximity, but for the potential of fording a predator's kill. One 
day as we were cutting, the vultures were particularly close, and Moses was keeping a 
keen eye in their direction. All of a sudden, a pack of wild dogs caon ictus burst 
through the bush of a tree island, across the plain, and into the trees of another island. 
Moses dashed after them, arriving in a small clearing in the island seconds after they had 
brought down an impala. With the wild dogs having fled our intrusion, we salvaged what 
we could; three limbs and half a rib cage, leaving the skin and head. Moses explained 
that this would provide evidence of the kill if we were questioned about our possession 
of fresh meat. Nevertheless, back at the camp no chances were taken, and after we had 
eaten, I was told to put the bones into the fire that I had naively thrown over my back. 
iss 
Chasing predators (wild dogs, leopards, lions and hyenas) off their kills is a practice that has 
existed for as long as memory stretches in the northern sandveld, as well as elsewhere in 
Botswana (eg Murray 1976: 16 for G/wi and G//ana), and Basarwa often refer to lions as `our 
[hunting] dogs'. Although officials I asked differed in their opinions as to whether this 
contravened the law, wildlife legislation is silent on this issue, indicating it is a means of 
obtaining meat that is a few shades less illegal than actually killing the animal oneself. 
Chasing predators off their kills has thus been prompted by legislation to become a 
comparatively more important means of obtaining meat than it used to be. 
The third means by which meat can be informally, but legally, obtained is through the 
destruction of problem animals; animals that damage crops, kill livestock, or continually 
endanger people's lives. Although the trophies from such animals belong to DWNP, the meat 
is generally free to be consumed by whoever wants it. 
In February 1998, Mababe was having problems with elephants stepping over the thorn- 
brush fences around their fields, and helping themselves to the knee-high sorghum and 
maize plants - already sparse from the poor rains. This continued for a week, before the 
village sent a man to Maun to borrow a . 375 rifle from their councillor. He returned a few days later, and that evening an elephant was shot. At first light the next morning, its 
spoor was traced to the place it had keeled over and died, several kilometres from the 
village. By mid-morning, men, women and children were involved in cutting off chunks 
of meat, that were then cut into strips and taken back into the village to hang and dry. By 
the end of the day, all that remained was the head, tusks, bones and skin. Two days later, 
this activity was repeated with a second elephant. This time it died almost immediately, 
at the foot of a field next to the village. In the fading light, Kopano, one of the men, cut a 
slit in its side. ̀Tsawaa [it's fat]', he smiled, and stuffed some leaves into the slit to deter 
hyenas while they waited overnight to cut it up. Perhaps because of my presence, 
perhaps just in reminiscence, the older women sang a song next to the dead elephant: 
Chxoa, Sonda o ko kü [Elephants, go back to Sondc/7] 
Tse kü Sonda o, tse Al [Let's go to Sonda, we are thirsty] 
Elephants are perhaps a stark example of the utility of dead 'problem animals'. While no 
elephants had been shot by Khwai or Gudigwa, hippo, leopards and lion were, most of which 
also were eaten. However, it is only really for elephants that the benefits outweigh the costs of 
the damages they incurred. Table 5.2 gives figures for 'problem animals' killed in the study 
area. 
 `Sonda' is the name for the area near the head of the Savuti riverbed, where it leaves the Linyanti. 
Early explorers, such as Seiner (1909), referred to it as ̀ Sunta'. 
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Plate 5.13: Finding a leopard-kill. 
Plate 5.14: Sangando with gun. 
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Plate 5.15: Cutting up an elephant, Mababe. 
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Plate 5.16: Making the elephant strips into strips of meat to dry (digwapa). 
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Khwai (no data) (no data) 1 hippo none 
2 lions 
Gudigwa 2 lions 1 lion 4 lions 1lion 
1 leopard 
Table 5.2: 'Problem animals' killed in Khwai, Mababe and Gudigwa 1996-1998 (*only 
one of these died near the village and could be eaten). 
Informal methods of procuring meat do, therefore, exist, but they are limited, in that their 
timing is generally beyond the control of residents. Finding a predator's kill is good fortune, 
hunting lodges only provide meat in the hunting season, and only the animals decide when 
they will become a `problem' to residents. None of these methods solve the need for a regular 
supply of game meat. This is a need only regular illegal hunting can meet, as expressed by 
Rra Diatla in Khwai: 
If they do not listen to us, we will continue stealing animals, because we are oppressed 
by molao [law] that we did not make or understand. We should be given the prerogative 
to decide how to conserve our animals. We need animals for funerals and motsetse 
[celebrations associated with the mother coming out of seclusion after childbirth]. For 
these things we need ready access to animals, as we have no livestock or fridges. It is us 
who must decide on quotas. We are not used to being told when to shoot animals and 
not. We end up poaching. 
Illegal hunting 
A wide range of animals are regularly hunted, both small and large. Small animals, such as 
springhares, tortoises, turtles (for Khwai), pythons, duiker, warthogs, iguanas, civets, etc., are 
caught by both men and women on short trips out from the village using snares or spears and 
dogs rather than guns. Larger animals, such as impala, that are old or injured may also be 
caught by such methods. Although technically illegal, the hunting of springhares is tolerated 
by many DWNP officials. Hunting them is difficult to disguise, as one has to carry a five 
metre long gondo; a flexible stick with a wire hook on the end to trap them in their burrows, 
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and a spade to dig them out once hooked. Hunting of other small animals is generally not 
tolerated, and those classified as endangered species, such as pythons, carry a maximum 
P 10,000 fine or ten years in prison. The hunting of large animals is more difficult. A gun is 
required - either one of the few rifles, or a shotgun if the hunter can get close enough. In the 
past, those that did not have guns, and were fit enough, sometimes ran down their prey with a 
spear. As with Khwe-speakers more generally, spears were a more common hunting tool than 
bows and poisoned arrows (e. g. Hitchcock 1995: 177-8 for Tyua). Some residents of Gudigwa 
hunted from horseback, although using horses and donkeys for hunting trips carries the extra 
risks of making concealment more difficult, especially for hunting animals such as eland, 
giraffe, kudu and roan which are more abundant east of the northern buffalo fence. Hunting 
trips for large animals need to go beyond earshot of the village, and generally last a day or 
more, involving several men. The animal is skinned in the bush, the skin buried to hide 
evidence, and the meat carried back to the village. If there is a risk of being seen - which is 
most of the time in Khwai - the meat is hidden on the outskirts of the village, and brought in 
after dark. If the animal was shot with a borrowed gun or ammunition, the owner is usually 
given a third to half of the animal. 
Meat from hunted animals was used primarily for subsistence. Some of it may be sold within 
the village for nominal amounts, but only a few individuals made a habit of hunting 
specifically to sell. Jewe was one such person, a man in his late thirties from Khwai, who 
spent most of his time in the yard of whoever happened to be selling homebrews that 
particular day. If he wasn't drinking, he was usually out `hunting for alcohol'; financing his 
drinking debts by trips with a spade and his gondo to catch springhares, which he sold for P 10 
each back in the village. The occasional hunting of a large animal specifically to sell the meat 
is also a means of meeting specific financial needs, such as paying for a sick relative to be 
seen by a healer. Basarwa have thus attempt to use wildlife in this sense to meet their needs in 
much the same way as pastoralists elsewhere in Botswana use their livestock. 
Residents of the northern sandveld have a long history of selling wildlife products. As Maun 
grew, Khwai and Mababe began to take advantage of the market created by local inhabitants 
for meat. The Divisional Commissioner commented in 1962 that, `Both Mababe and 
[neighbouring] Sankuyu live by hunting buffalo and selling biltong in Maun at ten shillings 
per bundle' (BNA 1962b). A `bundle', or segwapa [lit: `dried meat'] consists of about fifteen 
one metre-long dried strips of meat. Although technically illegal, this practice continued 
under the SGL system, the price per bundle being P85 in the early 1990s. By 1998, bundles 
were being sold for P120 each in Maun, the inflated price being due in part to the shortage of 
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beef after CBPP. Most bundles sold in the late 1990s were from shot problem animals, 
especially elephants, as illegally hunted meat was generally either consumed or shared or sold 
within the village. Although rarely was a whole animal sold, Table 5.3 gives an indication of 
potential returns from selling digwapa (bundles of dried meat): 
eland 10 1,200 
gemsbok 10 1,200 
kudu 7 720 
wildebeest 7 720 
lechwe 3 360 
impala 2 240 
Table 5.3: Yields of bundles of dried meat (digwapa) and potential returns (based on the 
going rate of P120 per bundle in Maun in 1998). 
Much more lucrative than selling digwapa, however, was the potential income from selling 
ivory. The recent ivory trade reached a peak in the 1970s and 1980s, but then fell dramatically 
with worldwide restrictions on ivory trading. During this latter ivory boom, as in the boom of 
the nineteenth century, Basarwa became involved in guiding hunters, and as hunters 
themselves. The ivory was generally bought from them at very low prices by Batswana, 
Hambukushu or Bayei middlemen, who then sold it on to white dealers for export. Prices paid 
ranged from P20 per tusk to about P3000. ̀8 Basarwa were at the most vulnerable end of this 
chain. Often they were paid far less than they were promised, and on one occasion an elderly 
man from Mababe was beaten and left for dead in the bush after guiding hunters who killed 
three elephants. Only a few individuals were able to integrate themselves as equals into 
syndicates - generally comprising a group of several Batswana - who pooled profits to help 
" Although amounts as high as P65,000 have allegedly been offered to individuals from the study area 
more recently, by white expatriates in Gaborone. 
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pay fines, and thus avoid jail sentences. Many elephants shot illegaly were additional to those 
legally shot under the single citizen licences that were raffled to citizen applicants each year. 
Illegal killing thus became more difficult once elephants were removed from citizen licences 
in 1983, a ban that lasted until 1996 when trophy hunting of elephants was resumed. Rhino 
horn provided an even more lucrative, but very severely restricted, form of income. Only a 
handful of rhinos were left in the northern sandveld by the 1980s, and, by the 1990s, they 
were considered extinct. 
Falling foul of the law 
It is these latter forms of hunting - large animals, especially endangered species such as 
giraffe, and commercial ivory hunting - that have brought Basarwa to court for poaching. 
Most of the men older than forty in Khwai, Mababe and Gudigwa have been to court at least 
once for offences related to illegal hunting, and about one third of them have spent time in 
prison as a result. Actual prison terms have ranged from several weeks to four years. Most of 
these cases, however, were in the 1970s and 1980s, and were due to hunting within the park, 
in close proximity to the village, or for attempting to sell ivory to undercover government 
officials. `Then we were stupid, and hunted right in front of Game [DWNP]. Now we think to 
hide ourselves', explained one ex-offender. 
Allegations of torture have commonly been made against DWNP and BDF, particularly 
concerning Basarwa. Cases of torture, in several cases leading to death, have also been 
documented by the Botswana Council of Churches and Ditshwanelo - the Botswana Centre 
for Human rights (Mogwe 1992, Ditshwanelo 1996: 17). While no Basarwa from the northern 
sandveld have been killed or maimed, many of the men who have been arrested claim to have 
been beaten, or to have been submitted to other forms of torture, such as being put in a hole 
and threatened with being buried alive. Resentment at ill-treatment grew during the 1980s, 
provoking a number of backlashes against DWNP officials, such as the one described in 
Chapter Two of a DWNP vehicle and officials in it being attacked in Gudigwa as it arrived 
with a resident who had been accused of poaching. There were no serious injuries, and 
DWNP made no reprisals. Perhaps as a result of such expressions of resentment, the 1990s 
saw fewer allegations of torture, with none between 1995 and 1998. 
Studies that have touched upon the treatment of Basarwa by conservation officials have 
tended to assert that Basarwa tend to receive stiffer penalties for hunting violations than non- 
Basarwa (e. g. Mogwe 1992, Hitchcock et at. 1996). Although it is probably correct that 
Basarwa have been more prone to violent treatment (due to their ethnicity and general 
difficulty of access to legal institutions), a measure of informal leniency seems to be granted 
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to Basarwa in the northern sandveld when it comes to pressing charges. Perhaps this is 
because many officials from Ngamiland, being ethnically non-Batswana themselves, are more 
sympathetic to Basarwa. One Anti-Poaching Unit official in Maun explained to me that if he 
witnessed an offence he could use his prerogative, to either give a warning, or take action. He 
claimed that he would treat what he saw as subsistence hunting less severely than 
commercially motivated hunting, a sentiment echoed by Peter, a DWNP official working in 
Khwai: 
If I found someone from Khwai who had killed something illegally, I would wait and see 
what motivated them to kill it. I wouldn't report subsistence hunting, but instead give 
them a verbal warning. As Basarwa here don't plant crops, they need something to eat. 
Basarwa seem aware of this informal leniency, often preferring not to hunt illegally with non- 
Basarwa, which (if caught) would be less likely to be interpreted as subsistence hunting, and 
thus more likely to lead to sentencing. Anecdotal evidence that Basarwa are less likely to face 
charges for illegal hunting, is backed up by statistics for Ngamiland's Anti-Poaching Unit. Of 
the 52 cases of illegal hunting they handled between February 1994 and August 1998, only 
four evidently (from names or residence) concerned Basarwa. S9 
Despite the long history Basarwa have of hunting for both their own consumption and for 
trade, many observers make a distinction between ̀ subsistence', as opposed to `commercial' 
hunting, and associate Basarwa with the former. For example, a Director of the Department of 
Wildlife and National Parks was of the opinion that, `Until... 1966... the use made of wildlife 
[by the inhabitants of the Okavango Delta] was purely for subsistence and not for commercial 
purposes' (von Richter and Campbell 1975: 4). Such dichotomies carry little resonance with 
Basarwa. `Those who had cows made money from them, and we made money from our 
animals', argued Sangando as we talked about the time he was apprehended by an undercover 
policeman to whom he offered to sell two tusks for the paltry sum of P30. ̀ God gave us those 
things to use', Ogwe said of the elephants he hunted on his off-days from the South African 
Defence Force in Caprivi. The image of `proper' Basarwa as purely `subsistence' hunters is 
S9 Not all cases of poaching are handled by the Anti-Poaching Unit, only those that their own officers 
apprehend. The four cases concerning Basarwa were: 
. 14.03.94 two people from Gudigwa were convicted of illegal possession of firearms. Sentenced to 
five years in jail, though they were let out early. 
. 02.06.95: six people from `Xaxa' (Cgaecgae) were convicted of poaching four eland. They were 
fined P500, suspended for two years. 
. 09.10.95: two people from Mababe charged with possession of two tusks. Case withdrawn because 
tusks could not be located, and three years had passed without conviction. 
1998: Unspecified case involving four Basarwa. Awaiting trial. 
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evident in the reasons DWNP gave for beginning to phase out the SGL system in 1995. They 
claimed that SGLs were being `abused' because some holders had: 
0 other sources of livelihood. 
" sold meat from animals hunted with SGLs. 
0 used ̀ non-traditional' means (i. e. guns) for hunting (Hitchcock 1996: 3). 
Ironically, the new community hunting quota system swings to the other side of the 
dichotomy, and encourages purely commercial utilisation, thus failing to recognise the mixed 
nature in the way many residents have used wildlife products. 
Impacts of hunting legislation 
The one impact progressively more restrictive legislation has not had on hunting patterns by 
the residents of the northern sandveld is to significantly curb hunting, perhaps with the single 
exception of elephants. It has, however, affected hunting practices in a number of other ways: 
" criminalising one of the central markers of Sesarwa identity, symbolically 
peripheralising Basarwa from `mainstream' society. 
" modifying the strategies used to procure game meat, so as to cope with the effects of 
legislation. 
" reducing the consistency with which meat is legally available; it is often either 
unavailable, or else there is a glut. 
" restricting sharing networks of meat, as meat generally has to be kept hidden within 
the village. 
" encouraging wasteful and abusive hunting practices. 
" undermining the ability of Basarwa to effectively manage their own wildlife 
utilisation, by transforming individual hunting to a hidden activity. 
The first of these concerns the way Basarwa are seen, and see themselves, within the wider 
socio-economy of Botswana. I do not dwell on it here, as it forms the subject of the following 
chapter on identity. The second has already been covered; a wider variety of informal means 
of procuring meat are employed, and illegally hunted meat is generally kept hidden. The third 
is self-explanatory; the means of legally obtaining meat are mostly contained within the 
officially defined six-month hunting season, and even then may be limited to only a few 
occasions. This is exacerbated by the cover that the presence of `legal' meat in the village 
gives to `illegal' meat, making these times the easiest for individuals to hunt, and times when 
there is no legal meat the hardest to hunt. 
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Plate 5.17: Hunting on behalf of Khwai village from their communal quota. 
Plate 5.18: Sharing out meat from communal quota, Khwai. 

The final three points relate to the `individualisation' of hunting and use of meat that wildlife 
legislation has inadvertently encouraged. The present system has made individual hunting 
difficult but also a necessity. It is difficult because the quota is now given on a communal 
basis, 6° but individual hunting remains necessary because the communal quota does not 
provide adequate subsistence for all residents for the whole year (Appendix Four). By making 
individual hunting illegal, it creates a realm of hunting that needs to be hidden. Even with the 
legitimacy afforded by Special Game Licences, hunting was generally hidden from officials 
as much as possible (e. g. Bonduriansky n. d.: 7 for Khwai). This was both an effort to retain 
control of an institution Basarwa felt was their own rather than the government's, as well as to 
avoid possible accusations of mishunting. Once SGLs were rescinded, the need to keep 
individual hunting hidden was accentuated; not only from officials, but also from other 
individuals with whom one may have had a disagreement. Khwai, Mababe and Gudigwa all 
had examples of residents who had acted on a grudge by reporting fellow villagers to DWNP 
for illegal hunting. The secrecy with which this enshrouded hunting made sharing beyond the 
household more difficult, 61 especially affecting those unable to hunt (single women, elderly, 
infirm) who do not have a man capable of hunting in their household. 2 Commenting on this 
trend, Mina Tiro from Mababe complained that the individualistic attitude she associated with 
white people had affected Mababe, preventing people from sharing meat: ̀ It is these [laws on 
hunting] that corrupted us. Now people here want to live sekgoa [as white people], looking after 
only their own children. But we can't live like that'. 63 
Moreover, making hunting a hidden activity encourages wasteful practices, such as leaving the 
skins in the bush to avoid incriminating evidence, or leaving some of the meat if it is too 
much for a lone hunter to carry. It simultaneously acts to undermine the ability of the village 
as a whole to regulate such hunting practices, as keeping such activities out of the public 
arena makes it all the harder to exercise accountability in restricting abuse. An incident in 
Mababe during a lunch break from drought relief work illustrates this principle. Republic, the 
headman's daughter, saw one of the young men eating meat. It was soon after an elephant had 
been killed, so Mababe was awash with elephant meat, but Republic did not eat elephant. She 
60 It is technically possible to divide the communal quota, or a portion of it, among households in the 
village for individual hunting. However, this is not a practice the Technical Committee has encouraged 
in the CHAs around the Okavango, although villages with CHAs in parts of the Kalahari less 
frequented by tourists have been encouraged to take this route. 
61 Hitchcock (1995: 184) comments on hunting restrictions causing a similar trend among Tyua in 
eastern Kalahari. 
62 Nonetheless, some women do hunt, especially households that have no men in them, such as Mma 
Kanj iye's (Plate 6.2). 
63 The construction of Basarwa as people who (ideally) share and whites and blacks as selfish is 
widespread (e. g. Widlok 1999: 45,46 for Hai//om) 
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recognised the meat he was eating was something different, and asked for some. ̀ It's elephant 
meat, ' he replied, trying to avoid sharing it, `what other meat is there in the village? ' An 
argument then developed, and the other men present rebuked him for leaving most of the animal 
he had killed in the bush, and for not telling people that he had meat. He defended himself by 
saying that he had not wanted to risk being reported. Keeme, a VDC member, then told him off 
for wasting a resource that belonged to all of them by not calling them to help carry more of the 
meat back to the village. He also berated him and for not taking into account the destitutes in the 
village who lacked bullets or any means of hunting. Others present threatened to kill him if they 
found him in the bush doing the same again. The young man fled to Maun, and let the dust settle 
for a few weeks before he returned to Mababe. 
While the bystanders' motivation for berating the hunter in this instance was as much his 
selfishness in not sharing the meat as his wasteful hunting practice, this incident nevertheless 
illustrates an attempt at stewardship, as well as the waste and individualism that hunting 
legislation can encourage. If he had been more careful and not eaten the meat in public, as is 
more common in Khwai with its heavy DWNP presence, this incident would not have been 
provoked, denying the opportunity to exert a form of collective control over harmful individual 
practices. 4 The erosion of collective control over wildlife is ironic with the move to a 
community quota under CBNRM, which is ostensibly to facilitate greater community control 
of wildlife. Whether CBNRM actually does this remains to be seen, but it is unlikely to affect 
individual subsistence hunting, which the present legislation delegates to the realm of the 
illegal. 
Conclusion 
In considering the three realms in which Basarwa in the northern sandveld pursue livelihoods 
- cash, livestock and wildlife - it is evident that all three are not only intimately 
interconnected, but also aspects of each of them are essential to the way they construct their 
livelihood strategies. Interventions that attempt to replace one type of livelihood with another 
(such as RADPs attempts to turn its clients from hunters to pastoralists), or to push a singular 
livelihood agenda (as CBNRM in its initial stages appears to be doing), are thus unlikely to 
meet with success. 
64 Twyman (1997: 180) notes that restrictions on wildlife utilisation had undermined the stewardship 
patterns of Basarwa in Okwa CHA in the Kalahari to the extent that abuse, such as hunting pregnant 
female gemsbok in the breeding season, was common. Although such abuses (and they would be 
acknowledged locally as such) occurred in the northern sandveld, they were not common - indicative of 
the relative strength of remaining sentiments of stewardship. 
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It is also evident that Basarwa are disadvantaged in all three of these realms; a function of 
their `remoteness', which is both a geographical and socially constructed reality. 
Geographically, they are distant from educational establishments, and thus find themselves 
without the formal qualifications that many jobs require. The employment opportunities 
available in their proximity are also limited. Their remoteness from main population centres 
means as well that predators are more abundant, which limits livestock accumulation. This 
geographical isolation is compounded by their social peripheralisation as Basarwa from the 
values that dictate decision-making over factors affecting their livelihood strategies. For 
example, Basarwa perceive that some employers are reluctant to hire them because of the 
stigma of their ethnicity. The priority given to wildlife - especially for Khwai and Mababe 
being situated in Wildlife Management Areas - means that the rearing of livestock either 
receives little assistance, or is not tolerated. It also means that the use of wildlife, which is 
important not only for subsistence, but also as a marker of their identity, is severely restricted. 
Returning to the Environmental Entitlements framework (Leach et al. 1997), it is evident that, 
despite living in an environment of abundant goods and services, residents find themselves 
having to resort to means classed as illegal to translate these into endowments. Access to 
environmental resources continues, albeit illegally in may cases, but exercising `legitimate 
effective command' (i. e. gaining entitlement) over these resources remains largely unattained. 
Not only is formal control restricted, but also informal means of controlling these resources 
are undermined by the effects of hunting legislation, which makes activities associated with it 
into an individual and hidden activity. Although the move to CBNRM offers local residents 
greater entitlement over natural resources, it has so far done so in such a limited fashion as to 
force the utilisation of wildlife beyond the legal parameters it sets, making individual and 
illegal hunting inevitable. The policy on which CBNRM is based also gives little cognisance 
to the opinion many Basarwa have that wildlife is a resource that they are entitled to because 
of their specific history, promoting their unwillingness to submit to external controls over its 
use. Although hunting and gathering may become periphalised as subsistence strategies 
through legislation and welfare handouts, these practices remain essential as markers of 
identity. Basarwa, in turn, speak of their identity in terms that contest wildlife legislation, and 







Identity and legitimacy 
Conversations in the northern sandveld about the current situation of Basarwa and their place 
in the wider social economy of the region often turned to the legendary figure of Khara/'uma, 
the first person God65 put on earth, and progenitor of all Basarwa. The story of Khara/'uma is 
set in the times of Wei -lam (kx'ei - long ago, lam - sun or time, in Bugakhwedam, thus `the 
times of long ago'), of creation, when the trajectories were set for social relations manifest 
today, and speaks of the division of the world into hunter-gatherers and agro-pastoralists. 
Khara/'uma is believed to have been placed onto the earth at the Tsodilo Hills, a common site 
for the genesis of the first people in the legends of other Khwe-speakers (e. g. Kilian-Hatz 
1999) as well as some Ju/'hoansi and Hambukushu (M. Taylor 1998). The following version 
of the story was written by Merafe Amos, a young resident of Khwai: 
The old Khwe people believe they were the first people to be put on earth, and they were 
followed by the Bayei, who they call their cousins. The first Khwe person on earth was 
Khara/'uma, the hero of all Khwe people. They say that while he was walking around 
the land with his family, they came to a river, on the banks of which was a mokoro 
[dugout canoe]. They saw lots of animals on the other side of the river, and so wanted to 
cross. Khara/'uma put his family in the mokoro, jumped in himself, and started beating 
the mokoro with a thin stick to make it move, but of course this was impossible. Moyei 
then came along and said to him, `My uncle, let me show you how to do this'. He 
63 Bugakhwe in Khwai call God Tyani, and in Gudigwa, Khyani. Ts'exa most commonly use the 
Setswana word Modimo, although some say that in the past he was called Nyumkhwe (lit. `creator'). 
Both Bugakhwe and Ts'exa, however, refer to the first person as Khara/'uma (or sometimes 
Khara/'umae), as do some Ju/'hoansi (Biesele 1986a: 321-3). 
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fetched a long straight pole, and used it to push the mokoro with Khara/'uma and his 
family to the other side. He left them there, and took the mokoro for himself. That is how 
Bayei and Khwe people started their relationship. 
After that, Khara/'uma didn't bother with the mokoro, as he knew that his nephew the 
Moyei had it, and could help him with it when he needed it. Khara/'uma instead chose to 
concentrate on hunting and gathering wild fruit. On his hunting and gathering trips he 
came across ploughed fields, and in the fields he found melons, which he ate. But when 
he found sorghum, he broke the heads off and roasted them whole, trying to eat the seeds 
one at a time. This annoyed him, because it took himself so long to fill his stomach in 
this way. Then along came Moyei, who showed him how to grind the sorghum, and 
make sorghum porridge. He found the porridge delicious, but complained it took too 
long to make, so he decided to leave the fields as well for his nephew Moyei. He went 
instead into the bush, knowing that if he needed he could get crops from Moyei 
whenever he needed them. 
Other tellers of the story often add that while Khara/'uma was out hunting, he came across 
animals that did not run away when stalked. Excited by the ease at which they could be killed, 
Khara/'uma went and called Moyei to come and share in the feast. Moyei came with him, but 
when he saw the animals he told him, `No, my uncle, these are cattle, they should not be 
hunted'. Moyei then made a kraal and began herding them. Khara/'uma went off to continue 
hunting, and came across afield of tall grasses that made him itch as he walked through them. 
Irritated at their itchiness, and wanting to promote the growth of new grass shoots that would 
attract animals, he set the grasses alight. Moyei came along, saw what he had done, and told 
him, `No, my uncle, this was sorghum and should not be burnt'. Moyei then planted sorghum 
for himself, leaving Kharal'uma to continue eating from other wild plants. 
Variations on the story of Khara/'uma are as many as the times it is told, but its appeal lies in 
its common repertoire that is known and shared by the listeners. It is a hermeneutic 
framework whose basic elements are shared by many different Sesarwa-language speakers in 
accounts of the division of the world into hunter-gatherers and agro-pastoralists (see, for 
example, Biesele 1986a: 321-3 for Ju/'hoansi, Guenther 1989: 65-68 for Nharo, and Widlok 
1999: 46ff for Hai//om). In their most basic sense, narratives of Khara/'uma provide a basis for 
collective identity. Khara/'uma as a common ancestor of Basarwa provides the fictive kinship 
links between people subsumed within this category, and the separation of Basarwa as hunter- 
gatherers from neighbouring agro-pastoralists provides an oppositional identity that maintains 
categorical boundaries (cf. Mare 1992: 11). 
While proposing the distinctiveness of a hunter-gatherer identity, such narratives, however, do 
not in themselves give substance to that distinctiveness, as noted by Widlok (1999: 60-1). In 
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looking at what does give substance to Basarwa identity, this chapter takes a different 
approach to most studies with Basarwa, whose interest has primarily been concerned with 
what may be termed `cultural difference'. In an analysis of stories of origin, Widlok (ibid. ), 
for example, finds distinctiveness that separates Hai//om from their pastoralist Ovambo 
neighbours in a mode of sociality indicated by the style of communicating stories and social 
experiences. This chapter instead asks how and why Basarwa represent themselves as 
different. By placing narratives such as those of Khara/uma within the wider contexts that 
give them life and meaning, this chapter examines how narratives of identity arise in a context 
in which Basarwa have come to occupy a structurally peripheral position in the contemporary 
social and political landscape of Botswana. Assertions of difference are examined not so 
much for the content of difference that they imply, as their role in claims for concessions and 
rights to equality. 
Although the Kalahari Debate prompted a greater appreciation of the extent which `hunter- 
gatherers' have been an integral part of wider social and economic networks, little attention 
has been paid to how Basarwa characterise themselves in contemporary socio-political 
contexts, and how identities are acted out in social interactions and encounters (cf. Saugestad 
1998: 136). This chapter explores how Basarwa in the northern sandveld represent themselves, 
and how these representations are often related to legitimating access to resources from which 
they have been alienated. Following a discussion of the theoretical issues pertaining to 
Basarwa identity in Botswana, I examine how Basarwa represent their identity, which is often 
in terms of their hunting and gathering heritage, and material poverty. The next section 
examines such expressions of identity as a means of asserting rights against government 
policies, against dominant values, and against various local `others'. This leads to the final 
section, which moves from the neat definitions of `self and ̀ other' to explore the ambiguity 
that exists in social action and relationships between dominant and subordinate, and the ways 
in which Basarwa negotiate these dichotomies. 
Culture, identity and context 
Studies of `hunter-gatherers' have been dominated by a tendency to catalogue the architecture 
of social forms that characterise the subjects of their research. Attention has thus been paid to 
describing such distinctives as egalitarianism, sharing networks, modes of sociality, or 
physiognomy (e. g. Kent 1992: 52). This approach has perhaps been motivated primarily by 
our categorisation of hunter-gatherers as different, a difference that has inspired and 
maintained the sub-discipline of hunter-gather studies. Focusing instead on how Basarwa 
constitute difference between themselves and others involves acknowledging the ongoing 
205 
processes of cultural, political and social self production, and the changing contexts in which 
these processes take place. Cultural patterns do not become defunct in such an analysis, but 
their salience is realised not so much in the forms they take, as in the relations they inform 
that mark `us' from `them'. Identity is thus approached primarily as a relation rather than a 
thing: `a relation inscribed in culture' (Comaroff and Comaroff 1992: 51). 
Acknowledging that `culture informs, shapes and underpins resistance at least as much as it 
emerges situational from it' (Ortner 1995: 181, cf. Fischer 1999), I argue that culture itself is 
the level at which oppositional struggles are often made. In other words, certain activities that 
carry collective meaning, such as hunting, become an important part of a collective identity 
that is in some respects aimed at sustaining cultural distance from a society that seeks to 
dominate them by incorporation. My interest in the role of identity in contesting processes of 
resource allocation and ̀ development' means that I emphasise its instrumentalist role. This is 
not to imply, however, that identity is invented to suit political purposes. A sense of identity is 
developed by acting in the world and interacting with others (Barth 1994: 14), and it derives 
its potency from this repertoire of shared symbols and shared experiences. These common 
experiences, which include dispossession as well as practices such as hunting, are central in 
considering Basarwa identity, 
Narratives and practices of identity are therefore a means for Basarwa to articulate with the 
regimes of authority that attempt to shape their lives, an essential component of attempts by 
Basarwa to assert a form of control over their world (cf. Comaroff 1985: 13). In asserting, and 
practising, difference from a government agenda oriented towards conformity and singularity, 
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Basarwa present a challenge to hegemony and the identity space in which its subjects live. 
Self-definition is thus decisively a question of empowerment. It is an attempt to address 
material conditions of deprivation by challenging their roots; the wider webs of meaning that 
allocate to people different value and unequal position in society (cf. Saugestad 1999: 9). 
One reason that the Kalahari Debate was able to continue for as long as it did was the 
diversity of people subsumed under the category ̀ Bushmen', and the contexts in which they 
have lived (cf. Barnard 1996: 247, Kent 1996). Ethnographic and historical evidence was thus 
available to back up quite different arguments and justify quite disparate theoretical positions. 
Alongside this spatial diversity has been rapid temporal change that has left the Kalahari and 
its inhabitants in very different contexts from when the ethnographers of the 1950s and 1960s 
began their work. One of the most significant changes has been the political climate of 
Botswana, that has seen increased opportunities for the assertion of ethnically based claims to 
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rights, particularly in the 1990s. At the beginning of the decade, an observer had noted that 
Basarwa had ̀ no support movements, they are not at all organised beyond the level of band or 
settlement groups, and they have no connection to international Fourth-World organisations' 
(Gulbrandsen 1991: 84). However, 1992 and 1993 saw high profile national conferences at 
which Basarwa representatives were for the first time given platforms in the centres of 
political power. The decade also saw the birth and growth of three pan-Basarwa support 
organisations: Kuru Development Trust; First People of the Kalahari; and the Working Group 
for Indigenous Minorities in Southern Africa (documented by Saugestad 1998: 237-83). 
Furthermore, the 1990s saw the first major cracks in Setswana hegemony in Botswana. Equal 
representation by non-Setswana speakers in the House of Chiefs, and mother-tongue 
education (rather than only Setswana and English) became hotly debated - and, by the end of 
the decade, as yet unresolved - issues in the parliament and national press. Ngamiland, the 
most ethnically diverse of Botswana's districts, also saw the birth of two organisations, 
ostensibly to promote the language and interests of two of its `minorites': Kamanamakao 
Society (by Bayei); and Mbungu (by Hambukushu). Locating itself within these wider 
processes, this chapter examines narratives of identity at the end of the twentieth century by 
Basarwa in a part of Ngamiland that over the past three decades has increasingly aroused the 
interest of conservationists, tourists and bureaucrats. 
Essentialising identity: how Basarwa speak about themselves 
Expressions of identity are rooted in dialectics that not only define `us' as distinct from 
`them', but also make sense of the changing world in which we live. `Those caught up in a 
process of radical change come to terms with their history by means of suggestive 
oppositions', contended Comaroff and Comaroff (1992: 159) from their work on Barolong 
experiences of colonialism in South Africa. In the same way that Barolong spoke of the 
distinction between wage labour (bereka) and work for oneself (tiro) as exemplifying the 
different worlds of exploitation and autonomy, Basarwa often speak in dualisms. These 
contrast a Sesarwa way of life based on wildlife and wild food with Setswana (based on 
pastoralism) and SekgoP (based on cash and the consumption of manufactured goods). As 
Moses looked back in middle age over his life, he characterised it in such terms: 
I took my wife and had my first child while I was still working at Khwai River Lodge. 
At this time I was living a life of Sekgoa and had left the Sesarwa life. I was different. I 
worked and had left behind our life of hunting. As I had more children, I started 
returning to a life of hunting. I bought a gun and used it to hunt.... I had eight children, 
all of whom I brought up in Sekgoa only. I brought them up on money, not fruit... Today 
everything is done with money. 
" Sekgoa is a Setswana word that is used to refer to the English language or the ways of white people. 
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The imaginary worlds of Sesarwa, Setswana and Sekgoa are, like the different livelihood 
strategies they represent (Chapter Five), not discrete in lived experience, but intimately 
articulated with each other. Their separation in speech arises from the emotive metaphors that 
they provide to explain and categorise their world and their experiences in it. Sesarw"a, 
Setswana and Sekgoa are categories that, as Raymond Williams (1973: 291) suggested in his 
seminal work on the dialectic between ̀ country' and `city' in Britain, represent experiences 
and interests for which there is no immediate vocabulary. Similarly, the moral contrast 
between experiences in town and village in different African contexts has provided a 
powerful resource for social critique, and has been well documented (e. g. Mayer 1971, 
Epstein 1981, Mitchell 1987, Comaroff and Comaroff 1992). Village life has provided 
powerful alternative `moral images' (Ferguson 1997: 138) to be contrasted against urban 
realities conceived as artificial, immoral, corrupt and anomic. Comparative oppositions that 
Basarwa use are similar in that they are a product of experiencing, and means of explaining, 
the rapidly changing world in which they live. However, these oppositions carry a deeper 
level of meaning to Basarwa, for whom they describe not only experiences that articulate 
imaginary worlds, but also a sense of identity as a separate category of people. 
The world of Sesarwa is often rooted in either of two oppositions: as a product of the bush 
rather than agropastoralism or towns; and as a world of poverty rather than wealth. These 
oppositions provide an immediate and evocative vocabulary with which to define both an 
identity in opposition to a dominant majority, and as moral narratives against current 
inequalities. 
People of the bush, people of poverty 
In one of the only ethnographically-based explorations of contemporary Bushman identity, 
Suzman (1997) argues from his research with Ju/'hoansi in a very different context - on the 
Afrikaner and Herero farms of Omaheke in eastern Namibia - that Ju'/hoan identity is 
constituted, not in terms of cultural institutions left over from a hunting and gathering past, 
but in terms of their marginalisation and domination by others. They were relegated to 
stigmatised underclass by the emergent political economy, and, Suzman argues, came to 
constitute their own identity in terms of their dependent underclass status. Like Suzrnan, this 
chapter argues that in studying former hunters and gatherers, it is necessary to move beyond 
the theoretical frameworks and models generated for the study of them as 'hunters and 
gatherers'. However, as stories of Khara/'uma imply, Basarwa from the northern sandveld, 
unlike Ju/'hoansi in Omaheke, draw not only upon their underclass status, but also their 
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gatherers'. However, as stories of Kharal'uma imply, Basarwa from the northern sandveld, 
unlike Ju/'hoansi in Omaheke, draw not only upon their underclass status, but also their 
hunting and gathering past. Perhaps because Basarwa in the northern sandveld have not been 
subject to such brutal and sustained subjugation, and because the limits to hunting and 
gathering are not environmentally, but politically, constituted, their history of hunting and 
gathering remains an important element in contemporary narratives of identity. 
Narratives of Khara/'uma are a clear example of the primordialist and essentialist imagery 
that `first peoples' worldwide often use in representing themselves to the outside world (cf. 
Sharp 1996, Fischer 1999). These stories represent a world in which Basarwa are a people 
whose way of life has been set from the beginning of time to be one derived from the bush, in 
contradistinction to their Bantu-speaking neighbours, who became agro-pastoralists. Within 
this scheme, one of the key markers of what it means to be Mosarwa is the use of wildlife. 
`There is no life now because there is no meat', exclaimed Petros, an old blind man from 
Khwai, or in the words of Mmadifalana, an old woman in Khwai: `I want to live by meat, 
because that is the seed [peo] of culture [ngwao] that our parents left us'. Eating game meat is 
thus represented as more than a subsistence option - although the hunger caused by not having 
easy access to wildlife is at times very real - but an essential element of their identity as 
Basarwa. Phentse, a middle-aged man from Mababe, explained this to me in terms that he 
thought I would best understand: 'I could not survive without game meat, because it is 
something like vitamins for me'. An identity tied to wildlife is not only expressed verbally. 
Some men display visible markers of this identity, especially horns from large antelope such 
as eland and kudu, in their homes or tied to the fences around their yards. It is, of course, also 
a lived identity; one that is practised in the form of regular hunting and gathering. 
In the same way that most Basarwa have experience of hunting and gathering, and the 
contemporary restrictions on doing so, they also have experience of poverty. In a conference 
in Gaborone in October 1993, Aaron Johannes, a founder member of First People of the 
Kalahari, took the stage and announced of those that have come to fall under the name 
Basarwa: 
We have many different names, and come from many different places with many 
different languages. But one thing is common to us all: we are the people with no 
money. 
This was more than a statement of circumstance, or an observation that many Basarwa happen 
to be poor. Poverty is often a defining feature of how Basarwa represent their identity as a 
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category of people, and is reflected in the names Basarwa call themselves. The term Xukhnve, 
for example, is an all-encompassing term used by Bugakhwe and Ts'exa to refer not only to 
themselves but also all other people that would otherwise be known as 13asarwa. A commonly 
used self-referential term, Xukhwe appears to be one of some antiquity, noted, for example, 
by Seiner (1977 [1910]) on a trip through Ngamiland in 1905/6. I asked both Bugakhwe and 
Ts'exa what `Xukhwe' meant, and each time I was given a similar answer. 'xu means to leave 
or forsake, and khwe means person, soXukhwe means the forsaken people. We are the people 
that are thrown away'. 7 
The current explanation of the name Xukhwe is one example of the way in which Basarwa 
frequently represent themselves as a people marked by poverty, or as 'People of the short 
blanket' (English et at. 1980). A similar explanation is often given by Basarwa on the 
meaning of the word `Mosarwa', as in the following exchange on a visit to Ju/'hoansi in 
Namibia by delegates from the northern sandveld in July 1998. As they shared ideas in a 
meeting, the issue of naming arose: 
Ju/'hoansi: You call yourselves ̀Mosarwa'. Where does that name come from? 
Visitors: Mosarwa means mo sa rua; someone that does not own stock. That is our 
name because we are poor. 
Ju/'hoans!: What, then, is the opposite of `Mosarwa'? 
Visitors: The opposite of `Mosarwa' is morul, a person that has livestock, a person 
that is rich. 
For many Basarwa, one of the most salient markers of their identity is their common 
experience of dispossession, mistreatment, or neglect by those more economically or 
politically powerful than themselves. Characterising themselves as a people marked by 
poverty is thus not so much an intrinsically negative self-image, but a commentary against a 
pattern of domination that is seen as responsible for their poverty. The twin images Basarwa 
present of being people of the bush and people of poverty are mutually interdependent. Being 
materially poor means much of their livelihood is gained from the bush, and being people of 
67 This contemporary explanation probably does not, however, reflect the origin of the name auAhwe. 
Köhler (1989: 183) was told several, decades earlier by Kxoe in the Caprivi Strip (who also call 
themselves Xukhwe) that this was the name given to them by //Anikhwe in the distant past. his 
informants maintained that //Anikhwe and Bugakhwe were the same people, until the //Anikhwe went 
to live along the Okavango River, leaving Bugakhwe in the bush, thus naming them XUAhwr. 'the 
people who are left behind'. Nonetheless, the current explanation in the northern sandveld reflects the 
ways in which narratives of identity are moulded by contemporary circumstances. its current use to 
refer to all Basarwa (adopted by Ts'exa as well) also reflects the widening of a pan-Basarwa identity in 
Botswana. 
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For those of us who have no cattle or jobs, wildlife is our life. But the government['s 
legislation] is making some people poor and some people rich. I am destitute. I am 
Mosarwa. 
Narratives of identity and the constitution of rights 
To take Basarwa representations of themselves as hunter-gatherers as evidence that they 
constitute an ethnic group of hunter-gatherers, would miss the point of such narratives. 
An equal misinterpretation would be to argue, on the basis of narratives of poverty, that 
the category of people labelled Basarwa is simply an underclass created by capitalist 
penetration into the Kalahari. The realities of their lives speak against such simplicities. 
Such assertions are primarily statements of ideology, directed at those who would rule 
and change them (cf. Keesing 1992: 226). These discourses are part of their struggle, 
which is, in Scott's (1985: xvii) words: 
Not only one of material objects, but appropriation of symbols, of how past and present 
should be understood and labelled, to identify causes and lay blame... a contentious 
effort to give partisan meaning to local history. 
Statements of identity are thus used to constitute a local `moral economy' (Thompson 1975), 
grounded in local views of norms and obligations, which legitimate for everyday practice 
what has become illegal and illegitimate. That a subordinate class of people should develop 
moral economies to sustain and legitimate practices defined as illegal is not a new discovery. 
Peasants in eighteenth century England (Thompson 1975, Hopkins 1985) and contemporary 
Malaysia (Scott 1985,1990), hill people in northeast India (Karlsson 1997), and residents on 
the peripheries of Zambian National Parks (Balakrishnan and Ndlouvu 1992) have all created 
alternative moral economies. Such moral economies have been based on customary rights to 
land and its products, and have served to sustain and legitimate access to resources that have 
been legally closed to common access. In this sense, Basarwa share both a dilemma and a 
means of legitimating common practices with many others in a similar situation, including 
non-Basarwa around the Okavango Delta. However, the moral economy that Basarwa 
vocalise is more than an appeal to customary rights of tenure, but a very identity that is based 
largely on the use of these resources. 
Narratives of Khara/'uma are widely known, not only among Basarwa, but also by many of 
their Bayei and Hambukushu neighbours. As such, they provide a wide currency with which 
to establish a moral universe of relationships between themselves, their neighbours, and the 
environment in which they live. This is a universe in which: 
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" Basarwa were first in the land. 
" God gave Basarwa all natural resources. 
" Basarwa chose to live off wild food, leaving black people to domesticate cattle and crops. 
" The relationship between Basarwa and their non-Basarwa neighbours was supposed to be 
one of mutual co-operation and assistance. 
The strength of narratives of Khara/'uma lies in their malleability. They are a common 
codification that can be manipulated to provide a moral commentary on current ethnically- 
structured inequalities. For example, Manne Thamaga, the younger brother of Gudigwa's 
headman, referred to Khara/'uma in questioning their domination by Hiambukushu and Bayei, 
with whom they were united under Okavango Community Trust: 
Blacks came and took our cows because they saw they were useful and valuable, and 
they left us with the wild animals because they saw they were dangerous. After killing 
cattle with ease, Khara/'uma tried to kill buffalo, but found they were very vicious and 
they nearly killed him, so had to flee up a tree. Mokoba [Moyei] took the cattle, leaving 
the dangerous ones for us. We lived happily with the wild animals, taking what we 
needed. Then today they see that animals can make money, so they have decided to take 
those as well. They want to make a business with those dangerous ones as well, but those 
are ours. Why do they want a share now, when in the beginning they did not look after 
(rua) them with us, saying they are too dangerous? 
Although their circumstances in OCT prompted Manne in this instance to assert a local moral 
economy against their non-Basarwa neighbours, such narratives are usually directed against 
the laws and values of molao, embodied by the government. Moral economies not only 
legitimate illegal activities such as hunting, but also criminalise the state for denying Basarwa 
what should be rightfully theirs: 
When I poach [utswa lit. `steal'], my heart does not tell me I have stolen. What may 
hold me back is the fear of being arrested, beaten and jailed. Who then will feed my 
family? I can't say some Basarwa poach and others don't. All of us will take an animal if 
we get the opportunity because they have been ours since the beginning. It is the same 
for us as you going to the fridge and getting out a loaf of bread. (Moses, Khw ai) 
When we steal animals, it is not that we despise the government, but we are hungry. It is 
the government that is at fault if we steal, not us, because they have taken our phapadi 
[wild foods]. If I could see, I would be hunting. I have waited for the government for a 
long time, thinking this person called government will change. What will we live by? 
Those that see should go and steal. It is not us at fault, but government. They should pay 
the fines if there are any. What kind of law is it that can refuse us mice - mice! - which is 
what springhares are? (Petros, Khwa() 
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When we steal animals, it is not that we despise the government, but we are hungry. It is 
the government that is at fault if we steal, not us, because they have taken our phapadi 
[wild foods]. If I could see, I would be hunting. I have waited for the government for a 
long time, thinking this person called government will change. What will we live by? 
Those that see should go and steal. It is not us at fault, but government. They should pay 
the fines if there are any. What kind of law is it that can refuse us mice - mice! - which is 
what springhares are? (Petros, Khwai) 
If I go into my kraal and take a goat out and kill it, who can tell me I have done wrong? 
The government says we are disenyi [law-breakers], but it is government that brought in 
the safaris that shoot all over the place. When I [i. e. Basarwa] was in charge, there were 
many animals, so the government is sesinyi. (Joubere, Mababe) 
Equating hunting for Basarwa with getting a loaf of bread out of the fridge for white people, 
or with a Motswana taking a goat from his herd are commonly used metaphors by Basarwa. 
Idea, the budding hawker from Mababe, for example, told me that, `Wildlife is my bread. In 
Maun they eat loaves, I eat wildlife. God divided us that way. ' On another occasion, I asked 
July Kangondo, a middle-aged resident of Khwai, whether he had ever owned livestock, he 
shook his head, then laughed and said, ̀ Of course I have owned livestock; buffalo, pythons, 
impala, lechwe.... ', and proceeded to reel of a list of wild animals. The use of such metaphors 
has been a pattern of speech for a long time, as indicated by Stow (1905: 282) who was told at 
the end of the nineteenth century by a lone surviving Bushman in the Orange River valley 
that, `all the game was our cattle'. As Raymond Williams (1973: 291) suggests, bread and 
wildlife, cattle and buffalo, all provide immediate metaphors for deeper experiences, and 
passionately felt beliefs about what should be legitimate. Using the metaphors of dominant 
pastoralist economy serves to translate the rights accepted for pastoralists to `hunter- 
gatherers'. By inverting the opposition between pastoralists and hunter-gatherers - categories 
that dominant society is in part responsible for creating - they reveal and challenge the 
premises of the form of Setswana hegemony that seeks to control Basarwa by incorporation. 
Articulating with molao 
The struggle to assert a local moral economy against molao [law] is especially difficult, as it 
challenges not only an overt legal system, but also the associated, and unwritten, package of 
values that underlie what it means to be a proper person. As outlined in Chapter Four, 
Basarwa have been represented as people without molao - wild and unpredictable, as they 
supposedly lack the social institutions that grant them proper humanity. Basarwa response to 
this has generally been a mix of conforming to molao in some respects, and in others 
attempting to counter it with a conception of their own Sesarwa molao. 
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The authority of molao pervades and regulates all aspects of life. What Basarwa discussed, 
the appropriateness of different contexts for discussing different issues, and the way these 
were framed, were all bound by molao's invisible system of values and mores. For example, 
early one morning the man whose family I was staying with in Mababe went out hunting. lie 
returned a few hours later, complaining that his hunt had been unsuccessful. Yet later in the 
morning he went to the outskirts of the village and returned carrying a sack. As we sat 
together at lunchtime eating fresh meat, however, any comment from me about enjoying the 
fruits of the morning's hunt would have been inappropriate. Verbalising what we all knew 
would have been tantamount to explicitly placing my host in the category of `thief. Not 
talking about it allowed him, instead, to retain an air of respectability. Conversations about 
illegal hunting were thus often framed in ways that molao deemed acceptable, although their 
unspoken subtext communicated a very different message. 
While the pervasiveness of molao demands that everyday speech conforms to its dictates, 
Basarwa are also vocal in decrying its consequences. `Molao is killing us', I was told several 
times, in reference to both the physical hunger caused by legal restrictions on hunting, as well 
as the challenge molao makes to a construction of Sesarwa culture in which wildlife is a key 
marker: 
We lived off the veld, our parents getting food from plants, and killing animals with 
spears and arrows. We learnt to use these, but they serve no purpose because we are not 
allowed to hunt. Molao [law] has killed us Basarwa. (Mathias, Khwaf) 
Moses was especially vocal about molao - not only the consequences of its manifestation in 
the law, but also its power of incorporation, as some of the younger generation appeared to 
adopt its values: 
It is molao that is killing Bosarwa [`Bushmanness'], that is where it is heading. Once 
government says something, it is a decision, and you cannot change it. We are powerless 
in the face of government. If something is done by a vote and you are a minority, what 
can you do? The young people outnumber us, and they don't want animals to be put 
aside for tlholego [heritage]. Our lives will be changed and we will be living in towns 
wearing suits. They want sekgoa [ways of white people] to come in. They want to be 
part Lekgoa [white person], part Motswana, but nothing Basarwa. Like in America, there 
are Basarwa [first people] who have lost their culture. In the end, Basarwa will be doing 
what you are doing: going to other countries and asking about their culture [because they 
will no longer have any of their own]. 
Government says that people must keep their culture, but they arc not saying that to 
Basarwa. Motswana has livestock, shops, and farms. Whites have factories. MOW U2 
has wildlife, but the government says these are not ours, and belong to all Batswwaria. 
That makes me give up on my Bosarwa. The government should give us our arras to 
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govern, and they can make sure we do it well - and we will, because that is what we have 
always done. They have finished the wildlife in their land, leaving only names to show 
there was once wildlife there, because they wanted cattle. We are supposed to rua [look 
after/own] the animals, but they are not ours. All those other people want to get rich 
from wildlife as well, and as they have finished theirs, they want ours now. They are 
already rich, but still want our wildlife. 
If we go and sell our wildlife to whites, we have killed our own culture, but if we are a 
minority, what can we do? Bosarwa will die. Whites and Batswana will keep getting 
money from our wildlife, but we are losing our culture, because they want these animals. 
We will also lose our culture because some of us despise it, and want nothing to do with 
the bush. 
We want to govern this area ourselves. It means nothing to a Motawana if these animals 
die, they still live on their cattle. They put fences to preserve their animals. They eat in 
our area, but we do not eat in theirs. 
Moses asserts Basarwa culture as one primarily based on wildlife, the sense of dispossession 
from which has heightened its salience as a marker of Sesarwa ̀tradition'. As molao defines 
such use of wildlife as illegal, by implication Basarwa culture becomes illegal and 
illegitimate. Moses' response is an impassioned defence of what he defines as Basarwa 
culture. The passion behind his words, and those of many others that weave through this 
chapter, speak against the instrumentalism of observers such as Wilmsen, who present such 
primordialist claims as, ̀ nothing more than claims to ownership of the past and rights to use it 
for present purposes' (1996: 3, emphasis mine). This passion indicates an affective attachment 
to these markers, and an affinity that goes beyond mere instrumentalism. 
A parallel response to Moses' defense of Sesarwa ̀culture' is to invoke a Sesarwa molao as a 
counter to official molao. Moitshoki, a younger man from Khwai, spoke of the government's 
molao as restrictive, but their own as giving them the freedom to hunt: 
The difference between our molao and the government's is that our molao allowed us to 
chase animals and kill them, that is how we used to do it. We also dug traps and used 
snares, bows and gondo [long hook for catching springhares]. We didn't use guns. We 
used medicine made from urine, mixed with herbs, to give endurance and success in 
hunting. The way we killed did not cause the animals to flee. Today they run away 
because of uns. Guns are not bad in themselves, and they were given to us by the 
government 8... The government has taken our land, we are left with nothing with which 
to support ourselves. The mistake was not bringing guns, but taking away our food. 
6$ In the 1970s, the government confiscated muzzle-loaders and Martini-Henry's from their owners, 
many of which were over one hundred years old, and were considered dangerous. It compensated 
owners with shotguns or rifles. 
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Although set in opposition to a dominant molao, Moitshoki's conception of a Sesarwa molao 
is not one that precludes options such as hunting with guns. As such, he also challenges the 
dichotomy that, as ̀ people of the bush', they do not have the rights to goods and services that 
other people have, and furthermore, that access to such goods necessarily undermines their 
stewardship of the environment. 
Many Basarwa see the Community Based Natural Resource Management Programme as 
providing an opportunity to turn the tables and assert molao themselves over tourism 
operators in their area. Forming a legally registered Community Trust requires a constitution, 
referred to in Setswana as molao motheo (molao - law, motheo - plan). For the first time, they 
had an opportunity to assert a molao of their own in written form, thus reflecting the power of 
the written molao (constitution) of Botswana. With the promise of assistance from an external 
advisor (funded by an NGO), Khwai rejected the standard pro forma constitution provided by 
the Technical Committee, and took the opportunity to make their own molao motheo. In an 
early workshop to discuss their constitution, in March 1996, they decided to declare in it that 
Khwai is a Basarwa area, and non-Basarwa will not be allowed to partake in the benefits of 
their Community Trust unless by marriage. This clause was nonetheless rejected by the 
Technical Committee as discriminatory when their constitution was submitted in 1998, and 
led to a deadlock, with Khwai unable to register their Trust. 
Narratives of identity, and the moral economies they support, are therefore primarily aimed at 
asserting rights against the people and government that have come to dominate them, and 
particularly the limitations imposed by official laws and policies. They are also used, 
however, against other people in the locality, whether non-Basarwa or Basarwa, whose 
origins lie elsewhere, by renegotiating the principles of belonging. 
Renegotiating belonging 
Focusing on narratives of identity anchored in a simple dichotomy of a subjugated ̀ us' in 
opposition to a dominant `them' can hide the complexity and creativity of relationships 
between subaltern and their many `others' (cf. Brown 1996: 733). In concert with a widening 
pan-Basarwa sense of identity, has been an opposite process; the assertion of local identities 
against local `others'. This is most evident in the way that associations to particular tracts of 
land are negotiated, and most probably associated with restricted access to, and the 
heightened value of, natural resources. 
Despite often being known by names that are topographical, association by Basarwa with 








relatively dispersed population. Belonging in a specific area has been figured more by kinship 
than previous residence patterns. Basarwa today maintain that in the past, moving to live with 
another group of people in their territory was a frequent occurrence, dependent primarily on 
the ability to establish kinship links with the `owners' of the land. However, as progressively 
stricter regimes of land tenure have decreased access to land, so have some residents recently 
begun identifying more strongly with specific tracts of land. This is particularly pronounced 
for the residents of Khwai, who have had least security of tenure, and who also have 
experienced a high degree of immigration (mostly by relatives from Gudigwa). I realised this 
after a conversation I had with Mma /Idam, soon after moving to Khwai. Mina /Idam is 
Moyei, and she and her household are the only long-term non-Basarwa residents in Khwai. 
Mma /Idam claims she first moved to Khwai from Sankuyu (a predominantly Bayei village) 
in 1971, and is ironically the only adult in Khwai whose teknonym arises from a child with a 
Bugakhwedam (and Ts'exadam) name. /Idam, her first daughter, was born from an illicit 
relationship with a childhood sweetheart at Mababe. As a marginal resident in Khwai, Mina 
/Idam was always keen to talk to me, and it did not take me long to ask her how she ended up 
in Khwai. She obliged: 
I used to live at Sankuyu, but life was hard, so I decided to return to the area from which 
we originated, Khwai. When Basarwa came here, they found us here already, although 
many had moved to Sankuyu. Many of the people here are recent arrivals. This is the 
land of Borazi, my mother's father. They left here, because of tsetse fly, to places like 
Sankuyu. Kanjiye [the lagoon next to Khwai village] belonged to Yarbi father of 
Mothathise [who was Mma/idams classificatory uncle], father of Santombwa [all Bayei]. 
When I was a little girl, my parents came here with others to fish and hunt. They gave 
some of what they caught to Santombwa because this was his lagoon. You can still see 
the remains of the animal traps they dug south of Kanjiye. 
Kwere came from here to Sankuyu. Mma Lebonang [one of the women in Khwai most 
vocal about Mma/Idam not belonging]'s mother carried me on her back when I was a 
baby. Kwere moved to Sankuyu from /Uku [Hippo Pool] with his in-laws Sango and 
Amos. People from Sankuyu came here every year after planting. Kwere found Basubia 
at /Uku, where they had some fields. Then the Basubia left, and Kwere was lonely, so he 
went to Sankuyu. Lebonang [Mma Lebonang's daughter]'s father's mother was a 
Subiya, and still lives at Sankuyu. Her father was a Moyei, the son of Mina Lebonang's 
father's sister. Kwere [and his people] only stayed a few years at Sankuyu, then got 
thirsty and returned to /Uku. 
Once she had told me her story, I left Mma Adam's yard, and was soon called over by Mma 
Lebonang and Mma Kelereng, key members of Khwai Interim Management Committee. 
They were incensed that I had spent so long speaking to a moagedi - someone who lived here 
only because they had built a house, not because she belonged. They found it especially 
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disconcerting that I had thus written the ̀ wrong' history. Mma Lebonang attempted to put the 
record straight: 
Mma Adam is here because she is a moagedi. She was born in Sankuyu, and Mmobi (the 
headman of Sankuyu) is her mothers younger brother. Her Omang [National 
Registration card] says she was born at Sankuyu. We have a home in Maun, but that 
doesn't mean we are from there - we are from here. Everything she does here is for 
business. She came here for business to cut grass, sell beer and have a semausu [hawkers 
shop], but her semausu has stopped operating. She has no plot of her own here in Khwai; 
hers is at Sankuyu. She has no place here. Mma/idam built her houses on her own 
accord, we didn't give her permission... Those that say we lived with Bayei should 
specify it was at Gabamukuni, not here at Khwai. We have been sleeping, but now we 
have woken up, and will do business ourselves. Basarwa are in charge of this land, and 
there is no black person who is going to push us around. 
These two narratives exemplify the changing manner in which attempts to legitimate title to 
land are framed. Mma Adam framed her arguments for belonging in Khwai according to 
kinship, by stressing her historical closeness with the main families at Khwai, and their kin 
relationships with Bayei from Sankuyu. She also points to her ancestor's periodic use of land 
at Khwai as justification for her present residence. Mma Lebonang, on the contrary, distanced 
Basarwa at Khwai from other non-Basarwa with whom they have periodically lived, by 
downplaying kinship links, and emphasising relations to land. This distancing is directed not 
only against non-Basarwa like Mina Adam, but also against other Basarwa. 
People in Khwai have extensive kinship links with residents of Mababe and Gudigwa, both 
through descent and marriage. However, Khwai is the only village of the three situated next to 
a permanent river. While the residents of Mababe and Gudigwa categorise themselves as 
Basarwa ba motlhaba ('Basarwa of the sandveld'), Basarwa in Khwai call themselves 
Basarwa ba noka ('Basarwa of the river'), a label usually reserved for //Anikhwe. On my first 
visit to Khwai, Dice, Chairman of the Village Development Committee, explained to me: 
There are many groups of Basarwa, like there are many groups of white people. We 
at Khwai and //Anikhwe are the only river Basarwa, all the others are ba moiThaba. 
They have their wells and pans to drink from. We get our food from the river. 
I soon found out about the efforts by various government officials to move Khwai away from 
their location next to the Khwai River, to a site at Mababe, next to a dry riverbed that had last 
flowed in 1979. The precariousness of their tenure in Khwai had thus encouraged its residents 
to express a sense of identity linked to the geographical area of Khwai. This was asserted to 
the extent that none of the families from Khwai sent their children to a new primary school 
that opened in Mababe in 1998 (Plate 4.5), which was intended to serve both villages. Mma 
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Lebonang, one of the most vocal members of Khwai against the move, described their 
differences thus: 
We don't get on with the people from Mababe; they are not the same as us. They are 
Basarwa of the sandveld, and we are of the river. The only River Basarwa are Bugakhwe 
and //Anikhwe. Those at Gudigwa are not River Basarwa because they are away from 
the river. We don't know how to live in the sandveld, because our lives are in the river. 
Moses went even further, including the location of Khwai as an integral part of who they are: 
`The Minister wants us to move, but if we move we will have left our culture here at Khwai, 
as we are people of Khwai, Bugakhwe'. 
Bugakhwe from Gudigwa who have moved to Khwai to take advantage of local job 
opportunities also find themselves excluded as Basarwa ba motlhaba, even though they can 
claim kinship links with people in Khwai. In private arguments, they are referred to as 
matsenelela; cattle that join the wrong herd when they are kraaled. Identity and a sense of 
belonging in Khwai are thus becoming more fixed to land and less fixed to people, a reversal 
of previous means of figuring belonging. This growing sense of identity at the local level 
cross-cuts familial relationships, allowing distancing from in-laws in Mababe and Sankuyu as 
well as from their own relatives at Gudigwa. 
The complex faces of hegemony 
Representations by Basarwa of their identity as different from others around them are linked 
to attempts to assert autonomy and a sense of control over themselves and their environment. 
However, these representations are just that; representations of clear-cut dichotomies that 
represent a world that is in reality a lot more ambiguous than they suggest. Ambiguity arises 
not just from the diversity of everyday practice, but as a product of the interplay between 
dominant and subordinate. It is in this relationship of differential power that attempts are 
made by the dominant to characterise, define and make subjects of the subordinate, and 
expressions of identity are in part a means of resisting these efforts, and asserting autonomy 
from them. In this symbolic struggle - in which material resources are nonetheless at stake - 
the meanings associated with ethnicity and identity change as they are asserted, adopted, 
challenged or rescripted. Resistance is `an experience that constructs and reconstructs the 
identity of subjects' (Gupta and Ferguson 1997: 19), and as such it changes people, defining 
the way they are subject to others, and how they come to be tied to their own identities (cf. 
Ortner 1995: 187). At the same time, self-definition by Basarwa untidies and distorts the larger 
identity space in which they live, and which those in power attempt to fashion. 
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In order to understand these processes further, I return to the concept of hegemony, 
introduced in Chapter Four. Although Gramsci proposed the concept to understand how forms 
of power encourage consent, it is equally useful in understanding struggle. Roseberry 
(1996: 80) argues that the concept of the naturalising power of hegemony is helpful in 
illuminating: 
the ways in which the words, images, symbols, forms, organisations, institutions, and 
movements used by subordinate populations to talk about, understand, confront, 
accommodate themselves to, or resist domination are shaped by the process of 
domination itself. What hegemony constructs, then, is not a shared ideology but a 
common material and meaningful framework for living through, talking about, and 
acting on social orders characterised by domination. 
Ilegemonic forms of control attempt to render identity problematic by turning unconscious, 
unreflexive acts into problematic, conscious and conspicuous ones (cf. Morris 1989: 150-6). 
Hunting and gathering therefore become not just neutral means of procuring subsistence 
needs, but activities loaded with symbolism. Patterns of living that are attached to a notion of 
`Sesarwa culture' - precisely because they are different from those of dominant society - 
become sites of contestation between those that practice them and the state. While the 
hegemony of the state attempts to control and even eradicate them, they become key cultural 
markers for Basarwa, and symbols with which to challenge Setswana hegemony. 
In speaking of their own identity, therefore, subaltern people often do not escape hegemonic 
frames of reference. In other words, they use the definitions of them that are propounded by 
the dominant. The label Ztfosarwa (or Mfasarwa)'' itself is an immediate example of this. 
Despite being a Sctswana term, it is now commonly used as a term of self-designation by 
Basarwa in Botswana, in places to the exclusion of previous terms of seif-appelation. 
Describing themselves as ̀ people of the bush', or `people of poverty' also mirrors dominant 
representations of Basarwa in the same terms (Chapter Four). However, these markers and 
symbols are reworked in new ways (cf. Comaroff 1985): being people of the bush is a 
positive, rather than a derogatory assertion; and being characterised by poverty is turned into 
an accusation at the policies and laws that make them poor. 
Responses to Setswana hegemony are a complex mix of what could be classified as 
resistance, accommodation and complicity. Much of what Sesarwa culture symbolises is 
69 The prefix ma- is used in Setswana of foreigners (such as Makgoa - white people), and as the prefix 
for class six nouns. Although 'Masarwa' is still often used in general discourse (by both Basarwa and 
non-Basarwa), official policy is to use the more politically correct 'Basarwa'. 
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ostensibly to dig tsxwi! (water lily roots): 'I am a Mosarwa and this land is mine, I will take 
what I want from it'. On another occasion, Jewe, Khwai's champion springhare hunter, 
shouted as he walked out of the village with his hunting gear, 'O a tlola' ('You have no right 
to tell me that'), to the game guard Hho told him, 'You are not allowed to hunt, Jcwc'. Yet, 
such bold statements in the face of authority arc made with care. In neither case was there 
(yet) physical evidence of a misdemeanour, and both assertions were made with a smile to 
people they knew. As Scott (1985) observed, subaltern challenges to authority are rarely overt 
and explicit, but arc instead conducted on the'backstage' of village life. 
In public and power-laden arenas, which is most ollen in the kgotla with visiting officials, 
sentiments are generally expressed that outline a grievance, but stop short of challenging - and 
often actually affirm - the structures of authority that gave rise to the grievance in the first 
place. For example, Amos, an elder from Khwai, asked DWNP officials In it meeting about 
their wildlife quota: 'If our animals are cancelled, as }bu the onvers of the animals say, then 
how will we live? They arc our lives'. Roles affirming the status quo are played out in these 
settings, such as Mma Lcbonang approaching the open microphone on her knees in a meeting 
with their MP, and the several people who prefaced their comments to him by: 'I am only a 
Mosarwa, so forgive me if I do not express myself well... '. In such circumstances, power is 
addressed and recognised even as it is protested against; a recognition that protest must adopt 
the forms and languages of domination in order to be heard (c. f. Roscbeny 1996: 81). At other 
times, the usual metaphors were inverted in the face of authority, such as in the way Smit "a 
regular hunter from Mababc - defended himself to DWNP officials who accused him of 
poaching ivory: 'I am a cow, and know nothing of the bush. I get lost when I go there'. 
In some cases, complicity with the dominant values is seen as the best means of avoiding the 
stigma associated with being Mosarwa. In 1933, for example, a colonial commission reported 
that Basarwa who were settling down to cultivate and raise stock, were 'anxious to pay taxes, 
because the act establishes their position as men and not as animals' (Pim 1933: 115). In a 
similar example, Wily (1976: 7) reported that Dasarwa at Dcre were pleased that fees were 
introduced once their privately-initiated school was taken over by Ghanzl District Council, 
saying, 'Now we are seen as citizens'. Sometimes rhetoric reflecting dominant values is 
reproduced by Basarwa, especially by those that have been through school. Mma Kcrcleng's 
32 year old daughter, Kerclcng, who lives in Alaun, explained, for example: 'The Council told 
us the way we are living is not good, and we should go to school to learn life'. having taken 
their advice, she gave her view of Basarwa cthnicityr. 
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The only difference between me and other Batswana is my language, otherwise I am like 
any other Motswana. I do not have the tlhaloganyo [mindset] of a Mosarwa. The time of 
living in a Sesarwa manner has passed. If you use Sesarwa tlhaloganyo, you will be at 
the bottom, or else you can think like anyone else and be the same. Our tlhaloganyo was 
inferior. If we were well fed we were okay, we did not plan or think of the next day 
[Jewe, the daily springhare hunter, drinking nearby, agrees]. I have learnt from life in 
Maun. There you use money. Here, you wake up, dig tswii, then come and sell it. I see 
no progress from living in Khwai. 
Kereleng's comments on the `inferiority' of a Mosarwa mindset echo similar comments that 
Basarwa often make about the `old ways' of thinking, that appear to parody perjorative 
dominant representations of Basarwa ethnicity. `We Bushmen are still the same; our brains 
still work in the old ways', a Nharo informant told Guenther (1989: 68), for example, after 
recounting their loss of livestock and crops in the creation myth. This is evident too in the 
degree of mistrust and suspicion with which the few families that do continue to live 
primarily by hunting and gathering are regarded. As with general representations of Basarwa 
by Batswana, their closer association with nature gives them an element of unpredictability. 
One such family is Mma Kanjiye and her daughters in Khwai (Plate 6.2). Soon after arriving 
in Khwai, I was warned that I should be wary of her, as she was able to ride people like a 
witch (moloi). Towards the end of my fieldwork, I spent ten days walking from Khwai to 
Gudigwa with her and her family. It was not until afterwards that I found out about the 
concern this had created among some people in Khwai, that she would kill me and use my 
body parts for medicine. A similar attitude prevailed with Nyamanyama and his family in 
Gudigwa (Plate 6.1). He was one of the most recent arrivals in Gudigwa, although during my 
fieldwork the following year he was in prison beginning a three year sentence for illegal 
possession of a rifle he used for hunting. Apart from being a regular hunter, he was also a 
healer. 7° Nyamanyama, his nickname by which everyone knew him, means ledimo -a 
70 Nyamanyama died in prison at the end of 1999, probably of an AIDS-related illness, which was most 
likely contracted from contact with blood in healing practices. 
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Plate 6.1: Kokoro, Nyamanyama's widow, in Gudigwa. 
Plate 6.2: Mma Kanj iye and her daughters. 
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mythical half human, half supernatural giant. His `deep' ethnicity provoked mistrust among 
his neighbours and kin, and stories were exaggerated about his supernatural attributes that 
emphasised his liminality. The same mistrust is shared of non Khwe-speaking Basarwa 
elsewhere. Derisively called badimpanyana (the little people with big bellies), stereotypes 
abound, such as Mma Kgosi's comment of ! XÖ (none of whom live in the area around 
Mababe): ̀ They kill you if you pass them and do not offer them tobacco'. 
Although interpretations by Basarwa of their own ethnicity often appear to be influenced by 
the representations of the dominant, pragmatic reasons were generally given for doing so. The 
key marker of hunting and gathering, for example, is a practice few stated they would want to 
live primarily by, even if given the opportunity. Nonetheless, this attitude is not simply an 
imitation of dominant derisory attitudes to this mode of subsistence. The reality of hunger, as 
well as the ravages of predators and diseases such as sleeping sickness and malaria, was 
commented upon by Basarwa and confirmed by early travellers: ̀ Hunger is the main cause of 
the dying out of this ancient race' concluded Passarge (1997[1907]: 134), for example, from 
his journeys through the Kalahari at the end of the nineteenth century. Hunger was not always 
prevalent - remember Livingstone's comment about Basarwa in the Mababe area being `fine, 
well-made men' with the abundance of game and wild fruit (1857: 149) - but periodic lean 
times were inevitable in such a highly variable environment. In the absence of any formal 
statistics, anecdotal evidence suggests that life expectancy was comparatively short. Many 
elderly people, for instance, report that they were still children when their parents died, such 
as Mma Kgosi from Mababe, whose parents were both killed by buffalo. 
Two of the most visible and commonly known markers of Basarwa ethnicity in Botswana are 
beehive-shaped huts, and leather clothes, both of which are stigmatised in wider society. 
Although they were common a generation ago in the northern sandveld, the only beehive huts 
now visible are chicken coops, and a showpiece on the edge of Mababe that some elders built 
`to show our children how we used to live'. The only leather clothes worn are during dances 
(mostly for tourists and competitions), and were bought from Kuru Development Trust in 
Ghanzi rather than made by themselves. When I enquired as to why these markers were no 
longer common, I was often given the same reasons: leather clothes are cold; and beehive huts 
burn down easily, and cannot adequately protect belongings from the elements. Language is 
another immediate marker of ethnicity. Most families speak to their children largely in 
Setswana, and give the reason for doing so as their prospects in education, as the first four 
years of primary education are in Setswana. Thus, most children of the present generation 
grow up speaking Setswana better than Bugakhwedam or Ts'exadam. Many Basarwa in the 
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northern sandveld have long been proficient in Setswana, as reported by the Resident 
Commissioner on a trip through the Mababe flats in 1906 (BNA 1906c). However, it is only 
in this generation of universal access to education that knowledge of Setswana has been at the 
expense of the languages of their parents. Most parents also give their children Setswana or 
English names, saying that they do not `know' Bugakhwedam or Ts'exadam names any more. 
As these examples demonstrate, the changing value that Basarwa give to visible markers 
associated with their ethnicity is motivated by both pragmatic reasons, and the stigma with 
which these markers have come to carry. Yet although these markers may be consciously 
avoided in an everyday sense, some residents attempt to objectify and preserve them, as in the 
example of the beehive hut in Mababe, the dancing troupes, or the wish by Dice, VDC 
chairman in Khwai, to start a `school' to teach their children tracking skills. 
That most Basarwa are physically more similar to their Bantu-speaking neighbours than the 
common stereotype of what Basarwa should look like, means that their identity is not 
necessarily embodied. They can choose whether to present themselves as Basarwa or not in 
contexts where their background is unknown. This flexibility is valued, and factors such as 
Sesarwa names, that could reveal identity, are generally avoided. Although most people have 
a Bugakhwedam or Ts'exadam name or nickname, younger people almost invariably use a 
non-Sesarwa name on official documents. One young man in Gudigwa, for example, found 
himself the butt of his friends' jokes for making the irreversible `mistake' of using his 
Bugakhwedam name on his school certificates and National Registration card. As is well 
documented, the boundaries between `hunter-gatherers' and their neighbours are more fluid 
than is often supposed (Woodburn 1997: 348). Some Basarwa, especially those that have 
succeeded in formal sector employment, live in Maun, have partners from elsewhere, and 
speak Setswana to their children, such as Kereleng who works as a chef in a lodge, Galebone, 
a professional guide, Omphile a primary school teacher, Baeti, a game guard (Plate 6.3), and 
Kebuseditswe, a Council driver (Plate 6.4). Although such people may hardly emphasise a 
Basarwa identity in most contexts, they generally retain close links to Khwai, Mababe or 
Gudigwa, to which they pay regular visits. 
In a sense, Moses embodied the complexities - or what would superficially appear as 
contradictions - of attitudes to Basarwa ethnicity. He was a regular hunter and defender of an 
essential Basarwa `culture', but in other areas very much a conformist. Critical of the 
generation below him adopting dominant values, yet careful to avoid activities associated 
with the `wilder' side of Sesarwa ethnicity: hunting trips that last longer than a day (unless for 
remuneration); climbing trees to find honey; or healing dances. He firmly stuck to the English 
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Plate 6.3: Baeti (from Khwai) with his family at his house in Maun. 
Plate 6.4: Kebuseditswe (from Khwai) at his house in Maun. 
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name given him when he began work as a young man for Khwai River Lodge, rather than 
//Xanitsho, the name he was given at birth. He was also explicitly sceptical of the value of 
drawing too deeply on practices associated with Sesarwa ethnicity: 
Mma Kanjiye's is the last family to live like Basarwa. They put Bosarwa 
[`Bushmanness'] forward as a goal, which is not right, because it is a hard life. They 
have taken their kids out of school so that they can be together. But what future do those 
children have? 
As with others who have experienced the dehumanising effects of colonialism, Moses and 
other Basarwa in the northern sandveld have to differing degrees appropriated both the power 
of colonialism and an objectified version of their own `tradition', welding them into a 
transcendent synthesis (Comaroff 1985: 12). Escobar (1995: 220) refers to this as `hybridity'. 
Despite its biological connotations, it is not meant to imply the mixing of pure strands of 
tradition and modernity, but a shifting simultaneously backward (in their own terms) into 
cultural heritage and one's social group, and forward, cutting across social boundaries into 
progressive elements of other social formations. Through this process, the apparent 
contradictions are transformed and brought together in a unitary social structure. Integrating 
some of the institutional forms, symbols and techniques by which the dominant society 
defines its relationships to Basarwa thus allows Basarwa in some measure to control them on 
their own terms, and for their own benefit. 
Conclusion 
Coping with the stigma that so much of the society in which they operate places on the 
essential markers of Basarwa ethnicity poses a challenge to Basarwa. The challenge is an 
especially difficult one, as so many of the markers of Basarwa culture are interpreted by 
dominant society as not only backward and antithetical to progress and `development', but 
illegal. Yet, the cultural struggle to be regarded as human has to be largely conducted within 
the idioms of dominant society (cf. Morris 1989: 121). In practice this means that Basarwa in 
the northern sandveld have accommodated to, and resisted, dominant values to different 
degrees. People of different circumstances have developed differing bricolages of 
overlapping values, a hybridity that implies not just a creolisation along frontiers, but an 
ongoing process in which both dominant and subaltern have been transformed by the `long 
conversation between them' (Comaroff and Comaroff 1997: 59). Rather than being the broken 
beings described by Brody (1999: 45) of `indigenous people' who have ̀ lost' their traditions, 7' 
11 'The anger of tribal people is intense, but often directed inward. And they fall into a deep silence... 
They... have absorbed the lessons of their oppressors: indigenous customs, history and ways of speech 
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this bricolage contributes to an identity that, despite being born from difficulty and 
contradiction, can be relatively comfortably worn by most of its bearers. 
Despite the complexities of how Basarwa have articulated with Setswana hegemony, 
narratives of identity often present a clear dichotomy between Basarwa and their Bantu- 
speaking neighbours. These dichotomies operate within the idioms of dominant society by 
reproducing representations of Basarwa as people of the bush and as people of poverty. At the 
same time, however, they challenge hegemonic representations by inverting their premises: 
their poverty not as a result of the inferiority of their culture, but because of oppression, 
discrimination and neglect; being people of the bush means not that they are wild and beyond 
sociality, but that they have rights to land and other natural resources. Metaphors of dominant 
culture are also used to translate the rights they imply to activities such as hunting and 
gathering. Expressions of identity are thus a logical form for Basarwa of contesting the 
regimes of authority that attempt to shape their lives, by contesting the wider webs of 
meaning that underpin the root causes of their material dispossession. 
Although in lived reality, Basarwa modify some visible aspects of their ethnicity to reduce 
difference from conceptions of dominant cultures, Basarwa also verbally articulate strong 
expressions of difference. As Turner (1992: 12) observed from his work with Kayapo in 
Brazil, this represents an attempt to `objectify their own culture as an "ethnic identity", in a 
form in which it can serve to mobilise collective action in opposition to the dominant national 
society'. Asserting difference in this form is a means of attempting to maintain a degree of 
autonomy in a socio-economic environment where integration means a continuation of 
inequality (cf. Saugestad 1993). As a resident of Gudigwa explained in a meeting about their 
Community Trust: `The government says we are all Batswana, but us Basarwa are different. If 
we are mixed with them, we will be pulled into their culture and be under them'. The 
following chapter examines how expressions of difference are used by Basarwa in attempts to 
shape CBNRM interventions according to their own priorities. 
are matters of shame... . Shame and grief, accumulated 
from generation to generation, can tie the 







CBNRM: contesting development 
You cannot put a tie on a buffalo, or give an animal bread, and say that is development. 
Moses, Khwai 
Moses' comment, made to me one day as we walked through the bush discussing the 
proposed Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) Programme, 
illustrates the contested nature of `development'; the ideal worlds it proposes, and the 
assumptions it makes on how these ideal worlds should be achieved. Using the metaphor of 
wildlife, Moses questioned the appropriateness of government development policies, 
particularly CBNRM, as they were being implemented in his area. He went on elaborate: 
We Basarwa and lions and animals are one. You can't take me and put me in Serowe [a 
large Setswana village] and then say I am developed. But government officials come 
here and say we are not developed. 
His challenge to the assumptions of official notions of development was predicated on an 
assertion of difference from dominant society, and thus of difference in what `development' 
should entail for the residents of his village. The Setswana word for `development', 
ditlhabololo, which Moses used, is used as well by officials, NGOs and other residents of the 
northern sandveld alike, to imply a myriad of different strategies and aims. The different 
visions behind this same word are fiercely contested, and it is these contestations that form the 
basis of this chapter. 
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Throughout the 1990s, most government officials who visited the northern sandveld to talk 
about `development' did so in the context of the new CBNRM Programme. Through this 
impending programme, they promised a revolutionary change in the way that development 
would be approached in these rural areas. For the first time (in the era of conservation), the 
residents of the northern sandveld were told that they would be able to decide themselves how 
to use and manage the natural resources in their area, and thus benefit directly from them. But 
as the decade passed, varying degrees of disillusionment set in among residents of Khwai, 
Gudigwa and Mababe. As Moses' comment implies, CBNRM did not seem after all to be so 
easily moulded to the hopes, aspirations and plans that formed their visions of what 
`development' would constitute. 
Rather than attempting to ascertain whether or not development interventions in the guise of 
CBNRM `work' or not, this chapter examines what they do. CBNRM is in its early stages in 
the northern sandveld, and pronouncements on its `success' or `failure' would be not only 
premature but also misguided. The extent to which it achieves its objectives or not is likely to 
be overshadowed by its unintended consequences; the processes it sets in motion that were 
not part of its original plan. This chapter focuses on the dynamics of the introduction of 
CBNRM in the northern sandveld: how it was introduced; how it was perceived locally; the 
ensuing debates it aroused; and the indirect implications of its introduction. The first section 
focuses on the state and its implementation of CBNRM. It argues that CBNRM serves, in 
some ways perhaps unintentionally, as a vehicle for the extension of bureaucratic power over 
people in the northern sandveld. The second section focuses on the people of the northern 
sandveld, and their attempts to use CBNRM to address their own priorities, particularly the 
reversal of their loss of access to, and control over, land and natural resources. The third 
section examines the important implications of CBNRM, most especially its unintended role 
in promoting local political mobilisation to protect resource rights. 
CBNRM: development and power 
A formal CBNRM programme began in Botswana in 1990, alongside a number of other 
southern and eastern African countries. It was initiated by the USAID-funded Natural 
Resources Management Project (NRMP), working closely with the Department of Wildlife 
and National Parks (DWNP) - who now carry prime responsibility for its implementation. 
In 
preparation for the programme, much of Botswana was divided up into Controlled Hunting 
Areas (CHAs), some of which could be allocated to specific villages for use under CBNRM. 
Under the Wildlife Conservation and National Parks Act of 1992, each CHA was zoned for 
various types of use that determined whether it could be used for consumptive or non- 
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consumptive purposes, and whether it could be allocated to a local community or not (Map 
7.1). This `community' could be a single village (as with Khwai and with Mababe), or a 
number of villages (as with Gudigwa and its four neighbouring villages). Eligible villages 
Map 7.1: Boundaries of CHAs in Botswana, showing those that have been designated 
for allocation to local communities. 
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have been encouraged to elect a management committee and legally register a Community 
Trust. A functioning management committee can request an annual quota of wildlife on 
behalf of residents for subistence hunting, whereas a Community Trust can apply for the 
head-lease for their CHA from the Land Board (or the state if, like Mababe, their CHA lies on 
State Land). They are then usually encouraged to sublease their CHA and hunting quota to a 
commercial tourism operator. They can also sell all or part of their wildlife quota to a licensed 
hunting company. The setting up of Community Trusts and participation of villages in 
CBNRM is overseen by the Technical Committee; a committee of three representatives from 
the District Council, Land Board and DWNP. 
In initiating CBNRM, NRMP identified both Khwai and Mababe as potential exemplary pilot 
projects. In fact, Khwai, with its combination of low human population in relation to the 
resource base, healthy wildlife populations, and position on existing tourist routes, was picked 
out as having the highest economic potential of the CHAs in Botswana (Parry 1989, Ecosurv 
1994). However, NRMP's attempts to initiate CBNRM projects with both Khwai and Mababe 
were rebutted, and NRMP ended up using Chobe enclave, on the northern side of Chobe 
National Park, as their `model project'. By the time I completed my fieldwork in 1998, neither 
Khwai nor Mababe had yet embarked on a formal CBNRM programme. 
In the words of the opening statement of the Government of Botswana's draft CBNRM Policy 
of June 1999 (GOB 1999: 1), CBNRM is: 
[A] development approach that fosters the sustainable use and conservation of natural 
resources and promotes rural development through community participation and the 
creation of economic incentives. CBNRM aims to alleviate rural poverty and advance 
conservation by strengthening rural economies and empowering communities to manage 
resources for their long-term social, economic and ecological benefits. 
There is no doubt that CBNRM proposes a significant change in the terms and conditions that 
govern resource use in the northern sandveld, as in other areas of Botswana where it is on 
offer. For the first time, the residents of the northern sandveld were promised greater control 
over the resources about them, a reversal of the trends they had experienced until then. I 
suggest that it is no co-incidence that Khwai and Mababe, the only two wholly Basarwa 
CHAS in Ngamiland, would be among the last to register Community Trusts, even though 
they were among the first to be approached to do so. This is not because Basarwa deem 
CBNRM to be irrelevant; quite the opposite. CBNRM promises to be of crucial importance to 
Basarwa, for the following reasons: 
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0 It addresses issues central to their identity and subsistence practices; land, wildlife, and 
natural resources. 
" It appears to hold out the promise of reversing the trend of alienation of these resources. 
" It opens up debates of whose aspirations, values and priorities development agendas are 
based on. 
" Areas targeted for CBNRM in Botswana (land marginal for arable or livestock use) are 
often those in which Basarwa live. 
Their delay in forming trusts was due to intense negotiation, both among themselves, and 
with the government, on what form CBNRM should take in its promise to devolve 
management of natural resources. The debate has essentially been about what the best use is 
of a very productive natural environment, and what strategies should be used to adequately 
harness its values. 
As a process of planned social and economic change initiated by the government, CBNRM is 
above all a `development' intervention. Although a large body of literature has built up 
around CBNRM initiatives throughout southern Africa in the last decade, a significant 
proportion of it has been dedicated to addressing its efficacy in promoting local-level 
conservation. This is certainly an important question, especially for the many practitioners for 
whom this is a primary aim in CBNRM. However, examining; the relationship between 
CBNRM as a development project, social control, and the reproduction of relations of 
inequality raises four critical questions: 
9 What are the local histories and priorities related to central tenets of CBNRM such as 
land, wildlife and authority? 
" Whose interests is CBNRM functioning to serve? 
" What forms of power are entrenched or challenged through CBNRM? 
" To what extent is `empowerment' (directly or indirectly) achieved? 
The first question has been covered in preceding chapters, which traced the political, social 
and economic peripheralisation of Basarwa by the ascending Batawana polity in Ngamiland 
(Chapter Two), and their gradual alienation from land and wildlife resources (Chapter Three). 
This has happened to people for whom natural resources, particularly wildlife, have formed 
not only an important part of their subsistence base (Chapter Five), but also of their identity as 
well (Chapter Six). With this background, the second, third and fourth questions inform much 
of the content of this chapter. 
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Although CBNRM presents itself as a technical programme, it raises issues that are clearly 
political. This is not only because, it ostensibly promotes `empowerment', which is by very 
definition political as it implies a redistribution of power, but also because it claims to address 
issues of resource tenure, in which the government and its policies are intimately implicated. 
CBNRM has thus become an arena in which state power is both extended and challenged. In 
this arena, it becomes evident that the ways in which power itself works may have unexpected 
outcomes. With a focus on the dynamics of bureaucratic power, Ferguson (1990) argues that 
the question as to whether development works or not is obsolete; many large-scale 
development projects patently do not realise their aims. Our attention should rather be on 
what they do. The intentions behind development projects, whether explicit or hidden behind 
rhetoric, do not always produce the results they set out to achieve, in the manner they 
intended to achieve them. Nonetheless, they produce an effect: 
Whatever interests may be at work and whatever they may think they are doing, they can 
only operate through a complex set of social and cultural structures so deeply embedded 
and so ill-perceived that the outcome may only be a baroque and unrecognisable 
transformation of the original intention (Ferguson 1990: 17). 
Ferguson's analysis of a development project in Lesotho revealed that the supposedly 
technical and apolitical measures instituted by the development project brought with them 
political `side effects' of greater consequence than the original intentions behind the project. 
He terms this the Anti-Politics Machine; a process the development intervention set in 
motion, that operated to depoliticise everything it touched by hiding political realities, while 
simultaneously functioning to expand bureaucratic state power. 
Through exploring the dynamics of CBNRM as implemented in the northern sandveld, I 
argue that it too has provided a point of entry for an intervention serving a variety of political 
uses, particularly the extension of the government's authority into areas where it had hitherto 
been marginal. This is not a new argument for CBNRM-type programmes. In one of the few 
pieces of research on CBNRM in southern Africa that has made its focus the state, Hill 
(1996: 106) notes that the CAMPFIRE programme in Zimbabwe72 does increase local 
participation in conservation, but at the same time serves state interests: 
The state uses conservation policies in much the same way as it uses taxation, 
investment, interest rate, or land resettlement policies; to establish and extend its own 
n The CAMPFIRE (Communal Areas Management Programme For Indigenous Resources) project in 
Zimbabwe is among the earliest and best known of southern Africa's CBNRM programmes. 
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interests, which in a relatively new and tenuous polity, centre on authority maintenance 
and extension. 
Hill notes four ways in which CAMPFIRE potentially works to benefit state authority 
(1996: 104-5). It: 
" legitimates locally the authority of the government in directing conservation. 
" integrates rural villagers into the national conservation scheme, encouraging them to 
internalise its values. 
" promotes economic reciprocity by raising money locally, that the government disburses. 
" promotes accountability between conservation officials and local co-operatives. 
While each of these factors promotes greater articulation between the state and rural- 
dwellers, Hill gives no evidence that they operate in practice to extend state authority. The 
only data he provides substantiates the argument that CAMPFIRE is essentially used as a 
rural taxation programme, with most funds ending up being controlled by the state. Madzudzo 
(1999) makes the same argument in his analysis of CAMPFIRE, as does Matenga (1999) on 
ADMADE, its sister organisation in Zambia. As revenues from CBNRM in Botswana are 
mostly returned to Community Trusts themselves, rather than District Councils, this specific 
argument is not relevant for Botswana. It is clearly in the interests of the state to extend its 
authority to areas where it has been marginal, and, as Hill argues, CBNRM-type programmes 
provides the potential to do so. However, beyond the monetary aspect, none of these authors 
make it any clearer whether state authority is actually extended on the local level, and if so, 
how this happens. Through examining several aspects of its operationalisation, I show how 
CBNRM has so far acted as a vehicle, both directly and indirectly, for the extension of state 
authority over the people in the northern sandveld. 
CBNRM and the capitalisation of nature 
Like much development policy in Botswana, CBNRM is based almost entirely on monetarist 
assumptions, in which the value of the resources is rated according to their capitalising 
potential. The draft CBNRM Policy of June 1997 (GOB 1997b: 2) clearly demonstrates the 
conflation of `development' with economic growth in its method: 
As a conservation based development program, CBNRM promotes rural economic 
growth and encourages conservation by providing communities with incentives to: (1) 
diversify local business activities, (2) increase the value of existing resources, (3) allow 
local communities to contribute to resource management, and (4) produce economic 
models which support national enterprises. 
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Amid questions as to the adequacy of the educational component of CBNRM to potential 
beneficiaries in Botswana (K. Taylor 1998, Twyman 1998), this economic aspect is the one 
component that has been repeatedly emphasised to potential participants in the CBNRM 
programme. The educational tools prepared for use in encouraging community involvement in 
CBNRM; a video, a series of posters, and a leaflet on joint ventures, all promote the economic 
potential of CBNRM as its selling point to potential participant villages. The series of posters, 
for example (Fig. 7.1), include a white hunter pointing a gun at a buffalo, with the caption, 
`Many people will pay a lot of money to shoot wild animals'. The next poster presents a 
hunter holding his gun to one side as a cow replaces the buffalo, and the caption, `Who will 
pay money to hunt your cattle? Nobody'. The same scenario is reproduced for photographic 
tourists in the following two posters. The series patently ignores the monetary and non- 
monetary values local people place on both cattle and wildlife (examined in Chapter Five) 
beyond their potential for generating money from tourists. 
Community Trusts technically have the choice what to do with their CHA and the annual 
wildlife quota, which are outlined in an educational booklet produced by NRMP and DWNP 
on joint ventures (DWNP n. d. (b)). The possibilities it outlines range from the Community 
Trust simply subleasing the land and wildlife quota to a commercial operator for an annual 
fee, to the `community' acting as a safari operator themselves, but hiring a skilled 
management company to market and run necessary aspects of the enterprise. Nonetheless, in 
the northern sandveld, it is only the first option -a simple sublease to an operator - that 
officials present in any detail, a pattern also noted by Twyman (1998) in western Kalahari. 
Officials implementing CBNRM therefore push a very narrow agenda, based on two key 
elements: (1) the commercialisation of natural resources; and (2), the exploitation of their 
commercial value by a private operator, for which the Community Trust receives royalties. 
This agenda has been wholeheartedly adopted and pursued by government officials at all 
levels, who often reinforce it in village meetings. Take, for example, the message that Bahiti 
Temane, the Minister of Parliament for Ngamiland, gave as he visited Mababe and Khwai on 
5 ̀h and 6 ̀h February 1998 on a ministerial tour: 
Chobe enclave has made P65,000 in the first year, P200,000 in the second, and P285,000 
third year from leases. You yourselves must ask for your land, set up a committee and a 
trust, and make business from your land. Sankuyu and Ditshiping [neighbouring 
villages] have their land already... Botswana is the seventh highest tourist destination in 
Africa. In 1996/7,935,000 tourists visited Botswana and brought money into our 
economy, and P4,500,000 was paid annually for leases... . We 
know that animals cause 
problems, but they support tourism. I also know that our grandparents lived off animals, 
but when change comes, we must embrace it.... I came with the message of tourism, 
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Apart from throwing out huge figures in an attempt to dazzle his audience into the riches that 
CBNRM could bring, his speech was loaded with suggestions that for Basarwa to truly 
'develop' they would have to embrace the option the government was offering them. For 
example, the income from tourism would give them a `purpose' for their land, with the 
implication that this could not be constituted by any other (non-monetary) use of the land. 
It thus becomes clear that the capitalisation of nature in this manner is not ideologically 
neutral. It relies on what Escobar (1995: 204) refers to as the `semiotic conquest of territories'. 
CBNRM transforms this `unutilised' land to sites of production under the guise of rural 
development and conservation, and the `communities' that live in them are made into 
`stewards' of nature. This ideology allows the recognition of locals as owners of resources, 
but within very prescribed limits and only inasmuch as they accept to treat it - and themselves 
- as reservoirs of capital. Whether or not its intended beneficiaries comply with its aims may, 
therefore, be more a function of radically different ideologies and aims than a passive failure 
to realise the monetary benefits that CBNRM can bring. 
Participation or paternalism? 
Writing on land reform in Scotland, Boyd (in Wightman 1999: 72) argues that, `We have 
institutionalised participation in which the State decides and determines the policies and 
permitted actions and the terms of reference for them'. Perhaps it is because policies claiming 
to reform land tenure threaten to challenge so fundamentally the status quo, that governments 
worldwide tend to co-opt them so as to contain their effect. There are two key areas in which 
CBNRM does not decentralise management to local inhabitants, over and above its policy of 
encouraging a simple sublease of their land and quota to a commercial operator. The first is in 
the boundaries of CHAs, which are predetermined by the government, and bear little 
resemblance to land claimed by villages as historically their own. As such, some villages may 
be outside the CHAs that are allocated to them, like Gudigwa and (initially) Khwai. The 
second is in the annual wildlife offtake quota, which is determined by DWNP with no local 
consultation. These quotas are based on wildlife surveys that have wide margins of error 
(Dangerfield 1995, Perkins and Ringrose 1996), and in some cases include animals that are 
not even found locally. 
In pursuing its agenda, government officials have not just presented arguments for 
commodifying natural resources, but against local attitudes perceived to be an obstacle to 
achieving their commodification. In Minister Temane's speech to Khwai, for example, he 
continued from tourism to make reference to their stubborn refusal to move from their present 
location. Using threats to withhold infrastructural development, as well as more benevolent 
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expressions of concern for their welfare, he attempted to persuade Khwai to follow the 
government's agenda of both relocation and CBNRM: 
You say you want to stay here because your ancestors were here, but whites come here 
and leave their ancestors' bones far away. Hardbattle and Sesana [of First People of the 
Kalahari] went to lie to people in the United States of America that the government 
wants to move people from their ancestors' land [in Central Kalahari Game Reserve]. 
But look at them [he gestures to the thirty or so government officials that are 
accompanying him on his tour]. They are from everywhere, and they are so developed. 
We don't want ujamaa [as in Tanzania] to pull people together. But if people don't want 
to move, all we can do is not give them development, and they will be left behind. If you 
had left here and gone to Mababe or Sankuyu, your numbers would be greater and you 
would get more development. Great nations are made from different people coming 
together like USA. You can't isolate yourselves... . When I addressed a meeting 
in 
Puduhudu, a man stood up saying, ̀I am Thapi, a Mosarwa. Now we see that we here are 
like the rest of Botswana, that we can sell our animals. Are we lions, hyenas that we can 
only eat animals? '... . One of the reasons that we want you to move is that wild animals 
are dangerous. 
The message to Khwai and Mababe, that they should conform to the government's agenda, is 
a consistent one. It was echoed, for example in a meeting held on 14th February 1998 by the 
Technical Committee in Khwai. They gallantly gave up one Saturday to attend a meeting in 
Khwai aimed at resolving intra-village disagreements that had divided Khwai's Interim 
Management Committee. One of the Technical Committee introduced their contribution by 
saying: 
These are things of the government, and if you don't make them work, the government 
will, and you will lose out. The government knows what is going on in Khwai. They 
have been asking us what is going on, as they want this land to be used for tourism... 
Your problem is that you are obsessed with hunting. 
Although the language used by officials in meetings is not often so explicit - precipitated in 
this case by frustration at Khwai's slowness in forming a Community Trust - these examples 
illustrate that those implementing CBNRM often do little to escape the paternalism that 
characterises most government interventions aimed at Basarwa. 
A meeting to approve Mababe's draft constitution, held by a DWNP official at Mababe's 
kgotla on 15`' May 1998, illustrates how official agendas may be achieved, even under the 
guise of participation. By this stage, Mababe had a draft constitution, based on a pro forma 
version that could be used for any Community Trust. The sought-after approval consisted of 
the DWNP official reading out each main point (translating from English into Setswana as he 
read), at which the people present clapped their hands. While the meeting carried an air of 
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participation, most of those present had little understanding of the points that the DWNP 
official was reading out. What they did understand was that they were supposed to clap, 
affirming the usual structure of interaction between government officials and village residents 
in the kgotla After the meeting, I asked Mma Tiro, the headman's middle-aged daughter, 
what she thought of the meeting. `A lot of people don't understand what is going on', she 
replied. `The old people are at fault', she continued, with reference to other similar meetings, 
`because the young come and report back from their meetings with Tau [DWNP representative 
on the Technical Committee], but when you ask someone like Pekenene [an elderly resident] 
afterwards what was said, he says he doesn't understand'. 
Because of their history of being treated as perpetual minors, Basarwa are especially prone to 
being subjected to such forms of paternalism, a pattern noted too by Twyman (1998: 752,2000) 
in the implementation of CBNRM in Okwa WMA in Ghanzi district. Paternalistic attitudes to 
the supposed beneficiaries of CBNRM characterise not only its practice, but elements of its 
conception as well. Primary among these is the characterisation of local people as inevitably 
harming their environment of their own accord, thus legitimating the intervention offered by 
CBNRM. This is clearly implied in the 1997 draft CBNRM Policy, which states that 
`CBNRM incentives provided by the government endorse a shift by community members 
away from activities causing harm to surrounding ecological systems and towards positive 
economic development' (GOB 1997b: 2). 
Notwithstanding such slips, the language of CBNRM is generally one of `participation' and 
`empowerment'. For example, the paragraph prior to the one quoted above states that, 
`Inclusive, participatory procedures are the cornerstone of all CBNRM programs' (GOB 
1997: 2). Commenting on the widespread use of such popular terms in everything from 
business management strategies to development-speak, James (1999: 14) comments: 
`Empowerment' seems to have little more body to it than responsibility delegated from 
above, or from the centre, to monitor others below or beyond one, for whose activities 
one has to be accountable. One seems to be ̀ empowered' to take a share of management 
responsibility and decision-making, but the contemporary sense of the word does not 
seem to entail any direct control of resources or scope to join with others at the same 
level in the structure to pursue collective bargaining with the centre. It seems oddly like 
the operation of `Indirect Rule' in British colonial Africa. 
Despite its progressive rhetoric, the evidence so far suggests that the efficacy of CBNRM is 
gauged not so much on the empowerment of rural-dwellers, but its ability to co-opt them to 
adopt official priorities of conservation and development (cf. 'Twyman 1998: 747). 
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Regularity and chaoticisation 
The draft CBNRM policy of June 1999 (GOB 1999: 41) concludes with the salutary point 
that: 
All programs must respect the integrity, importance, and distinctions of cultural 
traditions by allowing communities to identify and define their own development goals 
and priorities. 
This is an emphasis that was not present in earlier drafts, perhaps indicating an increased 
sensitivity to local-level diversity by CBNRM policy-makers. Nonetheless, there is little 
evidence of the radical changes in the structure and approach of CBNRM that would be 
necessary to achieve this. That villages like Khwai have met such consistent opposition to 
their plans, despite the assertion that client villages should be allowed to define their own 
development goals, prompts examination as to why this is happening. 
Part of the answer is to be found in those locally most benefiting from the status quo; the 
lodge owners, whose control of the upper end of the lucrative tourism industry keeps their 
voices heard. In the words of Mma Lebonang from Khwai, 'the lodge owners are strong with 
their money'. Tourism operators are those most immediately threatened by villagers 
attempting to assert a form of CBNRM different from the government blueprint, as we shall 
see of Khwai in the next section. For the owner of one these lodges, the possibility of Khwai 
being allocated NG19 and trying to run their own safari operation would represent yet another 
failure of chaotic 'Africanisation': 
I say to myself, `Oh shit, its Africa all over again! ' Community Areas are not going to 
work, and Khwai village is one example. 
While the terminology of bureaucrats would obviously be different, the same principle stands 
for a government seeking to increase the 'legibility' (Scott 1998) of a peripheral section of its 
population; the `chaotic' implications of encouraging local initiative poses a threat to 
established regularity and authority. 
I suggest three particular reasons why those implementing CBNRM pursue a narrow agenda 
of encouraging villages to lease their land and wildlife quota to a commercial tourism 
operator: 
"A standard blueprint for CBNRM is easier to administer than every CHA pursuing a 
different project. 
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" The most lucrative option (at least in the short term) is to lease the land and quota to a 
professional operator. 
" This agenda does little to challenge the established status quo. 
This combination of factors appears particularly efficient at maintaining the government 
blueprint of CBNRM as a simple `joint venture' programme on the local level. For the 
officers on the ground attempting to achieve measurable results, this blueprint achieves rapid 
economic results with minimum administrative hassle. For tourism operators, who command 
considerable financial influence in this lucrative industry, this blueprint poses little real threat 
to their sites of production. These local-level factors work very well to make CBNRM not 
only a programme that efficiently delivers an administratively facile blueprint, but also in a 
more complex way it serves the extension of a faceless bureaucratic power. It achieves this in 
part by attempting to co-opt local populations into a regularity that facilitates their 
bureaucratic control. This standardising agenda need not be the product of individuals 
consciously seeking to extend bureaucratic authority. It may simply be the easiest approach 
for those implementing CBNRM to take. Nonetheless, like Ferguson's Anti-Politics Machine 
which is set into motion by the interests and logic of `power' more than the deliberate design 
of any individuals, CBNRM proves useful in extending the authority of the state into these 
marginal areas. As such, the buffer zones around national parks, where most community 
CHAs are located, constitute not local zones of empowerment, but a geographical expansion 
of state authority beyond the boundaries of protected areas and into rural communities (cf. 
Neumann 1997: 564). 
The responses of Khwai, Mababe, and Gudigwa, to the government's CBNRM initiative 
illustrates the difference in priorities between them and the government's very narrow de 
facto agenda, as well as the ongoing struggle they have faced in attempting to put their own 
priorities into place. 
Local priorities in CBNRM 
That `development' in its various forms is such a ubiquitously sought-after commodity, by 
bureaucrats as well as rural residents, is perhaps underestimated by many critical development 
theorists. Escobar's (1995: 216) claim of local `resistance to development', and Manzo's 
(1991) attention to the `counter-modernist practices of Third World grassroots actors' 
deservedly focus attention on the means by which official development programmes may be 
subverted on the local level. Nonetheless, they can miss the subtleties by which the hegemony 
of development is in some senses successful; ̀ oppositional' movements to development are 
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rarely completely oppositional. Basarwa, for example, do see themselves as embracing 
modernism, although on their own terms. Local models do not escape the pervasive discourse 
of `development', and many of the technical aspects of official development programmes, 
such as the provision of basic services - water, health and education - are embraced. 
Essentially, the disagreements in the northern sandveld over what `development' should entail 
centre on control. Official agendas in development are about growth, about capital, about 
technology, about becoming modern. The only meaningful way to challenge such models of 
development is to challenge their order of discourse; expressed by Escobar (1995: 216) as, 
`restructuring the political economies of truth through the collective practice of social actors 
that asserts other types of knowledge and experience'. Put simply, this means asserting and 
living the validity of alternative models of development, which involves contesting meanings 
associated with `progress' and `development' as well as the political power that attempts to 
define these concepts (cf. Keesing 1992: 232). This is to some extent what Basarwa are 
attempting to do with CBNRM, although, just as expressions of identity do not always escape 
hegemonic frames of reference, such contestation is not complete. Furthermore, local actions 
with respect to CBNRM are a complex compound of their own alternative priorities, and the 
very real limitations dictated by the parameters of CBNRM. 
Culture is central to this stage upon which development is contested. Contestation over what 
development should entail becomes one expressed on both sides in terms of values placed on 
certain ways of life. However, to look at the development encounter as a clash between two 
cultural systems would be simplistic. It is rather an intersection that creates new forms of 
social positioning (Pigg 1992) in the interaction between Basarwa and the state. The 
distinctions between these oppositions (such as Sesarwa and Sekgoa) therefore lose their 
sharpness in practice, although they retain their relevance as ideological concepts. This will 
become evident in exploring the issues over, and means by which, Basarwa engage with 
official CBNRM policy. 
Contesting access to land 
Within the context of a progressive loss of access to land, halting - even attempting to reverse 
- this process has become of primary importance to Basarwa. CBNRM, in opening up 
dialogue about local management of land, has become an arena in which claims to land are 
made and contested at the local level. Recent research elsewhere, such as with Damara in 
northwestern Namibia (Sullivan 1999), suggests that this is an emerging pattern in CBNRM 




Plate 7.1: Women from Khwai in a meeting with government officials. 
Plate 7.2: Meeting in Khwai with CBNRM's Technical Committee. 
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I was not present at the initial meetings in which Khwai and Mababe rebutted NRMP's early 
attempts to involve them in CBNRM, but in hindsight some residents say that they found 
NRMP's approach, of coming to their village for a short stay and offering to teach them to 
look after their natural resources, condescending. However, Khwai and Mababe did 
understand the potential of what CBNRM could offer, and internal discussions began on how 
it could best serve them. The programme aroused interest, because it spoke of central issues to 
their situation, not least of which was the management of land and resources that, until then, 
they had steadily been losing control over. Very soon, the land issue became the central point 
of negotiation. In 1995, a team of consultants, travelled to each of the proposed community 
CHAs in Ngamiland to prepare management plans for them. Residents of Khwai, Mababe and 
Gudigwa all raised the issue of alienation from land, and their view that their opinions were 
not respected because of their ethnicity. In Mababe, for example, the consultants were told, 
`All over the country, Basarwa have never been treated as people' (OCC 1995: A7. See also 
4,73, A10, and Bonduriansky n. d. 15, HaBarad et. al. 1994: 5). In fact, Mababe told the 
consultants that there would be no further discussions on this issue in their kgotla until they 
received a reply to a letter they had written to the Paramount Chief of Ngamiland in January 
1994. The letter began: ̀ We the people of Mababe are waiting to be given back our land.... ', 
referring to the land lost to Chobe National Park and its extensions. The consultants noted in 
their report (OCC 1995: A16) that they had to stress to the people in Mababe that it was not a 
political meeting, as they raised many `political' issues. 
NRMPs response to Mababe was to dismiss involvement with Mababe, as they considered the 
village to be dominated by a minority in the village who, only represent a lobby group set up 
to work toward reversing a loss of access to land' (NRMP 1997: 2). Statements of this nature 
indicate that those implementing CBNRM regarded the issue of land as a distraction from 
their central focus of assisting villages to set up Community Trusts and lease out their CHA. 
Yet, for Basarwa, the issue of land is undisputedly paramount. Returning to Mababe's ̀ hand- 
clapping meeting' about their constitution, Kebuelemang, the headman, commented at the end of 
the meeting: 
We are talking about irrelevant things here that have no purpose. Our food - motsentsela 
[Berchemia discolor and mmompudu [Mimisops zeyheri] - is nearby yet we are hungry 
[a reference to N//odzö, a fertile gathering area now encompassed by Chobe National 
Park], yet the government is sitting well-fed in Gaborone. All we say is taken by the 
wind because our stomachs are empty. 
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Political action to address political problems 
The disenfranchisement of Basarwa, and their alienation from land and natural resources is 
deeply structural. This leads us to a central paradox of the official CBNRM programme in 
Botswana; CBNRM is assuming to address problems that are pre-eminently political and 
structural, but defining them as simply technical and geographical. The government is 
therefore a part of the problem rather than a neutral instrument for its solution (cf. Ferguson 
1990: 69), which makes the assumption that bureaucrats who implement CBNRM will be 
faithful in nurturing any meaningful form of `empowerment' questionable. The issue of 
empowerment is especially pertinent for a category of people who have become dependent on 
the government for so many key aspects of their lives, particularly household reproduction 
(cf. Hitchcock and Holm 1993). 
Nonetheless, Basarwa are not blind to the fact that to achieve their aims in CBNRM will 
require political action, rather than a passive acceptance of the official parameters it attempts 
to impose. This has been most pronounced for Khwai, whose hold on their land has been 
made all the more precarious by government threats to relocate them through the 1990s. 
When the management plan for Khwai revealed that they were to be offered NG18, but not 
NG19, the area in which their village (along with three lodges) is situated (Map 3.2), they 
realised that they would have little security of tenure, but felt powerless to challenge the 
government. In 1995, with the help of a lecturer from the University of Botswana, Dr Emang, 
and funding from an NGO, they sent a delegation to Gaborone to meet with Minister 
Mokgothu, the Minister of Local Government and Lands and successfully petitioned him for 
NG19 to be allocated to Khwai as well. I reproduce Moses' description of these events at 
length, as it not only relates how they achieved this, but also illuminates many of the 
principles touched upon in this chapter, not least how access to political authority is 
understood and approached: 
The government cannot be taken on by someone like a Mosarwa, because a Mosarwa is 
someone who is looked down upon. Even today if I speak out, people will ask 
themselves, ̀Who is that? ' When they hear I am a Mosarwa, they will say, ̀ 'That is 
someone with no sense'. That shows we have no strength. In the beginning the land 
belonged to Basarwa. They are the ones that were placed on the land with wild animals. 
Now the government is showing that it is in charge. They are in front, and Basarwa are 
now behind. The animals now belong to the government, the trees, and all the land. 
These things burden us. Now the government sells animals because they make a lot of 
money. The money is for the government, to buy cars, to pay soldiers. Batswana are 
eating, but we are not. The government has robbed us of our cows [i. e. wildlife]. They 
sell their own cows and ours too, and we are left sitting with our arms folded. 
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When tourism started increasing, Michael Tshipinare [then MP for the area] came and 
told us, `You people in Khwai, this area is gazetted as a park, so it cannot have any 
developments. The things that you want like schools and clinics cannot be done in 
Khwai. With the government's new tourism policy, this area must be for wild animals 
only. You can tell me where you want to move to, be it Sankuyu, Mababe, or wherever. 
Only then you can get these developments'. He came in 1991. We told him we did not 
agree with his idea that we should go somewhere else for development: ̀That means we 
are being moved. We have been moved often in our lives. Every Motswana has been 
developed in the area he originates from. If you are telling us to move to get 
development, we don't know life in those areas. We are not moving. If you want to take 
us somewhere else, you will be forcibly removing us and throwing us away. We are here 
because we have been moved here, and our houses were burnt where we came from. If 
we move from here, it will be the government that moves us, because it is used to doing 
so. We will stay here until that happens'. That is what we told him in the kgotla. 
Sometime after Tshipinare's visit, there was a meeting organised by Dr Emang in Maun, 
just for Basarwa. Dr Emang tried to make us aware of our rights. I was chosen by the 
people of Khwai to go there, although we didn't know what the meeting was for. They 
were tired of going to so many meetings, and I was not someone who usually went to 
such meetings. It was my first meeting. When I got there, I found that Dr Emang had got 
all the government officials there; Land Board, the Chief, Police, the District 
Commissioner, Council, DWNP. He encouraged us to stand up and explain to what 
extent the government worked with us. We pointed at the officials there, explaining how 
each one worked with us. I realised that this was a very important, showing that Basarwa 
were able to express all their grievances about the groups that live next to them, or about 
government officials, or about animals, telling them that wild animals have been taken 
away from us, rights given to me by God. We were not afraid of anything. We asked a 
lot of questions and said a lot of things to the officials. We told them we had been 
arrested and tried for killing animals, but not in the same manner as other Batswana. 
This was because we are Basarwa and were oppressed, not knowing how to speak for 
ourselves. When they arrest a Mosarwa, they should know they are taking him from his 
property, that has been taken away by the government. They should recognise that these 
are the livelihood of Basarwa. One Mosarwa from Pandamatenga stood up and told of 
how one of his parents was apprehended by anti-poaching officials and beaten up so 
badly that he died in front of his children's eyes. 
When I came back from this meeting, I told the people of Khwai about it, and I said if 
they would like, we should call Dr Emang, so that they could see him in Khwai... . He 
was someone who could help us meet the law-makers in Gaborone to prevent our village 
from being moved again... to meet the big people, the ones that plan development. We 
realised that if we did not act fast, what Tshipinare spoke of would happen, and we 
would be told to go and live in NG18 because the lodges already had NG19. We 
discussed and realised these things, and decided to call Dr Emang to sort this out for us, 
that we should go to where things are done, to take our grievance. We saw that if we did 
not speak out, we would end up being chased off our land. Dr Emang booked a hotel for 
us and sent a car to pick us up. We went [to -Gaborone] and met with Minister 
Mokgothu. 
When we arrived there, we didn't have a lot to say: ̀ We have come to you Minister, 
without a lot of things to say. Just that we have a complaint at Khwai. It is that our land 
that has been cut up, and they way this has been done shows that the land our village is 
on now belongs to lodges'. We asked whether we would be moved to NG18, and they 
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said it is only for business. We then asked him, `If the lodges ended up winning [the 
tender for] NG19, where would our village go? We could not get an answer from Land 
Board, so have come to you to find out, the one who does these things, to explain to us 
where our village is going'. Mokgothu told us he did not know the details, he did not 
even know about Khwai, but he thanked us for coming to him to him. That is the highest 
office you can go to with a request or a complaint, after that it is only the president. He 
confirmed that NG 19 would be tendered, and said we should apply for NG 19 along with 
the lodges. The minister then said he would pass on our complaint about NG 19, that our 
village is in NG19, yet it is being given to lodges. He said he would write them down for 
the president, who would then give us an answer. We then returned to Khwai. 
If Dr Emang had not come to Khwai, our village would have been destroyed a long time 
ago, because the government came with a plan that we would not have been able to 
counter. All we could do was to go to Maun, but we had no means of going beyond to 
Gaborone and meeting with ministers like Mokgothu. We recognised this, that if Dr 
Emang was with us, he could open the door to where all these things are done. I have 
never heard of other Basarwa that took their grievances to the minister before this. They 
don't know how to go about it - how you get in, how you speak, how you start, what you 
come with. There are a lot of Basarwa who are oppressed, but they do not know who 
they can speak to. Other Basarwa have been moved because they don't have anyone to 
speak for them, although at Xade they had [John] Hardbattle. 73 If it wasn't for Dr Emang 
we certainly would have been moved... . We stood up about the move because we have been pushed around more than anyone else. 
Although Moses' story is perhaps coloured by his stormy relationship with both fellow 
villagers and Dr Emang, it clearly illustrates the importance Khwai has placed on securing 
access to land, and the difficulties they have faced in achieving it. Moses attributes their 
success to crucial assistance by a concerned outsider in undertaking political action, a form of 
assistance not offered by NRMP. The full impact of Dr Emang's involvement with Khwai is 
complex. Apart from his undisputed role in assisting Khwai gain the promise of the lease for 
NG19, his erratic assistance may have delayed Khwai's registration of their Community 
Trust, and his outspokenness on issues pertaining to Basarwa may have strengthened Khwai's 
suspicions of involving a commercial operator in their area. Nonetheless, the point remains 
that Khwai initially chose to use his assistance rather than that offered by NRMP, as they 
realised that what the formal CBNRM programme offered them was meaningless if they 
could not get security of tenure to the land on which they lived. 
The crucial issue of control 
Having succeeded in securing the promise of NG19, Khwai proceeded to plan what to do with 
their CHA. The discussions and struggles that have occurred within and outside Khwai on 
what form these plans should take again illuminate priorities beyond the simple and neat 
73 A key founder member of First People of the Kalahari. His sudden death in 1996 was a setback for 
the organisation and causes it championed. 
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parameters of CBNRM's model of `joint venture partnership'. For many residents of Khwai, 
a sense of control over the land and resources encompassed by their CHA is crucial. There are 
two significant reasons for this: firstly, as a reaction against the progressive dispossession 
they have experienced (Chapter Three); and secondly the different values, meanings and uses 
that Khwai's residents have placed on wildlife and natural resources (Chapters Five and Six). 
Both of these factors are largely a function of their ethnicity as Basarwa, and thus hinge on 
their difference from dominant society, making their identity central to negotiations over 
plans for their CHA. 
The government's preferred plan of `joint venture partnerships', as far as most residents are 
concerned, does not allow for adequate control to be retained. Many of the residents beyond 
middle-age wanted to use the annual quota purely for subsistence hunting, believing that 
selling their quota to a safari hunter, would compromise not only their subsistence options, 
but their sense of identity: 
Our culture is finished, finished by your Sekgoa [white people's culture], by the 
government. This was done by government wanting [money from] animals to pay its 
workers. My heart tells me, when I see an animal, that a long time ago I could have eaten 
it, but it is held back by molao [law]. Kereedilwe, Mababe. 
Hunting in our concession area should be for Basarwa. We want to teach our children as 
we ourselves were taught by our parents. And they too will teach their children about the 
same things. If we take all these things and give them to white people, we will be left as 
Batswana, and our Bosarwa [`Bushmanness'] will be finished. Moses, Khwai. 
While there is local agreement that the symbolic value of land and wildlife is incomparable to 
their cash value, their commercial value is nonetheless important. Mma Lebonang was one of 
the driving forces behind Khwai's attempts to set up the own Community Trust with the aim 
of eventually running their own safari. She questioned the utility of hunting purely for 
subsistence in a village meeting about the Community Trust: 
We went to Dice [the head of the Village Development Committee], as he used to hunt 
with the [Batawana] chiefs. I asked Dice if he any money to show from the elephants he 
hunted. ̀Nothing', he told me. So, I asked him, `Then what is the purpose of going back 
to the old system of Special Game Licences [i. e. subsistence hunting]? '
`We have nothing to show from our Special Game Licenses other than our stomachs' Mma 
Lebonang was fond of saying in the sometimes vociferous debates that took place in various 
fora, from village meetings to sessions in people's yard around a drum of khadi homebrew. 
Most residents of Khwai, however, agreed upon a compromise that combines patterns of 
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resource use familiar from their own past with commercial activities that will bring in the 
money so necessary for `life'. The high value trophy animals would be sold for commercial 
hunting, and the others hunted for subsistence. ̀If we don't want safaris in this land, how will 
we buy soap? ' one regular subsistence hunter pragmatically asked. 
Rra Diatla articulated some of the contradictions they faced in options under CBNRM, and 
the overriding importance of retaining control: 
These animals are our cows. They should bring us money. Like cattle, you kill some 
every now and then. We want to kill these animals ourselves. The government wants us 
to sell the animals to whites, so that they can be in control. But if a white person comes 
and does business, we will remain destitute. I want to sell whites animals, but not for 
nothing, we must sell them for what they are worth. I am selling my culture, so must 
make sure they don't finish. The present system is dictated by white tourism operators, 
who want these areas to be used for their own benef it. 
The government wants us to enter into tourism. We know about animals, but we are not 
consulted in planning policy. The government says these animals belong to itself, so it is 
them who must make decisions. They do not ask us how we want to use these animals. 
We know about conservation. Batswana who do not know about tourism come and tell 
us how we must go about it. I and the animals are one. I know how to manage them. 
The tension is evident in his narrative between the desire to retain the symbolic and 
subsistence value of wildlife, while at the same time capitalising on its income potential. 
Whatever choices they make, however, people in Khwai also believe that they are in an 
informed position to make such choices themselves. They do not want to be dictated to by the 
commercial interests of a tourism operator, or distant bureaucrats. As Rra Diatla went on to 
explain: 
Our government knows nothing about animals. They know their offices. When Wildlife 
[DWNP officials] came here for training, it was us that taught them. Why should 
government or people from America come to teach us tourism? What I don't like about 
government is that ey make decisions, and enshrine them in law, about things they 
don't know and I di I want tourism, but using my knowledge. I don't want to be 
given someone else's molao, but to use my own. 
The general consensus in Khwai is that the best way to achieve these disparate aims is to set 
up their own safari company, owned by the Community Trust, and hire professionals to fill 
posts that Khwai residents are unable to fill themselves. This would allow them to gain an 
income from their area, use their skills for reasonable reward, and retain control over their 
CHA and the activities in it. Twenty-year old KB, like his grandfather Kwere, who fulfilled 
the role of headman for the people of Khwai in the past, was looked to by many people in 
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Khwai as one able to articulate their needs and priorities to outsiders. He explained to me 
their version of what `development' means in the context of CBNRM: 
We don't want to give someone else our land. We are not like other villages being given 
their own CHAs who have only seen tourists for the past couple of years. Khwai is 
different, because we have lived with lodges for so long. We haven't benefited from 
them, though, as they have a colonial attitude. Ditshipi (a village south of Moremi that 
was in the process of tendering out their CHA]'s vision ends with asking to be provided 
with a job. We have said since the early 1990s when CBNRM began that we will never 
hand over this land to someone else... . Joint ventures may work well in Ditshipi where 
people are not thinking for themselves. Is putting money in the bank, like Sankuyu (a 
village southeast of Khwai that was already tendering out their CIIA to a tourism 
operator] is doing, empowerment? Is it worth giving up your rights for a few hundred 
Pula each? This area is popular because it is wild, and it has been marketed overseas for 
30 years. They market wildlife, not people. When we market our area, we will say that 
there are people here, because we will market our culture... . We want to try. If we fail, 
we fail. But others cannot decide for us before we start that we are going to fail. 
The option that Khwai has chosen to follow is ironically referred to in the DWNP booklet on 
joint ventures as `not a true joint venture'. However, as KB points out, presenting the usual 
option of leasing to a commercial operator as a `joint venture' is questionable. Although in 
this scenario the Community Trust retains the prerogative whether or not to renew the lease to 
the same operator, the short experience of neighbouring trusts74 indicate that while they may 
change the operator to whom they lease, they undertake very little in the way of management 
themselves. 
The importance of retaining control over the land on which they live is reflected in other 
spheres not directly related to CBNRM. I term this `petty control', as these are forms of 
control exercised locally against outsiders that mirror, rather than challenge, official forms of 
exerting control. This is reflected in the exclusionism directed against residents of Khwai who 
were not part of the original family removed from Moremi Game Reserve (Chapter Six). 
Mma Adam, for example, head of Khwai's only Moyci household, lost the land on which she 
was building her vending shop, when KIMC allocated it to the new community-owned curio 
shop. KIMC named the shop Itekeng, a Setswana word meaning 'do your best'Pbe self- 
sufficient', after Mma Lebonang's explanation that, `We have been sleeping, but now woken 
up, and will do business ourselves. Basarwa are in charge of this land, and there is no black 
person who is going to push us around'. I too felt this petty control tangibly as I began my 
fieldwork in Khwai, a year after my first visit to ask permission to undertake my doctoral 
74 These include Gudigwa and the other villages under Okavango Community Trust with NG22 and 
NG23, Ditshipi and the other villages under Okavango Kopano Mokoro Community Trust with NG32 
and Sankuyu's Sankuyu Tshwaragano Management Trust with NG34. 
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research in their village. Although they had agreed to my research, I was reminded upon my 
return by one of the KIMC members that I was there at their behest, and that I would be asked 
to leave if my research went against their interests. During my stay a linguist and a journalist 
were both denied permission to do research in the village by KIMC members, who questioned 
whether they had a research permit from the Office of the President. In a similar vein, Khwai 
insisted on being informed in writing of any meetings to be held in their village. This even 
included the Minister, whose impending visit was announced in one meeting by the District 
Council's Social Welfare Officer. `He should write and inform us', Dice, the VDC Chairman 
replied, `tell him not to come without writing'. 
Official conservation policy, culminating in CBNRM, has progressively stripped from the 
residents of Khwai a sense of control over their area. I interpret these examples of `petty 
control' locally as manifestations of a desire to retain a sense of control over their village. As 
a sense of control over the future of their village has so far been frustrated by CBNRM and its 
preceding policies, this is expressed locally, even using elements of official authority such as 
the need for research permits. Whether these forms of petty control will weaken or be 
strengthened when - and if - Khwai gets more comprehensive control over their land remains 
to be seen. 
What are the implications of CBNRM? 
At this stage, it remains too early to ascertain to what extent the explicit aims behind the 
CBNRM programme in the northern sandveld are being met (although I offer my thoughts on 
how likely they are to be met in the concluding chapter). Nonetheless, it is already apparent 
that the CBNRM programme in the northern sandveld has so far served the interests of the 
state above those of the residents of the northern sandveld. This chapter has established that, 
although not necessarily a product of specific intentions, CBNRM has functioned to extend 
state authority into these marginal areas. Its introduction has also affected local manifestations 
of authority, prompting a higher degree of exclusionism to be asserted against `marginal' 
residents. In this final section, I examine two further ways in which CBNRM and related 
policies have reconfigured the reh tionships between local people and the state. The first of 
these is an implication of the strength carried by government policies and pronouncements, 
and reflects their power to reconfigure the aspirations of its beneficiaries to fit more closely 
with official agendas. The second works in the opposite direction, is an unintended 
consequence, and may be one of the most important consequences of CBNRM; the 
politicisation of issues pertaining to resource tenure, and resultant local political organisation 
to protect local interests. 
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Reconfiguring aspirations and minimising options 
Although assertions of difference are sometimes exaggerated to counter the universalism of 
official programmes, CBNRM policies have also promoted a degree of conformity amongst 
Basarwa who regard conforming to its dictates as the only means to achieve success in it. For 
example, Merafe was one of the young and educated members of KIMC, who tirelessly 
worked to put KIMC's plans into action. However, he remained sceptical as to how plausible 
it is to build their future plans on such a different set of values. In a discussion with Rra 
Diatla, his father, from which Rra Diatla's sentiments on the overriding importance of 
retaining control over wildlife are quoted on p. 256, Merafe countered: 
The government has said we must leave behind that lifestyle. Our grandparents didn't 
know things like guns, and hunted on foot with spears. They were nomadic. The 
government has told us to move to one place, but we refused because we said what 
livelihood would we have in one area without being able to move around? But there are 
changes now. Our parents killed as they wanted, then licences were introduced to limit 
numbers. There are many of us now in Botswana, and we have to share all the resources. 
It is not like before when they only belonged to Basarwa. We must therefore change 
with the times. They reduced the number of animals on the licence so they would not 
finish. The government is the one who regulates so that we don't kill everything, and 
that each Motswana gets the same treatment, and the same amount. That is why I don't 
see the new dispensation as oppressive. It gives people the opportunity to govern and get 
an income from our land. We must use our advantage as Basarwa to govern our CHA 
well, as we are familiar with the animals. We cannot hunt more than our quota anyway, 
as we will finish the animals. We will make money from animals, and buy livestock in 
Maun when we need it, especially as motsetse [feast for a newborn child] and funerals 
are often in Maun. 
I don't want to get used to hunting, because it is likely that the government will stop all 
citizen hunting so I will be desiring something I am then denied I will then become a 
poacher. That is why I want to sell all our animals. Some of us suffered under the system 
of Special Game Licences, as the government said we were only allowed to hunt with 
guns, not other methods, and many didn't have guns. I am not against the way we used to 
live long ago, but molao has made it impossible. It is true, we are not listened to, but we 
cannot return to the way things were. (emphasis mine) 
Like in his 
. 
father's quote, the tension is evident in Merafe's sentiments between values and 
practices concerning wildlife from his own heritage, and the limitations imposed by official 
policy. While his father emphasised the importance of his heritage of hunting and gathering, 
Merafe consciously attempted to avoid experiences of hunting, which, he admired, but 
nonetheless saw as being given no future by government policies. The sentiment that, despite 
whatever priorities they may themselves have, a future based on wildlife has been made 
impossible, is not restricted to the younger generation. Shangu, a 65 year old woman from 
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Gudigwa, for example, told me the same: ̀We have been refused animals. We want them but 
have given up, so we will accept cattle'. " 
Herein lies one of the powers of official development programmes and associated government 
policies; that they can define what has a future, and what does not. While this is challenged to 
some extent, the hurdles that are placed along the way make capitulation an increasingly 
likely outcome. This became evident in Khwai, as the delays to registering their Community 
Trust dragged on. The reasons for the delay are complex, and include delays by Dr Emang, on 
whom they had become reliant for their constitution to be formally written, and internal 
divisions within Khwai itself. Nonetheless, the failure of the Technical Committee to 
recognise their aspirations as legitimate and to provide appropriate assistance aggravated 
these factors. The delays this caused prompted such frustration locally that some of the people 
in Khwai who had supported the plan to set up their own safari company began thinking that 
it would be an impossible task, and were resigned to following the government's CBNRM 
blueprint. 
Political empowerment 
An ironic outcome of a policy that has served to strengthen centralised bureaucratic power is 
that it has prompted the political empowerment of its subjects through political organisation 
to oppose the manner of current CBNRM implementation. This may be the most important 
and lasting implication of the early phases of the introduction of CBNRM in the northern 
sandveld. Both Khwai and Gudigwa set up their own committees, operating separately from 
the government-initiated Village Development Committees (VDCs), to lobby for CBNRM to 
be shaped more according to their own priorities. In both cases, this was the first time that 
residents of these villages had themselves formed bodies with which to represent their views 
to government representatives. 
With the assistance of Dr Emang, Khwai elected the Khwai Interim Management Committee 
(KIMC). This was intended to be a temporary body that would represent Khwai's priorities in 
CBNRM, particularly land, until a constitution could be drawn up and a legal Community 
Trust could be formed. KIMC formed the delegation to Minister Mokgothu in 1995, and 
continued to be the ' body for negotiations with the Technical Committee and other 
government bodies as they moved towards forming their own Trust. Locally, KIMC was 
7s The irony is not lost that a programme aimed at promoting wildlife over cattle may, through its 
unwillingness to allow it recipients to use wildlife as they would like, contribute to promoting the 
expansion of the cattle industry, albeit in another area. 
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regarded as ̀ the committee for land', and its role seen as crucial in articulating the voice of 
the village to officialdom. 
The residents of Gudigwa considered too that their priorities in CBNRM had not been taken 
into account by the government. Having been combined with four other non-Basarwa villages 
under the Okavango Community Trust (OCT), they alleged that they were not receiving their 
fair share of the benefits accrued to OCT from leasing out their land, such as jobs, meat, cash, 
and use of OCT vehicles. This was an especially bitter pill to swallow, as they considered that 
despite losing direct legitimate access to wildlife through Special Game Licenses, they had 
gained little from CBNRM. Their pastoral neighbours, meanwhile, had kept their cattle, and 
gained income from wildlife under CBNRM as well 76 In order to motivate for their own 
CHA from which they could directly benefit, they elected a committee of their own accord 
that they named Masarwa Community. Mothowamanoong, a man in his fifties explained their 
frustration: 
We are constrained to just sit and wait for food handouts each month from government, 
that can stop at any time. We say we should be given help that is really meaningful. We 
can't hunt, we can't grow, we have no cattle. That is why we want `Masarwa 
Community', so we can work. If you ask why we want to be separate from blacks, the 
answer is that they oppress us because we are Basarwa. [ex-President] Seretse [Khama] 
gave us papers to live by animals because they are ours. The government then decided 
we were doing wrong, so took the papers away, but they must replace it with the 
opportunity to work. We will keep part of it to feed ourselves in, and we will bring 
tourists to the rest. Because we are not educated, we cannot live by anything else. If we 
had a lot of money like others, we would buy NG12, but our hands are short. 
Masarwa Community was charged by residents with the aim of helping Gudigwa secede from 
OCT, and be allocated their own CHA (the land on which Gudigwa is situated, as well as 
much of their ancestral land shown in Appendix Five is encompassed by CHAs as yet 
unallocated). The committee functioned as a forum for the expression of grievances to visiting 
government officials, and they also commissioned the free services of a sympathetic lawyer 
through whom they sent several letters to the Land Board and District Council requesting 
their own CHA. 
By 1998, these two committees could only point to mixed success: Gudigwa was still under 
OCT with little promise of gaining their own area; and, although KIMC gained the promise of 
76 The government's draft CBNRM Policy of June 1999 contains a clause to protect the interests of 
members who rely partly on foraging for subsistence: ̀Before using the quota, the community must 
first satisfy the needs of community members who rely upon natural resources for subsistence' (GOB 
1999: 15). Nonetheless, what `satisfy[ing] the[ir] needs' entails remains ambiguous. 
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NG19, they remained in deadlock with the Technical Committee over the registration of their 
constitution. Nonetheless, I suggest that their real success was in the very act of forming 
bodies among themselves through which to articulate with the government in a political 
manner. This was a precedent for Khwai and Gudigwa, initiated primarily by their desire to 
be involved in CBNRM according to their own priorities. While this did function for the first 
time to encourage organised political engagement with the government, it meant as well that 
much of their energy was focused on countering aspects of CBNRM that they deemed 
inappropriate, rather than constructively building a CBNRM project according to their own 
designs. 
The narrowness of the official CBNRM agenda with its assumption of the universal rural 
dweller has resulted in precisely the opposite being asserted on the local level, where 
problems and their solutions are often codified in ethnic terms. Khwai and Gudigwa have 
attempted to counter the constraints of CBNRM by asserting their difference as Basarwa, as 
expressed in the epigraph by Moses: ̀ You cannot put a tie on a buffalo, or give an animal 
bread, and say that is development'. Such assertions legitimate different treatment under the 
programme: reflected in Gudigwa's argument that they do not receive their due rewards from 
CBNRM because as Basarwa they are discriminated against; and that as Basarwa, they have a 
greater right to benefit from wildlife than either their neighbouring pastoralists or the 
government. The main reason for Khwai's deadlock with the Technical Committee in 
registering their Trust was their insistence in retaining clauses they had included from their 
earliest meetings about their constitution, that theirs would be a Basarwa Trust. They saw this 
as a means of protecting their village from becoming dominated by outsiders, but the 
Technical Committee maintained it invalidated their constitution, as it was contrary to the 
constitution of Botswana which claims to make no ethnic distinctions. 
Gudigwa's proposal to secede from OCT, which hinted at `ethnic' differentiation, was, like 
Khwai's, rejected outright by the Technical Committee. In response to a letter from Masarwa 
Community's lawyer, the Technical Committee asserted: ̀The whole Gudigwa issue hinges 
on tribal/ethnic differences, with Basarwa calling for a concession area strictly for Basarwa, 
which development [sic] should be discouraged at all costs'. Nonetheless, the government's 
purported policy of not acknowledging ̀ ethnic' difference - exemplified by their responses to 
these situations - has not stopped Basarwa from emphasising it in attempts to protect their 
interests in a programme they feel they have little control over. 
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Mababe's Community Trust was registered in 1999, and they put up their CHA and its quota 
for tender to a commercial operator. Their registration was delayed as well, largely by debates 
within Mababe about whether to use the quota for continued subsistence hunting, or tender it. 
The split between these options was generally between elders - both men and women - 
wanting the first, and the younger people wanting the second. Unlike Khwai, and with no 
assistance from third parties, they saw their options as either completely accepting or 
completely rejecting the official CBNRM blueprint. Unable to reconcile the desires of young 
and old, the young eventually won out. Being literate, they were the main negotiators with the 
Technical Committee and their priorities were the ones that were heard. " By the 2000 hunting 
season (April 2000), the Technical Committee allowed Khwai to sell their hunting quota, 
(which has an unusually high number of trophy animals), although they still refused to grant 
Khwai the headlease for NG18, thus preventing them from undertaking any of their, own 
commercial activities on it. With the assistance of a previous employee of DWNP in Maun, 
they divided their quota into twelve hunting packages, and auctioned them off for a total of 
P1,300,000. They were thus able (so far) to stick to their principle of retaining control over 
their area (by not leasing out their CHA), but not, as yet, realise any of their many plans to 
implement their own tourism enterprises. 
Conclusion 
Basarwa in the northern sandveld face the difficult task of asserting a form of `development' 
that in some ways is oxymoronic to official models of what `development' should entail. 
Within a dominant paradigm that is strongly modernist, attempts by Basarwa to resist the 
capitalisation of resources, or retain practices such as subsistence hunting, are interpreted by 
officials as backward, reflected in the rebuke to Khwai by the Technical Committee member: 
`Your problem is that you are obsessed by hunting'. Since markers associated with the past 
are so much part of the way Basarwa represent their identity, officials regard them as 
stubbornly attempting to give the past a future, rather than being truly 'progressive'. The 
result is a polarisation of `development' options by officials, as expressed by the Anti- 
Poaching Unit officer quoted in Chapter Four: Basarwa either remain `primitive'; or are 
enticed out by `showing them another way of life is better and easier'. These debates of what 
`development' should entail take place in a highly value-laden environment, and little 
freedom or encouragement is given for development receivers to escape from an `either-or' 
model and creatively mould their own development strategies that draw freely from different 
" The role of development interventions aimed at Basarwa in accentuating local differences, 
particularly generational, is also commented upon by, Garland (1999: 1), with respect to Nyae Nyae 
Development Foundation in Eastern Bushmanland, Namibia. 
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options, but adhere to the primary principle of retaining a meaningful form of control over the 
resources that CBNRM assumes to grant them. 
`Today life is hard. The government is telling us to live in a different way than that we are 
used to', Tumelo, a middle-aged man from Khwai exclaimed to me. The sense of alienation 
from determining their own choices and their own future make the opportunities afforded by 
CBNRM particularly salient for Basarwa. Khwai and Gudigwa, and to a lesser extent 
Mababe, have all struggled to use CBNRM to address issues of primary importance, most 
especially control over land. In this sense, CBNRM has been embraced by these villages, who 
have recognised the potential it promises of reversing the gradual erosion of control over, land 
and its productive resources that they have suffered. However, the promise of CBNRM has 
proved in practice so far to be largely hollow. The current CBNRM policy operates under the 
assumption that providing access to resources is sufficient, and underestimates the 
importance, considering the specific history of Basarwa in the northern sandveld, placed on 
the ability to control these resources. 
The government's singular agenda in CBNRM, I argue, has served to extend the authority and 
control of the state into these areas, where it has hitherto been marginal. Rather than 
increasing the authority of rural dwellers on the periphery of national parks over natural 
resources, CBNRM is in practice extending the authority of the state so firmly established in 
the national parks themselves, to the people who live on their peripheries. Contesting the 
development priorities of the state has necessitated articulation with the ideologies and forms 
of power that underpin official development interventions. The process of this articulation has 
demonstrated the cultural productivity of development representations and interventions; that 
through the dynamics of `development', new forms of social positioning have appeared, both 
between Basarwa and the government, and within the villages themselves. This has had some 
ironic consequences; by attempting to depoliticise the issues that it is addressing, CBNRM 
and related policies have prompted new forms of political organisation and action by 
Basarwa. Furthermore, attempting to impose a development blueprint with little cognisance of 
difference has led, in some respects, to a greater assertion of difference from dominant society 
by Basarwa. At the same time, the seemingly inflexible constraints imposed by the parameters 
of CBNRM have served to stifle and frustrate the initiative and considerable creative energy 
of some of the supposed beneficiaries of CBNRM. It is a severe indictment of a programme 
that claims to promote local-level empowerment in the management of natural resources, that 
it not only fails to promote any meaningful form of empowerment, but also actively frustrates 
local initiatives aimed at achieving empowerment. Nonetheless, CBNRM has opened up 
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debate on issues of land and resource tenure that are so central to the priorities of residents of 





In a world increasingly characterised by stark inequalities, `development' remains a potent 
force in local, national and international politics. Attempts to address such imbalances are set 
to be an integral part of the socio-political landscapes of many parts of the world, particularly 
those peripheral to centres of political and economic power. This thesis has been above all an 
exploration of the dynamics, meanings and implications of different local and national 
conceptions of what `development' should entail in a remote part of northern Ngamiland. Not 
only is this region geographically remote, but its inhabitants, being primarily Basarwa, have 
been structurally peripheralised from mainstream social, political and economic processes. 
The `remoteness' of Basarwa from centres of political power, in these many different senses, 
has attracted Western popular and academic interest, and is increasingly attracting interest in 
the form of development interventions. Their peripheral position also provides a useful 
commentary on the dynamics of development: `It is from the margins', comments Tucker 
(1999: 19), `that the most incisive critique of development can be constructed'. The contexts 
of Basarwa in the northern sandveld provide, as it were, a lens that magnifies and makes more 
visible some of the contradictions generally inherent in processes of development. 
Development is for, and about, people. Yet, Basarwa in the northern sandveld often feel 
invisible to policy planners and implementers. ̀They don't know there are people here', I was 
frequently told, echoing a similar paradox described by Adams (1978: 474) for peasant 
farmers of Jamaane in the Senegal River Valley: 
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For development to take place, Jamaane must be destroyed... . 
As Amara would put it: 
"They don't know there are live people here. Its ne savent pas qu'il ya ici des gees 
vivants ". 
Fundamentally, Basarwa in the northern sandveld face the challenge of making their presence 
felt as people in what is generally regarded as a wildlife area, where the needs of wildlife 
appear to take priority over their own. As Mosadiwaputhego, Mma Kanjiye's daughter, told 
me: `They took our Special Game Licenses and gave them to lions. It is only them that eat 
now'. Furthermore, they also face the challenge of asserting their presence as Basarwa in a 
socio-political environment that does not recognise local norms and values, and has steadily 
delegitimised practices associated with their identity. 
Throughout this thesis, I have attempted to demonstrate that narratives of identity and 
ethnicity have been a central logic in both legitimating and contesting domination and 
inequality. They have also been integral elements of contestations over development. 
Legitimating the forms that `development' should take (or be prevented from taking) involves 
certain ways of defining and representing a world that contains not only development 
interventions, but also the people being ̀ developed' and the landscape in which these people 
live. These definitions provide an interpretive grid that not only allows purveyors of 
development to construct a system of knowledge about the people and regions at whom it is 
targeted, but, crucially, that also allows them to act upon and change these regions (Ferguson 
1990: 15). I have shown how dominant representations of Basarwa as lacking molao (literally 
`law', but implying `civilisation') have in the past justified their servitude, just as benevolent 
declarations that Basarwa lack the means to enjoy the fruits of the country serve to justify the 
assimilationist nature of contemporary development interventions. By similar means, the 
ways in which Basarwa speak of their own identities often serve to discursively undermine 
such dominant representations, and legitimise locally-defined values, priorities and practices. 
Struggles over material resources are thus frequently semiotic struggles; attempts to attach 
specific values and meanings to resources or practices. For the residents of the northern 
sandveld, their material struggles have centred around control over natural resources, 
particularly land and wildlife. Not only has alienation from them been an acutely felt reality, 
but it also brings to the fore essential markers of an identity that separates Basarwa from a 
dominant agro-pastoralist society. Yet, expressions of identity serve not only instrumental 
purposes, they are often deeply felt expressions of dignity and personhood, and illuminate that 
development is as much about dignity as it is about economics. Debates of `development' are 
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thus intimately implicated with debates of ethnicity and identity, and the place of Basarwa as 
a category of people in the contemporary socio-political landscape of Botswana. 
In this concluding chapter, I look again at these two central threads - identity and 
development - and draw out some of the analytical and applied issues have been raised. 
Firstly, I examine how representations by Basarwa of their own lives challenge the way we as 
academics represent the category of people encapsulated by this label. Secondly, I comment 
upon how the ethnography in this thesis reflects upon recent trends in critical development 
theory, and lastly, I re-examine CBNRM, and the ways in which it could be used to meet the 
overlapping goals of the government, tourism, conservation, and Basarwa themselves. 
Researching and representing Basarwa 
This thesis constitutes one in a long line of academic literature produced on Basarwa, or 
`Bushmen'. 78 Much of this body of ethnography has been produced to satiate the curiosities of 
observers drawn to people whose hunting and gathering heritage held out the promise of 
illuminating different ways of being. The revisionist challenge to traditionalist perspectives 
reduced the distance between ̀ us' and `them', but revisionist arguments were, nonetheless, 
still framed in terms of what Basarwa could or could not tell us about a hunting and gathering 
way of life. Without questioning the academic validity and excellence of much of the large 
body of Basarwa ethnography, these works, and the debates they have inspired, have (as yet) 
proved of little relevance to the people about whom they are written. As the Kalahari 
continues to become more accessible to external interests, particularly cattle, tourism, and 
various government programmes, Basarwa find their futures implicated in the activities and 
policies of others more than ever before, and inequalities are increasingly conspicuous. These 
political, social and economic realities can no longer be excluded from our ethnographies: 
they are too immediate, and their repercussions for our informants too real, for us to ignore. 
These are considerations that have both methodological and analytical consequences for the 
way we represent Basarwa. Methodologically, our research interests need to be shaped more 
by our informants, and aimed at addressing current issues that are not only salient to 
academia, but to our informants themselves. For a category of less than 100,000 people, who 
have been the subject of more research than any other similarly-sized category of people in 
Africa, the disjuncture between the volume of this research and the minimal impact it has had 
on ameliorating aspects of their situation is especially stark. Analytically, questions of power 
78 Indicated by an annotated bibliography compiled by Barnard (1992b) of works relevant to the 
Kalahari Debate, which alone numbered 535 works. 
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and inequality need to be placed at the centre of studies with Basarwa. I have attempted to 
demonstrate how the salience of the label `Mosarwa' lies not as much in a certain set of 
cultural patterns, as in a means by which both domination and local struggles for resources, 
rights and dignity have been ciphered. ̀ Basarwa' is thus a unifying label because it implies a 
common structural position in the socio-political economy of Botswana. This moves our 
analysis, alongside wider moves in the discipline of anthropology, away from prior attempts 
to delineate who `the Basarwa' (or 'the Bugakhwe', or `the Ts'exa', etc. ) are. Escaping the 
artificiality of bounded holism involves a focus on the dynamic nature of socio-political 
systems in which people continually affirm, rework and challenge the patterns by which they 
live their lives, and the meanings attached to these patterns. Basarwa have been more prone 
than most people to be classed as, to use Clifford's phrase, ̀endangered authenticities' (1988), 
a view that is as disempowering as it is fallacious. 
Most of the younger generation of Basarwa in the northern sandveld today speaks Setswana 
better than they do Bugakhwedam or Ts'exadam. Some are fluent in English, and, through 
their work with tourists, are able to exchange pleasantries in Italian, German or French. Most 
households have a second home in Maun, the district capital, where they are integrated into 
wider social networks. Radios are ubiquitous, and with them comes a familiarity with national 
and global events and processes. Most Basarwa hunt and gather at times, but for few is this a 
primary source of subsistence. A great variety of social and political currents and 
crosscurrents exist among those encapsulated by the label Mosarwa, a diversity that I have 
attempted to portray. Nonetheless, I have focused too on commonalities: a shared heritage of 
hunting and gathering; pervasive poverty; and the profoundly political nature of the shared 
label Mosarwa. Although what is implied by this label is continually being reaffirmed, 
challenged and altered, it remains important to those that carry it, and Basarwa today in the 
northern sandveld generally consider themselves no less Basarwa (or any of its equivalent 
labels) than their ancestors were. 
Development: discourse and diversity 
Much of this thesis has been dedicated to exploring the relationship between ̀ development' 
and various forms of power and inequality. I have examined its epistemology (contestations 
over what `development' should mean), and its politics (as a form of social control). I have 
shown how certain aspects of contemporary development programmes in the northern 
sandveld have a genealogy that stretches back long before the era of `development', to the 
domination that Basarwa in the northern sandveld experienced over the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. In my analysis, I have found useful the insights of critical development 
270 
theorists -a body of work that has done much to shape the academic study of development in 
the past decade. 
One of the prime contributions of critical development theorists has been to uncover the 
ideological nature of development. They have brought attention to the means by which 
`development' facilitates managing and controlling those at whom it is aimed, and how this 
role is disguised by discourses that portray development as an essential but natural process. 
These inherent contradictions in development, alongside half a century of its evident failure in 
addressing poverty and marginalisation, have led critical development theorists to seek 
grassroots alternatives to development. With labels like `counter-modernist' (Manzo 1991), or 
`people's counter-tendencies to modernity' (Arce and Long 1999: 27), the most popular 
exemplars have been the `New Social Movements' of Latin America (e. g. Alvarez and 
Escobar 1992, Friedman 1994, Munck 1999: 207). Certain aspects of this body of theory are, 
however, challenged by this ethnography: (1) its stress on the oppositional nature of local 
responses to development; (2) its focus on a global monolithic discourse at the expense of 
national discourses of development; and (3) its avoidance of the discursive constructs of 
subaltern people. 
Firstly, in their intellectual deconstruction of development, many critical development 
theorists appear to have overlooked the prevalence of local desires for development. A clear 
dichotomy between homogenous discourses of development and oppositional discourses of 
anti-development may be ideologically attractive. Nonetheless, this perspective bears little 
resemblance to the reality and complexity of the ways in which development is spoken about 
in the northern sandveld, where `development' and its commodities are universally sought 
after. The grassroots organisations that have grown up within the context of CBNRM in the 
northern sandveld could thus not be described as `counter modernist', and their energies are 
not aimed at resisting development, but at harnessing its opportunities for their own goals and 
priorities. Of course, what development should entail is deeply contested, but Basarwa do not 
regard themselves as being `anti-development'. Local narratives of development allude to 
`progress' and `becoming modern', and are thus a complex compound of aspects of dominant 
definitions of development and priorities drawn from their own experiences. Although 
Basarwa resent interventions that perpetuate their powerlessness, `development' with its 
many different meanings remains a common goal of local residents and bureaucrats alike. I 
add to the calls of critical development theorists for deeper attention to what local people are 
saying about development. Nonetheless, premature attempts to write an obituary of 
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development (e. g. Sachs 1992), alongside academic projects to `transcend' development, risk 
decontextualising themselves from local perspectives on development. 
Secondly, deconstructing an imagined `development metadiscourse' is a relatively 
straightforward task. It is somewhat more difficult to unravel `the cacophony of different 
views and positions' (Stirrat 2000: 33) that actually make up dominant narratives behind 
development interventions. Critical analyses of development discourses have, almost without 
exception, treated development discourse as a global phenomenon; a new form of imperialism 
that enables action by the `First World' upon the `Third World'. Little cognisance has been 
given to the way global discourses articulate with national and local discourses in the 
implementation of development programmes by `Third World' governments on sections of 
their own populations. By ignoring national political processes, and the plurality of discourses 
involved, therefore, such analyses of global metadiscourses end up being curiously apolitical 
and Eurocentric. 
Thirdly, many critical development theorists are inconsistent in their willingness to 
deconstruct dominant discourses of development, without problematising the discursive 
constructs of subaltern populations themselves (cf. Lehmann 1997). Although this is a 
sensitive task because of its potential to undermine the legitimacy of oppositional movements 
for justice (cf. Lee 1992: 36), doing so is a necessary step in maintaining academic credibility. 
Contributing to a discussion of subaltern discursive constructs also means recognising the 
significance of local people as primary stakeholders in development. An extensive reliance on 
narratives by Basarwa of how they see themselves and their situations has been a deliberate 
hermeneutic method in this thesis, with these narratives providing a basis for understanding 
local experiences, relationships and needs. However, although these narratives are of interest 
in themselves, I have attempted to account for them as representations that reflect and affect 
social reality, but which at times also contradict it. 
Although critical development theory has provided a useful starting point to my analysis, I 
have attempted in this thesis to move beyond its homogenising tendencies to emphasise the 
fluidity and heterogeneity of various dominant and subaltern narratives of development and 
the power relations they invoke. Avoiding dualistic and homogenising characterisations of 
development in which a monolithic producer of discourse acts upon people who in turn may 
initiate `oppositional movements to development' (Escobar 1995) can only be achieved by 
detailed attention to the complexities of specific development interventions. This study of 
development in the northern sandveld has been one such attempt. 
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Finally, if everything is reduced to discourse, it becomes difficult to move beyond critique 
and suggest productive avenues of transformation and possibility (Agrawal 1996: 465, Fagan 
1999: 188). Just as I have attempted to root analyses of discursive constructs in the everyday 
lived realities of residents of the northern sandveld, so too must these realities be an anchor to 
discussions of the possibilities of change. 
Reassessing Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) 
Representing a global shift in approaches to both development and conservation, CBNRM 
uses much of the rhetoric prevalent in more general development approaches: 
`empowerment'; ̀ participation'; and creating an ̀ enabling environment' in which local people 
can more effectively manage resources for their own benefit. I have argued that, despite its 
rhetoric of decentralising management power, the CBNRM programme has served to extend 
the authority of the state over both people and natural resources in an area where it has 
hitherto been marginal. Rather than decentralise any meaningful form of control over natural 
resources to local residents, it has so far functioned primarily as an attempt to co-opt them 
into adopting official priorities for development and conservation. 
In practice, officials implementing CBNRM in the northern sandveld have pursued a narrow 
agenda of encouraging target `communities' to sublease their land and sell their annual 
wildlife offtake quota to commercial tourism operators. This can be a very lucrative option, 
but although this option decentralises monetary benefits, the extent to which it decentralises 
the power to make meaningful management decisions is limited. Attempts, like those of 
Khwai, to use CBNRM as an opportunity to set up their own tourism operations, which allow 
not only a diversity of options, but also a meaningful sense of control to be exercised over 
their area, are actively discouraged by those implementing CBNRM. I have suggested that 
decentralising management to any significant degree (as proposed by Khwai's initial plan) is 
militated against by two factors. Firstly, the threat it poses to vested interests, which in 
northern Ngamiland are primarily those of the lucrative tourism industry, and, secondly, the 
administrative difficulties that a multitude of different local initiatives propose. For 
government officers implementing CBNRM, whose success is judged on the number of 
Community Trusts that they can set up, a blueprint plan provides the easiest and most 
efficient means of putting a CBNRM programme into place. However, these very human 
factors work on a systemic level to facilitate the extension of bureaucratic power through the 
attempted regularisation and normalisation of the social reality of the northern sandveld. 
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CBNRM has thus so far operated, alongside other government programmes such as the 
Remote Area Development Programme, as a form of social control over the residents of the 
northern sandveld. However, just as the processes of governmentality demonstrate perhaps 
initially unintended dynamics, so does the dynamism of people subsumed by the expanding 
authority of the state. Local contestations over what CBNRM should entail have set into 
motion two contrasting dynamics. The strength of official policy, underpinned by a dominant 
set of values (both encapsulated by the Setswana term molao) has been successful in some 
ways in conforming local expectations and desires to official priorities, as reflected in the 
comment by Merafe, the young treasurer of KIMC: `I don't want to get used to hunting, 
because it is likely that the government will stop all citizen hunting, so I will be desiring 
something I am then denied. I will then become a poacher. That is why I want to sell all our 
animals'. Yet, the CBNRM programme has also inadvertently encouraged local political 
organisation, prompting the opposite of Ferguson's Anti-Politics Machine (1990), which, he 
argued, served to depoliticise the realities it touched. As such, the way in which CBNRM has 
been introduced in the northern sandveld has unwittingly heightened the politicisation of 
issues relating to land and resource control. 
Government officials have a range of motivations in implementing CBNRM. For some, it 
presents an opportunity to facilitate rural development. For others, it is a means to achieve 
more effective local-level conservation, and for yet others it redistributes what would 
otherwise be government funds to rural areas. Yet, to the residents of the northern sandveld, 
CBNRM is, with few exceptions, primarily an opportunity to assert land and resource rights. 
This prompts two questions about the role of CBNRM, which I go on to examine. Firstly, 
considering the broader policy context of which CBNRM is a part, what is the scope for 
residents of the northern sandveld to achieve greater land and resource rights? Secondly, are 
there areas of overlap between the disparate aims of stakeholders in CBNRM, and what 
would be necessary to allow CBNRM to satisfy these various aims? 
Resource tenure rights 
Resource tenure in the northern sandveld represents a profoundly political dilemma of 
competing claims among different social groups and interest bodies. International 
conservation concerns consider the landscape of northern Ngamiland as part of a global 
heritage in need of `preservation'. Allied with them are tourism interests, which fuel 
Botswana's fastest growing industry, generating ever increasing revenues and providing hope 
for employment. Added to these may soon be the claims of large cattle owners wanting to 
make use of the extensive grazing areas not encapsulated by Wildlife Management Areas - 
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their access facilitated by the reduction of tsetse infestation, and current road improvement 
programmes. The struggle to legitimate and realise claims to natural resources is one in which 
certain groups lose out, and so far, throughout the Kalahari, Basarwa have consistently lost 
more than other stakeholders. 
At the heart of these struggles are debates as to how `ownership' of natural resources is 
constituted and legitimated; what constitutes legitimate land use, and what resources can be 
legitimately `owned'. The national legal system recognises land ownership arising from 
pastoralist or agricultural use, but not hunting and gathering (which requires much more 
extensive areas). Small parcels of land can thus be allocated to individuals or groups for the 
first two purposes, but not the third. In the same way, cattle can be individually owned, but 
wildlife remains largely common property (with the exception of `community quotas' 
attached to each Controlled Hunting Area [CHA]). `Domestic animals and how many you 
have are the result of one's own hard work and sweat. Wildlife, on the other hand, is the 
natural resource of the whole nation', explained a Motswana contributor at the Okavango 
People's Conference in Maun in May 1997 (OPWT 1997: 31). Basarwa therefore find an 
important aspect of their livelihoods declared communal property, yet the individual wealth 
afforded by cattle typically remains beyond their reach. As Moses, the often outspoken 
entrepreneur from Khwai, explained to me, ̀ They eat [i. e. get rich] in our area, but we do not 
eat in theirs'. 
Customary resource rights in the northern sandveld, like in many parts of Africa, have 
operated by default. In other words, they have continued only to the extent that no other 
interests present have been sufficiently important to contest their validity. The patchwork of 
overlapping rights that developed with the immigration of Bantu-speakers to the riverine 
fringes of the northern sandveld from the eighteenth century weakened the strength of 
Basarwa land tenure. Nonetheless, the ambiguities inherent in this system functioned to allow 
continued access to natural resources by Basarwa. As noted by Behnke (1994: 15, quoted in 
Rohde 1997: 390) of resource rights in an African context: `certain critical ambiguities as to 
who owns what and can go where provide a degree of fluidity which suits everyone's 
purpose'. However, both de jure and de facto systems of resource tenure around the 
Okavango Delta have undergone considerable transformation over the past generation. The 
ambiguities inherent in resource tenure are becoming increasingly restricted, as conservation 
and tourism interests have provoked the clear demarcation of rights of access to land, wildlife 
and other natural resources. Moreover, with the increased interest of outsiders in the land and 
resources of the northern sandveld, its original inhabitants are increasingly vulnerable to 
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having the remaining ambiguities in resource tenure exploited by those more powerful than 
themselves. 
Despite its role in weakening Basarwa resource tenure, land use policy has indirectly operated 
to the advantage to residents, in that the designation of land around Khwai and Mababe as 
Wildlife Management Areas has, like the tsetse fly, prevented the influx of cattle-keepers. The 
only possibility for residents to retain the last vestiges of resource rights is to find a way for 
the formalisation of tenure rights to more solidly protect their own interests, rather than 
primarily those of other interest groups. This is a possibility made real by CBNRM. The form 
of tenure offered by CBNRM offers an unprecedented opportunity to formalise rights over a 
large tract of land on a communal level, providing the legislative and policy framework for 
Basarwa to assert control over tracts of land beyond plots individually allocated for 
pastoralism or agriculture. Under CBNRM, residents can also exercise exclusionary rights 
against non-residents, allowing them, if necessary, to regulate the influx of more powerful 
`others' who may otherwise come to dominate local political affairs, as has been the case in 
many of the government-initiated settlements for Remote Area Dwellers. The opportunities 
afforded by CBNRM may, therefore, be decisive in struggles by Basarwa to achieve a form of 
land rights. 
Conservation and development: decentralising power 
The tragedy of CBNRM in the northern sandveld is that it has so far failed to engage with the 
practices, priorities, aspirations and values of its potential beneficiaries. Its real beneficiaries, 
in fact, may be international tourists and conservation concerns, rather than local residents. By 
defining its benefits in purely monetarist terms, CBNRM neglects the history of resource use 
in the northern sandveld, local values attached to natural resources, and the diversity of 
livelihood strategies that residents pursue. This tragedy is especially pronounced, in that the 
issues that CBNRM raises, particularly of resource tenure, have been of utmost importance to 
residents of the northern sandveld, augmenting its potential to be of direct local relevance. 
Residents who have organised themselves in ambitious attempts to use the potential offered 
by CBNRM to implement a meaningful form of local development have found their energy 
expended in countering official, hurdles instead of in creatively building their own 
programmes. 
Despite disparities in the various aims that the stakeholders of the northern sandveld - 
conservationists, tourism operators, government officials, and residents - have for its future, 
they also share common goals. Primary among these is their common interest in the continued 
health of its natural environment. Furthermore, most stakeholders (with the exception, 
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perhaps, of some tourism operators) consider the new CBNRM programme as providing an 
opportunity to further their aims. Nonetheless, I suggest that, even notwithstanding local 
priorities, the manner in which the CBNRM programme is presently implemented is unlikely 
to satisfy official goals of either conservation or development unless it takes seriously its own 
rhetoric of believing in the managerial capabilities of local residents. 
CBNRM initiatives are currently based on the assumption that by improving financial 
benefits, attitudes towards wildlife will improve. Not only is this assumption unproven, as 
Boggs (1999: 31) asserts from her own research in Ngamiland, but it is based on the erroneous 
- but common (cf. Parry 1989) - assumption that local attitudes to wildlife are negative. 
Acknowledging that local criticism is directed against regimes of wildlife management rather 
than wildlife itself directs the need for change to official policy and practice as much as to 
local residents. Above all, the implementers of CBNRM need to overcome their marked 
reluctance to grant residents any form of control over the resources that have been so central 
to their lives and subsistence options. Attempts, under the rubric of CBNRM, to co-opt and 
regulate local relationships to natural resources serve instead to undermine local management 
institutions and relationships of accountability with respect to resource use. By delegating 
longstanding resource practices, such as subsistence hunting, to the realm of the illegal, such 
practices are forced to remain hidden, and are thus inadvertently individualised. I have argued 
that progressively stricter legislation restricting wildlife use has not significantly reduced 
subsistence hunting. Individual subsistence hunting is set to continue, driven by both the 
immediate demands of hunger, as well as a moral sense that access to wildlife is an 
inalienable right. As CBNRM attempts to reform, rather than articulate with, local practices, 
experiences and needs, it is unlikely to promote the form of conservation that its initiators 
intend. 
As a development programme, the current means of implementing CBNRM amounts to little 
more than a form of welfare, a means of redistributing government funds to rural areas. 
Rather than promoting a genuine form of empowerment and self-sufficiency for local 
residents, it is at risk of substituting one form of dependency with another. Tourism operators 
who win the tender to sublease Community-Controlled Hunting Areas and their wildlife 
offtake quotas from Community Trusts (which is renewable in the first, third and fifth years) 
find it against their immediate interests to encourage local means of self-sufficiency. It is 
instead to their advantage to make themselves indispensable to local livelihoods, so that they 
continue to win the tender each time it is up for renewal. Of course, whether such economic 
considerations take priority over ethical decisions depends on the individual operator. One of 
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the large hunting and photographic tourism operators shared with me his opinion of the 
residents of the northern sandveld: `They are destitute, their hands are out saying, "Give us 
food! Give us food! "' On several occasions (prior to their tenders being granted), he had sent 
trucks laden with sacks of food to Khwai and Mababe for free distribution, which Khwai 
Interim Management Committee told him not to repeat in their village. Nonetheless, he was 
alleged to have continued making food and money available from his offices in Maun to 
individuals from Khwai and Mababe who wanted it. 
The very lucrative potential profits for tourism operators from achieving a long-term lease 
promotes attempts to win the favour of not only whole villages, but in particular the villages' 
Trust Committees, which carry most weight in determining the granting or renewal of leases. 
One member of the Khwai Interim Management Committee, for example, told me that an 
operator had offered him the personal `gift' of a new four-wheel drive truck if his company 
was granted Khwai's hunting quota. By creating a small local elite whose main role is to 
make decisions pertaining to very large sums of money, the present system therefore 
promotes instability in relationships within villages (which rarely reflect the label 
`community' that the CBNRM programme gives them), and between local residents and 
outsiders. This is particularly pertinent considering the heritage Basarwa have of a relatively 
egalitarian social structure, and the local suspicion that is thus bred when individuals assume 
inordinately powerful positions in which they can make decisions with little transparency. 
The instability inherent in such local structures of authority undermines the long-term 
sustainability of the type of local projects that CBNRM currently puts in place. 
The sustainability of a CBNRM programme that is overwhelmingly aimed at maximising 
economic gain is therefore questionable. The potential for income and employment are, of 
course, locally important, but alongside these desires exists a keenly-felt history of extensive 
natural resource use that has steadily been curtailed by official edicts on land and wildlife. 
Alongside cash and employment, a meaningful sense of control over local natural resources, 
and over the commercial activities based on these resources, is of paramount importance to 
most residents. Rather than being `anti-economic', local priorities for resource control will 
probably be more sustainable in the long term. The model suggested by Khwai, for example, 
involves selling trophy animals to commercial hunters (who would bring their clients to a 
locally run lodge), but retaining some for subsistence hunting. Photographic safaris would be 
conducted on foot, and be oriented at sharing local knowledge as much as simply viewing 
wildlife. Such operations may not maximise economic gain, as not all animals would be sold 
to hunters, and photographic tourists would be mid-range, rather than the high-cost tourism 
278 
Plate 8.1: Delegates from the northern sandveld visit a restcamp in western 
Bushmanland, Namibia. 
Plate 8.2: Visiting a tourism project by Basarwa at Dqae Qare farm, D'kar. 
279 

presently characteristic of such areas. Nonetheless, this form of tourism uses local skills and 
knowledge, and is undertaken on the terms of local residents, rather than making residents 
employees of someone else's project on their own land. The absurdity of relations that have 
been engendered under the current system were expressed by Patrick, the head of Gudigwa's 
Village Development Committee, who had recently resigned from his job as a tracker at the 
hunting lodge run by Okavango Community Trust's lessee: 
All professional hunters here are from South Africa, and they take clients around and tell 
them about animals. When we try and say something - us who were born here - they 
say, ̀What do you know? ' [But] I am of the sandveld. I am Khara/'uma. 
The forms of `ecotourism' that many residents of the northern sandveld favour are globally 
popular, having increased worldwide by thirty percent per annum through the 1990s (Honey 
1999). Locally-run, small-scale tourism enterprises are increasingly seen as one of the most 
viable development options by Basarwa elsewhere in Botswana and Namibia, with such 
projects being set up with the assistance of NGOs in western Ngamiland, Ghanzi, and East 
and West Bushmanland in Namibia. The dangers of exploitative forms of tourism becoming a 
vehicle of disempowerment and dependence to Basarwa have already received extensive 
comment, as has its potential as a viable development option (e. g. Whyte 1995, Hitchcock 
1997, #Oma and Thoma 1998, Guenther 1998, cf. Ashley et al. 2000). Nonetheless, if 
undertaken on their own terms, involvement in tourism can provide an opportunity for not 
only financial reward, but also increased visibility and the expression and reformulation of 
history and identity in public arenas. It can also provide one component of a diversity of 
options for pursuing livelihood options rather than the singular option pursued by the 
CBNRM programme. For these reasons, direct involvement in tourism is set to become an 
increasingly important element of development plans by Basarwa, particularly in the northern 
sandveld. 
Despite the potential for locally based, small-scale tourism activities to promote a more 
holistic form of development, the current national policy framework (including policies on 
tourism, wildlife and CBNRM) continues to support high-cost (and thus high-expertise), low- 
volume tourism. Creating and supporting the opportunities for villages such as Khwai to set 
up their own tourism enterprises requires flexibility. This flexibility would allow the pace of 
development to be slowed, if necessary, to suit local requirements. It would also allow the 
freedom for different villages in the CBNRM programme to pursue projects within it that are 
most suited to local contexts and skills, and it would allow local livelihood priorities to be 
281 
reflected in the ways that tourism is developed. Moreover, the ability to mould their own 
diverse livelihood options would serve to avoid the limitations imposed by either overly 
culturalist or overly materialist interpretations of development, to which Basarwa have often 
been subject. 79 
The central challenge that the CBNRM programme faces is to bridge the ideological gap 
between its implementers and its intended beneficiaries. A lack of immediate co-operation 
from the residents of the northern sandveld is more a function of radically different ideologies 
and aims than a passive failure to realise the monetary benefits that CBNRM can bring. Yet, 
despite these differences, the various stakeholders in the northern sandveld share a common 
concern for the continued health and vitality of its natural environment, without which none 
of their aims would be attainable. I have suggested in this thesis that unless local residents - 
the primary stakeholders - are given a meaningful sense of control over natural resources and 
their own destiny, neither local priorities, nor official aims in development and conservation, 
are likely to be met. 
The future 
The northern peripheries of the Okavango Delta have seen considerable change over the past 
three decades. In 1967, the Okavango Delta's first lodge was built; Khwai River Lodge. By 
1998, the Delta supported 54 hotels and lodges, part of a tourism industry that generates 
millions of Pula, and provides thousands of jobs. The land on which the residents of the 
northern sandveld have lived has become increasingly subject to the controls and agendas of 
outside interest, whether represented by conservationists, tourism operators, or government 
officials. The residents of the northern sandveld have also undergone significant demographic 
change, with increasing restrictions on access to land and the resources on it. 
Although change is probably one of the most consistent and ubiquitous elements of the 
physical and social environment of the northern sandveld, the closing years of the twentieth 
century were especially marked as a time of transition for the residents of the northern 
sandveld. One of the most important elements of this transition is a tragedy beyond all 
proportion, common to much of the subcontinent. At the end of the 1990s, one in three adults 
in Botswana was estimated to be HIV positive, and, of all Botswana's districts, Ngamiland 
79 Although development interventions involving Basarwa in Botswana are primarily materialist, 
extensive NGO involvement with several development initiatives involving Bushmen in Namibia and 
South Africa has promoted a heavily culturalist focus (Garland 1999, Robins 2000). The limitations of 
emphasising a unique `Bushman' culture are no less real, considering the small role the primary 
stakeholders often play in defining what this `culture' entails. 
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had the highest increase in the rate of infection. No specific figures were available for HIV 
infection rates in the northern sandveld, but they were probably slightly lower than the 
national average, due to its relative isolation. Nonetheless, like elsewhere in Botswana, deaths 
from AIDS were beginning to gather pace in the northern sandveld at the end of the 1990s, 
indicative of the catastrophic effects AIDS is set to have on its population over the coming 
years. 
With the magnitude of the impending disaster from AIDS, other changes appear almost 
inconsequential. Nonetheless, in the face of ultimate powerlessness, residents of the northern 
sandveld will be forced to continue to look for `life' in ways that that have been explored in 
this thesis. As I have outlined, the new CBNRM programme promises to play a key role in the 
directions that livelihood strategies in the northern sandveld take. Despite its evident failure 
thus far to engage with local agendas on land, resources and economics, there are tentative 
signs that some local priorities are being heard by policy makers. The draft CBNRM policy of 
June 1999 calls for `Community-Use Zones' to be created in national parks and game reserves 
that give residents of adjacent areas rights of access (GOB 1999: 27,32). It also suggests 
directing tourist traffic towards villages (1999: 31), indicating recognition of the potential for 
direct local involvement in tourism. Yet, the draft policy favours too the continuation of the 
government's `high-cost, low-volume' policy despite the demands of very high paying 
tourists often being beyond capabilities of small-scale, locally run tourism enterprises. 
Whether these are token changes, more comprehensive attempts to co-opt, regulate and 
control people such as those of the northern sandveld, or whether they mark the beginning of 
a more genuine engagement with local priorities, remains to be seen. 
CBNRM offers the potential for viable economies to be created in areas that there have 
previously been few economic opportunities. If implemented beyond the narrow focus 
currently favoured by its practitioners, it can create a context in which a diversity of 
livelihood options (both economic and non-economic) are able to be sought without migration 
to the `urban villages' of Ngamiland and beyond. The possibility of controlling their own 
local economies thus also opens the possibility of stronger social economies as well, which in 
turn facilitates the possibilities of united political action to address inequalities where these 
may exist. Whether or not CBNRM eventually does allow a diversified set of local livelihood 
options patterned on the aspirations of local residents is yet to be proven. 1ýne Bess, its 
enduring contribution to date has been to provide a forum for debateAon issues of land, of 
rights to use natural resources, and of recognition. These are debates that are set to continue as 
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Basarwa in the northern sandveld attempt to mould `development' to more suit their own 
hopes, aspirations and visions. 
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Glossary 
//axa (B/T) chief 
Bakwena (S) one of the principle Setswana-speaking tribes of Botswana 
Bangwato (S) another of the principle Setswana-speaking tribes of Botswana 
Batawana (S) the Setswana-speaking tribe that has been politically dominant in 
Ngamiland sinc the 19 century 
basalagadi (S) female Basarwa (derogatory) 
Bosarwa (S) `Bushmanness', or culture associated with Basarwa 
botlhanka (S) serfdom 
dam (BIT) tongue, or language 
dao (BIT) path/road/spoor 
di xa//ae (B) leader of a Basarwa village (lit: `owner of village') 
gondo (BIT) a long flexible stick with a hook on the end used to catch springhares 
kgamelo (S) system used by Batswana polities to incorporate subject tribes (lit: 
`milk jug) 
kgosi(S) chief 
kgosana (S) headman (lit: `little chief) 
kgotla (S) originally meaning an assembly of elders, now most commonly refers 
to a geographical space in the centre of a village where the chief 
usually presides and public meetings are held 
khadi (S) homebrew made primarily with Grewia bicolor berries 
Khara/'uma (B/T) progenitor of all Basarwa, according to Khwe-speakers in the 
northern sandveld 
khwe (B/T) person 
Lekgoa (S) white person 
Makoba (S) Bayei (derogatory) 
Masarwa (S) Basarwa (derogatory) 
masimo (S) fields 
matsenelela (S) cattle that join the wrong herd 
meraka (S) cattleposts 
Mma- (S) prefix for teknonyms, meaning ̀ mother of -' 
moagedi (S) a person whose origins are from elsewhere, but lives in a place 
because they have built themselves a home there 
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mokoro (S) dugout canoe, hollowed from the trunk of a single tree, and 
commonly associated with Bayei 
molao (S) law, but also implying civilisation 
molao motheo (S) constitution 
molebeleedi (S) overseer (of a district) 
moloi (S) witch/wizard (i. e. user of harmful supernatural powers) 
Monate (S) brand-name for a sorghum-based homebrew 
morui (S) an owner of livestock 
motlhaba (S) sand 
motokwane (S) cannabis 
motse (S) village 
motswakwa (S) foreigner 
naga (S) bush 
namagadi (S) female, usually used for animals 
ndoba (Y) bund, that Bayei often built across channels in the Okavango Delta to 
control the flow of floodwater 
noka (S) river 
Omang (S) name for national registration cards (lit: `who are you? ') 
oo dao (B) wide path through the bush, commonly made by elephants 
oro (B/T) waterhole 
phapadi (S) gathered food 
Pula (S) currency of Botswana (P7.00 = £1.00 in 1998) 
rinderpest (E) a malignant and contagious cattle disease, also affecting wild 
ungulates 
Rra- (S) prefix for teknonyms, meaning ̀ father of -' 
rua (S) to own or possess, but most commonly used with pastoral 
connotations, for example of animals, land or guns 
Sekgoa (S) language, culture or ways of white people 
sehuba (S) chest, also used to refer to tribute demanded by Batswana chiefs of 
their subjects 
semausu (S) vending stall 
sesinyi (S) law-breaker/mischievous person 
sjambok (A) a short, thick whip made from hippo or giraffe hide 
tlhaloganyo (S) mindset/understanding 
tlhabolola (S) develop/improve 
tlholego (S) heritage/essential nature/origins 
ts'ao (B/T) sandveld/bush 
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tsetse (S/E) Glossina morsitans, small flies that transmit trypanosome parasites, 
causing sleeping sickness in people and nagana in livestock. 
tswii (S) edible roots of the water lily haea nouchali var. caerulea) 
thuso (S) help/assistance 
utswa (S) poach/steal 
veld (A) open, thinly-forested grass country 














Names of Origin 
Although the residents of Khwai and Gudigwa usually call themselves Bugakhwe, and of 
Mababe call themselves Ts'exa, they also have a number of other names by which they are 
known. I call these names of origin, as they often refer to demographic divisions that existed 
before the present patterns of living together. Others are simply nicknames, given to different 
family groups, but as these two uses are conflated (i. e. being a member of a different 
subgroup invites stereotyping and teasing), there is little to distinguish them. Kxoe in Caprivi 
refer to such names of social division as kurikx'am (kuri - `family', kx'am - `mouth') 
(Gertrud Boden, pers. comm. ), although I did not come across this word in Botswana. 
Divisions of Bugakhwe 
The main names of origin of Bugakhwe at Gudigwa are: 
//Qarangu: (//gara - `dry', ngu - `house'). This name apparently originted from the rough 
and unfinished grass mats from which they made their shelters. //Qarangu are considered to 
originate from Caprivi, although a many live in Gudigwa. They are generally looked down 
upon, and have a reputatuion for violence. 
N 'ujunu: (neu -'food', junu -'to finish'). Unsurprisingly, they are often teased for being 
greedy and finishing veld foods. Many N#ujunu originate from the sandveld northeast of 
Gudigwa, in the land of Sangando and Amos (Appendix Four). 
Thobokuru: (thobo - `wax', kuru - calabash container). Named after the wax that they (and 
others) use to fix cracked calabashes. Thobokuru consider themselves the senior people in 
Gudigwa. 
Within these three main categories, various other divisions are sometimes referred to: 
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N/wdtau: (n/wä - `bones', tau - `grind'). A name that some N*ujunu are distinguished as. 
Their name arises from allegations that they don't plan for the future, so when hunting is 
difficult, they are forced to return to site of old kills and eat the bones. 
ýXoakats'u: (; 4xoa - `elephant', ts'u - `shit'). Another name given to some of the people 
otherwise known as N#ujunu, to whom they are considered most closely related. With a name 
like this, few people admit to being -Xoakats'u, and refer to themselves instead as being 
N:?, -ujunu. 
Gwak'eikhwe: (gwa -'Rhodesian teak, Baikiaea plurijuga', k'el -'lots of, khwe " `people'). 
A term used to refer to people from the northern family lands, such as Patrick's, where this 
tree is more common. 
These names tend to be fluid, and are not strictly adhered to. Moreover, as many of them have 
derogatory connotations, some people stress their alternative, more encompassing, identity of 
Bugakhwe. The longstanding residents of Khwai, in contrast, do not distinguish different 
names of origin among themselves. This is probably because all the core residents come from 
one of only two families that have close historical connections (these families are called 
Madzikiza by their relatives in Gudigwa, after the tall mophane stands that grow along the 
northern fringe of the Delta). 
The names of origin of people in Mababe are of a different nature to those in Gudigwa. Rather 
than being primarily derogatory - implying they were given by their neighbours rather than 
being initially terms of self-appelation - names of origin in Mababe are generally associated 
with totems. Many residents of Gudigwa, too, have totems, but there is little correlation 
between totems and names of origin. Although all people in Mababe call themselves Ts'exa, 
there are distinct dialectical variations between people of different totemic groups. Names of 
origin in Mababe include: 
Danisani: Danisani in Mababe, like Kebuelemang (the headman), originate from the 
southeast, near the Boteti River. Many Basarwa who live in those regions continue to call 
themselves Danisani. Their totem is a genet. 
//xok'okhwe: (//xo -'pig', k'o -'eat', khwe -'people'). Their totem is pig. 
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/Gin//akhwe: (/gi - 'aardwolf', khwe -people'). Their totem is aardwolf. 
Yookhwe: (yoo -'bush', khwe -'people'). Their totem is crocodile. 
Paterokhwe: (patero - `open plain', kliwe - 'people'). Their totem is mokey. 





Bugakhwe land taxonomy 
This is a short list of the main categories in Bugakhwe land taxonomy, based on both 
substrate and vegetation type. It only includes land and vegetation types found in the northern 
sandveld of Ngamiland. The general word for `bush' is ts'ao, and any veld can be 
characterised by the dominant vegetation species as a prefix to -ts'ao. For example, 
n/gaots'ao means veld dominated by n/gao (mokwa, Pterocarpus an =old ensis). K'ei means 
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Name Description Main uses Illustration 
//gorok'ei Dominated by Clay soils have 
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soils (gern"). fields. Mogwana 
(Grewia bicolor) 
and different kinds 
of honey are ! "I 
abundant. 
geri Clay veld, As above 





um mopane), and 
motswiri 
(Combretum ... "' ý' ` ; 
imberbe) ý, 
=eu undulating/ Not good for 
uneven sand, 
dominated by 
much, except "w"ý: `ý " ._Y; 
springhares 
JY 
mogonono ` ýý: 
(Terminalia 
sericia). e.. Ä ti 
. Tom 
xoro Open plain, with Good for 
some spaced out visibility, and for 
mature trees hunting tsessebe, 
wildebeest, etc. 
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Name Description Main uses Illustration 
ee Open grass plain Good for visibility 
when tracking and 
hunting, especially 
springhares. Often 
burnt at the end of { 
winter. 
Yýii 0r5 
//xei//veik'ei Sandveld with Good for 
small shrubs, mogkonzphatha, r 
especially (Grewia 
moselesele flavescens), g << 
(Dichrostachys steenbok, and ý..,. ý` 
cinerea). Quite edible birds 
''r bushy. 
. ref ; r'" -" -, dr 
//xom Large, permanent Water, hunting 
river and swamp. and fishing. 
-41 
/gwi Bushy/thickly Good for hiding in 
forested area. when hunting 
Used too for tree illegally, and 
ý'ý 
islands in the finding animals ti. 
swamps. such as buffalo, 
lions, etc. Wide Týý 





To give an indication of welfare handouts in the northern sandveld, this appendix outlines the 
quantities of various forms of welfare that were given to residents of Khwai and Mababe. Unlike 
many other villages in Ngamiland (including Gudigwa) in 1998, Khwai and Mababe were 
receiving almost no CBPP welfare, as so few of their residents were considered to have been 
reliant on livestock. Except for the proportion of people classed as destitute, these figures are 
probably similar to villages throughout Botswana, Basarwa and non-Basarwa alike. What 
distinguishes Basarwa villages in this respect, is the relative importance that these forms of 
welfare play in household subistence strategies. 
1. Rations for infants: 
4- 18 months 5kg tsabana8° 





In February 1998: 
7.5kg tsabana 












750m1 vegetable oil 
32 children were receiving supplementary feed in Mababe. 
49 children were receiving supplementary feed in Khwai. 
80 Tsabana, meaning ̀ for children' is a soya - milk powder mix. 
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2. Tuberculosis outpatients: 5.5kg maizemeal 
10kg tsabana 
18kg beans 
750m1 vegetable oil 
In February 1998: Two men in Mababe received TB rations. 
No-one in Khwai received them. 
3. Destitute rations: maize meal 12.5kg 
sorghum meal 10kg 
flour 2.5kg 
sugar 5kg 






body soap 2bars 
oil 750m1 
baking powder 50g 
milkpowder 250g 
pilchards 215g 
corned beef 190g 
In February 1998: Eight people in Mababe received destitute rations. 
Eleven people in Khwai received destitute rations. 
4. Pensions: These were instituted in 1996, at P100 per month. They were 
increased to P120 in 1998 and P130 in 2000. 
In January 1998: Seven people in Mababe received a pension. 
Eight peopler in Khwai received a pension. 
5. CBPP: 50kg maizemeal 
20kg sorghum meal 
51 vegetable oil 
CBPP rations were instituted in 1996 with the cattle slaughter, and had not been stopped by 
August 1998, even though the restocking exercise was complete. They were supplied in 
single, double or triple portions, depending on the size of the household. Two families in 
Khwai and none in Mababe received CBPP rations (though compare with 117 in Gudigwa). 
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Appendix Four 
Yields of game meat 
Tables Al and A2 overleaf compare the potential yields of legally hunted game meat under 
the Special Game License (SGL) system, and the Community Quota system for Khwai. SGLs 
were allocated to almost all households in Khwai, Gudigwa and Mababe from 1979 (under 
the Unified Hunting Regulations) until 1995, when the introduction of CBNRM prompted 
their replaced with a Community Quota, with. When SGLs were rescinded in the northern 
sandveld in 1995, there were 27 households in Mababe and 32 in Khwai that had been granted 
an annual SGL (figures were unavailable for Gudigwa). 
Using Khwai as an example, the figures show that under the SGL system, each license 
allowed 2420kg of meat to be legally obtained per year. Assuming a population of 360 people 
benefitting from 32 licenses, this allowed a per capita potential annual yield of 215kg 
(including buffaloes, which were removed from SPGs in 1991). Under the Community Quota, 
the vast majority of meat is from elephants, of which Khwai has a particularly generous quota 
(ten), but not all people eat elephant (usually because of church-associated taboos). For a 
population of 360 people, the Community Quota provides a potential annual per capita supply 
of 57kg of meat including elephants, and 7kg excluding elephants - much less than the 
potential 2 15kg that SGLs enabled 8' 
Part of the intention of CBNRM is to enable a cash income from wildlife, so that residents are 
able buy food to substitute a direct dependence on wildlife for subsistence. Apart from the 
size of the shortfall evident from these figures, this assumption ignores two other factors: that 
it is not always easy to buy food in places like Khwai; and that many Basarwa lay a specific 
81 Dressing weights are calculated at fifty percent of total body weight, except for elephants at thirty- 
five percent (taken from Skinner 1990). Up to eighty percent of an animal's body weight is consumed 
on individual hunting (as under SGLs), but if the animals are hunted communally, the organs are 
generally discarded, or eaten by the hunters. 
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claim to eating game meat (see quotes on p. 209). Partly due to these factors, I argue that the 
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Gudigwa's family lands 
The map produced from Gudigwa's land mapping exercise (this version showing the 
approximate boundaries of family lands) is contained in the pocket in the inside back cover. 
323 
75 r00 
2230E 25 50 75 45' 2300 8°00'S 15 30' 
18 00' SU NAMIBIA noghere 
ý.. ý "-. ý.: ý ký- e ' 
edr 3ý 
ti härbk :::;: 
Ga3UdI gwa: 
CAPRIVI - STRI Nyamäiiai gha ý). - 




a' : iVarrlbl'öGhwe hB. Ka 
o0O k3* 
- 
". ; ILitebe istoric 
ýk - 1atrick Mbýbl eo00 Hr\I 
I ýý -. ýwr.. tl 
X. J ox 
,..:: M.. 
---. / %0 g0ga 
Xgaý° Ndeb 
Gwiyao0" .. \ Mueukubli andpIaCenam es " gara ý, ui :'T! dý, :: TS'ýtwan meng cell ý'"'x -a Tyaiku° q'a ý' i -' aD0lsba .'ý Dza J ieRCwa- ýDi hokor : $hanialiomtm :ia Ghwilsha t Ts' ara - :. Mov unizek Khwer1t '; eyzi Co. oga - ., yam gý . "Ca ýb N°CCýpga Tqghur71 fsE aýt e: Slebisso, C3; (rigät' äsiLsha f ý- . Mb '' ýýr w+sauLu (showing family areas) . 
": z:. zs D' . ama itsizi 
Ts ebaghen I __ -=ý<-ew ts,, 
7-I 
anagu 






\N M1go amlee Cw 
0 Nd ci nu Scale: 1: 150,000 
Panel ý ärnaiuk Keu he: 
ýýr 
T49pmgrum v qo Yurugo 
fTsa! ambara 
.: 't . 




tqo BP8 6q i1 
'"? '' NgýweKumtsh3 ryd andl' k" " Makýndäo 
0369 
-- 
® roc DDcwabatsh© Kilometres 
15 sewagak'am 
Koots T ro pos 
Ghd ýamtsha .. 1. 
vatvar . ý. dý 
. I ý. 
4dI ' 
Ndcifsha 
: tsha +fa.; + 
'rc r 15
569 
ss a 66 G Kyinva G! Pux°ga Kwatas mushin9 l aT 
'n Xä`$U 
ant 
ý,. Q JI 
P7ý 
Ntqu Tgee; q' , -- 
rsoxgeiz'am Gtqab meat Ncc fj Karoka 
Ka tsha qU' mtsha ! ('h vv'araki'o 
N 
"_ : erseope ,ý 
'_- Gtqe h BetTs aým 





a SI heu bad 1h se I a, - 
eyend 
.ýiL -id}ery\ 
X9otga dc. ab Xrre,, ý' 
.. Tggedslmtl; < G°ka Czighwaba äa- '\ 's- Track " Exact location ' ir "ýB GPS 
_ 








aý ce (": 10 
X dCWa r, PP 
--ý Ts' 








/ -- - ,'f locations Xa'rto XgosOr 'd ýBucslzee .. s&, amp 
,ýi 
Gubaeco 




Gwe amx'angu ý` Kyenghwa Gx" e L'u ̂h ýrý . 
', I- 
.. ' 
Tseere Xaý4 Xa 
. rzha 
ý 
.. ý g Is a Gh uýýT Nxatso 
Kyz swab l Tshao an hgg 
a an Old viii 
X 
arsutshz Tend 
N9x etsý a/... . -Intomabonal ' bound  
ný lsekughvr 'c rexe 




Oet, "h Nt amtsha 
ý Dev "r q9 ýýam T Pu heri 8 yý ri 9omd erFý 
ýý Nczmn ýf ý' ers sei qg 00 uru°tsha Kharet'om t, ek'unimdP'a yams; X atsamba 330 . ie a .-. GaTk "Cwaöatsc ye K'nalga" 
Gamtqi i : 
Swamp 'ý' Important food 
rants iý huga ý Tuh oxan Xe-bu Caba Gek saba Xga rGenzonýp5' Koyrga Cvraba ý' 
ýjtgi 
ishýý gathering/hunting 





ý9 ' Large pan 
Yi amohwa Xenaakh cwatshaGNderegýný' 
,l 
py "- mama Hotom zUýmNýtzý Xpcbogxan '' Nt , uff Tso eim 
ýý 






ý(y Yalley () 
50 
30 Ga 
ý5omti ýI llara°gtgasha tý týa TshonzarrIa D Tqi khu Tga-zwe ký Ngo 
ý Mba trl6a ' ý, u ;. ' ,ýo idbutsha p .. ý _. "K° i' i Xe x oa 
So 
ýý rgatqeb La oon lediba - Old ath route, ýýý Do ha C'et5ani hu ýotgvý, ilia: ý: 'mý CeilgaraT maýýg()P .ýýý ýý g Zd (a, rh.. PP 133 ý ý :. O wad Gtq xau rý ee ,B 
Tshaobe to 
Doýeký Ncai i Yik'o ýkhddl ýý t- - KyzozaraTsuromam . an , Gxamrsýý' r. , ta% a aý o {lC:, 
r±-'ýyý'ný _ 
OIShOkOfa 
Kyzmiq, +ý ua hwe kdro: _ ý- ,, Gh ghaga rakýý vgj ý" Thuskei Dzirimgxcm ; eRs Siez ; inahýrr ýýý Co ka 
ý ri f 
Cam! o'uro 
IJg ýn aý, oý : 
ßB 
ýý ýd., " ý 








; 3, ga 
Gar 
.. " ' ýýcr 
Note. Although locations are marked with a single dot the names d Ntq m'' 
,ýý generally refer to an area (encompassing several waterholes and KhwPtsad kp K ar ae 
wpx "Xw ne r Xekughwky zamtia 
naheniýa ; 
' ni Tq 'omdye u, oanzcozk' am ý` ý 
.... ý .,. A984 
Xoa ýze0n( Is'cm , ýys . 
G11 
; 
ý. ý\ Mi We Bo, d'abä a dzo K eu ha e9a arumzzp! w qutsha 01g ýu ze 
r, eJ' 
yzý u(sha ý/" .Fe:,. 
ý Tq'cd nesa - 
some suROUndin sandveld rather than a specific location 
U okaC 
rJtqubi9a Mal' öro a;, rk :ý &diml ý\ ePP, z K. wekwah3-ilsha NC 
ýxK ant ýW ixaramtee 4ýk 
ýpq r'`. ''+ sPB 28 "'ý_ 9ýr 
ýr 
ý' lyl elshai K'ororo +! ""^iýý Ghungh ý, 'zbaýxan r'yas ý ýý 
M Kh, vabughien 
1 
r 
humry3o T a' ýI .ý 'Pý 
ý, 
.- +w 
ýK'äukteý shaTq xý ý, rdo'^r a '` iý1 'ý'ý Z, evs tebý Kun'ny'i Iý Sarntrd = -'ý I yn0ýe: "-ý, 1ý 
I TqoI5! ý 
ý 
Tro Tqu doiornga 
-k"ý Ko au :' ýý ''. 
'ýý ;, -`ýi ýýa andsl or. 
Rapula 
"' bý. 'ýukýlýu_ 
3P, 2 
ý/ 









tlBfl " 'ý &t. ' a_ `- B5ý- 
,/e /etso ýiC4haP a" 9Br ýo '"I, 
+ 
ý""a 
ýS'BNrh 0111 r. 
45' 









.d Pr tl i1lVe ý BP8 285 
r 
'ý ýý- 
ýý. 'e sha II 
aT uk ' h' Two-Boy I t ti Keý,,, 
ýI© 
Grid: 
Ounlte aý\ ^' ý 
U. T. M. Zone 35 
o .ýrI 
Projectlom TrerrsverseMemator 
rr Spheroid: Clarke 1880 (Modified) 
s''on 




r BPS see iI Meridian of measurement 27 
ých 
ekat , 
deg. E of Greenwich 
:"1i /7 
ss2 I Latiude of orgin: Equator 
False co-ondinales of orgh: 500,000mE 10,000'000mN 
ý KABAMIýrtU ý1 BPS 262 ýI_ 
s 
I, j___-' 
Based on LINYANTI, Sheet number 2, pubtlshed by Department or Surveys and 








;: rr l These IocaUons were mapped by Michael Taylor and Orakilvýe i Tsima, together with members of Gudigwa Village Development 
r `" Committee, in Jul 1998. Financial assistance was provided b 7900 YY 
A 281 
Conservation Intemational and Okavango People's Wildlife 
tgoo'"230 
E'' 




S tgoo'E Graphics Group, University of Edinburgh. 2°'' 
ýr 
